Nuclear Power - Control, Reliability and Human Factors by Tsvetkov, Pavel
NUCLEAR POWER – 
CONTROL, RELIABILITY  
AND HUMAN FACTORS 
 
Edited by Pavel V. Tsvetkov 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nuclear Power – Control, Reliability and Human Factors 
Edited by Pavel V. Tsvetkov 
 
 
Published by InTech 
Janeza Trdine 9, 51000 Rijeka, Croatia 
 
Copyright © 2011 InTech 
All chapters are Open Access articles distributed under the Creative Commons  
Non Commercial Share Alike Attribution 3.0 license, which permits to copy,  
distribute, transmit, and adapt the work in any medium, so long as the original  
work is properly cited. After this work has been published by InTech, authors  
have the right to republish it, in whole or part, in any publication of which they  
are the author, and to make other personal use of the work. Any republication, 
referencing or personal use of the work must explicitly identify the original source. 
 
Statements and opinions expressed in the chapters are these of the individual contributors 
and not necessarily those of the editors or publisher. No responsibility is accepted  
for the accuracy of information contained in the published articles. The publisher  
assumes no responsibility for any damage or injury to persons or property arising out  
of the use of any materials, instructions, methods or ideas contained in the book. 
  
Publishing Process Manager Petra Zobic 
Technical Editor Teodora Smiljanic 
Cover Designer Jan Hyrat 
Image Copyright Ensuper, 2010. Used under license from Shutterstock.com 
 
First published September, 2011 
Printed in Croatia 
 
A free online edition of this book is available at www.intechopen.com 
Additional hard copies can be obtained from orders@intechweb.org  
 
 
 
Nuclear Power – Control, Reliability and Human Factors, Edited by Pavel V. Tsvetkov  
    p. cm.  
ISBN 978-953-307-599-0  
  
free online editions of InTech 
Books and Journals can be found at
www.intechopen.com
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Contents 
 
Preface IX 
Part 1 Instrumentation and Control 1 
Chapter 1 Sensor Devices with High Metrological Reliability 3 
Kseniia Sapozhnikova and Roald Taymanov 
Chapter 2 Multi-Version FPGA-Based Nuclear  
Power Plant I&C Systems: Evolution of Safety Ensuring 27 
Vyacheslav Kharchenko, Olexandr Siora and Volodymyr Sklyar 
Chapter 3 Nuclear Power Plant Instrumentation and Control 49 
H.M. Hashemian 
Chapter 4 Design Considerations for the Implementation of  
a Mobile IP Telephony System in a Nuclear Power Plant 67 
J. García-Hernández, J. C. Velázquez- Hernández, 
C. F. García-Hernández and M. A. Vallejo-Alarcón 
Chapter 5 Smart Synergistic Security  
Sensory Network for Harsh Environments: Net4S 85 
Igor Peshko 
Chapter 6 An Approach to Autonomous  
Control for Space Nuclear Power Systems 101 
Richard Wood and Belle Upadhyaya 
Chapter 7 Radiation-Hard and Intelligent  
Optical Fiber Sensors for Nuclear Power Plants 119 
Grigory Y. Buymistriuc 
Chapter 8 Monitoring Radioactivity  
in the Environment Under  
Routine and Emergency Conditions 145 
De Cort Marc 
VI Contents 
 
Chapter 9 Origin and Detection  
of Actinides: Where Do We Stand  
with the Accelerator Mass Spectrometry Technique? 167 
Mario De Cesare 
Part 2 Reliability and Failure Mechanisms 187 
Chapter 10 Evaluation of Dynamic J-R Curve for Leak Before  
Break Design of Nuclear Reactor Coolant Piping System 189 
Kuk-cheol Kim, Hee-kyung Kwon, Jae-seok Park and Un-hak Seong 
Chapter 11 Feed Water Line  
Cracking in Pressurized Water Reactor Plants 207 
Somnath Chattopadhyay 
Chapter 12 Degradation Due to Neutron  
Embrittlement of Nuclear Vessel Steels:  
A Critical Review about the Current Experimental  
and Analytical Techniques to Characterise the Material,  
with Particular Emphasis on Alternative Methodologies 215 
Diego Ferreño, Iñaki Gorrochategui and Federico Gutiérrez-Solana 
Chapter 13 Corrosion Monitoring  
of the Steam Generators of V-th and  
VI-th Energy Blocks of Nuclear Power Plant “Kozloduy” 239 
Nikolai Boshkov, Georgi Raichevski, Katja Minkova and Penjo Penev 
Chapter 14 Collapse Behavior  
of Moderately Thick Tubes Pressurized from Outside 257 
Leone Corradi, Antonio Cammi and Lelio Luzzi 
Chapter 15 Resistance of 10GN2MFA-A Low Alloy Steel to  
Stress Corrosion Cracking in High Temperature Water 275 
Karel Matocha, Petr Čížek, Ladislav Kander and Petr Pustějovský 
Part 3 Component Aging 287 
Chapter 16 Aging Evaluation for the Extension of  
Qualified Life of Nuclear Power Plant Equipment 289 
Pedro Luiz da Cruz Saldanha and Paulo Fernando F. Frutuoso e Melo 
Chapter 17 Non-Destructive Testing for  
Ageing Management of Nuclear Power Components 311 
Gerd Dobmann 
Part 4 Plant Operation and Human Factors 339 
Chapter 18 Human Aspects of NPP Operator Teamwork 341 
Márta Juhász and Juliánna Katalin Soós 
Contents      VII 
 
Chapter 19 The Human Factors Approaches  
to Reduce Human Errors in Nuclear Power Plants 377 
Yong-Hee Lee, Jaekyu Park and Tong-Il Jang 
Chapter 20 Virtual Control Desks for Nuclear Power Plants 393 
Maurício Alves C. Aghina, Antônio Carlos A. Mól,  
Carlos Alexandre F. Jorge, André C. do Espírito Santo,  
Diogo V. Nomiya, Gerson G. Cunha, Luiz Landau,  
Victor Gonçalves G. Freitas and Celso Marcelo F. Lapa 
Chapter 21 Risk Assessment in Accident Prevention  
Considering Uncertainty and Human Factor Influence 407 
Katarína Zánická Hollá 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Preface 
 
Energy demands due to economic growth and increasing population must be satisfied 
in a sustainable manner assuring inherent safety, efficiency and no or minimized 
environmental impact. Nuclear power is one of the contemporary clean energy 
technologies. It can be made available on a large scale to meet energy needs of the 
rapidly growing world. 
Today’s nuclear reactors are safe and highly efficient energy systems that offer 
electricity and a multitude of co-generation energy products ranging from potable 
water to heat for industrial applications. At the same time, catastrophic earthquake 
and tsunami events in Japan resulted in the nuclear accident that forced us to rethink 
our approach to nuclear safety, design requirements and facilitated growing interests 
in advanced nuclear energy systems, next generation nuclear reactors, which are 
inherently capable to withstand natural disasters and avoid catastrophic consequences 
without any environmental impact. Advances in reactor designs, materials and 
human-machine interfaces assure safety and reliability of emerging reactor 
technologies eliminating possibilities for high-consequence human errors as those 
occurred in the past. New instrumentation and control technologies founded on digital 
systems, novel sensors and measurement approaches facilitate safety, reliability and 
economic competitiveness of nuclear power options. Autonomous operation scenarios 
are becoming increasingly popular to consider for small modular systems designed for 
remote regions with limited industrial infrastructure, regions with no such an 
infrastructure but with human population whose safety, prosperity and growth 
depend on reliable energy supply. 
This book is one in a series of books on nuclear power published by InTech. It consists 
of four major sections housing twenty-one chapters on topics from the key subject 
areas pertinent to instrumentation and control, operation reliability, system aging and 
human-machine interfaces: 
• Instrumentation and Control 
1. Sensor Devices with high Metrological Reliability 
2. Multi-Version FPGA-Based Nuclear Power Plant IC 
3. Digital IC Implementation 
X Preface 
 
4. Design-for-Mobile-IP-Telephony-Nuclear-Plant 
5. Smart Synergistic Security Sensory Network 
6. Autonomous Control for Space 
7. Radiation-Hard and Intelligent Optical Fiber Sensors 
8. Monitoring Radioactivity 
9. Origin and Detection of Actinides 
• Reliability and Failure Mechanisms 
10. Dynamic J-R Curve for Leak Analysis 
11. Feedwater Line Cracking in PWR 
12. Neutron Embrittlement 
13. SG Corrosion Monitoring 
14. Collapse Behavior of Moderately Thick Tubes 
15. 10GN2MFA-A Low Alloy Steel Resistance 
• Component Aging 
16. Aging Evaluation 
17. Non-Destructive Testing for Ageing 
• Plant Operation and Human Factors 
18. Human Aspects of NPP Operator Team 
19. Human Factors Approaches 
20. Virtual Control Desks for Nuclear Power Plants 
21. Risk assessment in Accident Prevention 
Our book opens with the section on instrumentation and control aspects of nuclear 
power. Later sections and included chapters address selected issues in reliability and 
failure mechanisms, component aging, plant operation and human factors. The book 
shows both advantages and challenges emphasizing the need for further development 
and innovation. 
With all diversity of topics in 21 chapters, the nuclear power control, reliability and 
human factors is the common thread that is easily identifiable in all chapters of our 
book. The “system-thinking” approach allows synthesizing the entire body of 
provided information into a consistent integrated picture of the real-life complex 
engineering system – nuclear power system – where everything is working together. 
The goal of this book and the entire book series on nuclear power is to bring nuclear 
power to our readers as one of the promising energy sources that has a unique 
potential to meet energy demands with minimized environmental impact, near-zero 
carbon footprint, and competitive economics via robust potential applications. 
Preface      XI 
 
The book targets everyone as its potential readership groups - students, researchers 
and practitioners - who are interested to learn about nuclear power. The idea is to 
facilitate intellectual cross-fertilization between field experts and non-field experts 
taking advantage of methods and tools developed by both groups. The book will 
hopefully inspire future research and development efforts, innovation by stimulating 
ideas. 
We hope our readers will enjoy the book and will find it both interesting and useful. 
 
Pavel V. Tsvetkov 
Department of Nuclear Engineering 
Texas A&M University 
United States of America 
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Sensor Devices with  
High Metrological Reliability 
Kseniia Sapozhnikova and Roald Taymanov 
D.I.Mendeleyev Institute for Metrology, 
Russia 
1. Introduction  
At present, a great number of embedded sensor devices provide monitoring of operating 
conditions and state of equipment, including nuclear reactors of power plants. The 
metrological reliability of measuring instruments built in equipment determines the validity 
of measurement information. The quality of production, operating costs, and the probability 
of accidents depend on the validity of measurement information coming to control systems. 
The validity is particularly important in such fields as nuclear power engineering, 
cosmonautics, aviation, etc. For some products in definite periods of their operation, even a 
short-term loss of confidence in measurement accuracy is unacceptable. 
The key problems of the measurement information validity are related to the sensor 
metrological reliability, since their components age and their parameters drift with time. 
Sudden failures can also happen. All this can result in control errors. The sensor devices 
used to monitor the condition of technological equipment and the parameters of a 
technological process, are, as a rule, subject to a variety of influencing quantities. Possible 
consequences of these influences are, for example, depositions, magnetization, and so on. In 
some cases, the effect of the influence quantity can be weakened by a careful design of the 
sensor. For example, the rate of fouling of a sensor surface can be reduced by polishing the 
surface. However, it is not always possible to develop a sensor device immune to 
influencing factors over a long period of operation. Sometimes, economic reasons may play 
a role as well. 
At present, the traceability of measurements is provided by periodic calibrations or 
verifications (hereinafter both of these procedures will be referred to as calibrations). 
Accordingly, within the period of operation the probability of a metrological failure 
depends on the length of the calibration interval (CI). The state of a secondary transducer 
can be verified by supplying electrical signals of reference values to its inputs. As 
demonstrated in (Fridman, 1991), between 40% and 100% of all measuring instrument 
failures are due to metrological failures. Improvements in production quality result in 
decrease of the number of failures, the share of metrological failures being increased because 
with the technology improvement the share of sudden failures decreases. It is not expedient 
to apply fundamental assumptions of the classical reliability theory (e.g., mutual 
independence of failure rates and stability of a failure rate) to measuring instruments. Usage 
of methods based on these assumptions leads to crude errors in the CI determination. 
To decrease the risk of getting unreliable information, usually the CI is no more than 2-3 
years. However, the cost of a sensor device calibration is typically 35–300 euro, and the 
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number of sensor devices is growing year by year. If a CI duration is constant, the 
proportion of operating costs spent on calibration will rise to an unacceptable level. In many 
cases, it is necessary to disrupt a technological process in order to carry out sensor device 
calibration. Such interference leads to additional costs. 
The standard (ISO/IEC, 1999) states that it is ‘‘the responsibility of the end-user 
organization to determine the appropriate calibration interval under the requirements of its 
own quality system”. The guidelines (OIML, 2007) state that ‘‘the initial decision in 
determining the CI is based on the following factors: 
 instrument manufacturer’s recommendation; 
 expected extent and severity of use; 
 the influence of the environment; 
 the required uncertainty in measurement; 
 maximum permissible errors (e.g., by legal metrology authorities); 
 adjustment of (or change in) the individual instrument; 
 data about the same or similar devices, etc.” 
Furthermore, it is recommended to adjust the initial CI for the process of operation ‘‘in order 
to optimize the balance of risks and costs”, due to a number of reasons, for example: 
 the instruments may be less reliable than expected; 
 the operating conditions may vary significantly from the manufacturer’s recommended 
ranges, requiring an adjustment to the CI; 
 the level of drift determined by instrument recalibration can demonstrate that longer 
CIs are possible without any increase of risk; 
 it may be sufficient to carry out a limited calibration of certain instruments instead of a 
full calibration, etc. 
However, in some cases, it is impossible to perform calibrations with a short CI, in order to 
obtain the data necessary for adjusting the CI value for the measuring instrument. For many 
modern complex technical processes, the mean value of continuous running grows. At 
present, for some processes the campaign duration has to be no less than 10 years. 
Measuring instrument operation conditions can vary considerably over the course of 
several CIs. In industrial equipment, they can appreciably vary when upgrading the 
technological process, e.g., in case of production modernization. Operation conditions  
for sensor devices in ship nuclear power sets will depend on the intensity of the 
equipment use. For all the reasons given above, the end user does not want or has no 
possibility of affording the testing of each measuring instrument in order to provide 
grounds for optimizing the CI. Calibrations are expensive, but as the experience shows, 
the majority of measuring instruments (according to various estimates which vary from 
60% to 80% for all instruments submitted for calibrating) does not need it. However, 
approximately 12% of measuring instruments have an error exceeding the permissible 
limits within the CI. 
The contradiction is obvious. To reduce the costs associated with the interruption of a 
technological process and the calibration of built-in measuring instruments, it is desirable to 
calibrate as seldom as possible. However, unreliable information received by a control 
system from measuring instruments, can cause failures and large economic losses. To 
prevent this, it is necessary to check the measuring instrument state as often as possible.  
It is impossible to settle this contradiction using trivial methods of calibration.  
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This chapter deals with non-conventional methods of improvement of the measuring 
information validity and possibilities to increase the  sensor device metrological  reliability 
on the basis of these methods.  
2. Way to solve the problem. Self-check in biological and technical sensor 
systems  
Various attempts have been made to decrease the labour costs of instrument calibration: in 
some cases calibration is performed without dismantling the sensor. For example, in 
(Karzhavin et al., 2007) it was proposed to design the thermocouple housing with an 
additional hole and to periodically insert a thin reference thermocouple into this hole. Such 
periodical sensor calibration procedures are an additional load for personnel. They may 
result in bending or damaging of the thermocouples or sensor displacement from the 
required location. All these undesirable outcomes may result in calibration errors. 
In some sensors, a ‘‘live zero” correction is made. For example, in a pressure sensor this can 
be performed by ‘‘switching off” the pressure measured. However, such a procedure does 
not reveal and correct a multiplicative error. 
Both of the above proposals cannot ensure checking the ‘‘metrological health‘‘ of a sensor 
within the CI.  
One possible solution of the problem is suggested by taking into account the qualitative 
difference in the goals which metrologists try to achieve at various stages of the life cycle of 
a measuring instrument. The initial calibration of a sensor on completion of its manufacture 
is aimed at establishing and specifying the parameters corresponding to a ‘‘normal 
condition” of the sensor. At the stage of online operation, the goal is different. It consists in 
revealing a metrological failure, i.e. deviation of the parameters from their initial values 
registered at the initial calibration, and, if possible, in correcting them. This goal can be 
achieved using unconventional methods. 
In order to find possible ways to solve a problem it is necessary to have a criterion. Professor 
Wiener (Wiener, 1948) and the outstanding philosopher and writer Mr. Lem (Lem, 1980) 
demonstrated the value of applying an analogy between technical and biological systems. 
This analogy is very successfully being developed in evolutionary cybernetics (Red’ko, 2007; 
Turchin, 1977), as well as in bionics (biomimetics). As applied to sensors, a biomimetic 
approach enables to realize functions, structural elements and other features which mimic 
similar designs ‘‘discovered” by nature in the past (Bogue, 2009; Stroble et al, 2009).  
In our opinion, the similarity between the biological and technical evolutions forms not only 
a ‘‘reference book” containing successful structural and functional decisions. In the case of 
metrology, it gives a necessary strategic criterion for development of measuring instruments 
and systems with high metrological reliability.  
The time scales of biological evolution and of sensor device development are different. 
However, the tasks solved were similar: with time, the methods providing the survival in 
the nature and the methods providing metrological reliability of sensor devices built in the 
equipment intended to be used under changing environmental conditions, were improved. 
In the early period, prolonging of life was achieved through the use of conservative methods 
of enhancing the “reliability”. For example, protection of a turtle with a shell or protection of 
a sensor device with a sheath, certainly could prolong their life span.  
However, the ambient conditions of measuring instruments as well as those of living 
organisms are characterized by a significant level of unpredictability. Adaptive methods 
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allow to take into account the variability of the environment (Taymanov & Sapozhnikova, 
2010b). The adjustment of the insulating properties of an animal’s pelt with the season 
increases the likelihood of survival under a changing environment, as does the active 
thermoregulation of measuring instruments.  
The appearance and growth of biological intelligence relate to ensuring the survival under 
increasingly rapid environmental changes. Intelligence enables to forecast and take into 
account future changes of dangerous character, including those of an intelligence carrier 
state. ‘‘Evolutionary change is not a continuous thing; rather it occurs in fits and starts, and 
it is not progressive or directional‘‘. On the other hand, evolution ‘‘has indeed shown at 
least one vector: toward increasing complexity‘‘ (McFarland, 1999).  
Developing the idea of the analogy between biological and technical evolution, it is possible 
to consider a direct analogy between the life span of a living organism and the lifetime of a 
measuring instrument, during which the measuring instrument is characterized by 
metrological serviceability and the absence of any maintenance requirement.  
Then the purpose of artificial intelligence in a measuring instrument can be defined as 
ensuring the reliability of measurements for an extended lifetime. To achieve this ultimate 
purpose, it is necessary to analyze ‘‘metrological health”, to forecast future ‘‘behavior”, as 
well to provide a correction of an error and self-recovery of a measuring instrument.  
The idea of applying ‘‘intelligence” for increasing the reliability of measurement 
information formed by measuring instruments, appeared and started developing not long 
time ago. At this stage of technical evolution, it became necessary to extend considerably the 
lifetime of the ‘‘weak points‘‘ of measurement instruments. These ‘‘weak points‘‘  are sensor 
devices. At the same time, it became possible to solve this problem at the expence of the 
increase in the complexity of a sensor device. 
Intelligence in the nature has developed in two ways: the formation of a ‘‘collective mind” 
consisting of many living organisms, and the development of the intelligence (mind) of a 
separate individual. If the risk of extinction of individual living organisms is high, the 
‘‘collective mind” provides a way of preserving the experience gained and supporting the 
life of the species as a whole. Certainly, just such a type of intelligence started forming at the 
early stages of evolution, when the life span of an individual organism was short. A 
representative example is given by the swarming insects, i.e., the bees, which select reliable 
information by ‘‘voting”. The validity of information obtained by scout bees, depends on the 
number of bees obtained this information.  
Formation of the ‘‘collective mind” is the integration of a number of autonomous 
subsystems at a lower level (they can be different, to some extent) and the development of 
an additional control mechanism at a higher level (Red’ko, 2007). A similar approach to 
checking the reliability of information is applied in metrological practice. In nuclear 
power plants, a redundant number of sensors are integrated into a multichannel 
measuring system. In this case, the metrological malfunction of a sensor can be detected 
on the basis of deviation of its signal from the signals of the remaining sensors of the 
system, the readouts of the most part of sensor devices being considered to be reliable 
(Hashemian, 2006).  
However, it is not always possible to form a significantly large ‘‘swarm” of sensors to 
measure the same quantity. Information coming from a group of the sensors comprising a 
‘‘swarm”, can also be distorted by external factors. Signals from a significant part of the 
‘‘swarm” may come with some delay that can lead to erroneous decisions, etc. 
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The results of ‘‘metrological health” checks in a multichannel system of the sensor devices  
measuring different, but correlated values of the same or various  quantities, have an 
additional error component caused by the measurement method. Its value depends on the 
accuracy of the relationship between the values of measurands. It is possible to decrease the 
above error component by making the values of measurand field characteristics closer to each 
other. The same is related to characteristics of the fields of influencing quantities. However, 
this procedure requires a considerable amount of costly time and effort, particularly if it is 
necessary to perform measurements at several points of a given measurement range.  
In comparison with the ‘‘collective mind”, the intelligence of an individual has an advantage 
in searching for effective ways to survive under a changing environment. The ultimate 
check of ‘‘metrological sensor parameters” deviation has been realized by humans and other 
creatures with a developed personality. In addition to the minimum of ‘‘sensors” for the 
quantity to be measured, each sense organ is provided with supplementary sensors. The 
brain has a special mechanism for testing the stability of essential activity characteristics. 
This mechanism, known as an ‘‘error detector”, has been discovered by the famous Russian 
Academician Bekhtereva (Bekhtereva, et al., 2005). A person diagnoses a ‘‘malfunction” of a 
sense organ such as an eye or ear, initially, through an unpleasant sensation caused by 
signals coming from these supplementary sensors. It should be noted that to provide the 
selection of video- or audio- information, these supplementary sensors are not required and 
in this implication they are redundant.  
Similarly to the sense organs of intelligent living creatures, a measuring instrument with 
artificial intelligence distinguishes by the following features: 
 it contains one or more basic sensors, as well as additional elements, e.g.,  additional 
sensors; 
  these sensors and elements enable the generating and processing a measurement signal 
as well as a number of additional signals which carry information about the 
‘‘metrological health” of a measuring instrument. 
Besides the method discussed, a living organism applies auxiliary ways for detecting 
deterioration in the functioning of individual sense organs, namely, analysis of video-, 
audio- and other information, coming through all organs of sense as well as analysis of the 
response of other members of a society. 
In biological evolution, both types of intelligence considered above are developing in 
parallel. Sometimes, they supplement each other, but the intelligence of an individual has 
gained the priority and greatest pace of improvement. By the analogy, in technical set, it is 
the most perspective to apply the sensors with the individual “intelligence”, joint in the 
system with the ‘‘collective mind”. 
3. Metrological self-check 
In a number of publications, the experience has described, which demonstrates the 
methods of sensor device serviceability monitoring on the basis of joint processing of the 
data obtained in multichannel measuring system (e.g., GOST R, 1996; Hashemian, 2005, 
2006). 
Development of sensor devices with a structure that enables, to some extent, to control their 
metrological serviceability within the process of operation has been started in Russia since 
1980s (Druzhinin & Kochugurov, 1988; Sapozhnikova, 1991; Sapozhnikova et al., 1988; 
Tarbeyev et al., 2007). Later on, such activity was also expanded in the UK and USA as well 
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as in  Germany, China and other countries (Barberree, 2003; Hans & Ricken, 2007; Henry & 
Clarke, 1993; Henry et al., 2000; Feng et al., 2007, 2009; Reed, 2003; Werthschutzky & Muller, 
2007; Werthschutzky & Werner, 2009). In general, the above works are of an heuristic 
character. This circumstance impedes estimation of their efficiency. 
Below, the methodology concept is considered, which enables developing the measuring 
instruments with a high metrological reliability provided by metrological serviceability 
checks and additional  measures realized  on the basis of such checks. 
3.1 General terms and their definitions  
The terms and definitions given below were presented at a number of international 
conferences, discussed with specialists of many Russian organizations, and included into the 
national standard of Russia, developed by the authors (GOST R, 2009). The most part of 
these terms was given in (Taymanov & Sapozhnikova, 2009, 2010b). Taking into account the 
above and availability of those papers, there are no detailed explanation of the terms and 
their definitions here. 
Sensor: an “element of a measuring system that is directly affected by a phenomenon, body, 
or substance carrying a quantity to be measured” (VIM, 2008).  
Sensor device (“datchik“): a constructively isolated (separate) unit that contains one or a 
number of sensors. (Further in this chapter, the term “sensor device” is applied. The term 
“datchik“ is given here to facilitate understanding of the content of some publications 
referred below.) The sensor device can include secondary measuring transducers and 
material measures. 
Adaptive sensor device: a sensor device the parameters and/or operative algorithms of 
which can change in the process of operation subject to signals from sensors, secondary 
transducers and material measures it contains.  
Metrological serviceability of a sensor device in the process of operation: a state for which 
an error specified for this sensor device under operating conditions lies within some 
specified limits.  
Critical error component: the most “dangerous” error component, i.e., a predominant error 
component or component tending to rise quickly. This component determines mostly a risk 
of getting an unreliable result of measurement. It can be revealed by analysis of the 
experimental investigations results as well as of scientific and technical information.  
Metrological self-check of a sensor device: an automatic procedure of testing the 
metrological serviceability of a sensor device in the process of its operation, which is 
realized using a reference value generated with the help of an additional (redundant) 
embedded element (a sensor, secondary transducer, or material measure) or additional 
parameter of an output signal. The term “reference value” corresponds to the term given in 
(VIM, 2008). The reference values are determined and specified at the stage of a previous 
calibration. (Often, they use the term “self-monitoring” instead of the term “self-check”. At 
the same time, the metrological self-check accompanied by evaluation of error or 
uncertainty is usually called “self-validation”). 
Correction of the sensor device characteristics can be made on the basis of the metrological 
self-check results if an error nature (multiplicative or additive) is known. The results of the 
metrological self-check can be applied as a basis for increasing or reducing the value of a 
calibration interval as well as for making forecasts of a remaining life time. The metrological 
self-check is realized in a continuous or test mode and performed in two forms, i.e., in the 
form of a direct or diagnostic self-check. 
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Test mode of metrological self-checking of a sensor device: connection of a sensor or 
secondary transducer to an additional built-in sensor or built-in material measure, or 
injection of a test signal the relationship between which and a measurand or its variation is 
known with a required accuracy. The test mode assumes an interruption of an applied 
measurement procedure for a time interval within which the procedure of testing is 
performed. 
Metrological direct self-check of a sensor device: a metrological self-check performed by 
evaluating the deviation of a measured value from a reference value generated by an 
additional (redundant) element (by a sensor or material measure) of a higher accuracy. 
Therefore, it provides an automatic check of the total error of a sensor device under 
operating conditions. 
Metrological diagnostic self-check of a sensor device: a metrological self-check performed by 
evaluating the deviation of a diagnostic parameter characterizing the critical error 
component from the reference value of this parameter, established at the stage of a previous 
calibration. The metrological diagnostic self-check is performed without any embedded 
elements of a higher accuracy.  
Data-redundant sensor device: a sensor device enabling to generate a diagnostic parameter 
on the basis of an additional output signal parameter or of a built-in means. In case of 
connecting such a sensor device to a signal processing unit, the latter can provide realization 
of the metrological self-check function. 
Intelligent sensor device: a sensor device with the function of the metrological self-check.  
Reliability of metrological self-check of an intelligent sensor device: a qualitative estimate 
indicating the level of a risk to get the results of metrological self-check of a sensor device, 
which are inconsistent with an actual condition of this sensor device.  
3.2 Metrological self-check methods 
In (Henry & Clarke, 1993), a group of methods which can be applied to detect and identify 
the faults of a sensor or system of sensors and actuators, is given. These methods are based 
on analytical redundancy, a priori knowledge, or measurement aberration detection. 
Analytical redundancy exploits the implicit redundancy in the static and dynamic 
relationships between measurements and actuator inputs using a mathematical model. A 
priori knowledge relate to information “concerning operational conditions and associated 
fault modes, patterns of signal behaviour characteristic of particular faults, or historical fault 
statistics”. Measurement aberration detection permits to reveal faults, taking into account 
how they change the behaviour of the signal (e.g., bias, noise, etc.). A self-validating Coriolis 
flow meter developed on the basis of the above sources of additional information provides 
the self-diagnostics and diagnostics of corresponding actuators, the result of measurements 
being accompanied by a value of uncertainty (Henry et al., 2000).  
In (Feng et al., 2007), sources of information intended for diagnostics of sensor device faults 
are classified in the following way: 
 hardware redundancy (e.g., combination of a thermocouple and resistance 
thermometer); 
 analytical redundancy taking into account a known relationships between  the signals 
of several sensors or the signals of sensors and parameters of a technological process 
model; 
 information redundancy of a sequence of sensor device signals which is revealed with 
the help of mathematical methods. 
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In the publications of the authiors of this chapter (Taymanov & Sapozhnikova, 2009, 2010a, 
2010b), it is emphasized that the metrological self-check can be realized only on the basis of 
the redundancy that can be just of temporal, spatial, and informational type. The 
redundancy of the above types can be used separately as well as in any combination. 
Correspondingly, the methods permitting to organize the metrological self-check are 
subdivided in accordance with the types of redundancy. 
The spatial redundancy is provided by usage of additional sensors, secondary transducers, 
and/or material measures which occupy in a sensor device housing or directly in a 
measurement zone an additional space that is comparable with a minimally required one. 
Since these additional elements complicate the intelligent sensor device structure (as 
compared with its trivial non-intelligent analogue), the spatial redundancy is often named 
as structural. This term is accepted by the authors and will be used bellow. 
The temporal redundancy is provided by additional measurement operations, which should 
be carried out at a frequency or within the range of frequencies exceeding a corresponding 
minimal value required to perform measurements with a specified accuracy. 
The informational redundancy is provided by using an additional dependence of a certain 
parameter of a sensor device signal on a measurand. Since all types of redundancy provide 
additional information, necessary to perform the metrological self-check, hereinafter the 
term “informational redundancy” is replaced by the term “functional redundancy”. 
“External” information which is known for a specific equipment and mode of its operation 
(variation limits for parameters of a sensor device signal, correlation between the signals of 
various sensors and actuators, etc.) should be considered as a kind of the functional 
redundancy too. It should be noted that the accuracy of this “external” information is 
usually low. In a number of cases, it is subjected to interferences due to the remoteness of 
various sensor devices and actuators from each other. Application of these data is laid on 
customers. The competence of the customers in the field of the metrological self-check 
organization gives basis for doubts. The functional redundancy based on the “ external” 
information can help to detect crude faults of sensor devices and to perform the equipment 
trouble-shooting. However, it is not very efficient for evaluating the sensor device 
metrological serviceability. 
The metrological self-check (self-monitoring or self-validation) can be also organized in a 
multichannel measuring system containing a set of sensor devices  on the basis of the types of 
redundancy considered above. However, in (Taymanov & Sapozhnikova, 2010a) it is shown 
that the metrological self-check of autonomous sensor devices is the most efficient means, and 
the self-check provided in a system of sensor devices can be a useful addition to it. 
4. Direct metrological self-check. Essence and specific features  
In organizing the direct metrological self-check, it is necessary to have arguments according 
to which a sensor or material measure, used as a reference measurement standard, is more 
reliable as compared with a sensor, the metrological serviceability of which is checked. As a 
rule, the attempts to realize self-checking in such a form meet some limitations concerning a 
kind of measurand, a speed and range of its variation, and others.  
A typical example of the direct self-check realized in the test mode on the basis of both 
structural and temporal redundancy, is the eddy current sensor device of distance to a 
conducting surface of a target (Druzhinin & Kochugurov, 1988). This sensor device contains 
a drive inductance coil, sensor coil and target simulator made in the form of a switched flat 
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inductance coil. The simulator is fixed between the drive coil and target. The piece fixing the 
distance between the drive coil and simulator serves as a length measure. The simulator coil 
being open (disconnected), the distance to the target is measured using a signal received by 
the coil. In the test mode, the simulator coil is closed, and it becomes a shield for the target. 
The output signal in this situation is assumed to be the diagnostic parameter. It is possible to 
estimate the metrological serviceability of the sensor device on the basis of the deviation of 
the diagnostic parameter determined in the process of sensor device operation from the 
reference value of the diagnostic parameter measured at the stage of a previous calibration.  
In a temperature sensor device, the direct self-check is realized in the continuous mode on 
the basis of redundancy of structural and temporal types (Bernhard et al., 2003). In this 
sensor device, there is an embedded cell (capsule) with a metal, the fixed point of which is 
known with a high accuracy. This fixed point is taken as the reference value. When the 
environment, the temperature of which is measured, is heated or cooled and the metal melts 
or hardens in the capsule, the speed of measured temperature changes significantly 
decreases, forming a “plateau” in a diagram “temperature – time”. When the speed of 
temperature variation does not exceed a certain permissible minimum value that allows to 
register the “plateau”, then it is possible to estimate the metrological serviceability of the 
sensor device on the basis of the deviation of the temperature value measured in the metal 
fixed point from the reference value. It is possible to apply correction of the sensor device 
characteristic on the basis of the evaluated deviation only if the type of the originated error 
(additive or multiplicative) is known. Nevertheless, the application of the direct self-check in 
such cases enables the time interval between calibration procedures to be increased, since 
the metrological reliability of the applied additional material measures can be assumed to be 
greater than that of the sensors contained in the sensor device.  
Direct self-check can be useful for increasing the reliability of measuring the parameters of 
dynamic processes. In particular, if a range of the temperature to be measured is 
significantly wide and there is a need to trace its relatively fast changes, the reliability of 
measurements can be increased by applying a sensor device with structural redundancy. In 
this case in a sensor device body, in addition to a low-inertial sensor (thermocouple), it is 
necessary to place a more inertial platinum resistance thermometer (PRT) being at the same 
time more precise (Barberree, 2003). The latter will act as a reference measurement standard. 
Within the time intervals when the speed of measured temperature variation is so low that it 
does not significantly affect the error of temperature measurements made with PRT, the 
values obtained with the PRT are used as the reference ones. As a result, a sensor device of 
such a type can provide measurements with a time lag close to the thermocouple one, but 
with the accuracy typical for the PRT. 
Sometimes, direct self-check can be realized on the basis of functional redundancy. For 
example, in any PRT both the resistance and parameters of its output noise spectrum 
depend on temperature. The temperature measurements made in terms of noise spectrum 
parameters are more accurate than those made in terms of resistance. That is why a value of 
the temperature measured in terms of a noise spectrum can be taken as a reference value. 
However, measurement of temperature on the basis of the noise spectrum requires for much 
more complicated unit for data processing. 
The direct self-check is analogous to the conventional calibration procedure. The only 
difference consists in performing the procedure with the help of the built-in reference 
measurement standards available in an apparent or implicit (as in the last example)  
form. 
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5. Metrological diagnostic self-check. Essence and specific features  
The self-check of such a type is a qualitatively new procedure in providing the traceability 
of measurements. To select a diagnostic parameter characterizing the critical error 
component, it is necessary to measure two or a number of original parameters, the values of 
which depend on the value of a measurand to be determined by a sensor device. At the 
same time, these original parameters depend on factors causing the growth of the critical 
error component in different ways. Additional procedures of measurements are organized 
on the basis of structural, temporal, or functional redundancy revealed or introduced in a 
device that should be capable to perform the metrological diagnostic self-check (MDSC). 
The MDSC does not assume any usage of reference measurement standards of a higher 
accuracy. The additional sensor or material measure can have the metrological reliability 
that is close to that of the sensor, metrological serviceability of which is under checking. The 
same statement can be related to the accuracy of them. 
When the critical error component of duplicate sensors is drift, which for a group of sensors 
is characterized by a random distribution of the level and sign, the MDSC can be organized 
by arranging these sensors in a sensor device. In this case, it is possible to use a mean value 
of the deviation of output signal values from a mean value of the output signals as a 
diagnostic parameter. The metrological diagnostic check can be performed by estimating the 
difference between the diagnostic parameter values estimated in the process of operation 
and at the stage of a previous calibration.  
However, in addition to the random deviation of the duplicate sensor parameters combined 
in a sensor device, a monodirectional drift of the same parameters, which cannot be 
revealed, may take place. In this case, the efficiency of the MDSC can be increased by 
application of the sensors similar in the accuracy but differing in their design, production 
technology and /or principles of operation. The probability that an error of such sensors 
will change equally, is very small. 
The MDSC based on the structural redundancy in the test mode is realized, for example, in a 
pressure sensor device suggested in (Lukashev et al., 1984). In this sensor device, a 
diaphragm is rigidly connected with a plunger, the displacement of which inside of an 
inductive measuring transducer generates an output signal. At the same time, the plunger 
moves inside an electromagnet coil. Supplying the current of a fixed value to the 
electromagnet coil, it is possible to move the diaphragm simulating a certain increase of 
pressure, i.e., realizing the test mode. Within the time period of the test mode, the variation 
of an error value is assumed to be negligible in comparison with the permissible 
measurement error. If the conversion function “displacement of the diaphragm – pressure” 
is linear, then the self-check of such a type can detect a metrological fault for a case when the 
critical error component is multiplicative. The variation of an output signal as a result of the 
fixed variation of the electromagnet current can be used as the diagnostic parameter.  
The MDSC of the same type can be realized in a data redundant capacitive sensor device 
measuring a distance to a flat conducting body. Usually, the critical error component in 
such a sensor device is caused by fouling of the surface of electrodes. To perform the self-
check in the continuous mode it is possible to use a two-channel sensor device with the 
electrodes shifted relative to one another in a direction perpendicular to their surface 
(Sapozhnikova & Taymanov, 2010a). As the diagnostic parameter, it is possible to use the 
difference of voltage values at the shifted electrodes at a distance measured with the help 
of one of them. 
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The MDSC can be organized also on the basis of structural redundancy by combining the 
sensor under check and additional sensor of different principles of operation in one unit. 
This method of self-check is applied in an ultrasonic vortex gas flow meter (Hans & Ricken, 
2007). A ratio of the value of vortex flow velocity to that of vortex frequency can be used as 
the diagnostic parameter.  
The above examples show that realization of the MDSC on the basis of structural 
redundancy assumes the combination of the sensor under check and additional sensor into 
one unit. The main requirement for them and their packaging is reduced to the following. 
Under the impact of influence quantities generating a critical error component, the variation 
of conversion functions of the additional sensors should significantly differ from the 
corresponding variation of the conversion function of the sensor under check. 
Realization of the MDSC on the basis of temporal redundancy assumes application of more 
wideband or fast-response sensors than it is necessary for a non-intelligent analogue. The 
MDSC of such a type is used in a tachometer sensor device of flow rate. Its critical error 
component is caused by the wear of a bearing. The growth of the critical error component is 
accompanied by increase of vibration, which results in increase of the period and amplitude 
dispersion of the sensor signal. Usually, the variation of the flow rate measured for some 
revolution periods of a rotating element of the flow meter is distinctly less than the 
permissible error of measurement. In this case, the period and amplitude dispersion of the 
sensor signal can be used as the diagnostic parameters. 
If the critical error component of the temperature sensor device is caused by probable 
damages of a contact in a network of the sensor device, then the MDSC can be performed by 
using the temporal redundancy too. To achieve this, speed of a sensor device signal change 
can be used as the diagnostic parameter. In the process of sensor operation it should be 
compared with the maximum possible (limited by the equipment time lag) speed of the 
environmental temperature variation (Taymanov et al., 2010a). 
The MDSC basing on the functional redundancy implies usage of an additional dependence 
of a certain output signal parameter on the measurand. This  additional conversion function 
can be revealed in a sensor, introduced artificially or formed using a modulation of a 
measurand. 
The MDSC based on the functional redundancy can be realized in an eddy current sensor 
device, which determines the distance to a metal non-magnetc target. The critical error 
component often arises due to a variation of the impedance of the inductance coil 
parameters in the process of operation, e.g., wind short-circuits or core parameter variation. 
The critical error component can be evaluated by measuring the active and reactive 
components of the output signal and comparing their relationship with the reference value 
obtained at the stage of a previous calibration.  
The MDSC in a capacitive or eddy current sensor device measuring a distance to the 
conducting target surface, can also be provided on the basis of functional redundancy by a 
modulation of the measurand.  Such an approach is possible when the surface of the target 
cyclically moves with regard to the sensor device, e.g., the target is a surface of a rotating 
shaft. In this case, a step should be cut out on a section of the shaft or a strap has to be fixed 
there. When the shaft rotates, the distance to the target, which should be measured, is 
cyclically changing by a known value, e.g., by the value of a step depth. This can be used to 
estimate metrological serviceability of the sensor device.  
The examples considered give a general picture of the possibility to organize the 
metrological diagnostic check. 
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6. Metrological diagnostic self-check of pressure sensor device  
An analysis has demonstrated that the main sourse of error of the pressure sensor devices 
with elastic sensors is the residual deformation of sensors (Baksheeva et al., 2010). The 
method of metrological diagnostic self-check is illustrated below by an example of a sensor 
device with the Bourdon tube. As it is known, one end of such a tube is rigidly fastened in 
the device construction and the second end is free. Measuring the displacement of the free 
end, the pressure supplied to the tube is determined (Andreeva, 1981; Bera et al., 2009; 
Hashemian, 2005). The main reason of the error of such a sensor is the residual deformation 
of the tube (Baksheeva et al., 2010). When supplying the pressure, two differently directed 
deformation processes arise in the tube. 
The first process is the non-uniform variation of curvature of a tube middle line. The tube 
does not return into its initial position. Longitudinal fibers undergo some increase of their 
length. Residual deformation of such a kind results in displacement of ‘‘zero“ of the 
conversion characteristic and increase of the Bourdon tube sensitivity, which in its turn, 
generates an additive and multiplicative components of error. The second process is the 
non-uniform variation of transverse cross-sections along the tube. The size of a small 
semiaxis of the tube cross-sections is increased and consequently, the form of the cross-
sections approaches to a circle one. The residual deformation of this type results in 
displacement of ‘‘zero“  and decreases the Bourdon tube sensitivity. Thus, both the 
additive and multiplicative components of error have place here too. The degree of 
influence of the above processes on the state of the tube depends on distinguished 
features of a particular tube, as well as on its operating conditions. The multiplicative 
components of error partly compensate each other, and the additive components of error 
are summed up. As a result, the additive component of error should be considered to be 
the critical one.  
 
 
 
   (a)                                                                     (b) 
Fig. 1. Pressure sensor device with the metrological self-check  
(a)Location of the points of the Bourdon tube displacement measurement  
(b)Relationship between the relative variation of the diagnostic parameter (F) and relative 
error P of pressure measurement 
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The suggested method of the metrological diagnostic self-checking of an intelligent pressure 
sensor device on the basis of the Bourdon tube (Baksheeva et al., 2010), is based upon the 
diagnostic parameter (DP) in the form of a ratio of output signal values determined in 
various points of the sensor (Fig. 1a). Performed mathematical modelling has enabled the 
location of additional points of displacement measurement to be optimized.  
A prototype was made, a displacement signals in which were taken from two points of the 
Bourdon tube with the help of mechanical transmissions and two differential transformer 
transducers of displacement. Dependence of relative DP variation on relative error of 
pressure measurement is shown in Fig. 1b. The diagram indicates that the dependence of the 
relative variation of the DP on the relative error of pressure measurements is close to a 
linear one.  
The method considered provides the principal possibility for developing an intelligent 
pressure sensor device with the functions of self-correction  and forecast of its metrological 
state (with gradual accumulation of measurement data). 
7. Metrological diagnostic self-check of temperature sensor device  
Sensors of a resistance sensor device measuring a temperature are usually made on the basis 
of metal wire or thin film. For the temperatures up to 150 oC , they usually apply copper, 
while for the temperatures to 600 oC, platinum is used. If one sums up the known data 
(Berry, 1982; Crovini et al., 1992; Hashemian & Petersen, 1992; Li et al., 2010; Mangum, 1984), 
then within the working temperature range up to Tmax<(0.25-0.3)Tm, where Tmax is its upper 
limit and Tm is the melting point of platinum, which corresponds to Tmax (450-500) oC, the 
main processes affecting the change of the PRT error in its operation can be divided into two 
main groups. 
The first group includes the processes leading to destruction of a thin surface layer of 
conductors and variation of its conductive properties with regard to all sensors of the sensor 
devices. They are the following: surface oxidation, sublimation of surface substances, 
contamination of the surface layer by the diffusion of oxides and mixtures from the ceramic 
fill-up, mechanical damage of the surface, and so on. Under the influence of error sources, 
which refer to the first group, in the course of time the specific resistance of the surface layer 
begins to exceed significantly the specific resistance of a conductor material. This can be 
represented as a certain equivalent decrease of an area of the cross-section of the platinum 
wire, which correspondingly increases its resistance.  
Other processes (which are not connected with the destruction of the surface layer) leading 
to an unexpected change of resistance of some sensors, in particular caused by consequences 
of the technological spoilage, refer to the second group. When the processes of the first 
group dominate, a critical error component is the deviation of the platinum wire resistance, 
which is caused by variation of the properties of the surface layer. 
In (Taymanov et al., 2011) it is proposed to use the structural redundancy for realizing the 
function of metrological diagnostic self-check, i.e., to make an intelligent sensor device on 
the basis of two or a number of sensors differently sensitive to factors influencing on the 
growth of the critical error component. To realize the function of metrological diagnostic 
self-check in the process of operation, the DP β, that depends on the values of signals 
coming from various sensors, is calculated, for example, 1 2R R  .  
At the stage of the original calibration of the intelligent temperature sensor device, which 
corresponds to the start of operation, a nominal value 0  of the DP is determined. A relative 
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deviation   of the DP from the nominal value is rigidly connected with the error. In the 
process of operation the check of the metrological serviceability is performed by 
determining   at a temperature measured and comparing it with a permissible relative 
deviation. 
When the value   exceeds the permissible limit or approaches to such a limit, it is 
necessary to perform an unscheduled calibration of the sensor device even if the specified 
interval has not come to its end. When the specified calibration interval comes to the end 
and   does not exceed a permissible value, then this fact can become an argument for 
significant increasing the corresponding interval and using the sensor device further. 
In the general case (for various designs of the PRT), it is necessary to provide a different 
ratio of the cross-section area to the perimeter of the cross-section of sensors included into 
sensor device. In each sensor the destruction rate (rate of resistance variation) of the 
conductor surface layer, weakly depends on the geometrical parameters of the conductors 
themselves. The depth of the destructed layer is small as compared to linear dimensions of 
the conductor cross-section. Then for the simplest version of the sensor device including two 
sensors  
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where a  is the assumed thickness of the surface layer subjected to the destruction; 1P , 2P  
and 1S , 2S  are the perimeters and areas of the cross-sections of the sensors having different 
sensitivity to factors influencing on the growth of the critical error component, 
correspondingly. 
Provided the relationship between the   value and error T  of the temperature 
measurement is known, then, using a value of   determined experimentally, it is possible 
to introduce a corresponding correction into a measurement result.  
 
 
   (а)                                                                 (b) 
Fig. 2. The characteristic dependencies obtained in the experiment at temperature of 450  оС. 
(a) dependence of the resistance increment of  the sensors on the cycle number;   
(b) dependence of the relative DP  deviation on the relative error of temperature 
measurements. 
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For preliminary evaluation of the efficiency of the considered metrological self-check 
method, there were carried out experimental investigations of the sensor device prototypes. 
This was done in the mode of a forced load, “heating up to 600°С - cooling“, with a cycle 
time of 70 – 80 hours. The prototypes contained two spirals (each having a resistance of 100 
Ohm) which were made of a platinum wire of 50 and 30 μm in diameter. In each cycle the 
resistance of each spiral was measured at temperature of 0 and  450  °С determined with a 
reference thermometer. Then the values of  ,  , T  and resistance deviation (increment) 
R for each spiral were calculated (Fig.2). Fig. 2b indicates that the dependence of   on a 
relative error T of temperature measurements is close to a linear one.  
Thus, the method considered provides the principal possibility to develop an intelligent 
temperature sensor device with the functions of self-correction and forecast of its 
metrological state. 
8. Combined methods of the metrological self-check. The system intended 
for measuring control rod position in a nuclear reactor 
In Russian-built pressurized water reactor (WWER-1000), a control rod (CR) is moved by a 
linear stepping electromagnetic drive. A drive rack is connected with the CR. CR position is 
determined by a special measuring system that consists of a sensor device, a magnetic shunt 
mounted inside the rack cavity, and electronic processing unit. The CR position sensor 
device and some drive components (such as the rack and a transfer unit) are located in the 
coolant. The coolant temperature is up to 325 oC, and its pressure is up to 18 MPa. Also the 
coolant is under a strong radiation flux. 
To improve currently used reactors and to build new ones, it is very important to increase 
sensor device lifetime to about 40-60 years (i.e., to the lifetime of a reactor vessel). In 
addition, it is necessary to improve the sensor device accuracy and metrological reliability, 
as well as provide extended diagnostics. All this measures would make nuclear reactor 
more effective and safe. Under the leadership of the authors, the intelligent system intended 
for measuring control rod position (IS) with the properties said above was designed and 
developed (Taymanov, et al., 2007). The originality of the applied technical decisions is 
confirmed by a number of corresponding patents. 
A developed sensor device of the DPL-KV type is based on eddy current principle. In the 
sensor device, the combination of structural and functional redundancy is applied, which 
provides the possibility to perform metrological self-check and self-correction. The sensor 
device is a data-redundant one and includes 18 inductance coils inside a sealed housing (see 
Fig. 3a).  
To provide the required lifetime and metrological reliability, the sensor coils are made of 
specially designed heat-resistant wire. The wire is based on Ni-Cr alloy covered by 
nonorganic insulation. The Ni-Cr wire was chosen because of its high stability under 
temperature variations and long lifetime (according to estimations based on experimental 
data and calculations, the lifetime of the wire at temperatures about 325 oC is expected to be 
more than 250 years). All the sensor coils are located much lower than the electromagnets of 
the drive. This decreases the effect of noise from the electromagnets. 
The accuracy of CR position measurements was achieved by using multi-component 
magnetic shunt located inside the rack cavity (Fig. 3a). This shunt consists of a set of 
bushings made of magnetic and nonmagnetic steel. The coils and the set of bushings form a 
single-track code chain. The sequence of bushings in this shunt is quasi-random. The total 
 
Nuclear Power – Control, Reliability and Human Factors 
 
18
length of the shunt is slightly more than 2 m. For significantly longer shunts, the deeper rack 
boring is required to give enough space for the bushings. That would increase the risk of 
rack bending and decrease the rack life.  
To increase the metrological reliability of the sensor device, the number of coils is 
redundant. Due to this redundancy, the sensor device keeps working even in case of wrong 
data (i.e., code bit distortion, which could happen if any signal wire breaks or if any coil 
fails). As a result, the sensor device has an ability to keep its measuring accuracy within 
reasonable limits in case of any single failure. That is the sensor device fault-tolerance 
(recoverability). 
The electronic processing unit is located in a cabinet outside the containment. It consists of 
amplifiers, input and output transducers, a digital-analog power supply of the sensor 
device, and a microcontroller for data acquisition and processing (Sapozhnikova et al, 
2005b). All the boards are galvanically isolated from outside devices. The power supply 
frequency was optimized to maximize signal-to-noise ratio. The microcontroller processes 
all available sensor device data. Data processing results from all the processing units 
included in several ISs, are transferred to a higher level controller. Such a design enhances  
the level of reliability and the effectiveness of control and protection system modernization. 
As a result, the IS provides: 
 CR position measurement (accuracy is within 0.3% under all possible conditions); 
 metrological diagnostic self-check of the reliability of CR position measurements  (it is 
not necessary to calibrate the sensor device in the process of operation); 
 maintenance of operating integrity if any signal wire breaks or any coil fails; 
 automatic correction of a sensor device, shunt and processing unit parameters (this 
eliminates the influence of temperature variations, defects of joints, material and 
component aging); filtration of various noises; 
 self-diagnostics of the IS as a whole with failure localization; generation of textual 
recommendations for malfunction elimination;  
 assessment of the condition of main drive components (rack teeth, latches of the 
transfer unit and, partly, electromagnets) according to the step-by-step rack 
reciprocation diagrams (Fig. 3b); drive condition diagnostics (step missing or delay, as 
well as teeth slippage); checking of the CR and rack coupling; 
 sensor device to processing unit connection diagnostics; control connection 
diagnostics; 
 measuring and recording of CR drop time diagram (this allows diagnosing the 
condition of a guide sheath and rack curvature in case of CR emergency shut-down or 
spontaneous drop); determination of the top and bottom oscillation points during the 
CR damping process (this allows the condition of a rack damper to be diagnosed); 
checking whether the CR has fallen down on an arresting device. 
The metrological and technical diagnostics of the sensor device and microcontroller unit 
generally consists in comparison between: 
 the identified code combinations corresponding the CR position and the specified 
reference code combinations; 
 the code combinations related to consequent control rod positions and the specified 
reference code combinations; 
 the number of real steps made by the CR and the number of corresponding 
commands; 
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 current sensor coil parameters and their reference values determined at the original 
calibration.  
 
 
 
 
                   (a)                                                                                               (b) 
Fig. 3. System for measuring control rod position in a nuclear reactor 
(a) simplified scheme of sensor device and rack with shunt 
(b) diagram of drive rack: a step up 
Fig. 3b illustrates the diagnostic capabilities of the IS on the basis of the displacement 
diagrams analysis. The diagram enables: 
 determining the actuation time of the transfere unit latches,  
 checking the correctness of the response to an electromagnet current cyclogram, 
 checking the control rod and rack coupling. 
The ability to obtain such diagrams is determined by both the high displacement sensitivity 
of the sensor device and the fact that the time interval between two consecutive control rod 
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position measurements is very short. In case of the drive fault, the shape of the diagram is 
changing. This makes it possible to find out the origin of the fault or to reveal the incipient 
malfunction (even before appearance of a significant failure). Information about all the CR 
moves, control commands, operation modes, occurred malfunctions or failures as well as 
operator’s actions are logged in a “black box” recorder. At the same time, the IS estimates 
the drive operating time by accumulating the parameters like the number of drops, steps 
made, input control signals, etc. 
The real time CR position is displayed on a front panel. Each IS can be connected to a local 
network. With the help of the network, the ISs can perform cross-system diagnostics. This 
improves the IS fault-tolerance. For instance, the local network gives an opportunity to 
inform operators about the wrong positions of CR, including the case of CR position 
mismatch in the control group as well as of any CR slipping down from the end switch. 
Based on diagnostic information obtained during system operation, an individual 
“registration certificate” is automatically issued for each drive. This certificate contains an 
assessment of the drive condition as well as recommendations for operators how to carry 
out a preventive maintenance. 
Three ISs operated for many years at the power unit of the Kalinin NPP in Russia and 
were highly appraised by specialists. For that time interval, the first modification of the 
processing unit was replaced by a new one. The software parts related to diagnostics were 
improved. During the operation period, sensor signals varied insignificantly, and a 
tendency to stabilize  the parameters was noticed. During the last years, the average 
change of resistance of sensor coils was less than 0.2% per year. Extrapolation of the 
resistance-time function for 60 years shows that the predicted sensor resistance variation 
is less than 3.5%. With the ability to automatically correct each individual sensor 
parameter variations within about 25%, the sensor device lifetime is much longer than it is 
required. 
The use of the ISs improved the service effectiveness. It was more convenient for the stuff 
to work with textual recommendations from IS in case of malfunction. When the 
emergency shutdown of the power unit happened, the IS diagnostic capabilities helped  
to localize the failure even outside the ISs. Monitoring abilities are sufficient to extend the 
equipment lifetime by switching from pre-assigned lifetime to prediction of the state 
during future fuel cycle. As a result, the power plant can utilize equipment capability  
to the very end. In particular, the assessment based on the IS “black box” data at the 
Kalinin NPP gave the basis to increase  significantly a projected lifetime of transfer unit 
and rack.  
The additional study has  shown that the electromagnet temperature can be decreased if a 
special inexpensive auxiliary component is added to the electromagnet.  
Altogether, the developed technical solutions enable the lifetime of the equipment to 
become equal to the lifetime of the reactor vessel.  Some additional information with respect 
to the IS considered has been given in the paper presented at the IAEA meeting 
(Sapoznikova et al., 2005b). The main ideas used in the IS can be applied to the control and 
protection systems of other reactor types. 
9. Registration of self-check results. Status of measurement results 
An estimate of the measurement error obtained in calibrating a given measuring 
instrument, cannot be transferred to the measurement results obtained with the help of 
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this instrument significantly later in the process of operation, since the instrument error 
component changes with time. The metrological self-check results are characterized by 
some error too. 
It is not necessarily the case for the error to be determined quantitatively according to the 
metrological self-check data. For a significant part of applications, the qualitative estimate of 
the measurement reliability, by giving a certain “measurement value status” to the result of 
measurement, is expedient. For the first time, this concept was introduced in (Henry & 
Clarke, 1993). The following gradations of the status are recommended there: secure, clear, 
blurred, dazzled, blind. In the joint paper of Oxford and St.Petersburg scientists 
(Sapozhnikova et al., 2005a) a comprehensive reasoning of the necessity to introduce the 
measurement value status is given and some details of definitions and recommendations are 
proposed. It is noted that the number of status gradations should depend on the number of 
human operator’s actions required in response to information about the measurement value 
status. The number of responses is usually no more than 5. 
The status called “confirmed” indicates that a measurement result has been confirmed by 
additional information about the metrological serviceability of an intelligent sensor device 
or intelligent multichannel measuring system, and a risk to use an unreliable measurement 
result is negligible. This status is desirable in making very important decisions on 
equipment control. The status “confirmed” can be given to a measurement result obtained 
from a sensor device or measuring system when information at their output shows that they 
are in a “healthy“  state. 
The status called “normal” indicates that a risk to use an unreliable measurement result is 
small, which allows, for example, a decision on equipment control to be made in ordinary 
situations. This status can be given to the measurement result obtained within the 
calibration interval from a sensor device or multichannel measuring system, the 
metrological serviceability of which is not automatically checked in the process of 
operation.  
The status called “orienting” indicates that a risk to use an unreliable measurement result 
increases due to a defect in a sensor device or multichannel measuring system, but the result 
of measurement can be applied for an orienting estimate of the equipment condition and 
that of the technological process under control. The “orienting” status is sufficient for 
making a decision in the case, for example, when parameters of the technological process 
are far from the borders allowed. Giving the status “orienting” to the measurement result, 
indicates the need to perform the maintenance of a sensor device or measuring system as 
well as to set the terms of this maintenance. 
The status called “extrapolated” indicates that as a result of measurement they use the 
result obtained by extrapolating the data from the preceding time interval, since received 
information is unreliable during the known time interval that is rather short. The status 
“extrapolated” gives grounds, for example, to delay making a very important decision on 
equipment control before receiving reliable information or to make a certain cautious 
decision, orienting by a hypothesis  that within this known time interval the condition of 
the equipment and flow of the controlled technological process do not  change 
significantly. 
The status called “unreliable” indicates that a risk to use an unreliable measurement  result 
is great. The decision should be made to perform the maintenance of a sensor device or 
measuring system. 
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Status gradations can be joined into three groups which demonstrate the level of risk:  
 status “confirmed” or “normal”; 
 status “orienting” or “ extrapolated“; 
 status “unreliable”. 
Furthermore, the results of the metrological self-check can include: 
 an estimate of the error (taking into account a correction when it was made) or critical 
error component; 
 time when  the corresponding estimate was obtained; 
 an  estimate  of a residual metrological life; 
 history of metrological self-check data. 
10. Conclusion 
The technological expansion has led to the situation, when the conventional methods of 
metrological assurance have ceased to satisfy the high requirements of nuclear power 
engineering, astronautics and a number of other fields of science and industry for the 
metrological reliability of measuring instruments. The measurement information validity 
becomes insufficient.  
The similarity of the evolution of measuring instruments and biological sensor systems has 
created a basis for forecasting a significant complication of sensor devices and growth of the 
need for intelligent sensor devices and intelligent multichannel measuring systems with the 
metrological self-check. 
This chapter deals with the general approach to the development of intelligent sensor 
devices. This approach is illustrated by a number of examples of the measuring instruments 
including those developed under leadership of the authors, namely, the temperature and 
pressure sensor devices as well as the intelligent system intended for measuring the position 
of control rod in a nuclear reactor.   
It is shown that in the process of operation, the sensor devices with the metrological self-
check can provide: 
 practically continuous check of the measurement information reliability; 
 forecast of the metrological state of a sensor device on the basis of the self-check results 
obtained in the previous period of time; 
 automatic correction of the sensor device parameters (in a number of cases). 
A growth of the need for intelligent and data-redundant sensor devices is confirmed not 
only by the examples showing that in various countries such devices and corresponding 
standards and guides (BSI, 2005; GOST R, 1996, 2009; MI 2021, 1989; VDI/VDE, 2005) were 
developed.  
An increasing number of publications devoted to the topic considered,  as well as 
organization of special sessions at international conferences and preparation of new 
standards (in particular, e.g., the Russian draft standard “State system for ensuring the 
uniformity of measurements. Intelligent sensors and intelligent measuring systems. 
Methods of metrological self-checking”), indicate the growth of this need too. 
Under the conditions of economics globalization , the enhancement of requirements for the 
operating safety of various equipment, especially, nuclear reactors, obliges scientists and 
engineers to develop unified international requirements for standardizing the characteristics 
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of self-checked sensor devices and multichannel measuring systems as well as 
corresponding terms and definitions with respect to these instruments.  
To our point of view, the development of intelligent measuring instruments is a natural 
stage of measurement technique evolution. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Problem of decreasing common cause failure probability for nuclear power plant 
instrumentation and control systems  
To guarantee required level of dependability, safety and security of computer-based systems 
for critical (safety-critical, mission-critical and business-critical) applications it is used 
diversity approach. This approach implies development, choice and implementation of a 
few diverse design options of redundant channels for created system. Probability of 
common cause failure (CCF) of safety-critical systems may be essentially decreased due to 
selection and deployment of different diversity types on the assumption of maximal 
independence of redundant channels realizing software-hardware versions.  
This circumstance calls forth that a lot of international and national standards and guides 
contain the requirements to use diversity in safety-critical systems, first of all, in nuclear 
power plant (NPP) instrumentation and control systems (I&Cs) (reactor trip systems), 
aerospace on-board equipment (automatic/robot pilot, flight control systems), railway 
automatics (signalling and blocking systems), service oriented architecture (SOA)-based 
web-systems (e-science) etc. (Pullum, 2001; Wood et al., 2009; Gorbenko et al., 2009; 
Kharchenko et al., 2010; Sommerville, 2011).  
Application of the modern information and electronic technologies and component-based 
approaches to development in critical areas, on the one hand, improve reliability, 
availability, maintainability and safety characteristics of digital I&Cs. On the other hand, 
these technologies cause additional risks or so-called safety deficits. Microprocessor 
(software)-based systems are typical example in that sense. Advantages of this technology 
are well-known, however a program realization may increase CCF probability of complex 
software-based I&Cs. Software faults and design faults as a whole are the most probable 
reason of CCFs. These faults are replicated in redundant channels and cause a fatal failure of 
computer-based systems. It allows to conclude that, “fault-tolerant” system with identical 
channels may be “non-tolerant” or “not enough tolerant” to design faults. For example, 
software design faults caused more than 80% failures of computer-based rocket-space 
systems which were fatal in 1990 years (Kharchenko et al., 2003) and caused 13% 
emergencies of space systems and 22% emergencies of carrier rockets (Tarasyuk et al., 2011).  
The CCF risks may be essential for diversity-oriented or so-called multi-version systems 
(MVSs) (Kharchenko, 1999) as well if choice of version redundancy type and development 
 
Nuclear Power – Control, Reliability and Human Factors 
 
28
of channel versions are fulfilled without thorough analysis of their independence and 
assessment of real diversity degree assessed by special metrics, for example, β-factor 
(Bukowsky&Goble, 1994).  
1.2 Complex electronic components and FPGA technology for NPP I&Cs development  
An analysis of development and introduction trends of computer technologies to NPP I&Cs 
has specified a number of important aspects affecting their safety, peculiarities of 
development, update and licensing. Such trends include, among others (Yastrebenetsky, 
2004): introduction of novel complex electronic components (CECs); expanded 
nomenclature of software applied and increased effect of its quality to I&Cs safety; 
realization of novel principles and technologies in I&Cs development; advent of a large 
number of novel standards regulating the processes of I&Cs development and safety 
assessment. During recent decades the application of microprocessor techniques in NPP 
I&Cs design has substantially expanded. Microprocessors are used both in system computer 
core and in realization of intellectual peripherals – various sensors, drives and other devices 
with built-in programmable controllers.  
Another contemporary trend is dynamically growing application of programmable logic 
technologies, particularly, Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGA) in NPP I&Cs, onboard 
aerospace systems and other critical areas. FPGA as a kind of CECs is a convenient mean not 
only in realization of auxiliary functions of transformation and logical processing of 
information, but also in execution of basic monitoring and control functions inherent in NPP 
I&Cs. This approach in some cases is more reasonable than application of software-
controlled microprocessors (Kharchenko&Sklyar, 2008). In assessment of FPGA-based I&Cs 
it should be taken into consideration that application of this technologies somewhat levels 
the difference between hardware and software, whereas obtained solutions are an example 
of a peculiar realization of so called heterosystems – systems with “fuzzy” software-
hardware architecture and mixed execution of functions. This circumstance and other 
features of FPGA technology increase a number of diversity types and enlarge a set of 
possible diversity-oriented decisions for NPP I&Cs. 
1.3 Work related analysis 
Known works, related to the current problem and taking into account features of NPP I&C 
systems, are divided into three groups: (1) classification and analysis of version redundancy 
types and diversity-oriented decisions; (2) methods and techniques of diversity level 
assessment and evaluation of multi-version systems safety in context of CCFs; (3) multi-
version technologies of safety critical systems development. 
1. A set of diversity classification schemes (general, software and FPGA-based) was 
analyzed in (Kharchenko et al., 2009). First one is based on NUREG technical reports and 
guides, samples two-level hierarchy and includes seven main groups of version 
redundancy (Wood et al., 2009): signal diversity (different sensed reactor or process 
parameters, different physical effects, different set of sensors); equipment manufacture 
diversity (different manufacturers, different versions of design, different CEC versions, 
etc); functional diversity (different underlying mechanisms, logics, actuation means, etc); 
logic processing equipment or architecture diversity (different processing architectures, 
different component integration architectures, different communication architectures, etc); 
logic or software diversity (different algorithms, operating system, computer languages, 
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etc); design diversity (different technologies, approaches, etc); human or life cycle 
diversity (different design organizations/companies, management teams, designers, 
programmers, testers and other personnel). Software diversity types are classified in 
according with following attributes (Pullum, 2001; Volkoviy et al., 2008): life cycle models 
and processes of development (for example, V-model for main version and waterfall 
model with minimum set of processes for duplicate version); resources and means 
(different human resources, languages and notations, tools); project decisions (different 
architectures and platforms, protocols, data formats, etc). Next one FPGA-based 
classification includes the following types of diversity (Kharchenko&Sklyar, 2008; Siora et 
al., 2009): diversity of electronic elements (different electronic elements manufactures, 
technologies of production, electronic elements families, etc); diversity of CASE-tools 
(different developers, kinds and configurations of CASE-tools); diversity of projects 
development languages (different graphical scheme languages, hardware description 
languages and IP-cores); diversity of specifications (specification languages) and others.  
2. There are following methods of diversity level assessment and evaluation of MVS 
dependability and safety (Kharchenko et al, 2009). Theoretical-set and metric-oriented 
methods are based on: Eiler’s diagram for sets of version design, physical and 
interaction faults (including vulnerabilities for assessment intrusion-tolerance); matrix 
of diversity metrics for sets of different faults (individual, group and absolute faults of 
versions); calculation of diversity metrics by use of Eiler’s diagrams or other data about 
results of testing and faults of different versions. Probabilistic methods use reliability 
block-diagrams (RBDs), their modifications (survivability and safety block-diagrams), 
Markovian chains, Bayesian method, etc. Statistical methods include the following 
procedures: receiving and normalization of version fault trends using testing data; 
choice of software reliability growth model (SRGM) taking into account features of 
version development and verification processes and fitting SRGM parameters; metrics 
diversity assessment; calculation of reliability and safety indicators. Fault injection-
based assessment consists of: receiving project-oriented fault profiles; performing of 
faults injection procedure; proceeding of data and metrics diversity calculation; 
calculation of reliability and safety indicators. Expert-oriented methods use two groups 
of metrics: diversity metrics for direct assessment of versions and MVS reliability and 
safety (direct diversity metrics); indirect diversity metrics (product complexity metrics 
and process metrics); values of these metrics may be used to assess direct diversity 
metrics. Expert methods are added other techniques founded on interval mathematics-
based assessment of diversity metrics and MVS indicators, soft computing-based 
assessment (fussy logic, genetic algorithms), risk-oriented approach and so on. 
3. Multi-version technologies (MVTs) of diversity types selection and application, 
development of MVSs as a whole are based on (Siora et al., 2009; Wood et al., 2009) use of 
diversity types and strategies table, a model of multi-version life cycle (MVLC), a special 
graph of diversity types and their modifications, and procedures of diversity type and 
volume choice according with different criteria. The set of diversity strategies developed 
in the (Wood et al., 2009) consists of three families of strategies: different technologies—
Strategy A (digital vs analog), different approaches within the same technology—Strategy 
B (microprocessor vs FPGA) and different architectures within the same technology—
Strategy C (IP-based vs VHDL). Each of the strategy families is characterized by 
combinations of diversity criteria that may provide adequate mitigation of potential CCF 
vulnerabilities according with metrics determined by expert way. 
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There are a lot of examples of multi-version systems and multi-version technologies 
application in different safety critical areas. Generalized results of MVS application analysis 
are presented by matrix “types of diversity – areas of multi-version I&Cs application” in 
Table 1 (Wood et al., 2009; Kharchenko et al., 2010). 
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Table 1. Matrix “types of diversity – areas of multi-version I&Cs application” 
Types of diversity (diversity redundancy) are classified according to NUREG 6303 and 
painted by different colors. Last row of the matrix corresponds to other types of diversity. 
MVSs are used in space systems (Shuttle, ISS), aviation equipment (MC JVC, FAA FCS, 
Airbus and Boeing on-board systems), railway automatics (signaling, centralization and 
blocking systems SCB), chemical industry (CCPS), defense systems, power plants (electricity 
grid), NPPs (RTS and ESFAS), e-commerce and e-science (web-systems with diverse target 
web-services).  
1.4 Goal and structure of the chapter 
In spite of the intensive researches in area of multi-version systems and long-term 
experience of their application there are some problems of diversity approach 
implementation in context of FPGA technology application in NPP I&Cs, videlicet: 
specifying of concepts used; selection of diversity types and required volume of version 
redundancy; joint use of different diversity types taking into consideration state-of-the-art 
technologies; assessment of real diversity degree and effectiveness of MVSs, etc. Goal of the 
chapter is analysis of concepts in multi-version computing and diversity-scalable decisions 
for FPGA-based NPP I&Cs. Structure of the chapter is following. The section 2 elaborates 
the FPGA peculiarities in context of safety critical applications and evolution aspect of 
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FPGA-technology and diversity approach conformably to NPP I&Cs. The standards 
containing requirements to application of diversity approach in NPP I&Cs and key 
challenges in this area are analyzed in the section 3. The taxonomy of multi-version 
computing and models of MVSs and MVTs are represented in the section 4. General 
approach to assessment of diversity and MVS safety is described in the section 5. Features of 
FPGA-based platform RADIYTM and results of implementation of multi-version I&Cs in 
NPPs are analyzed in the section 6. Finally, the section 7 concludes the chapter and presents 
directions of future researches. 
2. An evolution of FPGA technology and diversity application in NPP I&Cs 
2.1 FPGA peculiarities in context of dependability and safety 
FPGA architecture topologically originates from channeled Gates Arrays (GA) (Altera, 
2001). In FPGA internal area a set of configurable logic units is disposed in a regular order 
with routing channels there between and I/O units at the periphery. Transistor couples, 
logic gates NAND, NOR (Simple Logic Cell), multiplexer-based logic modules, logic 
modules based on programmable Look-Up Tables (LUT) are used as configurable logic 
blocks. All those have segmented architecture of internal connections.  
System-On-Chip architecture appeared due to two factors: high level of integration 
permitting to arrange a very complicated circuit on a single crystal, and introduction of 
specialized hardcores into FPGA. Additional hardcores may be: additional Random Access 
Memory (RAM) units; JTAG interface for testing and configurating; Phase-Locked Loop 
(PLL) – frequency control system to correct timing relations of clock pulses as well as for 
generation of additional frequencies; processor cores enabling creation of devices with a 
control processor and a peripheral. 
Analysis of dependability assurance possibilities in FPGA-based systems allows to 
determine the following FPGA peculiarities (Kharchenko&Sklyar, 2008; Bobrek et al., 2009). 
1. Simplification of development and verification processes: apparatus parallelism in 
control algorithms execution and realization of different functions by different FPGA 
elements; absence of cyclical structures in FPGA projects; identity of FPGA project 
presentation to initial data; advanced testbeds and tools; verified libraries and 
Intellectual Properties (IP)- cores in FPGA development tools.  
2. There are three technologies of FPGA-projects development: development of 
graphical scheme with using of library blocks in CAD environment; development of 
software model with using of especial hardware describing languages (VHDL, 
Verilog, Java HDL, etc); development of program code for operation in environment 
of microprocessor emulators which are implemented in FPGA as IP-cores. It does 
allow increasing a number of options of different project versions and multi-version 
I&Cs.  
3. Assurance of fault-tolerance, data validation and maintainability due to use of: 
redundancy for intra- and inter-crystal levels; diversity implementation; 
reconfiguration and recovery in the case of component failures; improved means of 
diagnostic. 
4. Security assurance: FPGA reprogramming is possible only with use of especial 
equipment. Stability and survivability assurance due to: tolerance to external impacts 
(electromagnetic, climatic, radiation); possibilities of implementation of multi-step 
degradation with different types of adaptation.  
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2.2 FPGA technology application in safety-critical systems and NPP I&Cs 
Due to these peculiarities area of FPGA technology application essentially has expanded. 
We can say about a affirmative answer to question “Expansion of FPGA-technology 
application in safety-critical systems for the last decades: evolution or revolution?” It is 
confirmed by (Bakhmach et al., 2009):  
substantial increase of applying the technologies based on programmable logic (FPGA, 
CPLD, ASIC);  
FPGA technology is improved and ensures new possibilities to develop more reliable and 
effective systems; application FPGA technology for development of military (B-1B, F-16, etc) 
and civil aircraft control systems (Boeing 737, 777, AN70, 140), space control systems 
(satellites FedSat, WIRE; the Mars-vehicle Spirit), etc;  
application of FPGAs in NPP I&Cs (Ukraine, Russia, Bulgaria: 1999-start, 2002 – 1000, 2006 – 
6000, 2008-2010 – more than 8000 chips every year). 
Besides, the illustration of FPGA expansion is evolution of the NPP I&Cs produced by RPC 
Radiy during 2000-2008 years (Kharchenko&Sklyar, 2008). 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Application of FPGA technology in the NPP I&Cs produced by RPC Radiy 
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There are three stages of the evolution (Fig.1): from implementation of separate FPGA-based 
functions in I&Cs (signals processing (SP), control algorithms (CA), actuation signals 
formation (AS) and diagnostics (D)), stage 1, and implementation of FPGA-based CA, stage 
2, to preferred implementation of FPGA-based SP-, CA-, AS-, D- and communication 
functions, stage 3. 
Analysis of industrial application experience of FPGAs in NPP I&Cs is described in 
technical report prepared by EPRI (Naser, 2009).  
2.3 A law “negation of negation”: Stages of diversity approach implementation 
evolution in NPP I&Cs  
Interesting are the results of transformation of multi-version I&Cs for the last decades in 
context of hardware-software-FPGA technologies development. There are a few diversity 
implementation evolution stages in safety-critical NPP I&Cs, in particular, reactor trip 
systems. Analysis of these stages allows formulating (or demonstrating truth) a law 
“negation of negation” (Kharchenko et al., 2009) (Fig.2): 
- stage 1 (1970-1980s) – use of hardware (hard logic, HL)-based one-version systems and 
transition from hardware (HW)-based systems with identical subsystems to systems 
with hardware (HL)-based primary subsystem and software (microprocessor, MP)-
based secondary subsystem; it was the first “negation”; 
- stage 2 (1990s) – use of primary and secondary subsystems with software (SW) diversity 
(I&C platforms produced by Siemens, WH and other companies); example of multi-
version systems with software diversity is two-version system consisting of subsystems 
developed using microprocessors Intel and Motorola (languages C and Ada); it 
completed the first cycle of “negation of negation”; 
- stage 3 (2000s, first half) – transition to FPGA-based primary and software-based 
secondary subsystems with equipment, design and software diversity (first generation 
of the I&C platforms produced by RPC Radiy); it was next “negation”; 
- stage 4 (2000s, second half) – application of FPGA-oriented soft processors for primary 
subsystem and FPGA project developed using HDL-oriented language (hard logic) for 
creation of secondary subsystem (next generation of the I&C platform produced by 
RPC Radiy); it completed the second cycle of “negation of negation”; 
- stage 5 (beginning of 2010s) – application of different FPGAs (hard logic) produced by 
different manufacturers (and other types of diversity) for primary and secondary 
subsystems correspondingly; it is next “negation”. 
What will be the next step? Probably, advancement of electronic technologies, in particular, 
nanotechnologies, naturally dependable, safe and secure chips will create new perspectives 
and possibilities for development of diversity-oriented decisions. Actel, Altera and others 
companies inform about creating first chips called nano FPGAs allowing to develop fault-
tolerant projects using large-scale means. 
3. Normative base and key challenges connected with diversity application in 
NPP I&Cs  
3.1 Analysis of diversity related standards 
There are the following standards and guides contained requirements to diversity: 
- IEC 61513: 2001. NPPs - I&Cs important to safety – general requirements for systems; 
- IEC 60880: 2006. NPPs - I&Cs important to safety - SW aspects for computer-based 
systems performing category A functions; 
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- IAEA NS-G-1.3: 2002. I&Cs important to safety in NPPs; 
- IEEE std.7-4.3.2:1993. IEEE standard criteria for digital computers in safety systems of 
NPPs; 
 
 
Fig. 2. Stages of diversity approach implementation evolution in safety-critical NPP I&Cs 
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- NUREG/CR-6303:1993. Method for Performing Diversity and Defense-in-Depth 
Analyses of Reactor Protection Systems; 
- DI&C-ISG-02, Diversity and Defense-in-Depth Issues, Interim Staff Guidance, BTP 7-19, 
Guidance for Evaluation of D&DiD In Digital I&C Systems (USA); 
- NP 306.5.02/3.035: 2000. Requirement on nuclear and radiation safety to I&Cs 
important to safety in NPPs (Ukraine), etc. 
These standards contain general requirements concerning: systems which must/should be 
developed using diversity approach (Reactor Trip Systems); types of diversity used to 
develop NPP I&Cs and to decrease CCF probability; features of diversity implementation, 
determination of types and volume of diversity; assessment (justification) of real level of 
diversity in developed systems; drawbacks and benefits connected with the use of 
diversity. 
The standards are not enough detailed to make all necessary decisions concerning 
diversity. It’s important to develop additional detailed techniques of assessing diversity 
and choosing optimal kinds and volume of diversity according to criterion “safety-
reliability-cost”. 
3.2 Key challenges 
Main conclusions concerning FPGA-based MVS development and implementation 
experience are the following:  
FPGA-based multi-version I&Cs are used in NPPs during 6-8 last years, i.e. these systems 
are new object of analysis and still more unique one;  
FPGA technology gives additional possibilities to develop MVSs and ensure high safety and 
reliability;  
processes of FPGA project development are similar to processes of SW-based  
project development. FPGA project product is similar to HW-based project product (hard 
logic);  
there are not any international standards determined requirements to use of diversity for 
I&Cs development and application taking into account FPGA features. 
Results of comparative analysis of challenges caused by development and application of 
software- and FPGA-based multi-version systems are presented in Table 2. 
4. Main concepts and models of multi-version computing 
4.1 Taxonomy scheme of multi-version computing 
A set of concepts concerning diversity may be united by general term “multi-version 
computing” on the analogy with “dependable computing” (Avižienis et al., 2004). Multi-
version computing is a type of dependable computing organization based on use of 
diversity approach. Taxonomy scheme of multi-version computing developed taking into 
consideration concepts in this area described in international standards includes the 
following elements (Kharchenko et al, 2009) (Fig.3). 
Version is an option of the different realization of identical task (by use software, 
hardware or FPGA-based products and life cycle processes); identical versions of 
structure redundancy-based system are trivial. Version redundancy (VR) is a type of 
product and process redundancy allowing to create different (non-trivial) versions; 
product VR is realized jointly with structure, time and other types of non-version 
redundancy. 
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Challenges Software-based multi-version I&C FPGA-based multi-version I&C 
Detailed 
standards 
There are standards determining 
general requirements to use of 
diversity 
There are no special 
standards 
Experience of 
development and  
operation 
More 20 years 6-8 years 
Trustworthiness 
of diversity 
assessment 
Methods of expert-based, metrical 
assessment, probabilistic methods 
using SRGMs 
Methods of expert-based, 
metrical, probabilistic (RBD), 
deterministic methods 
Development of 
MVSs 
Choice of diversity kinds, generation 
of really diverse software versions 
Number of diversity kinds 
increases 
Verification of 
MVSs 
Verification activities volume are 
significantly increased 
Verification is more simple 
due to simplifying of version 
verification 
Table 3. Key challenges for software-based and FPGA-based MVSs 
 
 
Fig. 3. Taxonomy scheme of multi-version computing 
Diversity or multiversity (MV) is a principle providing use of several non-trivial versions; 
this principle means performance of the same function (realization of products or 
processes) by two and more options and processing of data received in such ways for 
checking, choice or formations of final or intermediate results and decision-making on 
their further use. 
Multi-version system (MVS) is a system in which a few versions-products are used; one-
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technology (MVT) is set of the interconnected rules and design actions in which in 
accordance with МV strategy a few versions-processes leading to development of two or 
more intermediate or end-products are used; thus for development of MVS should be used 
МVТ, for development one-version systems can be used both multi-version and one-version 
technology. 
Multi-version project (MVP) is a project in which the multi-version technology is applied 
(version redundancy of processes is used) leading to creation of one- or multi-version 
system (realization of version redundancy of products). Strategy of diversity (MV) is a 
collection of general criteria and rules defining principles of formation and selection of 
version redundancy types and volume or/and choice of MVTs. Besides, important elements 
of multi-version computing are concepts “multi-version life cycle”, “diversity metric”. More 
detailed interpretation of these concepts will be done below. 
4.2 Diversity type classification schemes 
Different variants of diversity type classifications were described above. The analysis of the 
considered classifications allows approving that: 
- they are presented by classifications of mixed facet-hierarchical or matrix (network) 
types; 
- the NUREG-based classification presented in (Wood et al., 2009) is the most detailed 
and systematic, though the principle of attributes orthogonality is not sustained in full 
in it; for example, subsets of design and software, functional and signal version 
redundancy are crossed and dependent; 
- variety of product (system, hardware and software components) and of process 
(technologies of development, testing and maintenance) version redundancy cause 
complexity of VR selection and MVS development. 
More general diversity type classification scheme is so-called “cube” of diversity described 
by matrix MVR = vrijk in three-dimensional space (Fig. 4). The scheme has coordinates: 
stage of LC (i); level of project decisions (PD, j) and type of VR (project decision).  
Example of two-space matrix presented a cut of “cube” for FPGA-based systems is shown 
on the table 3. This table contains variants of joint application of one or two diversity types 
(items 1.4.2-1.4.4, 2.3.3-2.3.8, 3.3.3-3.3.8, 4.2.4-4.2.15; for example, last combinations 
correspond to 12 = 4 (kinds of EE diversity) х 3 (kinds of CASE-tool diversity) couples).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. Cube” of diversity-oriented decisions 
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Stages of FPGA-
based I&C life 
cycle 
Kinds of version redundancy
1 Diversity of
electronic 
elements (EE) 
2 Diversity of  
CASE-tools  
3 Diversity of
project development 
languages 
4 Diversity of 
scheme 
specification (SS) 
1 Development 
of block-
diagrams 
according with 
signal formation 
algorithms 
 
1.2.1 Different develo-
pers of CASE-tools 
1.2.2 Different CASE-
tools kinds 
1.2.3 Different CASE-
tools configurations
 
1.4.1 Different SSs 
1.4.2-1.4.4 Combi-
nation of couples 
of diverse CASE-
tools and SSs  
2 Development 
of program 
models of signal 
formation 
algorithms in 
CASE-tools 
environment 
 
2.2.1 Different deve-
lopers of CASE-tools 
2.2.2 Different CASE-
tools kinds 
 2.2.3 Different CASE-  
tools configurations 
2.3.1 Joint use of
graphical scheme 
language and HDL  
2.3.2 Different HDLs
2.3.3-2.3.8 Combi-
nation of diverse 
CASE-tools and 
HDLs
 
3 Integration of 
program models 
of signal 
formation 
algorithms in 
CASE-tools 
environment 
 
3.2.1 Different deve-
lopers of CASE-tools 
3.2.2 Different CASE-
tools kinds 
3.2.3 Different CASE-
tools configurations 
3.3.1 Joint use of
graphical schemes 
and HDL  
3.3.2 Different HDLs
3.3.3 – 3.3.8 Combi-
nation of couples of 
diverse CASE-tools 
and HDLs 
 
4 
Implementation 
of integrated 
program model 
in FPGA 
4.1 Different
manufacturers 
of EEs  
4.2 Different 
technologies of 
EEs production
4.3 Different 
families of EEs 
4.4 Different 
EEs of family
4.2.1 Different deve-
lopers of CASE-tools 
4.2.2 Different CASE-
tools kinds 
4.2.3 Different CASE-
tools configurations 
4.2.4-4.2.15 Combina-
tion of diverse CASE-
tools and EEs 
  
Table 2. Matrix of diversity-oriented FPGA-based decisions 
4.3 Models multi-version systems  
One-version W(1) and multi-version W(n) systems are defined by 4 and 6 variables 
(Kharchenko et al., 2010): 
 W(1) = {X, Y, Z. Ф}, (1) 
 W(n) = {X, Y, Z. Ф, V, }, (2) 
where X, Y, Z – sets of input signals, internal conditions (states) and output signals 
correspondingly; Ф = {i, i=1, ..., a} – a set of I&C functions (for examples, actuation 
functions or algorithms of reactor trip system); V = {vj, j=1, ..., n} – a set of versions with 
output signals Z1,…, Zn (or signals Zid , d = 1,…, ni; ni is a number of versions for function i; 
i ~ vj= { vij, j =1,...,ni});  = {s, s=1, ..., в} – mapping Zi Z. 
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If the function i is performed, local mapping is true: s:{zi(vi1),..., zi(
iinv )} (S)iZ . Taking 
into account formulas (1) and (2), multi-version system and one-version system are 
connected by relationship: 
 W(n) = {W(1), V,  }. (3) 
System W(1) may be structure-redundant and contain usual means  for signals processing 
from identical channels (versions). In this case card V=1. For system W(n) is true that: 
j= 1,a : j: ni>1. 
Mapping s is generally described by: a subset of versions vsvj for receiving output signal 
Zi; a vector st

 of version vij initialization time ( st

= {t(vi1),..., (
iinv )}); a mean of transforming s values zi(vi1),..., zi(
iinv ) in output signal 
S
iZ . Hence,  
s:s = { vs, st

, s} and (S)iZ =s [zi(vij), st

], vijvs. 
There are the following means of transforming s: (a) the conjunctive, when SiZ =Vzi(vij); (b) 
the time conjunctive, when SiZ =Vzi(vij)ij , where ij=1, if t=t(vij), and if not ij=0; (c) the 
majority, when SiZ =М[zi(vij)], where М is a majority function k out of l (or k out of n); (d) the 
majority-weighted, when weights of versions (vij) are additionally defined on majorization; 
(e) the functional, when SiZ =f[zi(vij)], where f - some function of transforming output signals 
of every version. 
The model (2) describes system with n versions that, i
i 1
n n
a

  . This model does not take 
into account the possibility of applying several diversity kinds. A set of version redundancy 
kinds R={rd, d=1,..., m} may be decomposed on subsets for versions of products vprd(tj) and 
processes vprc(tj): R=(
j
 Rprdj)  (
j
 Rprcj), where Rprdj and Rprcj – appropriate subsets. 
Thus, different diversity kinds, rR, are accumulated in final versions of a multi-version 
system. It is described by special mapping  : R  V. Mapping  may be presented by 
Boolean matrix dj, d = 1,m; j = 1,n , where dj =1, if diversity kind rp is used in version 
vj, and if not dj = 0. Then multi-version system W(n,m) or multi-diversion system is 
described by formula: 
 W(n,m) = { X, Y, Z, Ф, V, , R,  } = {W(n), R, } = {W(1), V, ,R,  }. (4) 
It is important to describe correspondence between a set of versions V and a set of 
redundant channels С={cq, q=1,...,l}. This correspondence may be defined by mapping 
Q:V C. This mapping is presented by Boolean matrix Q = jg, d = 1,m , g = 1, l , where 
gj = 1, if version vi is realized by channel cj, and if not gj = 0. Then model of multi-version 
(multi-diversion) system is the following: 
 W(n,m,l) = { X, Y, Z, Ф, V, , R, , С, Q }= { W(n,m), С, Q }. (5) 
MVSs with temporal redundancy and р iterations of algorithms are indicated as W(n,m,n,р) 
dividing number of parallel (structural) versions nc, and sequential versions realized by 
using one channel. Set Х may be decomposed for different versions if 
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Х = j
j
X , j1j2 1,n ,  j1j2: j1 j2X X , j1 j2X X =. 
Such MVSs are called multi-version systems with naturally divided input alphabet: 
 WNХ = { {Хj}, Y, Z, Ф, V, , R, , С, Q}. (6) 
If versions process data presented in different notations, such MVSs are called multi-version 
systems with artificially divided input alphabet WAХ. A special function-transformer Пх 
(Пхj) should be specified in addition to alphabet Х : 
 WNХ = {X, {Пхj}, Y, Z, Ф, V, , R, , С, Q}. (7) 
 
 
1
C  , 2C  - the first and the second versions of a monitoring automaton; 
1
U  , 2U  - the first and the second versions of a contril automaton; 
d C , d U , d  - solver for union of two versions results. 
Fig. 5. Architecture variants of two-version I&C systems 
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Besides, I&Cs performing safety-critical functions may be represented by a composition of 
two interconnected subsystems – monitoring (checking) subsystem and control subsystem 
(monitoring and control automata). Monitoring automaton C analyses output signals X 
from monitoring and control object (MCO) and forms its status code ZC. 
Control automaton U forms control signals Z in accordance with signals ZC. Several options 
of MVS architectures are possible for a FPGA-based I&Cs. Those options may be classified 
according with such attributes (see Fig. 5): 
degree of diversity coverage (I&Cs with a full F and partial P diversity); 
diversity depth (I&Cs with a common O and separate S diversity); it should be noted that 
this feature is applicable only to full system diversity. 
4.4 Models of multi-version life cycle and technology  
A model of MVS life cycle (or multi-version LC model) is based on operations of version 
generation G, aggregation and selection U at various stages (Kharchenko et al., 2007). 
Example of the two-version life cycle model is shown on Fig. 6 taking to account some 
FPGA-oriented design features (Vij are different versions obtained on different stage of 
development) (Prokhorova et al., 2008).  
 
 
 
 
Fig. 6. FPGA-system multi-version life cycle 
In general case I&C system LC is a sequence of N stages. At each i-th stage of a multi-version 
I&C system LC Mi of diversity types may be applied. From Mi, i = 1,...,N; diversity types only 
a single j-th type, j = 1,...,Mi, may be selected. Besides, at each i-th stage of LC a single-version 
development technology may be selected. Each j-th diversity type at each i-th LC stage is 
characterized by two indices: diversity metrics (depth) dij and cost of respective diversity type 
application (cost increase as compared to single-version option of each i-th LC stage).  
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Thus, a set of solutions on selection of diversity kind is described by two matrices: diversity 
metrics values D =  dij  and cost values С =  сij . Hence MVS LC may be presented as a 
bipolar N-level graph (Fig.7) called graph of multi-version technologies (Sklyar 
&Kharchenko, 2007). MVT corresponds to non-zero way in this graph.  
Algorithms of MVT (optimal way in the graph) selection according with criteria “diversity 
(safety)-reliability-cost” are described in (Kharchenko&Sklyar, 2008). 
 
 
Fig. 7. Graph of MVTs 
5. Assessment of multi-version FPGA-based systems safety  
5.1 General approach to assessment 
Assessment of diversity level and MVS safety is based on the following basic procedures 
analysis and evaluation: 
- check-list-based analysis of applicable diversity types (CLD); initial data for the CLD 
analysis are I&C design and documentation, a table of diversity types (subtypes) was 
developed in advance; a result of the CLD analysis is a formalized structured 
information about used diversity types and subtypes in analyzed I&C system; 
- metric-based assessment of diversity (MAD); initial data for the MAD procedure are 
results of the CLD analysis and values of metrics and weight coefficients for diversity 
types (subtypes) used in I&C systems; a result of the MAD assessment is a value of 
general diversity metric; 
- Reliability Block Diagram (RBD) and Markovian model (MM)-based assessment taking 
into account results of MAD.  
5.2 Stages of assessment 
The main stages and operations of diversity analysis and MVS assessment depend on the 
type of the evaluated system. The first stage is a Check-list-based analysis of MVS design 
and documentation. This stage contains two operations: 
1. Analysis of I&C specification and requirements to system, definition of system safety 
class; requirements to diversity (necessary for diversity application); 
2. Analysis of I&C design and development process that involves activities: (a) 
identification of MVS types: which of the subsystems are FPGA-based and which are 
software and microprocessor-based; (b) identification of product diversity; for FPGA-
based MVSs: manufacturer of chips; FPGA technology; FPGA families; FPGA chips, 
languages; tools, etc); (c) identification of process diversity kinds. 
1
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Results of analysis are entered in a check-list in accordance with rule Yes (if corresponding 
diversity type is used in a system) / No (in opposite case) and is presented as a n-bit 
Boolean vector. 
The second stage is a metric-based assessment of diversity. This stage contains two 
operations: 
1. Determination of metric values for different types of applied diversity, i.e. performing 
two activities: (a) determination of metric values (local diversity metrics μi for diversity 
type di and local diversity metrics μij for diversity subtype dij); the metric values may be 
predefined; (b) correction of metric values in accordance with development and 
operation experience. 
2. Calculation of general diversity metric μ for a system: (a) determination (correction) of 
weight coefficients ωi (ωij) of metrics (taking into account multi-diversity aspect); sum of 
weight coefficients ωi (ωij) is equal 1; (b) convolution (additive or more complex) of 
metrics and calculating value of general diversity metric μ = Σ ωi Σ ωij μij, i = 1,…, n; j = 
1,…ni. 
Thus, result of this stage is a value of general diversity metric μ, which is some 
approximation of , and can characterize the diversity effect on CCF probability. 
The third stage is a probabilistic RBD- or MM-based (RDM) assessment of MVS reliability 
and safety. Initial data for the RDM procedure are I&C design and documentation, results of 
the CLD and MAD analysis; results of the RDM procedure are values of safety and 
dependability indicators. Detailed description of the RDM procedure is given in 
(Kharchenko et al., 2004).  
6. Implementation of FPGA-based safety-critical NPP I&Cs 
6.1 General description of the FPGA-based RADIYTM platform 
The platform RADIYTM produced by RPC Radiy is an example of a dependable and scalable 
FPGA-based I&C platform ensuring possibility of development of multi-version systems. 
Dependability assurance feature of the I&C platform RADIYTM is multi-diversity 
implementation through the following diversity types: equipment diversity is provided by 
different electronic components, different programmable components (FPGAs and 
microcontrollers) and different schemes of units; software diversity is provided by different 
programming languages and different tools for development and verification; life cycle 
(human) diversity is provided by different teams of developers. 
Scalability of the I&C platform RADIYTM permits to produce different types of safety-
critical systems without essential changing of hardware and software components. The 
I&C platform RADIYTM provides the following types of scalability: scalability of system 
functions types, volume and peculiarities by changing quantity and quality of sensors, 
actuators, input/output signals and control algorithms; scalability of dependability 
(safety integrity) by changing a number of redundant channel, tiers, diagnostic and 
reconfiguration procedures; scalability of diversity by changing types, depth and criteria 
of diversity choice. 
The FPGA-based I&C RADIYTM platform comprises both upper and lower levels 
(Kharchenko&Sklyar, 2008). The upper level has been created on purchased IBM-compatible 
industrial workstations. The software for the upper level RADIYTM platform was developed 
by RPC Radiy and is loaded on the workstations. The functions of the upper level 
workstations are the following: receipt of process and diagnostic information; creation of 
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man-machine interface in the Control Room; display of process information on each of the 
control algorithms relating to control action executed by I&C system components; display of 
diagnostic information on failures of I&C system components; registration, archiving and 
visualization of process and diagnostic information. 
The lower level of the RADIYTM platform consists of standard cabinets including standard 
functional modules blocks). The RADIYTM platform comprises the following standard 
cabinets (Bakmach et al., 2009): 
- Normalizing Converters Cabinets performs inputting and processing of discrete and 
analog signals as well as feeding sensors; 
- Signal Forming Cabinets performs inputting and processing of discrete and analog 
signals, processing of control algorithms, and formation of output control signals; 
- Cross Output Cabinets receives signals from three control channels (signal formation 
cabinets) and forms output signals by “two out of three” mode; 
- Remote Control Cabinets controls 24 actuators on the basis of Control Room signals, 
automatic adjustment signals and interlocks from signal formation cabinets; 
- Signalling Cabinets forms control signals for process annunciation panel at Control 
Room and others. 
The platform includes the following main modules: chassis and backplanes; power supply 
modules; analog input modules; normalizing converter modules, thermocouples; 
normalizing converter modules, resistive temperature detector; discrete input  
modules; discrete information input modules, pulse; potential signals input modules,  
high voltage; protection signal forming modules (logic modules); analog output modules, 
voltage; analog output modules, current; discrete output modules; potential signal  
output modules; solid-state output modules; relay output modules; actuator control 
modules; fiber optic communication modules; system diagnostic modules; fan cooling 
modules etc. 
6.2 Opportunites of the RADIYTM platform  
Application of the RADIYTM platform with the use of FPGA technology provides the 
following opportunities: 
- to implement control and other safety-critical functions in the form of FPGA with 
implemented electronic design, without software; 
- to use software only for diagnostics, archiving, signal processing, data reception and 
transfer between I&C systems components; failures of those functions do not affect 
execution of basic I&C systems control functions, and an operation system is not 
applied at I&C systems lower levels; 
- to process parallel of all control algorithms within one cycle, thus ensuring high 
performance of the system (for instance, a processing cycle of Reactor Trip System is 20 
ms) and proven determined temporal characteristics; 
- to develop the software-hardware platform in such a way that it becomes a universal 
interface to create I&C systems for any type of reactors; 
- to assure high reliability and availability due to the application of industrial 
components as well as using the principles of redundancy, independency, single failure 
criterion, and diversity;  
- to modify the I&C system after commissioning in a quite simple manner, including 
algorithm alterations, without any interference in I&C systems’ hardware structure; 
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- to reduce by more than 10 times the number of contact and terminal connections which 
cause many operational failures of equipment on account of the wide use of integrated 
solutions and fiber optic communication lines, etc. 
6.3 Licensing of the RADIYTM platform 
The RADIYTM platform has been licensed for NPP application in Ukraine and in Bulgaria. 
The main idea for licensing FPGA-based NPP I&C systems lays in consideration of FPGA-
chip as hardware and FPGA electronic design as a special kind of software with specific 
development and verification stages (Siora et al., 2009b). 
Qualification tests of FPGA-based hardware in accordance with International 
Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) standard requirements include: radiation exposure 
withstand qualification; environmental (climatic) qualification; seismic and mechanical 
impacts qualification; electromagnetic compatibility qualification. Results of qualification 
tests confirmed FPGA-based hardware compliance with IEC safety requirements. 
FPGA electronic design has a V-shape life cycle in accordance with requirements of 
standard IEC 62566 “NPP – I&C important to safety – Selection and use of complex 
electronic components for systems performing category A functions”. 
The safety assessments have been conducted by Ukrainian State Scientific Technical Centre 
on Nuclear and Radiation Safety (SSTC NRS), which is the supporting organization of 
Ukrainian Regulatory Authority. Experts of SSTC NRS have considerable experience in the 
area of FPGA-based systems safety assessment, as they have performed reviews of all thirty 
three FPGA-based safety systems supplied to Ukrainian NPP units since 2003. 
6.4 Implementation of the RADIYTM platform-based I&Cs in NPPs 
The RADIYTM platform has been applied to the following NPP I&Cs systems which perform 
reactor control and protection functions:  
Reactor Trip System (RTS); these I&Cs were developed as two-version systems consisting of 
two triple module redundant subsystems; 
Reactor Power Control and Limitation System; Engineering Safety Features Actuation 
System (ESFAS); Control Rods Actuation System; Automatic Regulation, Monitoring, 
Control, and Protection System for Research Reactors; these I&Cs were developed as one-
version systems consisting of triple module redundant subsystems. 
The first commissioning of the RADIYTM platform was done in 2003 for Ukrainian NPP unit 
Zaporozhe-1. In seven years since that time, more than 50 applications of RPC Radiy 
systems have been installed in 17 nuclear power units in Ukraine and Bulgaria. These 
systems are commissioned in pressurized water reactor (PWR) plants known as “VVER” 
reactors developed by design companies of the former Soviet Union. VVER reactors are 
used in Armenia, Bulgaria, China, Czech Republic, Finland, Hungary, India, Iran, Russia, 
Slovakia, and Ukraine. 
The largest project realized by RPC Radiy is the modernization of six ESFASs for Bulgarian 
NPP Kozloduy (three ESFASs for Kozloduy-Unit 5 and three ESFASs for Kozloduy-Unit 6).  
7. Conclusion 
Development and implementation of multi-version FPGA-based systems is new stage of 
evolution in area of improving safety of NPP I&Cs. In this chapter we discussed basic 
concepts of diversity as a key approach to decreasing probability of common cause failure of 
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safety-critical I&Cs and the taxonomic scheme of multi-version computing as a part of 
dependable, safe and secure computing.  
Known version redundancy classification schemes were generalized in three-space matrix 
(“cube of diversity”) taking into account features of FPGA technology. It is unique 
technology allows to simplify NPP I&C development and verification, realize multi-
reconfiguration (dynamical function- and dependability-oriented architecting, multi-
parametrical space-structural adaptation, etc.), to propose decisions with different product-
process version redundancy. 
Key challenges related to diversity-oriented and FPGA-based systems are the following: 
existing standards are not enough detailed to make all necessary decisions concerning 
diversity (all the more FPGA-based decisions); multi-version I&Cs are still unique, failures 
occurred rarely and information about failures is not enough representative and accessible; 
methods of diversity assessment and kind selection, as a rule, are based on expert approach. 
FPGA technology allows developing multi-version systems with different product-process 
version redundancy, diversity scalable multi-tolerant decisions for safety-critical NPP I&Cs. 
Described models of multi-version systems and multi-version technologies (life cycle) may 
support selecting of cost-effective technique and optimal architecture according with 
requirements to diversity, safety, reliability and limitation of applied technologies. These 
theoretical issues were used on development of FPGA-based I&C RADIYTM platform. Main 
peculiarities of the platform are realization of control and other safety-related functions 
without software and ensuring dependability- and diversity-scalable decisions of safety-
critical I&C. Experience of RPC Radiy has proved effectiveness of these decisions. 
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Nuclear Power Plant  
Instrumentation and Control 
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Analysis and Measurement Services Corp. 
United States 
1. Introduction 
Installed throughout a nuclear power plant, instrumentation and control (I&C) is an 
essential element in the normal, abnormal and emergency operation of nuclear power plants 
(International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], n.d.).  Through their equipment, modules, 
sensors, and transmitters, I&C systems measure thousands of variables and processes the 
data to activate pumps, valves, motors, and other electromechanical equipment that control 
the plant. The I&C system senses basic physical parameters, monitors performance, 
integrates information, and makes automatic adjustments to plant operations to keep 
process variables within the plant design limits. By reacting appropriately to failures and 
abnormal events, I&C ensures the plant’s safety and efficient production of power (U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission [U.S. NRC], 2011).  
All of these roles can be reduced to three basic functions (IAEA, 1999). First, as the plant’s 
nervous system, I&C provides plant operators with accurate and relevant information so 
they can make the appropriate actions during normal as well as abnormal operation. 
Second, I&C provides plant operators with the capacity to exercise automatic control over 
the plant and its associated systems so they can take whatever actions are needed to 
maintain efficient and safe operation. Finally, I&C serves the critical function of protecting 
the plant from faults in the system or errors made by the operator as well as abnormal or 
extreme external events that threaten the plant’s operation. More specifically, I&C should 
enable the plant to operate safely for an extended period without operator intervention 
following an accident (IAEA, 1999). 
Nuclear plant I&C systems must be accurate to properly sense and communicate the process 
variables and reasonably fast to provide timely display, adjustment, and protection against 
upsets in both the main plant and its ancillary systems. For example, temperature sensors 
such as resistance temperature detectors (RTDs), which are key elements in the safety 
system instrumentation of nuclear power plants, may be expected to provide 0.1 percent 
accuracy and respond to a step change in temperature in less than 4 seconds. 
Nuclear plant I&C is more complex and varied than the control instrumentation in other 
industrial applications because of the special nature of nuclear power. A nuclear plant’s 
production must remain continuous because of its high capital costs, direct access to and 
control over the nuclear plant’s reactor is impossible, and the potential risks of nuclear energy 
production require greater redundancy and reliability in plants’ control infrastructure (IAEA, 
1999). Although I&C is a relatively small component in a typical plant’s maintenance and 
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capital upgrade budget, its impact on the plant’s safety, reliability, and performance is 
preeminent (Hurst 2007). For example, assuming that a 1000 MWe plant has a daily operating 
revenue of about $2 million per day, a loss in power production level of even 1 percent can 
quickly amount to millions of dollars in lost revenue.  
Some 10,000 sensors and detectors and 5,000 kilometers of I&C cables—representing a total 
mass of 1,000 tons—comprise the I&C system of a typical nuclear plant unit, including up to 
20 neutron detectors, 60 RTDs, as many as 100 thermocouples, and 500 to 2,500 pressure 
transmitters (IAEA, n.d.; Hashemian, forthcoming). Categorized by function, I&C 
components consist of: 
 Sensors that interact with the plant’s physical processes to measure process variables 
such as temperature, pressure and flow as well as control, regulation, and safety 
components that process the sensors’ data. 
 Communication infrastructure—wires and cables, fiber-optic and wireless networks, 
digital data protocols—that move sensor and control data through the I&C system. 
 Human-system interfaces such as displays that enable human plant operators to 
monitor and respond to the continual flow of I&C data. 
 Surveillance and diagnostic systems that monitor sensor signals for abnormalities. 
 Actuators such as valves and motors that physically operate the plant’s control and 
safety components to adjust physical processes so the plant’s performance is optimized 
for efficiency and safety or, if needed, shut down. 
 Actuator status indicators that visually reflect automatic or manual control actions, such 
as the switching on or off of a motor or the opening or closing of a valve (IAEA, n.d.). 
2. Important I&C components 
Nuclear plant instrumentation can generally be classified into the following four categories: 
 Nuclear: instruments that measure nuclear processes or reactor power, such as neutron 
flux density. 
 Process: instruments that measure non-nuclear processes such as reactor pressure, coolant 
or pressurizer level, steam flow, coolant temperature and flow, containment pressure, etc. 
 Radiation monitoring: instruments that measure radiation, for example, in monitoring 
radiation in steam lines, gas effluents, and radiation at the plant site. 
 Special: Instruments encompassing all other applications, such as for measuring 
vibration, hydrogen concentration, water conductivity and boric acid concentration or 
meteorological, seismic, or failed fuel detection applications (IAEA, 1999). 
The variety of I&C components and applications notwithstanding, temperature, pressure, 
level, flow, and neutron flux remain the most important and safety-critical measurements 
for the control and safety protection of nuclear reactors. The heart of each of these 
measurements is the sensor itself--the most important component in an instrument channel 
and the one that usually resides in the harsh environment of the field (Hashemian, 2007). 
Despite the accelerating advances in I&C technology (to be discussed in the next section), 
the basic mechanism of measurement used by these sensors has not changed significantly 
since the earliest nuclear plants. Today, temperature, pressure, level, flow, and neutron flux 
are still primarily measured using conventional sensors such as resistance temperature 
detectors (RTDs), thermocouples, capacitance cells, bellows, force-balance sensors, and 
conventional neutron detectors although some advances have been made in developing new 
neutron detectors for nuclear power plants (Hashemian, 2009a). 
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The control and safety of nuclear power plants depend above all on temperature and 
pressure (including differential pressure to measure level and flow) instrumentation—the 
two most ubiquitous instrument types in a typical nuclear power plant process. In 
pressurized water reactor (PWR) plants, RTDs are the main sensors for primary system 
temperature measurement. RTDs are thermal devices that contain a resistance element 
referred to as the sensing element. Two groups of RTDs are typically used in nuclear power 
plants: direct immersion (or wet-type) and thermowell mounted (or well-type). The 
resistance of the sensing element changes with temperature, and therefore by measuring the 
resistance, one can indirectly determine the temperature. The number of RTDs in a nuclear 
power plant depends on the plant design and its thermal hydraulic requirements. For 
example, PWR plants have up to 60 safety-related RTDs while heavy water reactors such as 
Candu plants have several hundred RTDs. 
Pressure transmitters are the next most common I&C component. A pressure transmitter 
may be viewed as a combination of two systems: a mechanical system and an electronic 
system. The pressure transmitter’s mechanical system contains an elastic sensing element 
(diaphragm, bellows, Bourdon tube, etc.) that flexes in response to pressure applied. The 
movement of this sensing element is detected using a displacement sensor and converted 
into an electrical signal that is proportional to the pressure. Typically, two types of pressure 
transmitters are used in most nuclear power plants for safety-related pressure 
measurements. These are referred to as motion-balance and force-balance, depending on 
how the movement of the sensing element is converted into an electrical signal. 
A nuclear power plant generally contains about 400 to 1200 pressure and differential 
pressure transmitters to measure the process pressure, level, and flow in its primary and 
secondary cooling systems. The specific number of transmitters used in a plant usually 
depends on the type and design of the plant. For example, the number of transmitters used 
in PWRs depends on the number of reactor coolant loops. Figure 1 illustrates a typical 
process instrumentation channel in a nuclear power plant. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Typical Instrumentation Channel in Nuclear Power Plant (R = resistance; V = voltage; 
I = current). 
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3. Evolution of I&C  
The evolution of I&C has been marked by three generational shifts. In the first, analog 
technology was used for instrumentation, and mechanical relay-based equipment was used 
for control of discrete processes. The second generation of I&C was marked by the use of 
discrete or integrated solid-state equipment for both instrumentation and control. The 
emergence of the microprocessor in the late 1970s made possible the replacement of 
mechanical relays by programmable logic controllers (PLCs). PLCs were initially used in 
non-nuclear applications in nuclear plants, but their evolving ability to handle large 
volumes of data, perform mathematical calculations, execute continuous process control, 
and communicate with computers brought them into plants’ nuclear applications. The third 
generation of I&C is digital, to be discussed in the next section.  
One of the key forces driving the evolution of I&C has been the obsolescence of analog 
equipment. A second driver has been technological: new information, electronic, display, 
and digital technologies seem tailor made for the NPP I&C environment, where complexity 
rules, automation is essential, and high initial infrastructure cost can be rationalized (IAEA, 
1999). Though sensor technology itself has not changed significantly, other I&C systems 
have—perhaps more so than any other area of nuclear power plant science, offering 
quantum functionality and performance improvements.  
A third driver has been accidents, like Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, and Fukushima, which 
force I&C system designers to reevaluate operating principles, system robustness and safety 
margins, and accident probability assumptions. For example, both Three Mile Island and 
Fukushima underscored the critical role of I&C signals in enabling operators to understand 
the nature of the accident they are facing. On a general level, Three Mile Island helped 
stimulate new research and development into signal validation, ultimately spawning the 
discipline of on-line monitoring (to be discussed later in this chapter). Specifically, Three 
Mile Island led directly to the adoption of safety parameter display systems. Both Chernobyl 
and Fukushima forced I&C designers to focus more on analyzing the potential occurrence of 
very rare events that would once have been considered non-‘design basis events’ so their 
consequences might be mitigated. 
A fourth driver of changes in I&C has been economic. Enhanced I&C means greater 
knowledge of and control over plant conditions and therefore greater leeway in pushing 
plant operating limits and extending uptime. More in-core instrumentation, redundant and 
diverse instrumentation providing deeper comparative operational databases, and 
enhanced qualification, calibration and maintenance have enabled plants to uprate their 
power profiles without sacrificing safety margins (IAEA, 1999). 
Because the cost of building new plants is so high, regulatory hurdles are so substantial, and 
political resistance to nuclear power so significant, few new plants have been built. Instead, 
existing plants are relicensed for extended lives far beyond their original design 
assumptions. Nuclear power plants that operate for 60 years, for example, live through three 
generations of I&C evolution (the qualified life of most nuclear plant pressure transmitters 
and RTDs is typically about 20 years, although most properly maintained pressure 
transmitters last longer than 20 years) (IAEA, n.d.). In the mid-1980s, the nuclear industry 
began to talk about aging and obsolescence in analog I&C equipment (Hashemian, 2009a). In 
this plant-life extension climate, enhanced, digital I&C became a way to offset the plant’s 
age by giving operators new eyes and ears for staying on top of the continuing aging-
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induced degradation of the plant. New fatigue monitoring and ‘condition limitation’ 
systems have made it possible to minimize disturbances and smooth out transients (IAEA, 
1999). Typically, plants will replace I&C in steps or modularly, swapping out a discrete 
analog control system with a digital one, but retaining the existing field cabling, sensors, 
and actuators (IAEA, 1999). 
I&C system advances as a result of these drivers have produced a significant improvement 
in plant capacity factor, outage time duration, personnel radiation exposure, power uprates, 
and operational efficiency (Hashemian 2009b). However, it remains the case today that the 
bulk of I&C systems used to monitor and control existing NPPs use analog process 
technology developed in the 1950s and 1960s (IAEA, 1999).  
4. Emergence of digital I&C 
Digital I&C evolved from microprocessor-based PLCs and plant process-monitoring 
computers (IAEA, 1999). Because they can be programmed to perform complex tasks, 
microprocessors quickly replaced analog relays and spawned new applications in plant 
monitoring and control systems, including graphical display interfaces so human operators 
could observe and interact with the I&C system (IAEA, 1999). The first protection systems 
using digital technology, known as “core protection calculators,” were implemented on 
combustion engineering designed reactors in the late 1970s (Bickel, 2009). In the 1980s, 
digital technology was integrated into control systems for NPPs’ auxiliary subsystems. 
Digital relays and recorders, smart transmitters, and distributed control systems (DCSs) 
were implemented primarily in non-safety systems such as feedwater control, main turbine 
control, and recirculation control (U.S. NRC, 2011; IAEA, 1999). 
By the 1990s, microprocessors were being used for data logging, control, and display for 
many nonsafety-related functions (U.S. NRC, 2011). In 1996, the first fully digitalized I&C 
system was integrated into Japan’s Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Unit 6 advanced boiling-water 
reactor (ABWR), followed by Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Unit 7 in Japan (U.S. NRC, 2011; 
Hashemian 2009a). In the 2000s, all-digital I&C systems for both safety-related systems and 
safety-critical systems were implemented worldwide (IAEA, 1999). For example, France, the 
United Kingdom, Korea, and Sweden, among other countries, implemented digital I&C 
systems in their nuclear power plants (U.S. NRC, 2011; Hashemian 2009a). Today, about 40% 
of the world’s operating power reactors in almost all of the thirty nations with operating 
NPPs have been upgraded to some level of digital I&C. Ten percent of such installations 
have occurred at new reactors, with the rest involving upgrades at existing reactors (IAEA, 
n.d.). Since 1990, all of the reactors under construction worldwide have some digital I&C 
components in their control and safety systems (IAEA, n.d.). 
Today, control panel instruments such as controllers, display meters, and recorders  
are mostly digital. Most diagnostic and measuring equipment is digital, and increasingly 
common digital transducer transmitters now offer so-called smart features like automatic 
zeroing and calibration (IAEA, 1999). Similarly, digital I&C systems like Westinghouse’s 
Eagle 21, Common Q, and Ovation systems, Areva Nuclear Power’s Teleperm XS,  
the Triconix Company’s TRICON system and Rolls Royce's Spinline are available for 
retrofitting implementation on existing plants’ safety-related applications or in new  
all-digital plants (U.S. NRC, 2011; Hashemian 2009a; IAEA, 2008). The advanced boiling 
water reactor (ABWR) plants built in Japan for more than a decade all use fully integrated 
digital I&C systems for both safety-related and nonsafety-related plant control  
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and protection (Hurst 2007).  Finally, the new reactor designs that have already  
won certification (including the AP1000, System 80+, and ABWR) will make extensive use 
of digital I&C (Oak Ridge National Laboratory [ORNL], 2007). To satisfy the demanding 
operational environments of new designs, ranging from high temperatures to  
high neutron flux (not to mention the post-Fukushima demands for I&C that can  
survive “beyond design basis” conditions), advanced and in many cases digital sensors, 
detectors, transmitters, and data transmission lines will continue to be needed (IAEA, 
n.d.). 
4.1 Benefits of digital  
The attractions of digital I&C are many. First, by minimizing the number of analog circuits 
required to perform an I&C measurement, digital processing reduces the potential 
interference (noise) and drift that result from using multiple analog circuits. This makes 
possible more accurate or precise measurements, which can be further refined through 
digital data processing programs (IAEA, 1999; ORNL, 2007; Lipták, 2006). Second, 
measurement parameters can be much more easily modified with digital systems than with 
analog systems. In contrast to the physical reconfiguration of an analog device, modifying 
digital I&C merely requires loading a different program, which greatly enhances versatility. 
Shifting functionality from hardware to software in this way means quicker installation of 
I&C components (IAEA, 1999; ORNL, 2007; Lipták, 2006). Third, the increasingly 
miniaturized integrated circuits in digital I&C offer substantial processing power relative to 
device size, greatly reducing the space required for I&C equipment. Fewer and smaller 
devices capable of transmitting higher concentrations of data using multiplexing also 
translates into minimized cabling needs. Both the number and quality of I&C links in a plant 
can be increased (IAEA, 1999; ORNL, 2007). Fourth, digital technology’s processing power 
means more complex functional capabilities for I&C, from on-line power density limit 
computation and dead-time and temperature measurement correction to highly specifiable 
and versatile signal filtering (IAEA, 1999). Fifth, by offering greater automation possibilities, 
digital I&C minimizes the need for human intervention, thus minimizing the possibility of 
human error. Sixth, because digital I&C systems can perform automatic self-testing much 
more easily than analog systems, they reduce maintenance costs and improve reliability 
through continuous monitoring capability. Such self-testing functionality greatly aids in 
analyzing system faults (IAEA, 1999). 
4.2 Emerging sensors for digital I&C 
Although the core technology of nuclear plant sensors has remained largely unchanged 
since the inception of the industry, since the 1990s several new sensor technologies have 
been conceived, and some prototyped, that may find adoption in the next-generation 
nuclear power plants. The extreme high temperatures of next-generation reactors are 
probably the most significant driver of and technical challenge facing new sensor 
development today. While the current generation of industrial RTDs can accurately measure 
processes up to about 400ºC, some Gen IV reactors are expected to operate at coolant 
temperatures three or four times higher than light water reactors—that is, up to about 
1,000ºC (Hashemian, forthcoming).  
Emerging sensors fall into three main categories: (1) so-called next-generation sensors, (2) 
fiberoptic sensors; and (3) wireless sensors (Hashemian 2009a; Hashemian 1999).  
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4.3 Next-generation sensors  
Next-generation sensors encompass advanced sensor designs that will only find 
application in the longer term, 20-30 years from the present (Hashemian, forthcoming). 
Solid-state and Silicon Carbide (SiC) neutron flux monitors, magnetic flow meters, 
hydrogen sensors, virtual sensors, Nanotriodes, gamma ray tomographic spectrometers, 
fuel mimic power monitors, and Quantum Cascade Laser infrared sensors that sniff 
emissions and detect overheating, odor, burning, and fumes are among the designs 
currently in the R&D stage at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), Ohio State 
University, Idaho National Laboratory (INL) and other facilities (Hashemian 2008). One 
advanced sensor that is closer to actual implementation in nuclear power plants is the 
Johnson noise thermometer, which consists of an RTD whose open-circuit voltage is 
measured and related to temperature. This essentially drift-free sensor measures absolute 
temperature, and its reading is independent of RTD characteristics (Hashemian 2009a). 
The sensor was developed at ORNL and is ready for commercialization. 
Because flow is an inherently difficult parameter to measure and most industrial flow 
measurement techniques have large uncertainties, flow measurement is another area where 
advanced sensor types may find application in the longer term (Hashemian 1999).  For 
example, one conventional method, measuring differential pressure across venturi flow 
elements, is susceptible to fouling, which causes erroneous flow indication. Ultrasonic flow 
meters address this because they do not depend on venturi elements or other constrictions 
in the pipes. Rather, they measure flow by sending an ultrasonic signal through the fluid 
and measuring the time that it takes for the signal to travel through the fluid from the signal 
source to a downstream signal receiver and back again. Referred to as “transit time,” the 
signal travel time depends on the fluid flow rate (Hashemian 1999). 
Despite the long-term promise of advanced sensor types, in the short term--the next 10-15 
years--advances in sensors and transmitters are expected to center primarily on fiber-optic 
and wireless sensors (Hashemian, forthcoming). 
4.4 Fiber optic sensors  
Fiber optic technologies are emerging as a potential near-term sensor class for future nuclear 
power plants (Hashemian 1999). Fiber-optic sensors offer driftless accuracy and high 
sensitivity, light weight and small size, ease of installation, low power requirements, 
immunity to electromagnetic interference (EMI), potential for multiplexing (several sensors 
can be used with a single transmission cable), large bandwidth, and reliability and 
environmental ruggedness. Moreover, since some fiber-optic sensing modulation techniques 
are digital in nature, fiber-optic sensing can easily be made compatible with digital control 
systems (Hashemian, forthcoming). 
Fiber-optic sensors operate on the principle that environmental effects or displacements can 
be converted into measureable optical signals. Fiber-optic sensors can be divided into two 
broad categories based on the way in which the process measurement is applied to the fiber: 
extrinsic (or hybrid) and intrinsic (or all-fiber). In extrinsic or hybrid sensors, the sensing 
element itself is often similar to those in conventional sensors, but fiber optics are used to 
sense the movement of the sensing element (as with a strain gage) and then convert it into 
an electrical signal.  
In contrast, in intrinsic or all-fiber sensors, the fiber itself senses the environmental effect 
and itself transmits the affected light beam to a device that converts it into a measurement. 
The three most advanced fiber-optic sensor technologies—those most likely to replace the 
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functionality of conventional non-fiber-optic sensors now installed in nuclear power 
plants—are single-point interferometry, distributed fiber Bragg grating, and optical counter 
and encoder techniques.  
Fiber-optic temperature sensors are the most mature fiber-optic sensor types, with some 
commercially available types able to withstand operational temperatures of up to about 
450°C (Hashemian, forthcoming). Longer term, new sensor principles based on the 
transmission modes of fiber optic devices may also emerge (IAEA, 1999). 
4.5 Wireless sensors 
While sensor technologies change slowly, rapid advances have been made in networking 
technology to wirelessly transmit sensor data to a monitoring system (IAEA, 2008). So-called 
wireless sensors usually consist of a conventional sensing device such as a thermocouple, 
resistance temperature detector (RTD), or strain gauge as well as circuitry to convert the sensor 
output into an electrical signal (voltage or current), filter the signal, digitize it, and transmit it 
to a receiver. If fast data acquisition is required, the data is sometimes processed at the sensor, 
and the results are then transmitted. For example, averaging and fast Fourier transform (FFT) 
can be performed at the sensor. Faster data rates consume more battery power, and data 
processing at the sensor places additional demands on any battery (Hashemian 2008). 
In nuclear plants, equipment is typically spread over a large footprint, and data is gathered 
through wires that are drawn through conduits buried in trenches. Moreover, much of the 
cost of adding new instrumentation to existing equipment in a nuclear plant lies in the 
cabling. Wireline networks usually impose high cabling and installation costs, which can 
exceed $1000 per linear foot in typical nuclear power plants. A recent project funded in part 
by the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) concluded that adding cabling in existing 
nuclear plants costs approximately $2000 per foot (Hashemian 2009b). In addition to cost, 
over time rust, corrosion, steam, dirt, dust, and water degrade the wires and cause 
maintenance issues (IAEA, 2008). The extension of older plants’ licenses necessitates more 
instrumentation to monitor age, but installing wired sensors on all the equipment of an 
aging plant that needs monitoring would be prohibitively expensive (AMS, 2010b). 
Fortunately, the cost of wireless systems can be less than 1% of the cost of wired systems in a 
nuclear plant environment. These cabling costs alone represent a substantial incentive for 
plants to explore wireless systems. Moreover, the wireless industry is aiming to reduce 
wireless costs from $20/foot to $2/foot over the next few years (AMS, 2010b). 
Wireless sensors facilitate difficult measurements in processes where wiring is a weak link, 
in hazardous environments, and in applications where space for wiring installation is 
limited. Wireless sensors can also be added as needed, without laying more cabling, and 
they can be moved from one location to another without having to move wires. Wireless 
sensors can usually be installed and operational very quickly and offers immediate off/on 
availability, minimizing communication complexity, promoting system modularity, and 
facilitating the interconnection of devices within an I&C system. Wirelessly networked 
devices can be monitored for anomalies and quickly reconfigured (via software) much more 
easily than wirelined or cabled devices (IAEA, 2008).  
Furthermore, with wireless sensors, data can be collected from anywhere and routed on to 
the Internet where it can be easily accessed and analyzed (Hashemian 2008). The return on 
investment of wireless systems is often only several months, versus the years that 
wired/cabled systems require (IAEA, 2008). Wireless technologies do not suffer from a 
number of critical weaknesses to which wired technologies are susceptible. For example, one 
 
Nuclear Power Plant Instrumentation and Control 57 
intrinsic benefit to using wireless sensors is that the communication link between the sensor 
and destination is largely unaffected by moisture. For instance, in a loss-of-coolant accident 
(LOCA) the containment building of a nuclear reactor can be inundated with water, which 
can damage sensitive equipment cabling. On the other hand, a wireless sensor would likely 
be unaffected by this connection issue and continue to provide reliable and important 
reactor health information throughout the accident and subsequent investigations (AMS, 
2010b). 
Though wireless technologies do not completely eliminate all wiring needs, they reduce it 
by one to two orders of magnitude. For example, at Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Station-
-currently, the largest installation of wireless sensors in the world--more than 10,000 feet of 
cable were used to develop the foundation for implementing wireless technologies. The 
wireless infrastructure put in place there provides 100% communications coverage 
throughout the site and gives the plant the ability to add wireless sensors to monitor and 
analyze various plant processes and equipment (Hashemian 2009b). This installation has 
demonstrated that wireless sensor networks can be cost efficient, reliable and secure (IAEA, 
2008). 
In nuclear power plants, wireless sensors can provide a simple, cost-effective path to 
improved redundancy without compromising safety. Wired sensors would continue to be 
designated as the primary element and wireless sensors as a substitute if the wired sensor 
fails, such as during a LOCA, in which cables become wet or damaged and provide 
compromised signals (AMS, 2010b). 
Many sensor manufacturers have partnered with companies that make wireless transmitters, 
receivers, and network equipment to produce an integrated network of wireless sensors that 
can measure process temperature, pressure, vibration, humidity, and other parameters 
(Hashemian 2008). In addition, wireless community leaders, users, and producers are working 
on common terminology, a unified platform, and a new standard to facilitate the use of 
wireless sensors. For example, in 2009 the Instrumentation, Systems, and Automation Society 
(ISA) approved and released a new standard, referred to as ISA100, to harmonize the use of 
wireless technologies in industrial applications such as nuclear plants (Hashemian 2008). 
Including wireless communication capabilities based on a standard protocol such as ISA 100 or 
IEEE 802.11 in the design plans of the next generation of nuclear power plants can not only 
provide the necessary means to transmit much-needed sensor data; it can also provide an 
infrastructure for plant-wide communications (Hashemian 2009b). 
Wireless sensors are gaining popularity in plant monitoring in non-nuclear plants and 
radio frequency identification (RFID)–based sensors, coupled with small-scale, 
distributed, device-specific “energy harvesting” systems (Hashemian, forthcoming). 
Though wireless sensors may eventually find their way into nuclear plant process 
measurement and control, today, they are mainly useful for condition-monitoring 
applications (Hashemian, 2008). Indeed, on-line condition monitoring (to be discussed 
later in this chapter) is emerging as the first opportunity for wireless technology to prove 
itself in the industry (IAEA, 2008). 
Because of the potential offered by wireless networking, sensors are rapidly evolving from 
information devices to communication devices, with substantial implications for the 
management of security and configuration control in nuclear plants (IAEA, 2008). New 
wireless sensors from Eaton, Honeywell, General Electric, and others are expected to offer 
improved reliability and security in monitoring process conditions in real-time or near-real-
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time. Not only will they likely find application in nuclear condition monitoring applications; 
they may even one day be used in nuclear control applications.  
Future applications of wireless technologies will include distributing intelligence along the 
I&C network (which IAEA calls “the convergence of sensing, computation and 
communication”), thereby reducing the need for high data rates along wireless links, and 
reductions in sensor size and power requirements (IAEA, 2008). Already, the author is 
working with the Department of Energy on a project to extend wireless sensors and 
networks inside the reactor containment for equipment condition monitoring, auxiliary 
measurements during plant outages, and improved capability for post accident monitoring 
of the plant. Phase III of this project, which started in the fall of 2010, is designing and 
qualifying a wireless sensor network for use in the reactor containment building of nuclear 
power plants, where wiring costs can be as high as $50,000 per foot (Analysis and 
Measurement Services Corp. [AMS], 2010b). 
5. Challenges of digital I&C 
Although digital I&C technology has been successfully applied outside the U.S., the U.S. 
nuclear power industry has been slow to adopt digital I&C, and even then mostly for only 
non-safety-related applications, such as feedwater control systems, recirculation control 
systems, demineralizer control systems, main turbine controls, etc. (U.S. NRC, 2011; IAEA, 
1999; Hashemian, 2009a). This is largely the result of regulatory concerns over the unique 
question marks raised by digital I&C technology (Hashemian 2009a). 
One critical concern—and the primary reason why digital instrumentation is subject to 
stringent licensing requirements for use in process safety systems (Lipták, 2006)--is digital 
I&C’s dependency on software. Although analog I&C may have higher overall failure rates, 
its failure mechanisms and modes are perceived as better understood and more easily 
reproducible (ORNL, 2007). Repeatability gives confidence that periodic testing can 
minimize future failures. In contrast, software programs’ high number of discrete logic steps 
and inputs and algorithmic complexity means that I&C programs could potentially generate 
a unique, potentially infinite range of operating characteristics. To verify the reliability of 
such systems would require testing each line of code for every conceivable combination of 
inputs and at all possible rates of change—a monumental task (IAEA, n.d.; European 
Nuclear Agency [ENA], 2008). As a concrete example, in 2009 the UK Nuclear Installations 
Inspectorate reviewed the European Pressurized Reactor I&C architecture developed by 
AREVA and EDF and concluded that it “appears overly complex” and contains too many 
connections with less safety-critical systems (Hirsch, 2009). 
Common mode failure—failures resulting from errors or ‘bugs’ shared by identical software 
programs running on multiple I&C systems--is a second concern stemming from digital I&C’s 
dependence on software (Lipták, 2006). Specifically, calibration errors, errors in generating 
setpoints, and hardware and sensor failures are the types of common mode failure most feared 
from shared flaws in I&C software (Bickel, 2009). According to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, in the past twenty years, 38 of about 100 operating plants have reported 
“potential and actual” common-mode failures, some affecting single plants, but others 
affecting multiple plants using the same digital system (U.S. NRC, 2011). The more software is 
integrated into every layer of I&C—from large platform computer systems and 
microprocessor-driven control systems to software embedded in primary instrumentation and 
controllers—the greater the potential challenge posed by common mode failure (IAEA, 1999). 
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A second challenge posed by digital I&C is cyber security--the protection of data and 
systems in a network, both wired and wireless, from unauthorized access or attack, whether 
from business espionage, technology theft, or disgruntled employee interference or from 
recreational hacking, cyber activism, or the probing of a foreign state or terrorist 
organization. Wireless is the least secure of the physical layers (IAEA, 2008). Wireless 
transmissions are inherently open, meaning that access can potentially be obtained 
anywhere within the transmission zone, so they are more vulnerable to such intrusions and 
threats as non-directed, damaging attacks by software viruses and worms; data network 
nonperformance from denial-of-service attacks and network spoofing; loss of data privacy 
and confidentiality from eavesdropping and network packet sniffing; and directed threats 
involving network packet modification, mimicking, and data tampering (Hashemian, 2009b; 
AMS, 2010b). These threats can generally be grouped into four categories: loss of 
confidentiality (unauthorized access to data), loss of integrity (data or software/hardware 
changed by the intrusion), loss of availability (data transmissions interrupted or systems 
shut down), and loss of reliability (potential changes made to I&C data systems or 
computers) (IAEA, n.d.). 
There are two major cybersecurity concerns related to the use of wireless technologies in 
nuclear power plants: being able to satisfy regulatory requirements and employing 
sufficiently robust methodologies to protect data transmissions across wireless networks 
(e.g., encryption, authentication, intrusion prevention) (AMS, 2010b). 
A final challenge posed to digital I&C is electromagnetic and/or radio frequency 
interference (EMI/RFI). For wireless devices to be safely used in nuclear power plants, they 
must first be deemed electromagnetically compatible with the surrounding environment. A 
device is said to have electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) if it does not interfere with 
surrounding electronics and is not itself susceptible to interference from the other devices 
(AMS, 2010b). Aside from the EMI/RFI effects of wireless devices on surrounding plant 
equipment and vice versa, EMI/RFI issues can also exist between wireless devices. 
In industrial applications, most interference results from intermittent bursts of narrow-band 
signals, random electromagnetic interference (e.g., background noise) and deterministic EMI 
(e.g., radio stations; AMS, 2010b). The sources of EMI are many and varied, ranging from 
welders to managers with radio sets (IAEA, 1999). The range and fidelity of wireless signals 
can also be influenced by implementation issues such as multipath and signal attenuation 
resulting from proximity to metallic structures, which can limit deployment (IAEA, 2008; 
AMS, 2010a). Although, EMI/RFI issues have largely been addressed with respect to 
implementing wireless sensors and networks for equipment condition monitoring in nuclear 
plants, using wireless for equipment or process control is another matter. Much more secure 
EMI/RFI safeguards are required for wireless to find use in safety or control applications, 
which is why NRC standards specifically prohibit the use of wireless technology on “critical 
digital assets” (AMS, 2010b; Hashemian, 2008). 
5.1 Addressing the challenges posed by digital I&C 
The challenges posed by the application of digital and wireless I&C in nuclear power plants 
can partly be addressed by continued application of the nuclear power community’s 
longstanding “defense-in-depth” strategy. This strategy’s basic principle is that safety risks 
can be met by designing in multiple, distributed barriers and layers in I&C systems so that 
no abnormal event, error, or failure—external, electronic or mechanical, or human--can 
completely interrupt the system’s functioning (IAEA, 1999). 
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Broadly speaking, defense in depth takes three different forms: diversity of components, 
redundancy of components, and independence of components. Diversity can involve design 
diversity (the use of different technologies such as digital versus analog or different 
architectures, etc.), equipment diversity (the use of different equipment manufacturers, 
different equipment versions, etc.), functional diversity (applying different mechanisms 
such as rod insertion versus boron injection or different response times), human diversity 
(the use of different designers, engineers, programmers, testers), signal diversity (relying on 
different process parameters sensed by different physical effects or sensor types), and 
software diversity (different algorithms, logic, programming languages) (U.S. NRC, 2011; 
Hashemian 2009a). Such diversity diminishes the likelihood that an error or failure in one 
I&C element will be duplicated in another. As such, diversity is a specific form of protection 
against common mode failure in I&C software and systems (IAEA, 1999). 
The redundancy aspect of defense in depth complements the diversity aspect: not only are 
diverse systems available to perform functions should one system fail, but multiple 
components of the same systems are also available. If one component fails, an identical 
component is available to take its place (IAEA, n.d.; IAEA, 1999). 
The third aspect of defense in depth, independence or separation, minimizes the risk of 
I&C failure by ensuring that each element in an I&C system is truly independent of the 
others, through, for example, electrical isolation, physical separation (e.g., barriers, 
distance), and/or independence of system intercommunication (IAEA, n.d.; IAEA, 1999; 
Hirsch, 2009). 
The Fukushima Daiichi emergency of 2011 illustrates the principle and limits of the defense-
in-depth strategy. The Tokyo Electric Power Co. (TEPCO), the plant’s operator, believed it 
had sufficient diversity of electrical supply to provide the plant with ongoing electrical 
power during an emergency: it had primary electrical supply from TEPCO’s regional grid, it 
had backup generators in case grid power failed, and it had 8-hour emergency batteries in 
case the generators failed. However, in one stroke the earthquake and tsunami knocked out 
the primary grid power and rendered the generators unusable. The backup batteries worked 
but not long enough to enable TEPCO to reinstitute continuous power to prevent a LOCA. 
In other words, the plant’s electrical plan lacked true independence (both grid and backup 
generators were knocked out by the same factor, the tsunami) and true redundancy (no 
second-line generators or batteries were available to replace the first-line-of-defense 
generators and batteries).  
Of course, adding diversity, redundancy, and independence also increases a system’s 
complexity, expanding, in other words, the range of possible error or failure scenarios that 
plants must track. The nuclear power community has attempted to address the complexity 
issue through stringent regulation of proposed new I&C, by requiring the use of hardware 
and software I&C components that have been thoroughly verified and validated for nuclear 
plant environments (IAEA, n.d.), and by requiring that the complexity of I&C components 
be graded such that a safety-essential I&C component may have only limited, specific 
functionality to ensure that it will more reliably perform its design task. (Thus, I&C 
elements controlling non-safety tasks are allowed to have more complexity since less is at 
stake should that complexity produce unanticipated errors or failures) (IAEA, 1999). 
For example, field-programmable gate array (FPGA) technology has emerged as an answer 
to the risks posed by overly complex I&C software. An FPGA is a device made up of 
thousands or millions of logic gates on integrated circuit chips that can be programmed after 
manufacture by the customer to perform various tasks, ranging from simple logic 
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operations to complex mathematical functions (U.S. NRC, 2011; Hashemian, 2009a). Because, 
once programmed, an FPGA executes only that program repetitively and link only the 
functions needed for a given I&C application, they are substantially simpler than 
microprocessors, minimizing the risk posed by complexity (U.S. NRC, 2011). 
The cybersecurity concerns posed by the use of wireless in nuclear plant I&C are being 
addressed by the application of experience gained in military, national security, banking, 
and air-traffic sectors (IAEA, n.d.). On a technological level, intrusion detection, virus 
scanning, and encryption tools can identify and block cyber threats. In technical terms, 
security in wireless is no different from security in wired infrastructure. Wireless can be 
made more secure than wired by including security in the physical layer, thus providing no 
access to record or tap into the bit stream (AMS, 2010b). On an administrative level, security 
zones, security management systems, passwords and biometric identification can limit 
cybersecurity concerns (IAEA, n.d.). At least four sets of standards are relevant to 
cybersecurity in nuclear applications: IEC Security Standards ISO/IEC 27000 series, IEEE 
P1711 and IEEE P1689 for Cyber Security of Serial SCADA Links, ISA99 Security for 
Industrial Automation and Control Systems, and North American Electric Reliability 
Corporation (NERC) Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) standards CIP-002 through CIP-
009 (Hashemian, 2009b). 
Finally, concerns over EMI/RFI arose partly because many nuclear plants discovered their 
security personnel’s ‘walkie-talkie’ radios inadvertently affected plant systems. As a result, 
they established exclusion zones for such wireless devices around sensitive or critical 
equipment. However, the radios typically used by plant security personnel transmit at a 
much higher power level (several watts) than do wireless sensor technologies and in the 
megahertz (MHz) region. Wireless systems’ operate at the 100 milliwatts (mW) power level 
and in the gigahertz (GHz) range of frequencies. In general, modern wireless devices’ lower 
power and higher frequency levels significantly decrease the chances of interference with 
nuclear power reactor equipment (AMS, 2010a). Moreover in new plants, the plant EMI/RFI 
design should allow for other wireless sensor networks to be deployed side-by-side for 
various applications. This will enable the wireless sensors from various manufacturers to be 
used in the plant without interference (Hashemian, 2009b). 
Recent R&D work performed by the author under a Department of Energy Small Business 
Innovation Research grant has demonstrated that concerns such as cyber security, EMI, and 
wireless signal impact on plant equipment can be easily managed. Wireless technology can 
be implemented successfully and practically in industrial nuclear power plants for condition 
monitoring of safety-related equipment (AMS, 2010b). However, although wireless sensors 
and networks are well suited for equipment condition monitoring in nuclear power plants, 
they are not yet ready for control applications nor is it yet safe to attempt to use wireless 
sensors for equipment or process control. A hacker cannot cause much damage through 
wireless technologies used for condition monitoring, but he/she can cause problems in 
control (AMS, 2010b). The full application of digital I&C to safety-essential control will 
depend on further advances in nuclear plant I&C design, technology, and regulation. 
6. On-line monitoring 
The evolution of digital I&C is making possible the development of holistic, integrated 
systems for automatically verifying the performance of I&C sensors and assessing the health 
of nuclear power plant equipment and processes while the plant is operating. These so-
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called online condition monitoring (OLM) systems can be used for on-line I&C maintenance, 
predictive maintenance, and troubleshooting of reactor components, aging equipment, and 
to support life extension objectives (EPRI 2008). OLM can be used in PWRs, BWRs, and 
other reactor types. The system can be built into the design of new plants or deployed as an 
add-on feature to the existing generation of plants (Hashemian, 2009b). 
Applications that can be performed using OLM include in-situ response-time testing of 
process instrumentation; instrument calibration monitoring; cross-correlation flow 
measurement; online detection of venturi fouling; online detection of sensing-line blockages, 
voids, and leaks; fluid and gas leak detection; equipment and process condition monitoring; 
core barrel vibration measurement; online measurement of temperature coefficient of 
reactivity; aging management of neutron detectors and core exit thermocouples; and 
measurement of vibration of in-core flux monitors, core flow monitoring, or N-16 flow 
measurement.  
One of the important applications of OLM is in monitoring the performance of pressure, 
level, and flow transmitters (AMS, 2010b). In the simplest implementation, redundant 
channels are monitored by comparing the indicated measurement of each individual 
channel to a calculated best estimate of the actual process value. Each channel’s calibration 
status can be made by monitoring each channel’s deviation from the calculated best estimate 
(IAEA, 2008). Figure 2 shows the data acquisition signal path for an OLM system. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Data Acquisition Signal Path for OLM 
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An OLM system is made up of a data acquisition module involving hardware and software 
and a data processing module involving software implemented on a fast computer. The data 
acquisition module includes signal isolation devices as well as fast sampling capabilities 
(e.g., 1000 Hz). If the data is sampled fast, it can be used for both calibration verification by 
DC signal analysis using averaging and modeling techniques, and response- time testing by 
AC signal analysis using the noise analysis technique (Hashemian, 2009b). Dynamic analysis 
of nuclear plant sensors and equipment uses AC signal analysis to determine how sensors 
and equipment react to fast-changing events such as temperature or pressure steps, ramps, 
spikes, etc. (Hashemian, 2009b). 
OLM originated from reviews of equipment performance data from a variety of industries. 
These reviews showed that a majority of process equipment performs well for long periods 
of time and that frequent hands-on maintenance is not needed and is sometimes 
counterproductive. For example, research performed by Emerson Company’s Rosemount 
Division--which manufactures process sensors such as pressure, level, and flow transmitters 
for a variety of industries--has shown that these sensors perform well for periods of ten to 
twenty years and need little hands-on maintenance (Hashemian, 2008). Based on such 
research, it is now known that over 70% of maintenance work on pressure transmitters in 
industrial processes does not reveal problems, and maintenance intervals can therefore be 
extended (AMS, 2010b). 
Building on such findings, over the past twenty years, the nuclear power community has 
made substantial strides to establish OLM technologies in the industry. Numerous 
academic, government, and industry institutions (as well as private companies) have 
sponsored R&D efforts in this area. As a result, the feasibility of OLM technologies has 
been successfully demonstrated for implementation in the existing nuclear fleet (AMS, 
2010b). 
Moreover, the NRC has approved the OLM concept for in-situ determination of the 
calibration status of pressure, level, and flow transmitters in nuclear power plants. That is, 
nuclear power plants can use OLM to establish when a pressure, level, or flow transmitter 
must be calibrated.  
Although OLM provides substantial benefits to the safety and economy of nuclear power 
plants and has been approved by the NRC, OLM use in nuclear power plants is fragmented 
and sporadic (Hashemian, 2009b; Electric Power Research Institute [EPRI], 2008; AMS, 
2010b). For example, the Sizewell B plant in the United Kingdom was able to extend the 
calibration intervals of 70% of the transmitters that were eligible for calibration extension 
using OLM techniques. Similarly, as noted, TXU Comanche Peak nuclear power plant 
currently has the largest installation of wireless sensors in the world in its $14 million 
wireless network. Most of existing nuclear power plants have the capabilities and 
equipment needed for implementing many of the OLM technologies. However, for most 
plants, these capabilities are not used to their fullest extent for OLM applications 
(Hashemian, 2009b).  
One reason is that the implementation of OLM techniques depends on the availability of 
data from a large network of sensors deployed on equipment such as motors, fans, pumps, 
etc. While many nuclear power plants have an OLM or predictive maintenance program for 
equipment outside of their containments, none have OLM programs for equipment inside 
the containments due to the sensor wiring costs and penetration space limitations (AMS, 
2010b). Today, a majority of industrial equipment does not benefit from OLM technologies 
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partly because no sensors exist to provide the necessary data, and installing wired sensors is 
often cost prohibitive and impractical. 
Wireless sensors will help fill this gap, enabling condition-monitoring technologies  
to flourish (Hashemian, 2008). As a result, wireless sensors promise to experience 
explosive growth over the next decade in OLM. Incorporating a wireless infrastructure 
will help new plants to provide the necessary means of communicating OLM data to  
plant engineers at low cost, and provide a means for the future expansion of OLM 
capabilities (Hashemian, 2009b). Inevitably, research in OLM methods will continue, and 
there will be a need to measure and analyze parameters that are not being considered 
now.  
The application of wireless sensors for equipment condition monitoring in industrial 
processes has left open a critical gap in the handling of data from wireless sensors, in  
the guidelines that define which parameters must be measured, in the type and number  
of sensors to be deployed for measuring these parameters, and in the methods for 
ensuring that optimum data is gathered to monitor the health and condition of various 
equipment.  
Furthermore, over the next few years, the use of wireless sensors will generate an enormous 
amount of data from industrial processes. Although much thought has been focused on 
developing wireless sensors, little or no effort has been expended on data qualification and 
data processing techniques for these sensors. Moreover, little effort has been spent in 
determining the type of parameters that should be measured and what the correlation 
should be between these parameters and the actual condition of the equipment being 
monitored (Hashemian, 2008). 
In the next generation of reactors OLM systems should be built into the design so as to 
provide automated measurements, condition monitoring, and diagnostics to contribute to 
optimized maintenance of the plant (Hashemian, 2009b). Reactor designs for next-
generation plants will typically incorporate an integrated digital infrastructure including 
highly integrated control rooms, fault-tolerant control systems, and monitoring systems 
with large amounts of available information and data. Most of these digital systems will be 
designed to monitor their own performance continuously, self-correct for identified 
changes, and function more reliably than previous designs (Hashemian, 2009b). 
To develop OLM for future needs, considerations will be needed for increased availability of 
process sensor data in the plant computer, higher sampling frequency and resolution data 
acquisition capabilities, increased redundancy for critical process sensors, and more flexible 
infrastructure to accommodate future data acquisition needs. Utilities will have to adapt to 
continuous 24-hour monitoring of instrumentation (AMS, 2010b). 
7. Conclusion 
Today, OLM technologies and techniques have evolved to the point where in many  
cases equipment failures and/or maintenance needs can be adequately predicted days, 
weeks, or even months in advance of a system or equipment failure (AMS, 2010b). In 
general, a wireless system provides the lowest overall cost for large-scale OLM 
applications (IAEA, 2008). In the years ahead, future I&C will be fully digital (software 
based), distributed, bus connected, amenable to OLM, and qualified to industrial 
standards (IAEA, 1999). 
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1. Introduction 
IP telephony, also called voice over Internet protocol (VoIP), is rapidly becoming a familiar 
term and technology that is implementing in the enterprise, education, government 
organizations and industry. Mobile IP telephony is the new generation of communications 
networks that makes possible the convergence of voice and data over wireless local area 
networks (WLANs). This technology combines data networks with mobile technologies to 
support voice and data applications over a common integrated network. A key advantage of 
IP telephony is that it allows the transmission of voice signals from conventional telephones 
over an IP data network, being either a public network (Internet) or a private network 
(Intranet). Figure 1 shows a general IP telephony system. IP telephony is designed to replace 
the legacy TDM (time division multiplexing) technologies and networks by an IP-based data 
network. Digitized voice will be carried in IP data packets over a LAN and/or WAN 
network. A major aspect involved in a voice conversation using mobile IP telephony is the 
conversion of analog or digital voice signals from conventional phones to IP packets for 
further transmission either to a fixed or mobile phone, over an IP network. One of the most 
important recommendations that can be made is to pay close attention to the infrastructure  
 
 
Fig. 1. General IP telephony system 
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that the IP telephony network is built on. The design considerations must be solid otherwise; 
there will be ongoing quality issues until the network design issues are resolved. Even though 
IP telephony have made some vast reliability and quality improvements in recent years, 
customers and network designers still struggle with implementing the technology in a multi-
vendor network. There are many reasons for this, such as interoperability issues and 
proprietary protocols. In addition, the use of new wireless technologies in nuclear power 
plants is growing fast. The WLAN technology based on the IEEE 802.11 standard has a very 
promising future for its use in nuclear power plants, due to features like mobility, reliability, 
security, scalability and compatibility with other technologies in order to provide new services 
such as voice over IP (VoIP) and IP video (Shankar, 2003). 
In this work, the design considerations for the implementation of a mobile IP telephony 
system in a nuclear power plant based on national and international standards are 
presented, as well as, technical requirements that commercially available equipment must 
meet. In addition, this work gives an analysis of the most relevant wireless technologies 
currently available that can be implemented in nuclear power plants and also identifies 
nuclear regulatory guidelines, wireless networks standards, electromagnetic and radio-
frequency interference standards. In the next sections, an analysis of the most relevant 
wireless technologies currently available that can be implemented in nuclear power plants is 
presented. 
2. Wireless LAN standards 
The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) has been produced a series of 
standards for wireless networks referred as 802.11x, for wireless LAN (Local Area 
Networks). The original standard used to implement wireless LANs was 802.11 (IEEE, 
1999a). It was first published in 1999 and designed to support a maximum data rate of 2 
Mbps in the 2.4 GHz band. This standard uses two modulation techniques: frequency 
hopping spread spectrum (FHSS) and direct sequence spread spectrum (DSSS). Figure 2 
shows the IEEE 802.11 standard architecture. 
 
 
Fig. 2. The IEEE 802.11 Standard Architecture 
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bandwidth up to 11 Mbps, comparable to traditional Ethernet. The 802.11b standard also 
uses DSSS as modulation technique in the 2.4 GHz band as the original 802.11 standard, 
where Wi-Fi devices communicate to each other at data rates up to 11 Mbps (IEEE, 1999b). 
In case of any radiofrequency or interference signal cause errors in data transmission, Wi-Fi 
devices will automatically reduce their data rate to 5.5 Mbps, to 2Mbps and finally to 1 
Mbps (Martínez, 2002). These occasional reductions in the data rate are aimed to keep the 
network very stable and highly reliable. Some advantages of Wi-Fi standard are: high data 
rates, reliable, wide signal ranges and supports of all 802.11 devices using DSSS.  
2.2 Other IEEE 802.11x standards 
Along with the 802.11, other standards have been developed (Martínez, 2002): 802.11a, 
802.11g, 802.11e and 802.11i. The 802.11a standard (IEEE, 1999c) was published in 1999 and 
uses Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing (OFDM) to support bandwidth up to 54 
Mbps and signals in the unlicensed frequency spectrum around 5.8 GHz. This higher 
frequency compared to 802.11b limits the range of 802.11a networks. The higher frequency 
also means 802.11a signals have more difficulty penetrating walls and other obstructions. To 
solve this problem and to cover a similar range that 802.11b, a greater number of access 
points must be installed. Because 802.11a and 802.11b utilize different frequencies, the two 
technologies are incompatible with each other. The 802.11g standard (IEEE, 2003) attempts 
to combine the best of both 802.11a and 802.11b standards. It uses OFDM to support 
bandwidth up to 54 Mbps, using the 2.4 GHz band for greater range. 802.11g is backwards 
compatible with 802.11b, meaning that 802.11g access points will work with 802.11b wireless 
network adapters and vice versa. Also, 802.11g produces less multipath losses than 802.11a. 
The 802.11e standard (IEEE, 2005) has been developed to support applications with quality 
of service (QoS) requirements. It supports a wide range of real-time applications such as 
voice, audio, video and data over WLAN. It adopts time scheduling and polling 
mechanisms to cope with delay sensitive traffic. The 802.11i standard (IEEE, 2004) has been 
developed to improve the security of data provided by Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) 
protocol in 802.11b. 802.11i incorporates an entirely new privacy algorithm and 
authentication mechanism based on the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES).  
3. Electromagnetic interference standards 
Electromagnetic interference (EMI), radio-frequency interference (RFI), and power surges 
have been identified in (NUREG, 2003) as environmental conditions that can affect the 
performance of safety-related electrical equipment in a nuclear power plant. A series of 
comprehensive commercial EMI/RFI immunity standards have been issued by the 
following international organizations: 
 International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) 
 European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization (CENELEC) 
 International Special Committee on Radio Interference (CISPR) 
These international organizations have produced standards for general application. 
National organizations in countries like United States of America, Canada, Australia and 
Europe have their own standards that regulate EMI/RFI immunity of electronic equipment. 
In the U.S., the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has produced the most 
comprehensive guide known as Regulatory Guide 1.180 (NRC, 2003) with the aim of 
  
Nuclear Power – Control, Reliability and Human Factors 
 
70
developing the technical basis for regulatory guidance to address electromagnetic 
interference, radio-frequency interference, and surge withstand capability in safety-related 
instrumentation and control systems in a nuclear power plant. 
3.1 Regulatory guide 1.180 
This regulatory guide endorses design, installation, and testing practices acceptable to the 
NRC staff for addressing the effects of EMI/RFI and power surges on safety-related 
instrumentation and control systems in a nuclear power plant environment. This regulatory 
guide is based on the standards: IEEE 10-50 (IEEE, 1996), MIL-STD-461E (DoD, 1999) and 
IEC 61000 series (IEC, 2002). For instance, the design and installation practices described in 
the IEEE 1050 standard are endorsed for limiting EMI/RFI subject to the conditions stated in 
the Regulatory Position. Electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) testing practices from 
military and commercial standards are endorsed to address electromagnetic emissions, 
EMI/RFI susceptibility, and power surge withstand capability. The MIL-STD-461E standard 
contains test practices that can be applied to characterize EMI/RFI emissions. In addition, 
selected EMI/RFI test methods from MIL-STD-461E and the IEC 61000 series are endorsed 
to evaluate conducted and radiated EMI/RFI phenomena for safety-related control and 
instrumentation systems. The IEC electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) standards include 
IEC 61000-3 (part 3: Limits), IEC 61000-4 (part 4: Testing and measurement techniques), and 
IEC 61000-6 (part 6: Generic standards). This regulatory guide also endorses electromagnetic 
operating envelopes corresponding to the MIL-STD-461E test methods. These operating 
envelopes were tailored from the MIL-STD-461E test limits to represent the characteristic 
electromagnetic environment in key locations at nuclear power plants. Comparable 
operating envelopes for the IEC 61000 test methods are also endorsed. The Regulatory 
Guide 1.180 was updated in the year 2003 to provide additional acceptable methods for 
validating the performance of instrumentation and control systems and includes guidance 
on testing to address signal line susceptibility and very high frequency (>1GHz) 
phenomena. 
4. Wireless LAN technologies 
The use of wireless technologies in industrial and power utility environments, including 
their use in nuclear power plants is growing fast. The wireless technologies that have been 
implemented in nuclear power plants include paging systems, digital mobile radio and 
cellular systems. Currently, WLAN technology is been installing and evaluating in nuclear 
power plants, due to it provides enhanced features compared to traditional wireless 
communications technologies such as conventional mobile radio in two key aspects: 
 Higher operation frequencies 
 Lower output power 
WLAN technology is based on the 802.11 standard and generally operates at higher 
frequencies (2.4/5 GHz) and at significantly lower effective power output levels (20 mW-
1W) than UHF/VHF (890/450 MHz) communication systems operating at power output 
levels between 4-5 W. This feature of more modem wireless devices, including WLANs, 
general1y requires that the end user be closer to a potentially sensitive device before 
interference is noted. So, it can be inferred that modem wireless devices are less of a threat 
and less like1y to interfere with nuclear power plant equipment than older devices; that is, 
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more modern devices tend to be less intrusive. Those features make that the electromagnetic 
interference generated by devices based on WLAN technology does not affect significantly 
to safety-related instrumentation and control equipment (EPRI, 2003). In 2002, the Electric 
Research Institute (EPRI) published a report in which EPRI developed guidelines for the use 
of wireless technologies in nuclear power plants (EPRI, 2002). The purpose of this report 
was the evaluation of wireless technologies in nuclear power plants for integrated (voice, 
data and video) communication, remote equipment and system monitoring, and to 
complement an electronic procedures support system. The guidelines effort focuses on the 
development of a rules structure to support the deployment of wireless devices in a nuclear 
power plant without compromising continuous, safe, and reliable operation. For these 
reasons, spread spectrum appears to be the most adequate technology for the nuclear power 
environment. 
4.1 Frequency spectrum regulation 
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC), organism that manages and regulates the 
electromagnetic spectrum in U.S. assigned in 1985 to ISM band the 900 MHz, 2.4 GHz and 
5.8 GHz frequency ranges. These regulations are specified in the CFR-47 section 15.2.47 
(FCC, 2004). The ISM band is a license-free band and it is used by WLAN technology. In 
Mexico, the Consultative Committee for Standardization in Telecommunications (CCNNT) 
manages and regulates the electromagnetic spectrum (CCNNT, 2001). Table 1, shows the 
frequency ranges and bandwidth reserved for the ISM band for their use the U.S. and 
Mexico.  
 
ISM Band Bandwidth 
902 – 928 MHz 26 MHz 
2.4 – 2.4835 GHz 83.5 MHz 
5.725 – 5.850 GHz 125 MHz 
Table 1. Reserved frequencies for the ISM band 
The FCC set these ISM bands for license-free and low power radio transmission over short 
to medium distances (Meel, 1999). The FCC requires that the signal be distributed over a 
wide swath of bandwidth using a spread spectrum technology originally developed by the 
military for anti-jamming applications. Wireless devices that operate in these license-free 
bands can allow immediate, real-time commissioning of a network, avoiding the delays 
associated with installing wiring or cables. By spreading data transmissions across the 
available frequency band in a prearranged scheme, spread spectrum encoding technology 
makes the signal less vulnerable to noise, interference, and snooping. The significant 
amount of metal often found in industrial settings can cause signals sent over a single 
frequency to bounce and cancel other signals arriving at the same time. Spread spectrum 
technology helps overcome this problem and allows multiple users to share a frequency 
band with minimal interference from other users. 
4.2 Radiated power regulation 
The power level radiated by an antenna in a WLAN is specified by the rules stated in the 
FCC section 15.247 for operation in the U.S. (FCC, 2004). The FCC also limits the increase in 
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the output power of the antenna to a maximum of 6 dBi. So, the radiated power is limited to 
a maximum of 1W for the 2.4 GHz band. In Mexico it is limited to a maximum of 650 mW 
(CCNNT, 2001). In Europe and Japan, the radiated power levels are different to those 
allowed for U.S. and Mexico. Table 2, shows the maximum radiated power levels allowed 
for different countries (Meel, 1999). 
 
Maximum 
Transmit Power
Geographical 
Location Compliance Document 
1000 mW U.S.A. FCC 15.247 
650 mW Mexico CCNN-T 
100 mW Europe ETS 300-328 
10 mW/MHz Japan 
MPT ordinance for 
Regulating Radio 
Equipment, article 49-20 
Table 2. Maximum transmit power 
4.3 Bandwidth regulation 
Data throughput is adversely affected by distance and the amount of noise or interference in 
the area. If too many wireless devices are operating in the same vicinity, they can interfere 
with each other, restricting network capacity. In terms of protection from interference, the 
FCC and CCNN-T specify that WLANs operating in the three ISM bands, use spread 
spectrum (SS) as the encoding technique to comply with regulation requirements (Meel, 
1999; DoE, 2002; Pearce, 2001). Spread spectrum technology is based on two interference 
avoidance techniques: frequency hopping spread spectrum (FHSS) and direct sequence 
spread spectrum (DSSS). Both modulation schemes have been defined in (IEEE, 1999b) to 
operate in the 2.4 GHz band, using a bandwidth of 83 MHz (from 2.400 GHz to 2.4835 GHz). 
Also, the CCNNT specifies that the bandwidth of the transmitted signal depending on the 
modulation scheme (FHSSS or DSSS) employed (CCNNT, 2001), as shown in table 3. FHSS 
technique permits the fast movement or “hopping” to any channel within the total allocated 
spectrum. Here, the carrier frequency hops from channel to channel in some pre-arranged 
sequence. The major drawback to this technique is a limited data rate. 
 
SS Modulation 
 scheme Bandwidth 
Frequency Hopping 
(FHSS) 1 MHz (maximum)
Direct Sequence (DSSS) 500 KHz (minimum) 
Table 3. Bandwidth of transmitted signal 
By contrast, DSSS technique provides much higher data rates. Here, the carrier frequency 
does not jump from frequency to frequency, but instead spreads the information across a 
much wider bandwidth. Also, DSSS can provide many users to be on the same channel at 
the same time and be distinguished from each other by a digital code. DSSS uses the phase 
shift keying modulation technique known as differential BPSK (DBPSK) and differential 
BPSK (DQPSK). FHSS uses the frequency shift keying modulation technique known as 2 
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and 4 level Gaussian FSK (2GFSK and 4GFSK). The data rate for both FHSS and DSSS 
schemes is defined in (IEEE, 1999a; IEEE, 1999b). Table 4, shows the maximum data rates for 
the physical layer supported by the most commonly used 802.11 standards. The most 
common problem when applying an unlicensed wireless system in an industrial 
environment is radio frequency interference or better known as “radio noise”. Both FHSS 
and DSSS handle noise differently and can have certain advantages depending on the type 
of interference experienced.  
 
Standard 
 
Frequency 
band (GHz) 
Modulation 
scheme 
Maximum bit 
rate 
IEEE 802.11 2.4 - 2.4835 FHSS 2 Mbps 
IEEE 802.11 2.4 - 2.4835 DSSS 2 Mbps 
IEEE 802.11b 2.4 - 2.4835 DSSS 11 Mbps 
Table 4. Maximum data rates for WLANs 
5. Use of wireless LANs in the nuclear environment 
The WLAN technology based on the IEEE 802.11 standard has a very promising future for 
its use in nuclear power plants due to features like mobility, reliability, security, 
scalability and compatibility with other communication networks technologies in order to 
provide new services such as voice over IP (VoIP) and IP video (Shankar, 2003). A key 
issue of these technologies is that no wires are needed to implement new services. 
Currently, WLAN technology is been installing and evaluating in nuclear power plants, 
due to it provides enhanced features compared to traditional wireless communications 
technologies such as conventional mobile radio in two key aspects: higher operation 
frequencies and lower output power which translates in very high data rates and very low 
electromagnetic interference. However, wireless technology may exhibit greater 
vulnerability to the nuclear power plant EMI/RFI environment than existing 
instrumentation and control systems. The typical environment in a nuclear power plant 
includes many sources of electromagnetic interference (EMI), radio-frequency interference 
(RFI), and power surges, such as hand-held two-way radios, arc welders, switching of 
large inductive loads, high fault currents, and high-energy fast transients associated with 
switching at the generator or transmission voltage levels. Hence, operational and 
functional issues related to safety in the nuclear power plant environment are required to 
address the possibility of troubles and malfunctions in instrumentation and control 
systems caused by EMI/RFI and power surges.  
The wireless communications technologies that can be implemented in nuclear power plants 
include paging systems, mobile radio, cellular systems and wireless local area networks 
(WLANs). Recently, there has been a significant increase in the use of wireless technology in 
nuclear power plants. For example, wireless technology has been installed and evaluated in 
nuclear power plants by utility companies throughout the U.S., Canada, Mexico, Europe, 
and worldwide (Bahavnani, 2001; Telrad Connegy, 2001; Wireless Magazine, 1995). Wireless 
technology has many applications in the industry, including cellular phone systems, paging 
systems, two-way radio communication systems, dose management in nuclear power 
plants, remote monitoring and tracking systems, and operator logs (EPRI, 2004a). In 
addition, EPRI has reported the following case studies: Exelon´s Peach Bottom Nuclear 
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Power Plant, Texas Utilities Comanche Peak Nuclear Station, and in the San Onofre Nuclear 
Generating Station de la Southern California Edison (EPRI, 2004b). Other application cases 
of wireless technology in nuclear power plants in the U.S. include: Nine Mile Point Nuclear 
Station, Robinson Nuclear Plant (CP&L) and in the Seabrook Nuclear Power Plant (Shankar, 
2003; SpectraLink, 2004; Kjesbu, S. and Brunsvik T., 2000). 
6. Mobile IP telephony system for a nuclear power plant 
Mobile IP telephony is the new generation of communications networks that makes possible 
the convergence of voice and data over wireless local area networks. It refers to the 
transmission and reception of voice conversations over wireless IP data networks. This 
technology combines data networks with mobile technologies to support voice and data 
applications over a common integrated network. A key advantage of IP telephony is that it 
allows the transmission of voice signals from wireless telephones over IEEE 802.11 wireless 
LANs connected to an IP network backbone, being either a public network (Internet) or a 
private network (Intranet). IP telephony is designed to replace the legacy TDM (time 
division multiplexing) technologies and networks with an IP-based data network. Digitized 
voice will be carried in IP data packets over a LAN and/or WAN network. A major aspect 
involved in a voice conversation using mobile IP telephony is the conversion of analog or 
digital voice signals from conventional phones to IP packets for further transmission either 
to a fixed or mobile phone, over an IP network.  
This section presents the design considerations for the implementation of a mobile IP 
telephony system for voice communications applications in Laguna Verde nuclear power 
plant (CNLV), Federal Commission of Electricity (CFE), Mexico based on national and 
international standards as well as, the technical requirements that commercially available 
equipment must meet. In addition, the technical requirements of a mobile IP management 
system are presented.  
6.1 Components of the mobile IP telephony system 
One of the main requirements of a mobile IP telephony system is that the proposed system 
must meet the design technical requirements for its exclusive operation in a nuclear power 
plant in Mexico. Regarding standardization, it must meet national and international 
standards and regulatory guides applicable to nuclear power plants. Also, this system will 
operate upon the existing CNLV´s data backbone which is based on Gigabit Ethernet 
switching technology. The model proposed in this work for the mobile IP telephony system 
is showed in figure 3 and it is composed of the following components:     
 Voice gateway 
 Priority server 
 Wireless Access points (AP) 
 Wireless telephones 
The voice gateway provides the conversion of analog or digital voice signals from 
conventional phones to IP packets for further transmission to any access point connected to 
the CNLV´s IP data network backbone. The priority server has as a main function to assign 
priorities according to the type of traffic to be sent over the network, in order to give the 
highest priority to voice packets guaranteeing in this way high quality voice conversations. 
The wireless access points have as a main function to interconnect the portable wireless 
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mobile telephones to the CNLV´s backbone. The functionality of the proposed system shall 
be so good that allows any user located in a wireless coverage area using a conventional 
analog or digital telephone connected to a private branch exchange (PBX) equipment to 
make calls and communicate with any other user located in some other area carrying a 
wireless telephone assigned to an access point or having nearby a conventional wired 
telephone.  
 
 
Fig. 3. Mobile IP telephony system for the CNLV nuclear plant, Mexico. 
In addition, a network management system for the mobile IP telephony system is proposed. 
It is composed of a server and the network management software which will allow 
visualizing all network components such as access points, wireless telephones, voice 
gateways, priority server and airspace by means of a human machine interface (HMI). Next, 
the technical requirements that every component of the proposed mobile IP telephony 
system shall meet, are presented.       
6.2 Technical requirements of the mobile IP telephony system 
The proposed mobile IP telephony system shall support voice over IP communication 
applications within the CNLV controlled areas. Regarding standardization, it must meet 
national and international standards and regulatory guides applicable to nuclear power 
plants. The components of the wireless system shall be compatible with IEEE 802.11b 
standard (IEEE, 1999b), use direct sequence spread spectrum (DSS) a modulation technique 
and support a data rate of 11 Mbps. The systems must operate in the ISM (Industrial, 
Scientific and Medical) band from 2.4 to 2.4835 GHz, according to the NOM-121-SCT-94 
standard (CCNNT, 2001) from the Mexican Normalization in Telecommunications 
Consultative Committee. The maximum output power radiated form the wireless 
components shall be 100 mW. The system shall be composed of industrial type equipment 
for use in nuclear power plants and must meet the acceptable electromagnetic interference 
(EMI) and radiofrequency interference (RFI) ranges for electronic equipment operating in 
frequencies above of I GHz, established in the regulatory guide 1.180 (NRC, 2003), issued by 
the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). The system must meet military 
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levels of electromagnetic emissions, electromagnetic compatibility and electromagnetic 
interference susceptibility for electronic equipment operating in the frequency range from 1 
GHz to 10 GHz, according to MIL-STD-461E (DoD, 1999) military standard. Also, the system 
must meet the applicable electromagnetic interference and radiofrequency interference 
standards from the International Special Committee on Radio Interference (CISPR), the 
International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) as well as, from the Institute of Electrical 
and Electronics Engineers (IEEE).  
The system must meet the technical requirements of electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) 
and radiofrequency interference contained in the IEC-61000 (IEC, 2002) set of standards. It 
must meet national and international wireless communication standards such as NOM-121-
SCT-94 (CCNNT, 2001), FCC Part 15.247 (FCC, 2004), IEEE 802.3 (IEEE, 2002) and IEEE 
802.11b (IEEE, 1999b). Regarding the system components, they must be designed to operate 
in risky and severe environments such as: high humidity levels, temperature, radiation, 
noise, vibration, shock, as well as in controlled levels in a nuclear power plant. Regarding 
security, the system shall provide military like high security levels by using data encryption 
techniques as integral part of the voice over IP communication system. Also, the system 
must use robust electronic equipment and provide an availability at least of 99.999%, 
considering a redundant and fault tolerant communications architecture, as well as an 
uninterruptible power supply (UPS) with the aim of avoiding the system collapse.      
The system shall be designed with the necessary security and authentication levels in order 
to deny the access to private information of validated users or their privileges by means of 
interception and modifications of their data messages. In addition, it must provide high 
confidentiality in order to guarantee very high efficiency in the activation and deactivation 
of voice conversations, data messages, control messages or authentication passwords. With 
regard to availability, then mobile IP telephony system must guarantee the continuous voice 
communications between mobile users using wireless telephones and the access points 
installed in and out the CNLV power plant. Regarding wireless telephones, the system must 
handle 64 spread spectrum wireless telephones per unit, being 128 in total to serve the 2 
units available to the CNLV. 
6.2.1 Voice bandwidth 
In the traditional voice world a single T1 leased line is used to carry 24 digital channels of 64 
Kbps, toll quality telephone calls from the public switched telephone network (PSTN). In its 
turn, those with a private point-to-point T1 connection can compress the voice to less than 
64 Kbps bandwidth for more efficiency, but the quality may be sacrificed. The three most 
common modulation schemes for encoding voice are: 
 64 Kbps (PCM)/1.544 Mbps = 24 simultaneous calls on a T1 
 32 Kbps (ADPCM)/1.544 Mbps = 48 simultaneous calls on a T1 
 8 Kbps (CELP)/1.544 Mbps = 120 simultaneous calls on a T1 
Bandwidth use and voice compression play an important role in provisioning the 
LAN/WAN. 
6.2.2 Voice over IP bandwidth 
The concept of combining traditional voice on data networks is simple because voice traffic 
uses a lot less bandwidth than traditional LAN-based computer networks. A single toll-
quality phone call over the public network uses 64 Kbps in each direction – that’s only 
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0.0625% of a 100 Mbps full duplex link. On a 100 Mbps Ethernet network, each voice call 
takes up to 85.6 Kbps (64 Kbps + IP header + Ethernet header) in each direction supporting 
up to 1,160 calls over a full duplex link. On a Gigabit backbone, up to 11,600 simultaneous 
calls can be handled. 
6.2.3 Voice gateway 
The voice gateway has as main function to provide the conversion of analog or digital voice 
signals from conventional phones to IP packets for further transmission to any access point 
connected to the CNLV´s IP data network backbone. For the implementation of the mobile 
IP telephony system, it is required to integrate the analog or digital voice circuits from the 
private branch exchange (PBX) Harris equipment model 20-20L installed in the CNLV to a 
voice over IP system based on an Ethernet wireless LAN, and compatible with the IEEE 
802.11b standard (IEEE, 1999b). This function must be carried out by the proposed voice 
gateway. Next, the most relevant technical requirements the voice gateway shall meet are 
presented.   
Regarding the functional characteristics, the proposed voice gateway must provide the 
interface between an enterprise PBX and a wireless LAN network by supporting digital 
and/or analog line interfaces, and shall provide the voice encoding and packetization 
required to transmit telephone conversations over an IP network. It must provide RJ-21 
physical interfaces for its connection to the PBX, as well as a RJ-45 interface for connection 
to an Ethernet LAN. It must provide the necessary control signaling to the host PBX 
allowing wireless telephone users to access all the features and capabilities of the PBX. 
The setting up of voice connections and the control of voice calls within the voice gateway 
shall support a wide variety of packet-oriented protocol standards such as ITU-H.323 
(ITU, 2009), RFC3261 (IETF, 2002), ITU-H.248.1 (ITU, 2005) or a subset of these protocols. 
Also, the voice gateway shall support H.323-compliant clients, allowing third-party 
wireless devices to make and receive calls through the host PBX. In addition, the voice 
gateway must provide coding and decoding of voice packets according to VoIP 
compression standards such as ITU-G.711 (ITU, 1988), ITU-G723.1 (ITU, 2006)or ITU-
G.729 A/B (ITU, 2007) with design characteristics that enhance the quality of the voice 
signals to be transmitted providing silence suppression and echo cancellation functions 
according to the ITU-G.168 standard (ITU, 2009).  
With regard to security and availability, the voice gateway to be used in a nuclear power 
environment shall meet military requirements of electromagnetic interference emissions, 
compatibility and susceptibility specified in MIL-STD-461E (DoD, 1999) and IEC-61000 (IEC, 
2002) standards. In its turn, it must meet security technical requirements applicable to 
electronic communication equipment stated in the IEC-60950 (IEC, 2005) standard or other 
equivalent standards like UL-60950 y EN-60950. 
6.2.4 Priority server 
The proposed priority server has as a main function to recognize and to assign priorities to 
voice and data packets according to the type of traffic to be sent over the network, in order 
to give the highest priority to voice packets to reduce the voice packets time delay and 
causing the minimum impact on data throughput, guaranteeing in this way high quality 
voice conversations. Next, the most relevant technical requirements the priority server shall 
meet are presented.   
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The proposed priority server shall use a packet filtering mechanism to guarantee a high 
quality of service (QoS) to voice packets with the possibility of a transparent migration of 
the system to the IEEE 802.11e standard (IEEE, 2005) when it has been ratified. It must has 
the capacity of supporting up to 120 simultaneous voice calls, provide an Ethernet 100Base-
T port with a RJ-45 connector, support full-duplex transmission compatible with the IEEE 
802.11b standard (IEEE, 1999b) for operation in Wi-Fi WLANs and also, it must be capable 
of supporting native VoIP protocols and interfaces provided by the proposed voice gateway.  
With regard to the WLAN monitoring, the priority server shall provide a RS-232 interface 
for configuration and diagnostics purposes, WLAN connection indicators, system activity, 
collisions events and error state indicators. It shall support local mode configuration by 
using the RS-232 and USB interfaces or support remote mode configuration by using the 
Telnet application protocol over a LAN or WLAN.  
Regarding the operational conditions, the priority server shall support an operation 
temperature range from 0° C to 40° C, relative humidity between 0% and 95% non-
condensed, and a supply voltage of 110/220 VAC at an operation frequency of 60 Hz.     
6.2.5 Wireless access points 
The proposed wireless access points have as a main function to interconnect the portable 
wireless mobile telephones to the CNLV nuclear power plant´s data backbone. According to 
the normative defined by the Mexican Normalization in Telecommunications Consultative 
Committee (CCNNT, 2001) as well as, for the CNLV nuclear power plant environment 
operating conditions, the access points providing the wireless communication links to the 
mobile telephones must operate in the ISM frequency band, from 2.4 to 2.4835 GHz an must 
use a maximum output radiated power of 100 mW. Next, the most relevant technical 
requirements the wireless access points shall meet, are presented.   
For the implementation of the wireless VoIP application, the proposed wireless access points 
shall are required to be compatible with the IEEE 802.11b (IEEE, 1999b) standard, use direct 
sequence spread spectrum modulation technique and support a data rate of 11 Mbps. With 
regard to security, the wireless access points shall provide very high security mechanisms to 
voice and data packets during transmissions of voice conversations by supporting at least the 
WEP (Wired Equivalent Privacy) encryption technique with 128 bit keys, and the possibility of 
easily migrate to the WPA (Wi-Fi Protected Access) encryption scheme, as well as to support 
the security mechanisms included in the IEEE 802.11i standard (IEEE, 2004).  
Other security functions are desirable such as continuous airspace monitoring, detection and 
blocking of access points that are not part of the CNLV´s data backbone, etc. The wireless 
access points shall be compatible with quality of service mechanism supported by the 
proposed priority server and the voice gateway, with the possibility of migrating in a 
transparent manner to the IEEE 802.11e (IEEE, 2005) when it has been ratified. The physical 
distribution and the number of the wireless access points installed in the CNLV nuclear 
power plant must guarantee a wireless coverage area of 100 % in each controlled area so the 
use of dual external antennas shall allow a much better distribution of electromagnetic 
signals radiation pattern so that no black spots exist.       
In order to improve the reliability and availability of the mobile IP telephony system, the 
wireless access points shall provide two 10/100 Mbps Ethernet ports one for physical 
connection and the other one for a backup network segment. The power supply for the 
wireless access points shall be provided by means of a UTP network cable supporting Power 
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over Ethernet (PoE) mechanism, according to the IEEE 802.3af standard (IEEE, 2003). In 
addition, it is recommended that each wireless access point shall provide an independent 
110/220 VAC voltage input.   
The legislation that the wireless access points must meet, includes the regulation emitted by 
the Federal Communications Commission, FCC Part 15.247 (FCC, 2004) for digitally 
modulated intentional radiators devices, and the security and electromagnetic interference 
requirements (DoD, 1999), (IEC, 2002), (IEC, 2005), in order to respect the acceptable 
electromagnetic interference and radiofrequency ranges for electronic communication 
equipment operating at frequencies above 1 GHz according to the Nuclear Regulatory 
Guide 1.180 (NRC, 2003), emitted by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.  
6.2.6 Wireless telephones 
The proposed wireless telephones will be used by personnel working in the external areas of 
the CNLV nuclear power plant, conducting fieldwork so that they have to be robust 
designed for using in industrial and nuclear power plants, in particular. Next, the most 
relevant technical requirements the wireless telephones shall meet, are presented.   
The wireless telephones shall be compliant to the IEEE 802.11b (IEEE, 1999b), H.323 (ITU, 
2009), G.711 (ITU, 1988), G.729 (ITU, 2007) standards as well as to VoIP protocols emitted by 
international standards bodies. Besides, they must support the capability of sending and 
receiving short text messages via open application interface. The wireless telephones shall 
support both static and dynamic (DHCP) IP addressing configuration and must operate in 
the ISM frequency band, from 2.4 to 2.4835 GHz, according to the NOM-121-SCT-94 
standard (CCNNT, 2001), issued by the Mexican Normalization in Telecommunications 
Consultative Committee. They shall be compliant to the IEEE 802.11b (Wi-Fi) standard 
(IEEE, 1999b), use direct sequence spread spectrum (DSSS) modulation technique and 
support data rates of 11, 5.5, 2 and 1 Mbps, which must be automatically selected according 
to the communication channel conditions and voice quality of service.  
With regard to radiated power, the wireless telephones shall produce a maximum transmission 
power below 100 mW (20 dBm), which must be automatically adjusted in order to have always 
the same radiated power level. They shall provide very high security mechanisms to voice and 
data packets during transmissions of voice conversations by supporting at least the WEP (Wired 
Equivalent Privacy) encryption technique with 128 bit keys, and the possibility of easily migrate 
to the WPA (Wi-Fi Protected Access) encryption scheme, as well as to support the security 
mechanisms included in the IEEE 802.11i standard (IEEE, 2004).  
In addition, the proposed wireless telephones shall provide an LCD backlit dot matrix 
display with icons and line-status indicators with the aim of visualizing the entire display in 
darkness conditions. They shall support the instant communication feature known as push-
to-talk (PTT) by using IP multicast addresses. This requires that multicasting be enabled on 
the subnet used for the wireless telephones, priority server, and voice gateway. They shall 
provide an integrated TFTP client in order to allow remote software updates via the TFTP 
(Trivial File Transfer Protocol) application. Also, wireless telephones must be lightweight 
with a weight less than 200 grams.  
6.3 Mobile IP management system 
In addition to the mobile IP telephony system, a network management system is proposed. 
It consists of the network management server and the network management software. Next, 
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the most relevant technical requirements the network management system shall meet, are 
presented.   
The proposed network management server shall provide the following minimum capacities: 
1.8 GHz processor (Pentium IV), 256 MB RDRAM, internal 40 GB hard disk, a CD-ROM 
unit, a 20” color monitor, and a 10/100 Mbps Ethernet network card. For its part, the 
network management software must be capable of visualizing all components of the mobile 
IP telephony system such as access points, wireless telephones, voice gateway, and priority 
server) as well as the airspace. With regard to capacity, the network management software 
shall provide management functions like configuration, performance monitoring, fault 
detection, network statistics, and security, among others. Regarding functionality, it shall 
support functions such as discovering, configuring and monitoring all access points 
connected to de CNLV data backbone, allowing the configuration all wireless devices 
specified in the design of the mobile IP telephony system with just one click.      
In addition, the network management system shall provide management tools such as 
monitoring and measurement of the wireless network performance (delay, throughput, etc.), 
used and available bandwidth, wireless network use, among others parameters. It shall 
provide wireless network statistics such as transmitted and received signal level, number of 
transmitted and received IP packets, frequency deviations, and changes in data rate for each 
access point.  
With regard to security, the network management system must be a centralized-type 
system, and be capable of providing the mobile IP telephony system with a high level of 
security by means of monitoring both the physical network devices and the wireless pace 
used by the system. Also, it shall detect most of wireless network cyber attacks including 
massive attacks, intrusions, impersonation, sniffers, denial of service (DoS), etc., and finally 
the network management system must has the ability to perform remote software upgrades 
to wireless telephones from the network management´s central station. 
6.4 Implementation of the mobile IP telephony system at CNLV 
In this section, an example of use of the proposed mobile IP telephony system for voice 
communications applications in Laguna Verde nuclear power plant (CNLV) is presented. 
Once the design considerations for the implementation of a mobile IP telephony for voice 
communications applications were carried out, the Federal Commission of Electricity (CFE), 
Mexico began the system acquisition phase with an international bidding in order to have a 
winner.  Then, the components of the mobile IP telephony system such as: access points, 
voice gateway, priority server, and wireless telephone, etc., were supplied and installed in 
the selected controlled areas of the CNLV nuclear power plant. After this, the 
implementation phase began. The acquired mobile IP telephony system was installed at 
CNLV´s telecommunications room, and now it is operating upon the existing CNLV´s data 
backbone which is based on Gigabit Ethernet switching technology. The system provides 
communication applications such as telephony and voice over IP. 
Another example of use of wireless LAN technologies in the nuclear power plant environment 
from the previous project is that, CFE has initiated a new implementation phase consisting of 
the introduction of wireless IP video technology with the aim of having a true integrated data, 
voice and video system using the same CNLV´s network infrastructure. The proposed IP 
video system will be used for remote video monitoring and video surveillance within the 
CNLV nuclear power plant taking advantage of the IEEE 802.11b/g standard-based wireless 
Design Considerations  
for the Implementation of a Mobile IP Telephony System in a Nuclear Power Plant 
 
81 
network technology already installed. The main components of the system are: wireless IP 
video cameras, massive storage unit (terabyte network attached storage), and a video 
monitoring and surveillance station. The proposed IP video system which will be integrated to 
the existing wireless network is shown in figure 4. 
 
 
Fig. 4. Proposed wireless IP video system for the CNLV nuclear plant, Mexico. 
7. Conclusions 
In this chapter, the design considerations for the implementation of a mobile IP telephony 
system for voice communications applications in Laguna Verde nuclear power plant 
(CNLV), Federal Commission of Electricity (CFE), Mexico based on national and 
international standards were presented. Also, this work gave an analysis of the most 
relevant wireless technologies currently available that can be implemented in nuclear power 
plants and also identified nuclear regulatory guidelines, wireless networks standards, 
electromagnetic and radio-frequency interference standards. With regard to the use of 
wireless LANs in the nuclear environment, there is clear evidence that the electromagnetic 
interference and radio-frequency interference conditions can adversely affect the 
performance of safety-related instrumentation and control equipment. EMC is an element of 
addressing that requirement. Operational and functional issues related to safety in the 
nuclear power plant environment are required to address the possibility of troubles and 
malfunctions in instrumentation and control systems caused by electromagnetic emissions 
(EMI/RFI) from wireless technology. On the other hand, WLAN technology based on the 
IEEE 802.11 standards, has a very promising future for its use in nuclear power plants, due 
to its features like mobility, reliability, security, scalability and compatibility with other 
technologies. Currently, WLAN technology is been installing and evaluating in nuclear 
power plants worldwide, due to it provides enhanced features compared to traditional 
wireless technologies such as conventional mobile radio in two key aspects: higher 
operation frequencies and lower output power, which translates in very high data rates and 
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very low electromagnetic interference. With regard to system design, a mobile IP telephony 
system based on wireless local area networks which will operate upon the existing CNLV´s 
data backbone, has being proposed. In addition, the technical requirements that each 
commercially available component system must meet for its correct operation regarding the 
compliance with national and international standards, recommendations, regulatory guides, 
reliability and availability metrics, and security mechanisms, were established. Within the 
most important aspects identified in this work, are that the mobile IP telephony system must 
meet the design technical requirements for its exclusive operation in a nuclear power plant 
in Mexico, as well as to compliant to existing national and international standards applicable 
to nuclear power plants. Finally, the technical requirements of a network management 
system consisting of a network management server and network management software for 
the mobile IP telephony system, have been specified. 
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1. Introduction 
This chapter discusses the basic requirements for the design and algorithms of operation of 
a multi-parametric, synergistic sensory network – Smart Synergistic Security Sensory 
Network or Net4S – specially adapted for operation at nuclear power plants or other 
potentially dangerous sites. This network contains sensors of different types and is capable 
of analyzing the dynamics of environmental processes and predicting the most probable 
events. The discussion includes analysis of: 1) the technical aspects of operability of the 
sensors, optical and electrical telecommunication channels, and computers in the presence 
of ionizing radiation; 2) the influence of environmental parameters on the sensors’ accuracy 
and network operability; and 3) the development of simulators capable of advising safe 
solutions based on the analysis of the data acquired by the Net4S. Such a real-time operating 
network should monitor: (1) environmental and atmospheric conditions – chemical, 
biological, radiological, explosive, and weather hazards; (2) climate/man-induced 
catastrophes; (3) contamination of water, soil, food chains, and public health care delivery; 
and (4) large public/industrial/government/military areas. Military personnel, police 
officers, firefighters, miners, rescue teams, and nuclear power plant personnel may use the 
mobile terminals (man-operated vehicles or unmanned robots) as separate multi-sensor 
units for local and remote monitoring.  
Among different types of sensors, only optical laser sensors can respond immediately and 
remotely. Such sensors can simultaneously monitor several gases, vapours, and ions with 
the help of single tunable laser; however, the use of several lasers operating at different, well 
separated wavelengths, dramatically improves accuracy and reliability, and increases the 
number of monitored substances. The Net4S, monitoring a number of parameters inside and 
outside a Nuclear Power Plant (NPP), can serve as the security, safety, and controlling 
system of the NPP. 
Besides the technical issues, the chapter also discusses the social aspects of the Nuclear 
Power Plants’ design, construction, and exploitation. Some power consumption-free 
technologies that significantly improve the reliability of the Nuclear Power Plant are 
discussed.   
In principle, open access publishing is a purely commercial project. After submitting a paper 
to classical journals, the author should wait for a relatively long time and should fight with 
the reviewers – the “narrow specialists” are the author’s competitors and usually state that 
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everything is known, that the subject of publication is not interesting, and that the author is 
of low qualification. The “wide specialists” do not understand what the paper is about and 
criticize in general – the current tendency in science and technology are out of the subject 
that the author discusses, that any laser now can be bought off the shelf, and so on. Because 
of this paradox, a lot of the papers that were later nominated for prestigious awards were 
initially rejected. In some sense, open access publishing is free from these disadvantages. 
However, since the publisher should generate maximum profits from this activity, the high 
requirements for the quality of publications are difficult to be completed.   
The next argument is then why so critically select the papers if, anyway, no one can or 
wants to estimate the real value of new papers. At the same time, open access publications 
have one very serious advantage. Government experts mostly write in reports what their 
chiefs expect to hear from them, post-graduate students write to please their supervisors, 
and Professors write proposals on subjects that the funding agencies declare in calls, and so 
on. These are because, directly or indirectly, all these categories are payable from the “top 
publishers”. So, once a funding agency declares a solicitation for the investigation of ozone 
hole, a lot of researchers demonstrate how dangerous the hole is. As soon as the funding 
ends, nobody remembers what the ozone hole is.   
A somewhat different situation is present with open access publishing: the author pays for 
the publication, so he/she is almost free not to lie. However, other public requirements, 
such as generating more publications before a thesis defense, getting a Professorship 
position, or being awarded by a Government or private agency push people to publish 
something. Thus, they invest money in future benefits. No one is absolutely honest and 
those who believe that they are, very often have limited knowledge of the subject they 
discuss and analyze. The ways to develop a really safe and effective Nuclear Power plant  
are very twisted and long. The NPP is very big, complex, expensive to be built and proven 
in different variants. Drosophila flight is much more perfect in design and implementation 
since the generation time is several tens of hours, not tens of years as it is for NPPs. Until 
now, the problem of design and safe exploitation of a NPP is very challenging and 
uncertain.        
The author of this chapter is a specialist in laser physics and optical sensors, not in atomic 
physics or its applications. However, Dr. I. Peshko was working in Kyiv, Ukraine at the 
moment of Chernobyl’s “peaceful explosion” and watched the reaction and behavior of 
regular people, academics, government organizations, and researchers. These observations 
can be very useful for analytical specialists who develop general principles of design, 
exploitation, and control of the NPPs. In such a “twilling zone” as the NPP, the probabilistic 
estimation of a single independent person may sometimes be more valuable than official 
reports and opinions of specialists. The bottom line is that official reports are typically 
prepared by specialists and officials to protect themselves and to hide their past mistakes, 
not to protect the future of millions of people. Every time I think about Chernobyl’s events, I 
remember my mother who spent all her life as a housekeeper in a small town in Northern 
Ukraine and understood nothing about atomic energy. One day, when a radio broadcast 
informed us about the government’s decision to build Chernobyl’s Nuclear Power Plant, my 
mother said, “My feelings are very bad. How is it possible to construct a nuclear station in a 
place that is a source of water for tens of millions of people?” As I laughed, I replied, “The 
Chief of the Atomic energy program promised to install his bed on the top of the reactor to 
demonstrate how safe a reactor is.” Unfortunately, time has shown how wrong the best 
specialist was and how right a regular housekeeper was.                   
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2. Synergistic sensory network 
2.1 Threat classification  
Nuclear Power Plants are strategically important objects that may be affected by internal 
and external threats. Consequently, a NPP is considered a potential source of danger to its 
surroundings and, in turn, environmental elements – natural, artificial, and human factors – 
are potential dangers for a NPP. 
Five types of possible threats potentially affecting the NPP are: 
1. Natural catastrophes; 
2. Technological (internal and external) problems resulting in emergencies; 
3. Terrorist threats; 
4. Personnel and security staff sabotage; 
5. Scientific uncertainty and scams. 
The first and second threats in the list above were widely discussed and documented during 
the initial stages of the development of nuclear technologies. The third threat became 
extremely evident after the 9/11 attacks and until now, is a very popular topic of discussion 
at different public and government levels. The fourth threat may be linked with both 
internal and external country sources and may have criminal and political backgrounds. 
Finally, the fifth threat, to our knowledge, is discussed for the first time in this book. It is not 
an issue for detailed discussion here but this is a very serious problem of modern and future 
life. The falsification of scientific results; demonstrations of non-existing products or 
unachieved parameters on the Internet; publication of preliminary, “fast” materials in 
numerous journals; and awarding grants on the basis of relationships rather than merit 
result in unpredictable events with critical technologies. 
I would like to present one example from my personal experiences. A very famous 
Canadian Professor, whom I was working with, proposed a thin diffractive grating filled 
with a biological material as a biosensor. The more specific substance the grating 
accumulates, the stronger the diffraction is. This works in some range of small changes in 
grating strength. However, the Bessel function that describes the diffraction process of the 
thin grating has multiple zero points (solutions); in other words, for several different amounts 
of measured substance, the output signal will be the same. I gently mentioned that this kind 
of technology cannot be used for sensor applications and two weeks later, was fired for 
some formal reasons. If a tenured Professor of a famous University does not know the 
properties of the Bessel functions, this is very bad. However, if the Professor knows this and 
hides it just to receive a grant for the “development” of critical technology, this is much 
worse.           
In attempts to forecast the future, the principle question is: if we know that we don’t know, 
how do we develop a probabilistic solution of the problem with minimal material losses? 
How can we estimate and forecast of “unpredictable” events? First of all, we need to collect 
maximal real-time flows of information. To control the situation inside and outside of a 
NPP, the Sensory Network should monitor several zones: a) core (reactor) area; b) plant 
building and surrounding territory; c) 30-km radius zone (the Chernobyl tragedy showed 
that the strongest radioactive poisoning happened within a 30-km zone); d) in North 
America: Mexico - USA - Canada region (depending on the specific plant location). Thus, a 
NPP is a duplex element of the global security network. It needs to accept information from 
near and far environmental areas, and information regarding what is going on inside the 
NPP should be retrievable from any control station in the country.                 
 
Nuclear Power – Control, Reliability and Human Factors 
 
88
The safety zone classification depends on the reactor construction, type of emergency, 
population density, and the locations of other industrial plants. In the case of the recent 
Fucushima reactors catastrophe in Japan, the officials specified 5-km and 20-km evacuation 
zones.  
2.2 Principles of 4SNet 
The development of a Global Monitoring Security Network is the main task on route to 
several scientific, technological, business, military, and political directions of modern life. 
Such a real-time operating network should monitor: (1) environmental and atmospheric 
conditions: chemical, biological, radiological, explosive, and weather hazards; (2) 
climate/man-induced catastrophes; (3) contamination of water, soil, food chains, and public 
health care delivery; (4) large public/industrial/government/military areas. Such a system 
is expected to consist of mobile robotic and stationary platforms, equipped with a set of 
portable environmental sensors that are connected to the monitoring centers. Each sensor 
should be a self-registering, self-reporting, plug-and-play unit that uses unified electrical 
and/or optical connectors and operates with the IP communication protocol. Military 
personnel, police officers, firefighters, miners, rescue teams, and nuclear power plant 
personnel may use the mobile terminals (man-operated vehicles or unmanned robots) as 
separate multi-sensor units for local and remote monitoring. Some of the objects being 
monitored require special attention, such as nuclear and chemical plants, offshore oil 
platforms, mines, military ammunition production facilities, and so on. The Net4S 
components must operate at varying pressures and temperatures; at indoor and outdoor 
conditions; be immune to mechanical, thermal, electro-magnetic and radiological noise; and 
be able to operate in case of electrical blackouts.  
In different areas of the reactor and surrounding territories, different types of sensors can be 
installed. This makes it possible to map temperature, ionizing radiation of different types, 
gas molecules and ion concentrations, vapors, and presence of dust particles. The 
overlapping of all these maps and reconstruction of their dynamics can predict what will 
happen in the close future. During several initial cycles of reactor operation in a “manual 
regime”, the dynamics of all parameters should be recorded and analyzed. During the next 
routine operation, the total network should permanently measure the data, map them, and 
compare with previously averaged data. If even small changes of parameters are 
accumulated along time, this is a sign for alarm. It does not matter which parameter is out of 
the norm. A negligible event may initiate a catastrophe: a cup of coffee left by a personnel 
on the operational panel may flip over and cause damage to the electronics located under 
the desk. Of course, everyone can tell me that nobody is permitted to drink coffee on the 
command desk, and I absolutely agree, but I definitely know that real life is much richer 
with possibilities than any designer or programmer can imagine.  
During the design stage, any chains of possible undesirable events should be simulated and 
analyzed. Let us continue the hypothetical “flipped coffee” example. Because of the short 
circuit in the desk electronics, several high power circuits in the power commutation station 
are simultaneously activated. This results in a fire and uncontrollable activation of the fuel 
reloading system that, in turn, results in the quick heating and destruction of the reactor. This 
example is naïve, very simplified, and may never be realized in practice due to specific reactor 
construction details and algorithms of operation; however, it helps to understand that to 
design a nuclear reactor, psychologists and specialists in the traditions of different cultures 
should be involved, not just specialists in nuclear physics. Previous background and 
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experience are very important as well. In case of a sudden earthquake, people who experience 
it for the first time will chaotically look around; those who have survived a strong earthquake 
may be in panic, but will run away as fast as possible. In both cases the reactor may be out of 
personnel control. So, it is better if the territory around the plant is supplied with sensors that 
can measure the amplitude of impact, activate the reactor shut down system, and sound 
alarms for the personnel. An even better solution is one where the Global Security Network 
can directly and automatically inform the NPP that a tsunami is approaching.   
2.3 Reliability of an inhomogeneous network 
In order to improve reliability, sensor redundancy (using multiple instances of a sensor) can 
be implemented; however, adequateness (ensuring the measured signal pertains only to 
specific parameters) is still not guaranteed. In real life, it is practically impossible to isolate a 
single process and be certain that the measurement is related to just one variable. A readable 
sensor signal may appear as a result of one “strong” interaction with an object, or several 
indirect interactions that affect the sensor in the same way as the “strong” one. Thus, the 
problem of reliability is apparent in these measurements, especially if we need to measure in 
unexpected, unpredictable, and unfriendly conditions. As a simple example: some house 
fire alarm sensors are typically activated every time someone takes a shower; both water 
and fire are interpreted as the same entity by the sensor. These sensors were tested for fire 
emergency events and definitely work well in corresponding conditions; however, nobody 
thought to test them in high humidity conditions, an absolutely "opposite" range of 
application. The result of this is that after several false alarms people typically turn off a fire 
alarm sensor. Thus, the adequateness of measurements is questioned every time. 
A sensory network, where the sensors operate in different physical domains, should be 
used. This creates an inhomogeneous network with a variety of sensors capable to perform 
joint analyses and mapping of different datasets.  
References (Peshko, 2007; Matharoo, 2010) discuss a concept of an “inhomogeneous 
network”. This network combines a set of different types of sensors to measure different 
parameters (sub-networks), and different types of sensors that measure the same parameter 
but based on different physical phenomena. For example, temperature can be measured by a 
bi-metallic thermometer (mechanical thermo-deformation), by a thermocouple thermometer 
(a junction between two different metals that produces a voltage related to a temperature 
difference), and can be calculated from the gas optical absorption spectra (spectral line 
broadening is proportional to the temperature). Evidently, in this hierarchy, the simplest 
implementation (and one that does not require any power supply) is the bi-metallic 
thermometer. It may not give information very precisely, but it does “survive” in harsh 
conditions. In an inhomogeneous network, the sensors synergistically collect and analyze 
information that individual sensors cannot. This information may be used as a rough 
measurement for evaluation of more sophisticated multi-parametric processes. If one knows 
the local temperature of a gas even with relatively low accuracy, the gas concentration 
remote measurement based on spectroscopy principles may be many times more accurate 
than if the temperature is unknown. 
The sensor network should be analyzed and tested very carefully for the possibility of very 
rare but theoretically possible scenarios: due to strong irradiation, signals may saturate the 
transmittance of the processing system that may be interpreted as no signal or a very weak 
signal.      
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The required ability to interface with different sensors poses a challenge in maintaining a 
high level of overall system reliability. Using duplicate sensors for the same task decreases 
the probability of failure. If different sensors are used, each type of sensor needs to be 
rigorously tested to identify its most appropriate ranges and conditions of operation. Once 
this data is available for all the different types of sensors, an algorithm will be deployed to 
choose the sensor that has the likelihood of providing the most accurate reading at those 
environmental conditions. This provides a base platform for synergistic reliability. The best 
way is if the same set of parameters, such as level of radiation, temperature in some specific 
places, humidity, and presence of some gases or ions, can be measured locally and remotely. 
A difference in data, being acquired by local and remote sensory networks, means that 
"something is wrong".  
A typical situation in science and technology is one when different groups of scientists and 
engineers developing devices working in the same area of research or technology fight with 
each other, proving which technology is better, cheaper, more accurate, and so on. For such 
sites as a NPP, the “single best choice” is unacceptable as nobody can predict for sure which 
technology will survive longer and would be more accurate in some unexpected conditions.  
The data acquired at a NPP should be accessible (monitored) at plant command station but 
the NPP's personnel should not have access and ability to modify these data. They should be 
transferred to the external command and processing center. Even in cases when the data 
seems incorrect or “stupid”, they should be transferred and analyzed together with data 
from surrounding areas. A meteorite can be registered by seismic, gaseous, and temperature 
sensors 5 km away from a NPP and this can be interpreted by the NPP’s security network 
and personnel as a nuclear bomb explosion. In any case, the reactor cannot be stopped 
immediately, so each minute is crucial when preparing for critical events.             
2.4 Synergistic cross-data 
In an inhomogeneous, multi-level security network, each sensor, first of all, is responsible 
for measuring some specific parameters; at the same time, it supplies other sensors with 
some additional information that serves for more accurate measurements, more precise 
description of the investigated multi-parametric phenomena, and for the development of 
some conclusions about the characteristics of monitored events. Typically, the smart 
sensory network uses a set of sensors that control some secondary phenomena but still 
help in evaluation of the main process. For example, the level of ionizing radiation around 
a reactor in a power plant can be monitored with a set of scintillators; however, the 
concentration of the ionized air over the reactor can be measured well remotely and the 
radiation level can be estimated. Of course, this is not a direct measurement and it 
strongly depends on the reactor construction and principles of operation. Though, in case 
of an emergency, such estimations can be done from hundreds or even thousands of 
meters away from danger zones. Being preliminarily calibrated, this technique can 
provide quite accurate measurements.         
To introduce the concept of an “inhomogeneous network of synergistic sensors”, consider a 
simple example. If your home thermometer, barometer, and humidity meter show values of 
28C, 750 torr, and 70% respectively, considering these devices individually, one can 
conclude that the weather is beautiful. Now, a synergistic complex, which is actually a set of 
different sensors – humidity, temperature, pressure, oxygen, methane, carbon 
oxide/dioxide, etc. – tells you that during the last two hours, the pressure fell from 770 to 
750 torr, the humidity increased from 45% to 70%, the temperature increased by 3C, and 
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the concentration of methane in your kitchen increased from 0.0002% to 0.2%. The dynamics 
of pressure, humidity, and temperature readings tell you that a hurricane is approaching, 
while the methane reading tells you that there is a gas leak in the house. Each separate 
reading does not say something terrible, but the history of parameter changes may predict 
that the roof of your house (that you were going to repair), may be destroyed by a hurricane, 
and because of the methane explosion, your house will be on the news.       
A very important feature of the synergistic sensory complex is its ability to predict events; 
thus, the complex can alert you that the current, “beautiful” environmental data is just the 
beginning of a critical event. As another example, all gasoline stations are supposed to be 
equipped with fire alarm sensors; however, no one has considered implementing detectors 
for the presence of explosive materials or checking the quality of the electrical ground of fuel 
tanks and electronic equipment at the station. Potential sources of sparks, burned cigarettes, 
or explosive materials should be monitored before the fire starts and is then detected. Thus, 
the fire alarm sensory network should be “inhomogeneous” – it must contain different types 
of sensors capable of synergistically analyzing different scenarios.  
A combination of several sensors can provide an estimation of an environmental event or 
emergency. For example, in case of a fire, CO, CO2, H2O vapour, and other specific gases 
(CxHy, NOx) are emitted. However, the temperature and relative concentrations of these 
gases are different in the case of burning gasoline, wood, or plastic. A smart, multi-gas, 
multi-functional sensor would be able to tell the difference between a well-done BBQ on the 
stove versus a stove on fire. The difference is in the corresponding gas concentrations and 
character of light. A flame is chaotically modulated whereas a lamp over the stove irradiates 
light with constant intensity.  
By referencing the measured concentrations with a database and analyzing the deviations in 
environmental conditions, the sensory platform can immediately generate the most 
plausible reason for the emergency. Analysis of space-time event maps and weather 
conditions will help to remotely identify the event and predict its dynamics.  
3. Natural inhomogeneous network 
It is often said that nature is the best creator, and that after many years of evolution, we 
are all products of good design. Our bodies are complex systems comprising of sensors, a 
central processing unit, and actuation devices. The human sensory-network is an example 
of a “well-designed” system. Every day, we use our senses of smell, touch, taste, hearing, 
balance, and vision, and although different sensors located throughout the human body 
register these sensations, the information gathered is sent through the same neurons to 
the brain, where it is processed and interpreted. After the data is processed and a decision 
is made, the “CPU center” activates a movable platform – the body. The decision made is 
based on information extracted from sensors specializing in different domains, i.e. 
analysis of electromagnetic fields, mechanical vibrations, chemical reactions, etc. The 
design of new technology is often driven by efforts to mimic designs found in nature. The 
problem is how to develop a “smart” sensory network for a power plant and environment 
monitoring that operates in a similar fashion to its biological counterpart, yet is capable of 
performing tasks not possible by natural sensory-organs, in an effort to increase public 
and private security. 
As an additional example, imagine that you say to your significant other that you love them. 
You then receive feedback signals from different information channels – verbal responses, 
facial expressions, body movement, breathing patterns, etc. Each separate channel may 
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generate a false signal or no signal, e.g. they may close their eyes, but is it because they are 
happy or afraid to say “no”?   
If any sensor/channel of information fails, the total human ability drops down; however, 
because of synergistic inhomogeneity, a human still operates, i.e. visually impaired people. 
Another very interesting capability of the human sensory network is that if one channel 
fails, the other ones increase sensitivity to compensate for the lost data set. This is why 
visually impaired people often have an “absolute musical” hearing and can easily recognize 
similar sources of sound belonging to different objects, i.e. the footsteps of different people. 
How to teach or train the 4SNet for these capabilities is not currently clear.           
4. How and what to do? 
From an initial glance, the market is full of different types of sensors; however, there are still 
some gaping holes. For example, there are many methane sensors on the market, but 
thousands of miners around the world still die each year due to methane asphyxia or 
explosions. Similar arguments can be made for carbon monoxide sensors. NASA still 
announces a competition for the development of O2, CO, and CO2 sensors for extra-
terrestrial missions; military and recreational divers still lack compact, reliable, and long-
lasting sensors for the control of breathing gases; soldiers still die from roadside bombs; and 
airport security systems still do not detect explosives well. Current tendencies in advanced 
technologies pertain to the development of simple, cheap hardware and sophisticated 
software. Each sensor measures something; the deficiency, however, is in the interpretation 
of the data, shifting the problem from the real to the virtual world – complicated software 
might be more unpredictable and unstable than complicated hardware. However, it is much 
cheaper to correct software and to reload processors than to repair or upgrade millions of 
sensors. 
To summarize, we then pose the following question: What are the basic requirements for a 
“universal”, portable alarm sensor capable of operating on a movable robotic platform or in 
a life-supporting system? Such a sensor should demonstrate: 
1. Immediate response; 
2. Reliability: several processes are used to measure one parameter; 
3. Multi-functionality: one process is used to measure several parameters; 
4. Operability in hard environmental conditions; 
5. Cheap, effective, simple hardware; 
6. Sophisticated, “smart” software; 
7. Low power consumption; 
8. Self-calibration ability; 
9. Synergistic data processing; 
10. No additional external devices: pumps, calibrator, power supplies; 
11. Immune to thermal, radiation, and mechanical noise; 
12. Compatible with other sensors, sensory networks, and scientific instruments.   
5. Nuclear power plant operational conditions 
A nuclear power plant is a very specific object where the requirements for the Net4S are 
especially high. There are some technical problems in the sense of network exploitation. The 
optical elements (fibers, lasers, optics) can be colored under ionizing radiation. The main 
 
Smart Synergistic Security Sensory Network for Harsh Environments: Net4S 
 
93 
components of electronics (semiconductor materials) are affected by such radiation as well. 
The penetrating radiation can affect the computer and electronics operation without even 
physically destroying these elements, resulting in the generation of false signals through the 
system. So, the optical sensors have some troubles, operating in this area.  
In space, nuclear power, and other scientific applications, optical glass may be exposed to 
high-energy radiation like gamma-, electron, proton, and neutron radiation. With the 
accumulation of higher doses, this radiation changes the transmittance of optical glass 
especially near the UV-visible edge of the spectrum. The investigations of resistance of 
glasses versus ionizing radiation were intensively provided in 50’s; these investigations 
were connected with research on nuclear bomb action on optical devices and other 
techniques.        
Generally speaking, a long history of space exploration and NPP exploitation has 
accumulated enough knowledge on safe operation of opto-electronic devices at regular 
reactor conditions. However, for emergency cases, the sensory network should be protected 
so as to survive in catastrophes similar to the one in Chernobyl. First of all, a circuit of well-
protected sensors should be installed on the perimeter of the NPP to supply the “outside” 
world with information in case the internal system is down. As this chapter is oriented for a 
wide range of readers, let us consider very shortly the problems in design and construction 
of internal opto-electronic sensors. 
Firstly, any glass components (fibers, objectives, prisms, filters, etc.) located in the reactor 
and surrounding zones can be affected by ionizing radiation. Ionization caused by photon 
and particle radiation, changes the transmittance of optical glasses (Friebele, 1974; Schott, 
2007; Sigel, 1974; Smith, 1964). An absorbed radiation dose of 10 Gy (10J energy of absorbed 
ionizing radiation by 1 kg of matter) gamma radiation leads to recognizable loss in 
transmittance over the complete visible spectral range. The decrease of transmittance is most 
significant at the UV-edge of the spectrum. Most glasses become unusable for optical 
applications if the radiation is increased to 100 Gy. The intensity of the color change does 
not only depend on the type of radiation dose but also on the energy of the ionizing 
radiation and the radiation dose rate.  
Optical glasses can be stabilized against transmittance loss caused by ionizing radiation by 
adding cerium to the composition. The extent of stabilization depends on the glass type. In 
general, the higher the cerium content, the more the glass is stabilized against higher total 
doses but the more the intrinsic transmittance is reduced. In addition, the impact to the color 
change by addition of cerium depends on the glass matrix. 
Most of the modern technological and telecom lasers work within the 1-2 microns 
wavelength range. So, the ionizing irradiation affects the transparency of glasses mostly in 
the wavelength range where the typical lasers do not work.  
It should be mentioned that most of the currently operating NPPs have been designed and 
built 20-40 years ago. During this time, a lot of new radiation-protected technologies have 
been developed. One techno-cluster that absorbs a lot of new, specially developed 
technologies is the Large Hadron Collider (which started to work in 2010). These 
technologies are extreme radiation-resisting plastics, micro-cables, and radiation detectors. 
These technologies were designed to survive the radiation levels that are equivalent to a 
100-megaton nuclear bomb explosion. Now is definitely the time to use them on old and 
new NPPs.     
Generally speaking, all semiconductor devices are very sensitive to ionizing radiation. 
The attempts to use robots on the Chernobyl NPP failed very fast. The fact that 
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semiconductor devices irradiated by nuclear bomb ionizing and radio pulses stop 
operating tens of kilometers around a bomb explosion is well known. However, old 
electronic bulb devices still survive despite being very close to the epicenter (if not 
destroyed mechanically). So, two variants are possible: 1) all robot controllers and other 
electronics units should be located in a protected cabin with a cable connected to the robot 
engines, or 2) the electronics should be designed with old-fashioned components that are 
very insensitive to ionizing radiation. 
6. Located on-robot 
A sensor system for a reconnaissance mobile robot must monitor many environmental 
parameters; however, in miniature systems, we cannot simply combine several different 
sensors because of weight, size, and power consumption limitations. Therefore, all available 
processes and information gathered from sensor-environment interactions should be used 
for monitoring these different parameters. 
The current tendency in the development of technologies for dangerous sites is the 
application of mobile robots. Such systems are under intensive development in Japan, USA, 
Canada, China, and the EU. Robots, as “environmental” guards, have some advantages and 
disadvantages. From one side, having limited “intellectual” abilities, a robot cannot find 
probabilistic solutions for unexpected problems. On the other hand, a robot has no human 
characteristics such as panic, fatigue, or narcotic/alcohol dependency that can suppress 
normal human abilities. The most useful and current application for a robot is as a carrier of 
sensors with preprocessing of the data. Regular reconnaissance robots may be applied 
without limitation within a NPP zone. However, to increase the emergency protection of the 
robots within the core (reactor) and secondary (building and territory) zones, the robots 
should be designed with high radiation and temperature protection. 
A mobile robot with multi-gas sensors and a multifunctional spectrometer on-board is 
capable of identifying more than a hundred gases, liquids, and solids, locally and remotely. 
Such a system can be additionally supplied with a non-linear microscope, cameras, 
rangefinders, a laser-ultrasound scanner, and other techniques for detailed scanning of the 
environment and atmospheric conditions. This system is under development at several 
industrial companies and Universities in Canada: 1) Engineering Services, Inc. (Toronto) 
(ESI, n.d.), University of Toronto (Department of Mechanical and Industrial Engineering) 
(RAL, n.d.), P&P Optica, Inc. (Waterloo) (P&P Optica, n.d.).        
The end-goal is to develop a smart sensory network for environmental monitoring, which is 
capable of performing tasks not possible by natural sensory-organs, in an effort to increase 
public and private security (Peshko, 2007; Matharoo, 2010). As the first step in achieving this 
goal, the design of an integral part of the proposed smart sensor-network: an all-in-one, 
multi-gas, photonic sensor (for CO, CO2, CH4, N2O, O2, and H2O vapor sensing) is provided. 
The sensory platform also houses independent total-pressure and temperature sensors, 
infrared, ultraviolet, and -ray radiation detectors.  
7. Catastrophe simulator: Computer forecasting of processes and events 
The problems of continuous reliability and adequateness are apparent in measurements, 
especially if we need to measure in some unexpected, unpredictable, and unfriendly 
conditions. Sometimes, occasional combinations of the sensor signals may be interpreted as 
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an alarm signal, and, sometimes, at really dangerous situations, the alarm system “is 
sleeping” because an unpredictable interference of the environmental parameters may mask 
the real event. Thus, modeling the environmental processes together with the reactor’s 
operational processes is necessary. This includes mapping the internal temperature and 
pressure parameters (dependent on the external ones), radioactive background during the 
reload process of technological elements and normal standard operation, and other 
repair/maintenance operations. A simulator will help check a number of situations that may 
or may not have happened in real life over thousands of years. Additionally, analyzing 
space-time event-maps and weather conditions will help to remotely identify the event and 
predict its dynamics. The end-goal is to develop a smart sensor-network for monitoring a 
nuclear power plant and its surrounding areas to estimate the most probable means that are 
necessary to predict and prevent catastrophic events. 
A full size simulator should include: 1) Modeling of meteorological conditions (in case of 
an emergency, the area located along the wind path should be alarmed first); 2) 
Temperature 3D map: the heating/cooling plant model (sun/wind action, reactor 
operation, air-conditioning operation) should be taken into account – is it an internal 
source of unexpected heating or are external current factors resulting in local internal 
heating; what are the amplitudes of possible construction stresses in case of catastrophes); 
3) Map of the over-ground and underground rivers, big water reservoirs; 4) Possible 
action of earthquakes, hurricanes, and other natural phenomena; 5) Modeling of the 
security system and problems with its operation in case of a catastrophe, cyber or direct 
terrorist attacks, errors, and emergencies. 
8. Reactor zone security monitoring 
The general reason for an alarm in any type of the security system is, “something is wrong”. 
This concept is not connected with any specific technology. It is based on pre-calibrated 
standard scenarios and logical chains of events that typically happen if “everything is right”. 
For example, let us consider the monitoring of personnel motion inside some protected 
zone: 
1. Someone inserts a card key into the (corridor) door (does not matter who as the key 
may be stolen); 
2. The cameras monitoring the door space confirm a moving object (it does not matter 
who (what) is imaged on monitors, as the security system may be hacked and some 
recording transferred to the monitors); 
3. The motion sensors confirm that something is moving along the corridor; 
4. The sound analyzers confirm that the sound spectrum of steps belongs to a person who 
did open a door (codes of the key), the person is alone, and moves along the way 
he/she is authorized to walk.  
Non-confirmation at any stage of the described chain results in the activation of an alarm. In 
this case, the most important thing is not the right signal at each stage that may be falsified 
or not mentioned by security personnel, but the right sequence of actions with some specific 
signs at each stage.  
If no motion is detected by the cameras (comparing pixel information variations, not by 
motion sensors!) for 20-30 seconds in the security room, it means that the security guards are 
neutralized or sleeping; an alarm should be activated automatically. This algorithm can be 
applied in any protected zone: banks, treasures, military sites, and so on.       
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It is very important that the same logic and the same sensors can be used for NPP safety 
control.           
9. After 9/11 
After the events of 9/11, governments are paying more attention to the protection of 
NPPs. USA’s Congressional Research Service published open documents that describe the 
main requirements for the newly designed plants and propose the means for protection of 
old operating units. These documents are focused on analyses of NPP vulnerability to 
terrorist attacks (Holt, 2007) and general problems of NPP security and vulnerability 
(Holt, 2010). I cite here some key paragraphs from these documents because of their high 
importance. 
“Nuclear plant security measures are designed to protect three primary areas of 
vulnerability: controls on the nuclear chain reaction, cooling systems that prevent hot 
nuclear fuel from melting even after the chain reaction has stopped, and storage facilities for 
highly radioactive spent nuclear fuel. U.S. plants are designed and built to prevent dispersal 
of radioactivity, in the event of an accident, by surrounding the reactor in a steel-reinforced 
concrete containment structure. 
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) approved its final rule amending the design 
basis threat (DBT) (10 C.F.R. Part 73.1) on January 29, 2007, effective April 18, 2007. 
Although specific details of the revised DBT were not released to the public, in general the 
final rule  
 clarifies that physical protection systems are required to protect against diversion and 
theft of fissile material; 
 expands the assumed capabilities of adversaries to operate as one or more teams and 
attack from multiple entry points; 
 assumes that adversaries are willing to kill or be killed and are knowledgeable about 
specific target selection; 
 expands the scope of vehicles that licensees must defend against to include water 
vehicles and land vehicles beyond four-wheel-drive type; 
 revises the threat posed by an insider to be more flexible in scope; and 
 adds a new mode of attack from adversaries coordinating a vehicle bomb assault with 
another external assault. 
In October 2006, NRC proposed to amend the security regulations and add new security 
requirements that would codify the series of orders issued after 9/11 and respond to 
requirements in the Energy Policy Act of 2005. The new security regulations were 
approved by the NRC Commissioners on December 17, 2008, and published March 27, 
2009: 
 Safety and Security Interface. Explicit requirements are established for nuclear plants to 
ensure that necessary security measures do not compromise plant safety. 
 Mixed-Oxide Fuel. Enhanced physical security requirements are established to prevent 
theft or diversion of plutonium-bearing mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel. 
 Cyber Security. Nuclear plants must submit security plans that describe how digital 
computer and communications systems and safety-related networks are protected from 
cyber attacks. 
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 Aircraft Attack Mitigative Strategies and Response. As discussed in the earlier section 
on vulnerability to aircraft crashes, nuclear plants must prepare strategies for 
responding to warnings of an aircraft attack and for mitigating the effects of large 
explosions and fires. 
 Plant Access Authorization. Nuclear plants must implement more rigorous programs 
for authorizing access, including enhanced psychological assessments and behavioral 
observation. 
 Security Personnel Training and Qualification. Modifications to security personnel 
requirements include additional physical fitness standards, increased minimum 
qualification scores for mandatory personnel tests, and requirements for on-the-job 
training. 
 Physical Security Enhancements. New requirements are intended to ensure the 
availability of backup security command centers, uninterruptible power supplies to 
detection systems, enhanced video capability, and protection from waterborne 
vehicles.” 
From my point of view, these documents do not pay enough attention to the tendencies of 
modern weapons. It is much harder to protect a NPP from small, truck-launched weapons 
than from a big rocket sent from a plane or ship hundreds of kilometers away from the 
NNP. 
It is interesting to note that the problems that took place at Fucushima’s reactors (after 
earthquake) were listed in the NRC documents listed above. So, these documents and the 
NPP live their own independent life: corporate interests stand higher than the security of the 
entire country.   
Technological monitoring of a power plant includes the control of radiation level (all types 
of ionizing radiation), temperature, humidity, and some ions and gases that may appear as a 
result of normal technological process or abnormal situations, for example, CO2 or CO, 
CxHy, and NOx in case of a fire. However, the gas monitoring system should also monitor 
explosive vapours, nerve/blister agents, and other substances that can be used in terrorist 
actions or during preparing for such actions.  
10. Some simple ideas 
The key issue is electrical consumption – feeding the security network and coolers for  
the reactors and burned fuel. The special attention zone is reserve electrical generators 
and pumps for cooling systems. The recent catastrophe (March 2011) in Japan definitely 
demonstrated that a reserve generator should be mounted on the damping pyramid  
with height two times higher than any tsunami or other floating debris potentially 
affecting the generator. It would be nice to introduce a technique where if the reserve 
generator is not checked once a year, the NPP should automatically slow down to a safe 
power minimum, and no NPP personnel, government official, or president of the NPP 
operating company can turn off the “shut down” option. The best way is to install a 
generator out of the NPP territory with several power lines going to the NPP by different 
ways. The cooling loops should be duplicated and triplicated (as much as engineers 
would decide). It is strongly recommended to have a lot of small pumps instead of fewer 
high power pumps. 
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The best option is to build a reservoir of alarm cooling liquid capable of autonomously 
operating the coolers until the NPP slows down to a safe level. 
Every day, on my way to work, I see big tanks of water along the road in each municipality. 
A relatively low-power pump delivers water to the tank 25-m high and after that, the water 
runs to consumers without any pumping. So why this extremely simple technology, which 
was actually developed during the times of ancient Rome, is not used as an emergency 
reserve cooler that can work until the risk crew reconstructs a source of electricity to support 
the main pumps’ operation?                               
Analysis of the recent cyber attacks around the world shows that from time to time, higher 
and higher protected entities, like banks, governments, and big corporations that put in 
extra efforts to protect their sites and databases, are successfully hacked. It is time to 
develop special interfaces that have no electrical (wire/wireless) contact between the inside-
outside zones of the protected segments of the network. 
11. Conclusions  
This chapter discusses the principles of development of a Smart Synergistic Security Sensory 
Network for Harsh Environments: Net4S. It includes an analysis of: 
 the technical aspects of operability of the sensors, optical, and electrical 
telecommunication channels, and computers in the presence of ionizing radiation;  
 the influence of environmental parameters on the sensors’ accuracy and network 
operability;  
 the development of simulators capable of advising safe solutions based on the analysis 
of the data acquired by the Net4S; and  
 social aspects of the Nuclear Power Plant design, construction, and exploitation.  
In total, such a real-time operating network should monitor: 
 environmental and atmospheric conditions: chemical, biological, radiological, 
explosive, and weather hazards;  
 climate/man-induced catastrophes;  
 contamination of water, soil, food chains, and public health care delivery; and  
 large public/industrial/government/military areas.  
The end terminals of the system consist of mobile robotic and stationary platforms, 
equipped with a set of portable environmental sensors that are connected to the monitoring 
centers. Each sensor should be a self-registering, self-reporting, plug-and-play unit that uses 
unified electrical and/or optical connectors and operates with the IP communication 
protocol.  
To control the situation inside and outside a NPP, the Sensory Network should monitor 
several zones:  
 core (reactor) area;  
 plant building and surrounding territory;  
 10-30 km radius zone; and  
 entire country and neighboring territories. 
A concept of an “inhomogeneous network” is also introduced. This network combines a set 
of different types of sensors to measure different parameters (sub-networks), and different 
types of sensors that measure the same parameter but based on different physical 
phenomena. The Net4S aims to solve several problems simultaneously: 
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 the detection and estimation of critical events by a synergistic sensory-network,  
 higher reliability of multi-substance sensors based on different operational principles; 
and  
 prediction of critical events based on a history of monitored parameters. 
The reactor area should be monitored by a network of local sensors and by the network of 
remote sensors, in case the core zone is in a state of emergency.   
Among different types of sensors, only optical laser sensors can respond immediately and 
remotely. Such sensors can simultaneously monitor several gases, vapours, and ions with 
the help of one laser; however, the use of several lasers operating at different wavelengths, 
dramatically improves accuracy and reliability, and increases the number of monitored 
substances. A synergistic sensory network can monitor the background optical losses 
(scattering), environmental pressure, temperature, and humidity. 
The Net4S, monitoring a number of parameters inside and outside a Nuclear Power Plant, 
can serve as the security, safety, and controlling system of the NPP. 
The most critical parts of the cooling systems should be self-operable: the water should be 
delivered from the highly located tank by free running without any pumps.  
In total, the security system should identify natural events (hurricane, earthquake, 
abnormally high or low temperatures and pressures), unauthorized access to the NPP 
(terrorist attack, hacker’s attack) and wrong personnel actions.  
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An Approach to Autonomous  
Control for Space Nuclear Power Systems 
Richard Wood and Belle Upadhyaya 
Oak Ridge National Laboratory & The University of Tennessee, 
United States of America 
1. Introduction 
Under Project Prometheus, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) 
investigated deep space missions that would utilize space nuclear power systems (SNPSs) to 
provide energy for propulsion and spacecraft power. The initial study involved the Jupiter 
Icy Moons Orbiter (JIMO), which was proposed to conduct in-depth studies of three Jovian 
moons. Current radioisotope thermoelectric generator (RTG) and solar power systems 
cannot meet expected mission power demands, which include propulsion, scientific 
instrument packages, and communications. Historically, RTGs have provided long-lived, 
highly reliable, low-power-level systems. Solar power systems can provide much greater 
levels of power, but power density levels decrease dramatically at ~1.5 astronomical units 
(AU) and beyond. Alternatively, an SNPS can supply high-sustained power for space 
applications that is both reliable and mass efficient.  
Terrestrial nuclear reactors employ varying degrees of human control and decision-making 
for operations and benefit from periodic human interaction for maintenance. In contrast, the 
control system of an SNPS must be able to provide continuous operation for the mission 
duration with limited immediate human interaction and no opportunity for hardware 
maintenance or sensor calibration. In effect, the SNPS control system must be able to 
independently operate the power plant while maintaining power production even when 
subject to off-normal events and component failure. This capability is critical because it will 
not be possible to rely upon continuous, immediate human interaction for control due to 
communications delays and periods of planetary occlusion. In addition, uncertainties, rare 
events, and component degradation combine with the aforementioned inaccessibility and 
unattended operation to pose unique challenges that an SNPS control system must 
accommodate. Autonomous control is needed to address these challenges and optimize the 
reactor control design. 
1.1 State of the technology 
To support JIMO development, Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) and the University 
of Tennessee (UT) conducted an investigation of autonomous control. Overviews of 
autonomous control characteristics, capabilities, and applications were found that establish 
the existing experience and current technology readiness (Antsaklis & Passino, 1992; 
Astrom, 1989; Chaudhuri et al., 1996; Passino, 1995; Zeigler & Chi, 1992; Basher & Neal, 
2003). The desirable characteristics of autonomous control include intelligence, robustness, 
optimization, flexibility, adaptability, and reliability. 
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Control systems with varying levels of autonomy have been employed in robotic, 
transportation, spacecraft, and manufacturing applications. However, autonomous control 
has not been implemented for an operating terrestrial nuclear power plant, and there  
has not been any experience beyond automating simple control loops for space reactors. 
Current automated control technologies for nuclear power plants are reasonably mature, 
and basic control for an SNPS is clearly feasible under optimum circumstances. 
Autonomous control is primarily intended to account for non-optimum circumstances when 
degradation, failure, and other off-normal events challenge the performance of the reactor, 
and near-term human intervention is not possible. There are clear gaps in the development 
and demonstration of autonomous control capabilities for the specific domain of nuclear 
power operations.  
1.2 Advanced control in nuclear power applications 
In the nuclear power industry, single-input, single-output classical control has been the 
primary means of automating individual control loops. The use of multivariate control, such 
as three element controllers for steam generators, has been employed in some cases. In a few 
cases, efforts were made to coordinate the action of individual control loops, based on an 
overall control goal, and extend the range of automated control.  
The application of most advanced techniques for nuclear power control has primarily been 
the domain of universities and national laboratories. Some of the techniques employed in 
controls research for both power and research reactors include adaptive robust control for 
the Experimental Breeder Reactor II (EBR-II), fuzzy logic control for power transition, H-
infinity control and genetic-algorithm based control for steam generators, neural network 
control for power distribution in a reactor core, and supervisory control for the multi-
modular advanced liquid-metal reactor (ALMR). Proceedings of past American Nuclear 
Society (ANS) International Topical Meetings on Nuclear Plant Instrumentation, Control 
and Human-Machine Interface Technologies provide a useful compendium of findings from 
such research activities (ANS, 1993, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2006, 2009, 2010). In recent research for 
the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), UT demonstrated aspects of near-autonomy for a 
representative SNPS design through the development of a model-predictive controller using 
a simulation of the SP-100 reactor system (Upadhyaya et al., 2007; Na & Upadhyaya, 2007). 
The approach demonstrated the fault-tolerance and reconfiguration features of the control 
strategy. 
1.3 Autonomy in space exploration 
NASA has pursued autonomy for spacecraft and surface exploration vehicles (e.g., rovers) 
to reduce mission costs, increase efficiency for communications between ground control and 
the vehicle, and enable independent operation of the vehicle during times of 
communications blackout. For rovers, functional autonomy addresses navigation, target 
identification, and science package manipulation. For spacecraft, functional autonomy has 
focused on automated guidance, navigation, and control. 
Autonomy for rovers has progressed during the last decade with prominent examples from 
efforts to explore the surface of Mars. The Mars Pathfinder rover, Sojourner, explored the 
Martian terrain beginning in July 1997 (Mishkin et al., 1998). The Sojourner had very limited 
autonomy to enable navigation and provide for resource management and contingency 
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response. Because it only provided supervised autonomy, repetitive ground monitoring was 
required. In January 2004, Spirit and Opportunity, the twin Mars Exploration Rovers 
(MERs), began a surface exploration mission that has continued into 2011. These rovers 
employ expanded autonomy over what was feasible for Sojourner and provide model-based 
recovery, resource management, and autonomous planning capabilities in addition to 
autonomous obstacle detection and navigation. The integration software architecture used 
to facilitate MER autonomy is the “Coupled Layer Architecture for Robotic Autonomy” or 
CLARAty (Volpe et al., 2001). CLARAty provides a dual-layer architecture consisting of a 
decision layer for artificial intelligence (AI) software and a functional layer for controls 
implementations. Implicit granularity in each layer allows for a functional hierarchy with 
nested capabilities.  
Spacecraft autonomy has been demonstrated with the Deep Space 1 mission. Deep Space 1 
was launched in October 1998 as a test platform to validate high-risk advanced technologies 
in space (Rayman et al., 1999). In support of autonomous navigation of the spacecraft, a 
principal experiment involved demonstration of the remote agent (RA) AI system for on-
board planning and execution of spacecraft activities.  
2. Autonomous control functional definition 
2.1 The nature of autonomy 
There is a distinction between automated control and autonomous control. Consideration  
of the Greek root words illustrates the difference. Automatos means self-acting, while 
autonomos means independent. Similarly, automated control involves self-action, while 
autonomous control involves independent action. Autonomous control implies an 
embedded intelligence. Although automation includes at least a limited inherent authority 
within the control system, automated control often consists of straightforward automatic 
execution of repetitive basic actions. It is clear that autonomous control encompasses 
automated control.  
Automated control provides control actions that result from a fixed set of algorithms with 
typically limited global state determination. As a result, automated control is often 
implemented as rigidly defined individual control loops rather than as fully integrated 
process/plant control. Although automated control requires no real-time operator action for 
normal operational events, most significant decision-making is left to the human rather than 
being incorporated as part of the control system. In contrast, autonomous control integrates 
control, diagnostic, and decision capabilities. A flexible functional architecture provides the 
capability to adapt to evolving conditions and operational constraints and even support self-
maintenance over the control system lifetime. While automated control is common in 
numerous applications, autonomous control is more difficult to achieve, and the experience 
base is very limited.  
Autonomy extends the scope of primary control functions. Such capabilities can consist of 
automated control during all operating modes, process performance optimization (for 
example, self-tuning), continuous monitoring, and diagnosis of performance indicators as 
well as trends for operational and safety-related parameters, diagnosis of component health, 
flexible control to address both anticipated and unanticipated events and to provide 
protection of life-limited components (such as batteries and actuators), adaptation to 
changing or degrading conditions, and validation and maintenance of control system 
performance. 
 
Nuclear Power – Control, Reliability and Human Factors 
 
104 
Key characteristics of autonomy include intelligence, robustness, optimization, flexibility, and 
adaptability. Intelligence facilitates minimal or no reliance on human intervention and can 
accommodate an integrated, whole system approach to control. It implies embedded decision-
making and management/planning authority. Intelligence in control provides for anticipatory 
action based on system knowledge and event prediction. To support control and decision, 
real-time diagnostic/prognostic capabilities are important for state identification and 
health/condition monitoring. Additionally, self-validation is an aspect of intelligence that 
addresses data, command, and system performance assessment and response. 
In addition to providing an environmentally rugged implementation, robustness is addressed 
by accounting for design uncertainties and unmodeled dynamics. Fault management is an 
important consideration in achieving robustness. Fault management involves techniques such 
as fault avoidance, fault removal, fault tolerance, and fault forecasting. Robustness can also 
involve self-maintenance or self-healing. This capability is promoted through means such as 
captured design knowledge and self-correcting features, prognostics to identify incipient 
failure, and fault detection and isolation. 
Optimization implies rapid response to demands, minimal deviation from target conditions, 
and efficient actuator actions. Optimized control can be facilitated by self-tuning and other 
forms of adaptation. Flexibility and adaptability are enabled by diverse measurements, 
multiple communication options, and alternate control solutions. Functional reconfigurability 
facilitates the effective use of these systems options, while an inherent redesign capability 
permits adaptation to unanticipated conditions. 
The characteristics discussed above represent the possibilities of autonomy, but they do not 
constitute a necessary set. Therefore, autonomous control can be viewed as providing a 
spectrum of capabilities with automated control representing the lowest extreme or baseline 
of the continuum. The incorporation of increasing intelligence and fault tolerance moves the 
control capabilities further along the spectrum. The higher degrees of autonomy are 
characterized by greater fault management, more embedded planning and goal setting, and 
even self-healing. The realization of full autonomy involves learning, evolving, and 
strategizing independent of human interaction or supervision. 
2.2 Space nuclear power mission challenges 
The space reactor control and protection paradigm is different from conventional terrestrial 
reactor applications. Terrestrial reactors have relied upon immediate interaction from 
readily available human resources. This includes varying degrees of direct human control 
and decision-making for operations and periodic human intervention for maintenance and 
refurbishment. In contrast, the SNPS control system must be able to provide continuous, 
remote, often-unattended operation for a mission lasting up to a decade or more. Because of 
communication delays and blackouts, immediate human interaction for continuous 
operational supervision and event management is not feasible. This isolation drives the need 
for a high level of autonomy. Because of launch considerations, size and mass constraints 
significantly limit the options for redundancy and diverse systems. This limitation drives 
the need for functional and environmental robustness. Because of distance from the Earth 
for deep space or planetary surface power applications, maintenance and refurbishment are 
improbable if not impossible. This inaccessibility drives the need for long-life dependability. 
Also, because of the critical and time-sensitive nature of some spacecraft maneuvers, space 
reactor power must be available on demand. This operational imperative, coupled with the 
likelihood that an SNPS restart capability will be unavailable, requires that reactor scrams as 
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a response to plant events must be minimized if not completely avoided. Thus, unlike the 
design criteria for terrestrial nuclear power plants, mission assurance must be emphasized 
over reactor protection for space reactors. 
Automated control can provide the necessary automation of normal operational control to 
permit ground control personnel to assume a supervisory role for an SNPS rather than 
taking on direct, active control responsibilities. This control capability for full-power range 
maneuverability, including startup, has been developed and demonstrated for terrestrial 
reactors (Winks et al., 1992). However, considering the challenges of a deep space mission, 
the SNPS control system must do more than provide automated control of normal 
operational activities. In addition to automation, the control system must provide a level of 
autonomy that can detect, diagnose, and adapt to evolving conditions (e.g., failures or 
degradation) as well as rapidly respond to anticipated events without requiring a reactor 
scram. As a result, autonomous control is clearly necessary to ensure the successful 
application of an SNPS for deep space missions. This conclusion is based on the 
understanding that autonomous capabilities permit the SNPS control system to satisfy 
essential control objectives under significant uncertainties, disturbances, and degradation 
without requiring any human intervention. In a sense, the role of the autonomous control 
system is to act as an extension of and occasional proxy for the ground-based human 
operators to ensure reliable, continuous operation of an SNPS over an extended lifetime 
under adverse conditions.  
2.3 Space Nuclear Power System control 
Autonomous control functions of an SNPS can be defined based on the expected operational 
modes, which include startup, normal power operation, reactor protection, contingent 
operation, and end-of-mission shutdown. As a minimum requirement of autonomy, the 
SNPS control system must be able to switch between normal operational modes 
automatically (i.e., automated control). Additionally, reactor protective action must be 
available if the desired operational conditions cannot be achieved.  
The phases of power operation include power ascension, steady state power and load 
following, and power reduction. Under normal conditions, power operation can be 
relatively simple, with inherent feedback effects serving to maintain stability and provide 
the means for load following in response to minor fluctuations. Thermal load transients 
(e.g., turbine failure) can be treated as off-normal events. Other off-normal events include 
design uncertainties, load/power interruptions, control element jamming, control motor 
burnout, control linkage failure, unintended control element motion, actuator signal 
interruption or interference, heat rejection system degradation or damage, control processor 
fault, rare-event software error, sensor failure, sensor signal interruption or interference, 
sensor drift, signal conditioning electronics drift, sensor noise increase, and communication 
failures or retransmissions. The most likely protective action would consist of a rapid power 
runback. Contingent operation occurs when SNPS operation may be restricted either 
because of environmental limitations, such as an abnormal thermal environment, or because 
of power system limitations, such as component failures. 
The response to off-normal events is where autonomy becomes especially relevant. The 
autonomous response includes a reflexive element and a deliberative element. The first 
element addresses reactor protection. Unlike terrestrial reactors, in which the primary 
defense against potentially adverse conditions resulting from off-normal events is to 
scram the reactor, it is quite likely that an SNPS must not shut down until the end of the 
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mission because a restart capability may not be feasible. Thus, reactor protection  
is provided through diversity and defense-in-depth to anticipate potential challenges to 
power operation. A limitation system is one means of protecting the reactor. This is 
accomplished by defining acceptable operational regimes and overriding control actions 
that would drive the reactor conditions to violate the limitation boundaries. In effect, the 
limitation system acts as a bounding system whose primary purpose is to provide a check 
against operations outside of analyzed conditions. The principal response of the limitation 
system would be to run back the reactor power to assume a safe low-power condition 
when necessary. Because of the operational imperative that power must remain available 
during critical spacecraft actions for deep space missions, the SNPS control system must 
provide the capability to switch out the protection element (or at least expand  
the operational boundaries it maintains) on demand from the spacecraft or mission 
control. 
The second element of the response to off-normal events addresses mission assurance. The 
deliberative nature (i.e., determination and decision) of this element contributes the most 
relevant attribute of autonomous control that distinguishes it from conventional 
automation. In the operational control context, the autonomous control functionality 
involves detection and immediate response to degraded or failure conditions. Fault 
management is a crucial part of this element of autonomous control; it provides for 
detection, diagnosis, and adaptation (or reconfiguration) given changing SNPS conditions. 
An additional aspect of the deliberative element is the monitoring, diagnosis, and validation 
of control system and SNPS performance. Through this capability, the SNPS control system 
is able to identify incipient events (transients or failures) for anticipatory rather than 
reactionary action, determine measures to protect life-limited or vulnerable components, 
and ensure continued dependable operation of the power plant. 
As noted, the SNPS autonomous control functionality revolves around automated control 
for normal operational modes. In essence, the primary function of the control system is 
command generation to achieve the desired operational state. Additional functionality to 
support confirmation of control system performance includes features such as command 
verification, control coordination with interconnected systems, and strategy enforcement. 
Mechanisms for implementing these features can involve multiple diverse algorithms for 
comparison with the principal controller command, inclusion of feedforward action or some 
representation of unmodeled dynamics (e.g., exogenous variables) in control algorithms, 
event management according to predetermined sequences of events, and adaptation of the 
control strategy. 
Performance management as part of the SNPS autonomous control functionality involves 
continuously assessing the condition of the control system and the SNPS to identify when 
predetermined adjustments to the controller should be invoked. The needed assessments 
include monitoring control system effectiveness, identifying the dynamic state of the SNPS, 
and determining the condition of key components. Methods that can be employed are state 
estimation algorithms, process system diagnostics, component condition monitoring, and 
control parameter adaptation. 
Data management and communications are related capabilities with traditional and 
autonomous functionality intended to support autonomy and system integration. Data 
acquisition and signal processing methods provide the data needed for control and 
monitoring, while signal validation adds information about data quality. For 
communications, the functional elements include device-level data and control signals, 
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system-level information and commands, and spacecraft-level status and demands. The 
effective integration of data and information at each level requires a well-defined functional 
architecture with a capable physical infrastructure that supports reliable, timely information 
flow. 
Desired functionality for fault management includes detection and identification of field 
device faults, change tracking for system parameters, detection of off-normal transients and 
identification of anticipated events, and configuration control. Field device monitoring can 
be accomplished through model-based and/or data-driven algorithms. Parameter tracking 
can involve empirical models or first principles estimation. Each capability can be used to 
facilitate an adjustable system dynamic model that can be used for fault prediction or 
control system performance validation. Configuration control functions are needed to 
manage transitions among predefined control strategies or algorithms for the autonomous 
control system. This is essential for effective fault recovery. 
To illustrate the autonomous functionality that can be provided for the SNPS control 
system, two fault management scenarios are considered in which detection and response are 
described. The first scenario relates to fault adaptation in the case of sensor failure. The 
indicators from surveillance and diagnostic functions that the SNPS control system can 
employ include divergence of redundant measurements, conflict between predicted (based 
on analytical or relational estimation) and measured values, and detection and isolation of a 
confirmed fault. The prospective response can include substitution of a redundant 
measurement or utilization of a diverse measurement. An example of the latter would be 
using neutron flux instead of temperature (i.e., core thermal power) as a power 
measurement. Switching to an alternate control algorithm may prove necessary for faulted 
or suspect measurements.  
The second scenario relates to fault avoidance in the case of a degrading actuator. The 
indicators of an incipient failure can be prediction of actuator failure based on prognostic 
modeling (e.g., fault forecasting) or detection of sluggish response to commands. The 
prospective response can be to switch to an alternate control strategy to avoid incipient 
failure by reducing stress on the suspect component. An example would be utilizing 
manipulation of core heat removal (e.g., coolant density change) instead of direct reactivity 
insertion (e.g., control element movement) to control reactor power. 
2.4 Enabling autonomous control 
Autonomous control must be addressed early in the design of an SNPS to determine the 
degree of autonomy required. Mission requirements, technology readiness, design trade-
offs, and resource constraints will affect the autonomous capabilities to be included. The 
extent to which the key characteristics of autonomy are realized depends on the level of 
responsibility that is to be entrusted to the autonomous control system and the degree of 
mission risk that the autonomous control system must mitigate.  
Several factors can influence the degree of autonomy selected for an SNPS control system. 
These factors include the potential for human interaction (which is physically limited but 
also may be practically limited due to the economics of maintaining a ground-based team), 
performance goals, complexity of system demands, technological constraints, mission risk 
considerations, and the balance between simplicity (i.e., reliability) and complexity (i.e., the 
capacity to detect and adapt). The trade-off between reliability and mission assurance 
profoundly affects the level of autonomy employed for SNPS control. While having a highly 
reliable SNPS control system is important, that fact is meaningless if it cannot accommodate 
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SNPS degradation. In such a case, the result is a highly reliable control system that becomes 
useless because the plant has changed.  
Finally, as previously described, the experience base for autonomous control is not deep. In 
particular, autonomous control has not been implemented for an operating terrestrial 
nuclear power plant. The technology gaps indicated by investigation of the state of the 
technology for reactor control in general and autonomous control in particular suggest 
research, development, and demonstration (RD&D) activities that need to be accomplished 
to fully realize the goal of autonomous control for an SNPS. Key elements of the needed 
RD&D effort involve establishing a suitable functional architecture, developing 
foundational modules to support autonomy, and demonstrating the integrated application 
of autonomous capabilities.  
3. Functional architecture for autonomous control 
3.1 Architectural approaches 
As observed from examples of autonomous control for nuclear and space applications, the 
principal functional architectures that have been employed, in most cases, involve some 
form of hierarchical framework with varying distributions of intelligence. 
A three-level hierarchy is typical for robotic applications (Antsaklis & Passino, 1992; Alami 
et al., 1998; Gat, 1998). The general concept of the hierarchy is that commands are issued by 
higher levels to lower levels, and response data flows from lower levels to higher levels in 
the multi-tiered framework. Intelligence increases with increasing level within the 
hierarchy. Each of the three interacting tiers has a principal role. Basically the functional 
layer provides direct control, the executive layer provides sequencing of action, and the 
planner layer provides deliberative planning. 
As previously described, an autonomous control architecture, based on the CLARAty 
software environment, was developed to support the MER mission. The CLARAty dual-
layer architecture provides an upper (decision) layer for AI software and a lower 
(functional) layer for controls implementations. The development of CLARAty addresses 
perceived issues with the three-tiered architecture (Volpe et al., 2001). Those issues are the 
tendency toward a dominant level that depends on the expertise of the developer, the lack 
of access from the deliberative or planner level to the control or functional level, and the 
difficulty in representing the internal hierarchy of each level (e.g., nested subsystems, trees 
of logic, and multiple time lines and planning horizons) using this representation. In one 
sense, the CLARAty architecture collapses the planner and executive levels, which are 
characterized by high levels of intelligence, into the decision layer. Essentially, the 
deliberative and procedural functionalities are merged into an architectural layer that 
parallels the functional layer and provides a common database to support decision-making. 
Additionally, a system granularity dimension is maintained to explicitly represent the 
system hierarchies of the functional layer and the multiple planning horizons of the decision 
layer. 
The functional layer is an object-oriented hierarchy that provides access to the capabilities of 
the plant/system hardware and serves as the interface for the decision layer to the subject 
(robot, spacecraft, plant) under control. The interaction between the two layers depends on 
the relative granularity of each layer at the interface. At lower granularity, the decision layer 
has almost direct access to the basic capabilities of the plant/system. At higher granularity, 
the decision layer provides high-level commands that are broken down and executed by the 
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intelligent control capability of the functional layer. The decision layer provides 
functionality to break down goals into objectives, establish a sequential task ordering based 
on the plant/system state and known constraints, and assess the capability of the functional 
layer to implement those commands. At lower granularity within the decision layer, 
executive functions such as procedure enforcement are dominant while, at higher 
granularity, planning functions such as goal determination and strategy development are 
dominant. 
There is an architectural approach for nearly autonomous control systems that have been 
applied through simulated nuclear power applications (see Fig. 1). As part of research into 
advanced multi-modular nuclear reactor concepts, such as the International Reactor 
Innovative and Secure (IRIS) and the ALMR, a supervisory control system architecture was 
devised (Wood et al., 2004). This approach provides a framework for autonomous control 
while supporting a high-level interface with operations staff, who can act as plant 
supervisors. The final authority for decisions and goal setting remains with the human, but 
the control system assumes expanded responsibilities for normal control action, abnormal 
event response, and system fault tolerance. The autonomous control framework allows 
integration of controllers and diagnostics at the subsystem level with command and 
decision modules at higher levels. 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Supervisory control architecture for multi-modular nuclear power plants 
The autonomous control system architecture is hierarchical and recursive. Each node in the 
hierarchy (except for the terminal nodes at the base) is a supervisory module. The 
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supervisory control modules at each level within the hierarchy respond to goals and 
directions set in modules above it and to data and information presented from modules 
below it. Each module makes decisions appropriate for its level in the hierarchy and passes 
the decision results and necessary supporting information to the functionally connected 
modules. 
The device network level consists of sensors, actuators, and communications links. The next 
highest level consists of control, surveillance, and diagnostic modules. The coupling of the 
control modules with the lower-level nodes is equivalent to an automated control system 
composed of controllers and field devices. The surveillance and diagnostic modules provide 
derived data to support condition determination and monitoring for components and 
process systems. The hybrid control level provides command and signal validation 
capabilities and supports prognosis of incipient failure or emerging component degradation 
(i.e., fault identification). The command level provides algorithms to permit reconfiguration 
or adaptation to accommodate detected or predicted plant conditions (i.e., active fault 
tolerance). For example, if immediate sensor failure is detected by the diagnostic modules 
and the corresponding control algorithm gives evidence of deviation based on command 
validation against pre-established diverse control algorithms, then the command module 
may direct that an alternate controller, which is not dependent on the affected measurement 
variable, be selected as principal controller. The actions taken at these lower levels can be 
constrained to predetermined configuration options implemented as part of the design. In 
addition, the capability to inhibit or reverse autonomous control actions based on operator 
commands can be provided. The highest level of the autonomous control architecture 
provides the link to the operational staff. 
3.2 Framework for autonomous control functionality 
A variation on the nuclear plant supervisory control architecture and the CLARAty 
architecture for microrovers seems appropriate for consideration as the framework to 
support autonomy for an SNPS control system. Figure 2 illustrates the concept. Essentially, 
the approach of a hierarchical distribution of supervisory control and diagnostic 
functionality throughout the control system structure is adopted, while the overlaid decision 
functionality is maintained. It is possible to blend the decision and functional layers for this 
application domain because the planning regime for nuclear power system operation is 
much more restricted than for robotic or spacecraft applications. For example, while there 
are a multitude of paths that a robot may traverse as it navigates to its next site, the states 
are allowed for an SNPS are much more constrained. Even in the event of transients or 
faults, the control system will try to drive the plant back to a known safe state. This 
compression of the dual layers into a truncated three-sided pyramid allows for a deeper 
integration of control, diagnostics, and decision to provide the necessary capability to 
respond to rapid events and to adapt to changing or degraded conditions.  
The granularity dimension is retained with more complexity shown at the lower hierarchical 
levels. Additionally, the information and command flow reflects granularity as well. At 
lower granularity, volumes of data are present. As the granularity increases moving up the 
hierarchy, the data are processed into system state and diagnostic/prognostic information 
that are subsequently refined into status and indicator information. On the command side, 
the transition from the top is demands to commands to control signals with the resolution of 
the plant/system control growing increasingly more detailed.  
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As with the supervisory control architecture, the bottom two levels of the hierarchy are the 
equivalent of an automated control system. The embedded functionality that enables a 
reliable, fault-tolerant implementation is indicated as a base intelligence. It is expected that 
there will be some decision capability associated with the control/surveillance/diagnostics 
level of that baseline system. The higher levels of the hierarchy assume greater degrees of 
decision capabilities.  
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Hierarchical framework to support SNPS control system autonomy 
In addition to managing the communications within the hierarchy, the autonomous control 
system must coordinate with the spacecraft control system and keep the mission control 
staff informed. To this end, the reactor supervisor/coordinator node must communicate 
information about the status of the SNPS and the control system and also receive directives 
and commands. The information provided by the supervisor node can include  
SNPS operational status and capability (e.g., constraints due to degradation), control action 
histories, diagnostic information, self-validation results, control system configuration,  
and data logs. Additional communication outside of the hierarchy may be required to 
coordinate control actions with other segments of the spacecraft, such as the power 
conversion system. 
The functionality that is embodied in the hierarchy can be decomposed into several 
elements. These include data acquisition, actuator activation, validation, arbitration, 
control, limitation, checking, monitoring, commanding, prediction, communication, fault 
management, and configuration management. The validation functionality can address 
signals, commands, and system performance. The arbitration functionality can address 
redundant inputs or outputs, commands from redundant or diverse controllers, and 
status indicators from various monitoring and diagnostic modules. The control 
functionality includes direct plant or system control and supervisory control of the SNPS 
control system itself. The limitation functionality involves maintaining plant conditions 
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within an acceptable boundary and inhibiting control system actions. The checking 
functionality can address computational results, input and output consistency, and 
plant/system response. The monitoring functionality includes status, response, and 
condition or health of the control system, components, and plant, and it provides 
diagnostic and prognostic information. The commanding functionality is directed toward 
configuration and action of lower level controllers and diagnostic modules. The 
prediction functionality can address identification of plant/system state, expected 
response to prospective actions, remaining useful life of components, and incipient 
operational events or failures. The communication functionality involves control and 
measurement signals to and from the field devices, information and commands within the 
control system, and status and demands between the SNPS control system and spacecraft 
or ground control. The fault management and configuration management functionalities 
are interrelated and depend on two principal design characteristics. These are the ability 
of the designer to anticipate a full range of faults and the degree of autonomy enabled by 
the control system design. 
Finally, the distribution of functions throughout the hierarchy must be established based on 
the degree of autonomy selected, technology readiness, reliability and fault management 
considerations, software development practices and platform capabilities, and the physical 
architecture of the SNPS control system hardware. Because an autonomous control system 
has never been implemented for a nuclear reactor and because several functional 
capabilities remain underdeveloped (as seen in the overview of the state of the art), there is 
clearly a critical need for further development and demonstration of a suitable architectural 
framework.  
4. Application of model-based control to Space Nuclear Power Systems 
Key functionality that is necessary to establish the basis for autonomous control has been 
demonstrated through a simulated space reactor application under university research 
sponsored by DOE. These capabilities related to control elements within the lower layers of 
the functional hierarchy. Specifically, the research conducted at UT involved development 
of a highly fault tolerant power controller for the SP-100 space power reactor design 
(Upadhyaya et al., 2007; Na & Upadhyaya, 2007).  
The SP-100 design provides for a fast spectrum, lithium-cooled fuel pin reactor coupled with 
thermo-electric converters (TE) with the waste heat removed through a heat pipe 
distribution system and space radiators. The TE generator output is rated at 112 kW, with a 
nominal reactor thermal power 2000 kW.  
A lumped parameter simulation of a representative SNPS was developed based  
on physics models specific to the SP-100 reactor, which were derived in prior academic 
work at the University of New Mexico (El-Genk & Seo, 1987). The reactor system modules 
include a model of reactor control mechanism, a neutron kinetics model, a reactor  
core heat transfer model, a primary heat exchanger (HX) model, and a TE conversion 
model. Figure 3 illustrates the elements of the SNPS model. The integrated SP-100  
SNPS model was assembled through an iterative algorithm. The model involves both 
nonlinear ordinary differential equations and partial differential equations. The code 
development was performed under the MATLAB™/SIMULINK™ environment. The 
SNPS simulation provided the demonstration platform for the fault tolerant controller 
development. 
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Fig. 3. Schematic of the model development of the SP-100 reactor system 
 
 
Fig. 4. Basic concept of a model predictive control method 
The control approach adopted is a model-predictive controller (MPC) design. The basic 
concept of the model-predictive control method is illustrated in Fig. 4. The MPC 
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minimizes a quadratic cost function and takes into consideration any constraints imposed 
on the control action and the state variables. For a given set of present and future control 
actions, the future behavior of the state variables are predicted over a prediction horizon 
N, and M present and future control moves (M ≤ N) are computed to minimize the 
quadratic objective function. Out of the M control moves that are calculated, only the first 
control action is implemented. The prediction feature of the controller has an anticipatory 
effect, and is reflected in the current control action. These calculations are repeated in the 
next time step by appending the next measurement to the database. The new 
measurements compensate for the unmeasured disturbances and model inaccuracies, both 
of which result in the measured system output being different from that predicted by the 
model. The MPC requires the on-line solution of an optimization problem to compute 
optimal control inputs over the time horizon. The MPC calculates a sequence of future 
control signals by minimizing a multi-stage cost function defined over a prediction 
horizon. 
The performance index for deriving an optimal control input is represented by the quadratic 
objective function given in Eq. (1). 
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where Q  and R  are the weights for the TE generator power (system output) error and 
the SP-100 control drum angle (reactivity as control input) change between time steps at 
certain future time intervals, respectively, and w  is a set point (desired generator power). 
The estimate ˆ( | )y t j t  is an optimum j -step-ahead prediction of the system output (TE 
generator power) based on data up to time t; that is, the expected value of the output at 
time t as a function of the past input and output and the future control sequence are 
known. N and M are the prediction horizon and the control horizon, respectively. The 
prediction horizon represents the limiting time for the output to follow the reference 
sequence. In order to obtain control inputs, the predicted outputs are first calculated as a 
function of past values of inputs and outputs. The constraint, ( 1) 0 foru t j j M     , 
indicates that there is no variation in the control signal after a certain time interval M < N, 
where M is the control horizon. minu  and maxu  are the minimum and maximum values of 
input, respectively, and maxu  is a maximum allowable control perturbation per time 
step. 
The applicability and the effectiveness of the MPC approach were demonstrated through its 
simulated performance for several operational scenarios, including under degraded or ill-
characterized conditions (Upadhyaya et al., 2007). The effectiveness of the MPC controller 
for tracking the TE power output is illustrated in Figure 6. Figure 6a shows the TE converter 
set point profile and the actual TE generator power. The corresponding reactivity changes 
(drum angle variations) are shown in Figure 6b.  
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(b) 
Fig. 6. (a) Electric power (TE) set point profile and the controller performance. (b) Controller 
response (i.e., reactivity control) in terms of the drum angle 
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The MPC approach was shown to provide a fast response and robustness under changing 
system conditions. Specifically, fault tolerance and reconfigurability features of the control 
approach were demonstrated in response to sensor faults, drum actuator anomalies, and 
changes in model parameters (Upadhyaya et al., 2007; Na & Upadhyaya, 2007). 
Consequently, it is observed that several of the capabilities and characteristics that are 
necessary to enable autonomous control are provided by the MPC approach. 
5. Conclusion 
The control system for an SNPS will be subject to unique challenges as compared to 
terrestrial nuclear reactors, which employ varying degrees of human control and decision-
making for operations and benefit from periodic human interaction for maintenance. In 
contrast, the SNPS control system must be able to provide continuous, remote, often 
unattended operation for a mission lasting a decade or more with limited immediate human 
interaction and no opportunity for hardware maintenance. In addition to the inaccessibility 
and periods of unattended operation, the SNPS control system must accommodate severe 
environments, system and equipment degradation or failure, design uncertainties, and rare 
or unanticipated operational events during an extended mission life. As a result, the 
capability to respond to rapid events and to adapt to changing or degraded conditions 
without near-term human supervision is required to support mission goals. Autonomous 
control can satisfy essential control objectives under significant uncertainties, disturbances, 
and degradation without requiring any human intervention. Therefore, autonomous control 
is necessary to ensure the successful application of an SNPS for deep space missions.  
Key characteristics that are feasible through autonomous control include 
 intelligence to confirm system performance and detect degraded or failed conditions,  
 optimization to minimize stress on SNPS components and efficiently react to 
operational events without compromising system integrity,  
 robustness to accommodate uncertainties and changing conditions, and 
 flexibility and adaptability to accommodate failures through reconfiguration among 
available control system elements or adjustment of control system strategies, 
algorithms, or parameters.  
Autonomous control must be addressed early in the design of an SNPS to determine the 
degree of autonomy required. Mission requirements, design trade-offs, and the state of 
the technology will affect the autonomous capabilities to be included. The extent to which 
the key characteristics of autonomy are realized depends on the level of responsibility that 
is to be entrusted to the autonomous control system. Given anticipated mission 
imperatives to utilize technology with demonstrated (or at least high probability) 
readiness, it is not practical to strive for the high-end extreme of autonomy. Instead, 
modest advancement beyond fully automatic control to allow extended fault tolerance for 
anticipated events or degraded conditions and some predefined reconfigurability is the 
most realistic goal for an initial application of SNPS autonomous control. A hierarchical 
functional architecture providing integrated control, diagnostic, and decision capabilities 
that are distributed throughout the hierarchy can support this approach. The application 
of the MPC approach to the SP-100 reactor system and demonstration of key fault-tolerant 
and reconfigurable control features have been accomplished through simulation. The 
results illustrate the feasibility of incorporating these techniques in future space reactor 
designs. 
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Control systems with varying levels of autonomy have been employed in robotic, 
transportation, spacecraft, and manufacturing applications. However, autonomous control 
has not been implemented for an operating terrestrial nuclear power plant. Therefore, 
technology development and demonstration activities are needed to provide the desired 
technical readiness for implementation of an SNPS autonomous control system. In 
particular, the capabilities to monitor, trend, detect, diagnose, decide, and self-adjust must 
be established to enable control system autonomy. Finally, development and demonstration 
of a suitable architectural framework is also needed. 
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Intelligent Optical Fiber  
Sensors for Nuclear Power Plants 
Grigory Y. Buymistriuc  
Intel-Systems Instruments, Inc., St-Petersburg,  
Russia 
1. Introduction 
Optical fiber sensors (OFS) have a number of intrinsic advantages that make them attractive 
for nuclear power plant (NPP) applications, including absolute explosion safety, extremely 
low mass, small size, immunity to electromagnetic interference, high-accuracy, self-
calibration, and operation in extremely harsh environments, and it is a well-known fact. 
Civil nuclear industry essentially encompasses the complete nuclear fuel cycle and therefore 
the range of possible fiber applications both for communications and sensing is very broad 
(Berghmans & Decreton, 1994), (Korsah et al., 2006).   
In order to expand OFS applications in nuclear engineering it was necessary to overcome a 
bias that some scientists and engineers used to have at the initial stage of using an optical 
fiber for communication, about "darkening" of a fiber and sharp growth of optical 
attenuation under the conditions of ionizing radiation, i.e. availability of convincing proofs 
of radiation hardness of optical fibers and OFS.     
Safety and long-term metrological stability of OFS for NPP assumes:  
- Radiation hardness of fiber optic sensors and cables;  
- Absence of mechanical resonances of the gauge at frequencies up to 200 Hz;  
- Immunity to electromagnetic effects in the range of frequencies 200 kHz and 18 – 20 
MHz,  
- High reliability of a sensitive element of the OFS ;  
- Temperature-insensitive measurements of pressure in the working range of 
temperatures;  
- Self-calibration of the gauge without stopping the process of measurement.  
These requirements are satisfied by modern OFS, especially intellectual optical fiber sensors 
which can self-calibrate, i.e. control themselves at the level of changing their internal (own) 
parameters depending on the calibrated value (Buymistriuc & Rogov, 2009).  
No optical measurement electronics will survive in, or near, an operating nuclear reactor 
core. Therefore, OFS light emission must be guided to the measurement electronics located 
in a well-controlled, benign environment. Several different implementations can be 
employed to accomplish this, each with their own advantages and weaknesses. Recently 
single material hollow-core optical fibers (referred to as photonic crystal fibers) have become 
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commercially available. All silica, photonic crystal fibers appear likely to have much larger 
radiation tolerance than conventional optical fiber technologies. 
Monitoring signals from sensors in NPP is not only to diagnose process anomalies but also it 
is necessary to verify the performance of the sensors and the associated instrumentations. 
Tests such as calibration verification, response time measurement, cable integrity checking, 
and noise diagnostics are required in NPP. In-situ test methods that use externally applied 
active test signals are also used to measure equipment performance or for providing 
diagnostics and anomaly detection capabilities. Controls and instrumentation were 
enhanced through incorporation of optical and digital technologies with automated, self-
diagnostic features.  
The design of the sensitive element of interferometric pressure OFS working with the 
measured environment of a nuclear reactor without application of pulse tubes is such that 
its resonant frequency lies in the range of frequencies above 60 kHz, i.e. inadmissible 
resonances in nuclear reactors at frequencies below 200 Hz are structurally excluded.  
Was developed also methods of realization of intelligent OFS on other principles of 
operation, in particular possibilities of intelligentization of the acoustic emission OFS based 
on intrinsic optical fiber effect of Doppler,  of the strain and temperature OFS based on the 
fiber Bragg gratings.          
Coatings of the sensitive element of interferometric OFS with enhanced adhesion to silica 
tips and long-term durability was obtained by a molecular layering method or atomic layer 
deposition. An important advantage of such interferometric pressure OFS is its enhanced 
reliability determined by a unitary structure of the sensor and extremely high adhesion of 
molecular coatings to silica optical fibers.  Reliability  of OFS with such nano-coatings is 
preserved high under different external effects, including at dose ionizing radiation up 10 
MGy.        
Safe disposal of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and high level waste is currently considered a 
major challenge, a key element to the sustainability of future nuclear power use in most 
countries. A first priority is obviously ensuring safety during operation under normal and 
faulty conditions. With this, besides contributing to guarantee operational safety, systems 
reliably monitoring the repository environment over several decades of years, whenever 
possible maintenance free and in unattended mode, can become a key element in achieving 
confidence on repository performance as well as public and regulatory acceptance. 
Application of fiber optic technologies for monitoring SNF offers distinct advantages 
compared with conventional systems. Optical fibers not only withstand chemical corrosion 
and high temperatures much better than conventional systems, but their immunity to 
electromagnetic interference and their large bandwidths and data rates ensure high 
reliability and superior performance.   
Due to this optical fibers are the preferred alternative for both: sensing and signal 
transmission in long-term monitoring of NPP  and SNF applications. 
2. Background 
A NPP generally uses about 200 to 800 pressure and differential pressure sensors to measure 
the process pressure, level, and flow in its primary and secondary systems. For example, fig. 
1 shows a typical pressure sensing (pulse) line inside a nuclear reactor containment (Lin K. 
& Holbert K., 2010). 
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Fig. 1. Typical pressure sensing (instrument) line inside a nuclear reactor containment. 
Instrument lines can encounter a number of problems that can influence the accuracy, 
response time of a pressure sensing system and decrease safety of  NPP in consequence of 
mechanical resonances which appear on frequencies up 200 Hz , for example, fig. 2 shows  
transfer functions of a pressure sensing system (Lin K. & Holbert K., 2010). 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Transfer functions of a pressure sensing system with resonance frequencies 
Exception pulse lines from join of pressure sensors to technological equipment and  
pipelines in NPP is provided by Technical Regulations of the Russia (TR, 2000).  
Performance  of this requirement became real possible only at use of fiber optic 
technologies. Advanced concept of construction of water-water nuclear reactors from 
Russian nuclear research center "Kurchatov Institute" provides use of welded joints of gages 
with equipment NPP instead of less reliable fitting connections that is possible with 
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application OFS with the big life time (up to 60 years) and with function of metrological self-
calibration (Buymistriuc & Rogov, 2009). 
It is important to notice that begun using fiber-optical technologies of communication and 
measurements in NPPs considerably improves their equipment. Really, typical NPPs used 
hard wired point-to-point connections from field instrumentation to control systems and 
panels in the control room. Essentially there is one wire per function or about 30 – 50 
thousands wires coming from the field to the cable spreading room and then control room. 
The use of optical fiber networks, which carry substantially more information and decrease 
in 9 once weight of connections, instead of copper cabling, can eliminate 400 kilometers of 
cabling and 12500 cubic meters of cable trays (GE, 2006).  
Contemporary optical fiber sensors give  a unique possibility to realize the principle of  
remote measurement (fig. 1) . 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Concept of remote pressure measurements 
1 – OFS; 2 – optoelectronic transceiver 
When sensitive element 1 of an OFS placed in harsh environment can be moved away from 
optoelectronic transceiver 2, which is under comfortable conditions of an equipment room, 
at the distance up to 3000 meters by means of an optical cable option which replaces 
undesirable pulse tubes very effectively.         
The design of the sensitive element of pressure OFS working with the measured 
environment of a nuclear reactor without application of pulse tubes is such that its resonant 
frequency lies in the range of frequencies above 80 kHz, i.e. inadmissible resonances in 
nuclear reactors at frequencies below 200 Hz are structurally excluded. In fact, the resonant 
frequency of longitudinal vibration of optical fiber Fabry-Perot interferometer (FFPI) in the 
form of a quartz glass core is defined as 
 1
4.91 Ef
L                                  (1) 
where Е - Young’ modulus of elasticity  of a glass core, Pa 
ρ – glass core density, kg/m3    
E/ρ - own rigidity, in particular for silica glass, 45х105 m. 
Thus the sensor mechanical resonant frequency is defined by its length L = 0.001 … 0.1 m 
and lies in the range f1 = 10,4092 / L [kHz] = 104,092 … 10409,2 kHz. 
Frequency resonant characteristic of a typical pressure OFS based on FFPI indicates Fig. 4. 
 
Radiation-Hard and Intelligent Optical Fiber Sensors for Nuclear Power Plants 
 
123 
 
 
Fig. 4. A resonance frequency response of FFPI-based pressure OFS 
OFS of acoustic emission, humidity and others parameters on the basis of coils of a fiber or 
nano-coatings of an tip of a fiber have resonant frequencies a few tens in MHz.   
Use the optical fiber technologies allowing to realize a principle remote measurements 
changes a principle of construction of measuring systems of NPP and completely to solve a 
problem of resonances of pulse lines.  
                        
 
 
Fig. 5. New advanced structure of the pressure sensing  line inside a nuclear reactor 
containment 
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Fig. 6. Transfer gain-frequency function of a pressure optical fiber sensing system 
On fig. 5 the new structure of system of measurement of the pressure is shown, one of which 
results of realization is full elimination resonances of the measuring channel as is shown in 
fig. 6. 
For maintenance of working reliability of offered measuring system, especially in zones 
NPP with radiation presence, application radiation-hard optical  fiber and cables is 
necessary (TR, 2003). 
3. Ionizing radiation hardness of OFS  
Use of silica as a material for fiber optic sensors and measuring communication lines is an 
effective solution both in terms of mechanical properties and radiation hardness of silica 
fibers which are reached by modern manufacturers, for example, a method of entering and 
retention of hydrogen in an optical fiber.  
Another important factor of applying silica optical fibers under radiation conditions, in 
particular for OFS based on silica optical fibers, is their low radiation induced losses in the 
range of wavelengths between1150 nm and 1350 nm as is shown in fig. 7 (Fiedler  et. al., 
2005). 
Radiation hardness of OFS equaled earlier to a general dose of irradiation of about 1.2 MGy 
with γ-radiation and 2.6•1016 neutrons/cm2 with a neutron fluence  (Berghmans F. & 
Decréton M., Ed.,1994) but now reaches doses of gamma radiation up to 23 MGy and  
neutron flux 52 •1016 neutrons/cm2   (Fiedler  et. al., 2005).  
Photonic crystal fibers (PCFs) were also recently submitted to a number of nuclear 
environments applications. In hollow core PCFs the light is essentially guided in air, which 
may significantly decrease the radiation response of such waveguides compared to 
conventional optical fibers. The structure used by us hole core PCF at 1000X and 10000X 
imagnifying in a microscope is shown on fig. 8.      
The permanent radiation induced attenuation (RIA) levels after radiation of PCF were found 
to be very low. This was confirmed with hollow core PCF showing at least about 30 to 100 
times lower RIA than the best present conventional optical fibers at 1550 nm with theoretical 
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limit of total dose of gamma radiation over 1 GGy  (Henschel H. et al. ,2005). Post-
fabrication treatment of the photonic band gap fiber with hydrogen gas has been reported to 
improve the fiber’s resistance to radiation (Tomashuk A.;  Kosolapov A. & Semjonov S. 
(2006). 
 
 
 
Fig. 7. Spectral transmission for 20% Ge  doped silica optical fiber 
 
 
 
Fig. 8. Structure of  the hollow core PCF at 1000X and 10000X magnifying in a microscope. 
For extreme dose situations, the light must initially be guided from the measurement 
location using a hollow-core light guide. All known materials darken unacceptably in the 
intense radiation field of a nuclear reactor core. However, reflective technologies are 
available that have been shown to withstand comparable environments.   
Conceptually, a hollow-core light guide is simply a mirror that has been formed into a 
polished titanium tube as shown on fig. 9. This approach was used for measurements 
temperature and the neutron flux in near-reactor environments (Holcomb D.; Miller D. & 
Talnagi J. (2005).  
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The principal innovation of this approach is to combine optical and fiber optical 
measurement components in a form suitable for deployment in a nuclear reactor core.  
The main needs for in-pile concern the assessment of creep and  growth of cladding 
materials, or nuclear fuel rod behaviour, which require elongation measurements or 
diameter measurements of cylindrical samples. Among others adaptations to the nuclear 
environment, these OFS will need a radiation resistant fixing. 
 
 
 
Fig. 9. Hollow-Core Light Guide Concept. 
As the light reaches lower radiation environments, several different optical transmission 
technologies become possible:  
hollow core PCF or conventional radiation-hard optical fibers. 
For total doses up to about 104 Gy, pure silica core, fluorosilica clad, multimode optical 
fibers are suitable light guides.  
4. Enhanced reliability of OFS in harsh environments 
А standard version of FFPI has no face reflecting coverings and works based on natural 
Fresnel reflections in the amount about 4%. For changing the sensitivity and dynamic range 
of the pressure OFS , we used TiO2  reflecting coverings.  
The fibers are placed in magnetron sputtering (MS) machine and coated with TiO2 by 
vacuum deposition. The reason for using TiO2 is that it has high refractive index (~2.4, vs. 
1.4 for the silica fiber) over visible and infrared spectral ranges and strong bonding on glass 
based materials. The MS machine is filled with a mixture of 70% argon and 30% oxygen so 
that the titanium and oxygen atoms ejected toward cleaved fiber end and stick to the fiber 
until the desired film thickness is reached. However, experiments have shown that adhesion 
to glass and roughness  of the TiO2 coatings made by this method are not satisfactory. 
Apparently on fig. 10, mean-quadratic deviation of the surface profile equal about 37.8 
nanometers. 
A coating with enhanced adhesion and long-term durability was obtained by a enhanced 
method af atomic leyer deposition - method molecular layering (ML) (Buymistriuc & Rogov, 
2009). 
Synthesis was carried out by repeated and alternate processing of the surface of the fiber 
end face by H2O and TiCl4 steams removing the surplus of not reacted and formed by-
products after each stage of processing. Thus, not more than one monomolecular layer with 
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the thickness of new structural units about 0.3 nanometers are added to the surface in each 
cycle of ML reactions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 10. Microscopic view of optical fiber tip with TiO2 magnetron sputtering   
With processing by TiCl4 steams the reaction on the surface proceeds as follows: 
 (≡Si-OH) +  TiCl4 →  (≡Si-O-)2TiCl2 + HCl  (2)  
With processing by water steams the reaction on the surface proceeds as follows: 
 (≡Si-O-)2TiCl2 + 2H2O → (≡Si-O-)2Ti(OH)2 + 2HCl  (3) 
At this stage of the ML process we obtain a hydroxylated surface again but now OH-
groups are linked not with the atoms of silicon of the initial matrix but with the atoms 
which are part of the imparted functional groups. The hydroxylated surface is processed 
 
Nuclear Power – Control, Reliability and Human Factors 
 
128 
by TiCl4 steams again. At this stage the second titanoxidechloride monolayer is formed as 
follows: 
 2(≡Si-O-)2Ti(OH)2+TiCl4→[(≡Si-O-)2Ti(O-)]2TiCl2+2HCl               (4) 
Then a reaction product is again subject to processing by water steams. The process was 
finished when obtaining coatings with thickness from 10 to 180 nanometers with a mean-
quadratic deviation of the surface profile about 1.4 nanometers, as shown in fig. 9 which 
gives the view of the end faces of the optical fiber obtained by means of an atomic-power 
microscope. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 11. Microscopic view of fiber tip with TiO2 molecular layered nano-coating 
An important advantage of such pressure OFS is its enhanced reliability determined by a 
unitary structure of the sensor and extremely high adhesion of molecular coatings to silica 
optical fibers. OFS fabricated with new ML technology possess the greatest reliability (on 
distribution of Weibull) than usual MS method as shown on fig. 12.                                 
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Fig. 12. Weibull distribution plots for basic fiber and fibers coated by using ML  and MS 
technologies 
5. Principles and constructions of intelligent OFS 
Information redundancy of optical fiber sensors,  as well as possibility to their 
programmable tuning in combination with a minimum structural redundancy allow to 
develop the so-called intelligent sensors with a function of metrological self-checking. The 
function of metrological self-checking of optical fiber sensors is provided with their 
multimodality, i.e. with their similar dependence of an output signal on several variable 
parameters, f.e., with their dependence on a variable pressure at a constant optical spectrum 
of an input signal and, accordingly, on a  readjusted optical spectrum of the signal at a 
constant pressure. Construction of intelligent sensors of new generation assumes presence at 
such sensors of structural (internal) and/or information (external) redundancy (Taymanov 
R. & Sapozhnikova K., 2008).       
Microelectronic sensors of physical quantities generate the unimodal output signal Y 
depending on change only of one parameter of sensor R: 
 0 ( ; )Y Y k R x t                                                   (5) 
where Y – an output time signal, Y0 – initial value of an output signal; 
ΔR – change of parameter of a sensor, caused in the measured physical quantity x in time t;    
k – proportionality factor.  
That is, microelectronic sensors do not possess necessary information redundancy. To 
provide self-checking of such sensors by creation of information redundancy, for example 
giving on them influences of physical quantity of known value – it is almost impossible 
while in process controllable equipment in real time. Therefore intelligent microelectronic 
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sensors are under construction by creation of structural redundancy (embedding of the 
reference sensor, the additional sensor with parameters close to the basic sensor, etc.) that 
not always is the optimum decision.   
5.1 Self-checking OFS 
Application of a fiber optic Fabry-Perot interferometer  for measurements of pressure and 
speed of pressure variation in water reactors of NPPs contributes to improving their safety 
and long-term metrological stability, which demands for intelligent sensors. 
5.1.1 Basic principles 
By means of fast tuning of the spectrum of an optical source it is possible to make self-
calibration in the course of continuous work of the pressure gauge. Optical cables including 
connectors, splices, and other components are tested by evaluating the optical losses 
relationship along the cable. 
OFS of physical quantity creates the multimodal output signal depending at least from two 
parameters of the sensor, for example for OFS based on FFPI output signal Is depends on 
change of length of optical resonator G and change of  a wavelength of light λ:   
 0
0
41 ( ; )
( )s
I I Cos G x t
t


          
                          (6) 
where I0 – initial intensity of light coupled into FFPI. 
The output signal such OFS according to the equation (2) changes depending on change of 
length of a cavity of the resonator ΔG, caused by pressure, and depending on change of the 
central optical wavelength of the coherent sensing channel Δλ0, provided, for example, by 
the tuneable spectral optical filter (TSOF) as is shown in fig. 13. 
 
 
Fig. 13. Response of FFPI output from resonator cavity length and optical source peak 
wavelength changes 
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Additional possibility at such intelligent OFS is possibility of stabilization of a quiescent 
point (Q-point) on its linear site calibration characteristics by fine tuning of a wavelength of 
light on value δλ0 sensing channel, compensating a deviation of initial length of a cavity of 
the optical resonator δG, caused by destabilizing factors during long operation of the sensor. 
Thus, it is obvious that for realization FMSC interferometric OFS possess necessary 
information redundancy.Structural redundancy of OFS at realization FMSC is minimal and 
is reduced to application of the TSOF, as shown on the scheme fig. 14. 
On such principle has been realised the intelligent pressure OFS with function metrological 
self-checking (FMSC) at long operation in extreme conditions (Buymistriuc G. &  Rogov 
A.,2009). 
Speed of tuning of a modern TSOF, for example the models “FFP-TF” from “Micron Optics, 
Inc” or the acousto-optical tuneable filter models “AOTF” from “Fianium, Inc” is rather high 
also the period of tuning time T on all set spectrum. For example in sequence T = t3 - t1 on 
fig. 15, makes value of an order 0,1 … 0,4 microsecond that it is enough for the majority of 
modes of measurement of pressure, deformation, vibration, temperature, level of etc. 
controllable industrial equipment. 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 14. Intelligent pressure OFS 
1 – FFPI; 2 – optical cable; 3 – optical coupler; 4 –light emitting diode;  5 –TSOF;  
6 –photodiode;  7 – microcontroller 
5.2 Algorithm  
Procedure of self-checking of pressure OFS on the basis of FFPI consists of the following 
consecutive steps.  
Step 1. When OFS is manufactured, its calibration characteristic is measured:    
   Iс = f(ΔG{P}) at  λ0 = const  
by means of a precision pressure calibrator (for example from DPI-610 from “Druck, Ltd”) 
and stored as initial data in the energy-independent  memory of the device.   
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Fig. 15. A spectral peak in time change of tunable optical filter of the OFS   
Step 2. While OFS is in service after a certain period of time, which may be equal to an  
periodic testing interval of the device, the current calibration characteristic of the 
gauge is measured without stopping the process of pressure measurement : 
   I’с = f(λ)  at  ΔG{P} = const  
by fast tuning of the central wavelength of the spectral optical filter transmission [λ0 → λ2] – 
forward scan, and [λ2 → λ0] – reverse scan, as shown in fig. 15. The speed of the filter tuning 
should exceed the rate of the measured pressure change. 
Step 3. The graduation characteristic of the pressure OFS is compared with the initial data 
of calibration and corresponding correction factors are calculated. 
Step 4. The measurement of pressure by means of OFS with using correction factors  
obtained at step 3 is continued.  
Thus, interference OFS is internally inherent necessary information and structural in 
redundancy effectively to carry out FMSC. 
5.3 Estimation of error 
Error of measurement of the intelligent OFS, caused by instability of the central wavelength 
of TSOF, i.e. shifted spectra TSOF and light emitting diode and casual displacement of 
spectral characteristics of the filter us has been investigated by modeling and experimental 
check. 
Distortion s’ of an output signal s, is described by following expression: 
 4' 1 1
2
c
o
Is s Cos G
I
 
 
             
 (7) 
where γc – contrast (“fringe visibility”) of interference. 
The normalised error of measurement of pressure δs/s, caused by shift Δλ the central 
wavelength of the filter, is described by expression: 
 2
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s I d  
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   (8) 
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A case non-centering (casual displacement) of a wavelengths of the optical filter and a 
source of optical radiation in the course of long operation.  
By means modeling and experiences is established that spectrum mismatching of the TSOF 
with a light source poorly influences an error of measurements of OFS. Big shifted spectral 
mismatch, above 3 nm, gives metrological error less then 0.02%.  
Besides by tuning TSOF with feedback included on an output signal it is possible to provide 
stability of a quiescent point (Q-point) interferometric OFS that is to realise the intelligent 
gauge with self-correction.     
Possible application of adaptive OFS is their use as additional measuring transducers of the 
self-checking channel at construction of intelligent gauges of pressure with elastic elements 
and gauges of level and other physical quantities for the purpose of substantial growth of 
their actual interval between testing.  
5.4 Intelligent acoustic emission OFS 
Was investigated also methods of realization of intelligent OFS on other principles of 
operation, in particular possibilities of intellectualizing of the acoustic emission OFS based 
on intrinsic optical fiber effect of Doppler (Li F. et al., 2009).  
A Doppler shift of frequency fD under influence of a sound wave a  is defined as 
 
0
( ; )
( )D
n dL a tf
t dt                                                              (9) 
where n –index of refraction of a fiber;  λ0 – wavelength of laser radiation;   L – length of 
fiber sensing element;  a – acoustic signal; t – time.      
Apparently from a equation (9) and fig. 4 that frequency OFS has information redundancy – 
dependence Doppler shift of frequency both from change of length of fiber L, and from 
change of frequency of laser radiation f0, and structural redundancy – the tunable laser 
diode.                            
 
 
 
Fig. 16. Intelligent acoustic emission OFS  
1-fiber coil sensing element; 2, 6 – fiber optic couplers; 3 – tuneable laser diode;  
4 – acousto-optical frequency shifter; 5 – RF generator; 7 – frequency detector;  
8- microcontroller 
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When absent an etalon device for creation, in real-time, on the OFS of acoustic emission of 
entrance mechanical influence with known characteristics, i.e. when fD = const, self-checking 
of the amplitude-frequency characteristic of the OFS is made by fast tuning of acousto-
optical modulator shift frequency fM , or by fast tuning of optical frequency of laser diode 
radiation f0.  Modern tunable acoustic-optical modulators and laser diodes have period of 
tuning through all spectrum of the frequency characteristic about 1 μs that it is quite enough 
at frequencies acoustic emission up to 500 kHz. 
This graduation amplitude-frequency characteristic of the acoustic emission OFS is 
compared with the initial data of calibration of OFS and corresponding correction factors are 
calculated. The measurement of acoustic emission by means of OFS with using obtained 
correction factors is continued. 
5.5 Intelligent fiber Bragg grating OFS 
The intelligent strain OFS design uses an induced phase discontinuity (structural 
redundancy) in the fiber Bragg grating (FBG) that gives information redundancy in optical 
spectrum which is used for self-monitoring sensor’s condition .  
The reflectivity at the Bragg wavelength can be estimated using the equation 
 2 2
1( ) tanh 1
( )B
L nR n
n V
 
                
                             (10) 
where L – the length of FBG; n – index of refraction;  
V - the normalized frequency of the fiber (V ≥2.4);  
λB – Bragg diffraction wavelength that has multimodal response:          
 ( ; ) 2 ( ; )B t n x t       ,  Λ=const  ∀x ∈ L,  Λ0 >Λ  for x0 ∈ L                     (11) 
where Λ – the period of the n modulation of of FBG; x – the fiber axis direction; x0 – the point 
of phase discontinuity. 
Figures 17a and 17b show the reflection spectrum of FBG-based diffraction OFS with  and 
without a phase discontinuity respectively. The presence of a narrow pass-band in the 
wavelength spectrum is due forming of phase discontinuity in the FBG structure.  
While a strain is applied along axis of the healthy FBG sensor with a phase discontinuity (eq. 
7), optical reflection spectrum (eq. 6) shows linear shift  as 
  1BS B                                          (12) 
where    - the photoelastic coefficient of the fiber , ε – strain (tension).  
When a strain is applied along axis of the damaged FBG sensor with a phase discontinuity 
(eq. 7), then damage changes the photoelastic coefficient of fiber (strain sensitivity varies) 
and optical spectrum shows linear shift (eq. 8) and simultaneously changes her shape - the 
relative position of the main peak of the FBG and narrow pass-band  will no longer constant: 
their disposition are changed that represents a damaged sensor. 
It is important to note that the presence of this narrow pass-band in spectra does not add 
any additional complexity to the signal processing schemes to be used.  
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Simple tracking the phase-shift and main peak of optical spectrum allows determine 
technical condition (health) of the FBG strain sensor. 
 
 
  
 
a)                                                                                      b) 
 
Fig. 17. Reflection spectra of strain FBG optical fiber sensor 
a)– without discontinuity  b) – with discontinuity  
6. Applications OFS in nuclear power plants 
The analysis of possible ways of influence of electromagnetic disturbances on pressure 
sensors under the conditions of factual operation on NPP units has shown that the basic 
influences leading to failures in work of electronic pressure gauges occur on the direct 
current feed circuit, the current signal output  circuit and as a result of impact of 
electromagnetic fields.  
The Russian Federal Agency of Ecological, Technological and Nuclear Supervision yearly 
registered a few deviations in the work of Russian nuclear stations.  The causes included 
malfunction and false data of the electron pressure sensor. 
In addition, after the inspection of electromagnetic conditions on the NPP it was established 
that the basic components of periodic disturbances at the output of pressure gauges have 
characteristic frequencies in the range of 18 – 20 MHz and 200 kHz imposed on a supply 
mains voltage sinusoid, which increases the value of the gauge current signal  to a setting 
value at which emergency protection is activated.  
The reason of EMI occurrence at frequencies 18 – 20 MHz and 200 kHz is the electronic 
circuit of the gauge in the long line operating mode when high-frequency fluctuations fade 
after several runs from one end of a coaxial cable to another.  
This circumstance demands replacement of electronic pressure gauges by noise-proof OFS 
with fiber optic cable lines. 
A general view of intelligent pressure OFS based on FFPI is shown in fig. 18.  
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a)    b) 
Fig. 18. General view of intelligent pressure OFS 
a)– sensing element  (b)- optoelectronic transceiver 
The pressure applied to a sensitive element causes blooming deformation of the FFPI glass 
cover. The cover radius decreases resulting in the growth of length of the L0 resonator cavity 
by value ∆G up to hundred nanometers.  
 
 
Fig. 19. General view of FFPI-based pressure sensor 
1 – sensing element; 2 – FFPI cavity with ∆G length (10x magnifying) 
Analytical expression of the change of the length of the optical resonator ∆G follows from 
mechanics principles owing to the applied pressure: 
  о z r tLG E                                       (13) 
where σz , σr , σt - longitudinal, radial and lateral deformation of the sensor. 
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  1 2 оr LG k PE
                                       (14) 
where Р – pressure on the sensitive element;  
μ- Poisson factor for quartz glass, 0.17;  
Е –Young modulus for silica, 73 GPa. 
kr – geometry factor of the sensitive element, 1.16.   
FFPI output sensing signal is defined by ΔG value with the constant transmission peak of 
the spectral optical filter λо: 
 
0
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
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                                  (15) 
Normalization of the FFPI output signal, i.e. relation formation 
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allows practically to eliminate the influence of instability of the optical source radiation (for 
example, ageing or change of the current rating), the influence of the induced losses of 
optical power in the sensor (for example, ionizing radiation) and the influence of insertion 
losses in the optical communication cable (for example, abrupt bends of optical cable and 
connectors). It is experimentally established that, for example, at an average value of 
relation IN = 0.27145 and insertion optical losses up to 70% the standard deviation of the 
relation from the average value does not exceed 0.00063    (0,23 %) as shown in fig. 20. 
 
 
Fig. 20. Normalized output signal of the pressure OFS  
The temperature dependence of the resonator cavity length is expressed by the formula: 
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  1 1 2 2o oG L L L T       ,                   (17) 
where ΔТ – temperature change; 
αо , α1, α2– CTE of capillary cover quartz glasses, input and output fibers, accordingly; 
Lо , L1 , L2 – lengths of the sensor measuring cavity, input and output optical fibers of the 
interferometer accordingly. 
To reduce a temperature error to a minimum, it is necessary to pick up such values of αо , α1, 
α2, L1 that the expression (17) of the formula in brackets almost equals  zero: 
 1 1 2 2 0o oL L L                              (18) 
at αо  = 6.1·10-7 К-1, α1  = 6.5·10-7 К-1, α2  = 5.6·10-7 К-1, L1 = 5.06 mm we obtain:  
 1 1 2 2 0,0002 o oL L L нм      .  
When the temperature ΔT of the measured environment changes by 600°C, the length of the 
FFPI resonator cavity will change according to the formula (17) by 0.1 nanometers, which is 
below a permissible threshold. That is, FFPI provides for practical temperature insensitive 
measurement of pressure in the entire working range of temperatures. 
Fig. 7 shows calibration characteristics of pressure OFS with temperature self-compensation 
for working temperatures 24 °С and 250 °С. Practically, additional temperature errors are 
absent. 
 
 
Fig. 21. Calibration characteristics of the temperature insensitive OFS 
7. Application of OFS for spent nuclear fuel repository monitoring 
Radioactive waste requires, due to its high hazard potential, careful handling from 
production to final disposal. In all waste management activities the safety objectives defined 
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by the authorities must be met to guarantee an adequate protection of the public. Waste 
management starts with the registration of the radioactive waste arising at different 
locations from different applications in industry, research as well as at nuclear fuel cycle 
facilities. The waste is then stored, conditioned into an appropriate form for further 
handling and disposal, intermediately stored whenever necessary over long periods of time, 
and eventually disposed of (Jobmann M. & Biurrun E.,2003).        
Long-term effectiveness, low maintenance, reliable functioning with high accuracy, and 
resistance to various mechanical and geochemical impacts are major attributes of 
monitoring systems devised to be operated at least during the operational phase of a 
repository. In addition, low maintenance and automatic data acquisition without disturbing 
the normal operation will help reducing operational costs. Due to these reasons  Russian 
“Krasnoyarsk SNF repository” started using of reliable and radiation-hard fiber optic 
technology as the basis for global monitoring systems at final disposal sites. 
Series of parameters important to safety of SNF repository can be monitored by optical 
sensors. Sensing elements to measure strain, displacement, temperature, and water 
occurrence together with the multiplexing and data acquisition systems were installed at 
1000m depth and the operation temperature is about 40 °C .        
The configuration of experimental OFS system is shown on fig. 22. 
 
 
Fig. 22. Configuration of the OFS system in SNF repository 
In three boreholes strain, temperature, and water detection sensors are installed, whereas 
the displacement sensors are fastened around the cross-section of the drift to monitor 
changes of the cavity geometry.   
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The complete circuit diagram of the OFS system is shown on fig. 23.  
 
 
Fig. 23. Circuit diagram of the OFS system in SNF repository 
All measured data will be collected by a so called sensing server via the corresponding 
multiplexing units. The sensing server can be connected to a backbone providing the data in 
special output files to be downloaded by the user.  
The presented fibre optic sensing systems which can be used in an all fibre optic network 
could be the basis for a high-reliability, low-maintenance, economic monitoring system for 
operational safety requirements in a final repository as shown in fig. 24.  
Monitoring the cavities deformation at representative cross-sections will be the basis for 
evaluating the operational safety. Together with temperature monitoring as a function of 
time at different locations, data for validating the thermo-mechanical constitutive laws of 
the host rock will be available.  
Monitoring of harmful gases as methane and carbon dioxide is an important issue in a salt 
environment because of the ongoing excavations during the operational period. Thus, fibre 
optic gas sensors at least for measuring methane and carbon dioxide was included in the 
global monitoring systems for spent nuclear fuel repositories. In an underground repository, 
the availability of appropriate monitoring tools is a major issue in order to ensure 
operational safety and  to verify that the repository evolves as predicted. The feasibility of 
measuring safety relevant parameters using sensors and multiplexing systems based on 
fibre optic technology. 
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Further developments are necessary to increase accuracy in large sensing networks and to 
check the long term performance. 
 
 
Fig. 24. All-fiber optic sensors network for SNF repository 
8. Trends in developments OFS for nuclear energy an industry  
In  the next decade, nuclear energy is expected to play an important role in the energetic 
mix. Various national and international programs taking place in order to improve the 
performance and the safety of existing and future NPPs as well as to assess and develop 
new reactor concepts. Instrumentation is a key issue to take the best benefit of costly and 
hard to implement experiments, under high level of radiation.    
OFS are contributed to improve instrumentation available thanks to its intrinsic capability of 
high accuracy associated with the passive remote sensing implementation allowed by fiber 
optic communication line. It can work under high temperature and high radiation. The 
small size is appreciated attending the lack of available space in research reactor, while 
miniaturized sensors will not disturb the temperature and radiation profile on the tested 
material. The ability of fiber optic sensors to provide smart sensing capabilities, detailed 
self-diagnostics, and multiple measurements per transducer and distributed OFS for 
temperature, strain and other parameters profiling are provided. These capabilities, coupled 
other intrinsic advantages, make fiber optic sensors a promising solution for extremely 
harsh-environment applications where data integrity is paramount. 
The advanced fiber optic sensing technologies that could be used for the in fusion reactors, 
for example ITER, safety monitoring. The remote monitoring of environmental parameters, 
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such as temperature, pressure and strain, distributed chemical sensing, could significantly 
enhance the ITER productivity and provide early warning for hazardous situations. 
The development of new intelligent (smart) OFS involves the design of reconfigurable 
systems capable of working with different input sensors. Reconfigurable systems based on 
OFS ideally should spend the least possible amount of time in their calibration (Rivera J., et 
al., 2007).                
A traditional NPPs control system has almost no knowledge memory.  The neural network, 
by comparison, learns from experience what settings work best.  The system updates the 
network weighting factors with a learning algorithm.  The neural network outputs adjusts 
the basic parameters (criteria) of technological processes and safety of NPP. This is an 
excellent artificial intelligence application.  Rather than model and solve the entire process, 
this neural network handles a localized control challenge.  
When a complex system NPP is operating safely, the outputs of thousands of sensors or 
control room instruments form a pattern (or unique set) of readings that represent a safe 
state of the NPP. When a disturbance occurs, the sensor outputs or instrument readings 
form a different pattern that represents a different state of the plant. This latter state may be 
safe or unsafe, depending upon the nature of the disturbance. The fact that the pattern of 
sensor outputs or instrument readings is different for different conditions is sufficient to 
provide a basis for identifying the state of the plant at any given time. To implement a 
diagnostic tool based on this principle, that is useful in the operation of complex systems, 
requires a real-time, efficient method of pattern recognition. Neural networks offer such a 
method. Neural networks have demonstrated high performance even when presented with 
noisy, sparse and incomplete data. Neural networks have the ability to recognize patterns, 
even when the information comprising these patterns is noisy or incomplete. Unlike most 
computer programs, neural network implementations in hardware are very fault tolerant; 
i.e. neural network systems can operate even when some individual nodes in the network 
are damaged. The reduction in system performance is about proportional to the amount of 
the network that is damaged. 
Beyond traditional methods, the neural network based approach has some valuable 
characteristics, such as the adaptive learning ability, distributed associability, as well as 
nonlinear mapping ability. Also, unlike conventional approaches, it does not require the 
complete and accurate knowledge on the system model. Therefore it is usually more flexible 
when implemented in practice. Thus, systems of artificial neural networks have high promise 
for use in environments in which robust, fault-tolerant pattern recognition is necessary in a 
real-time mode, and in which the incoming data may be distorted or noisy. This makes 
artificial neural networks ideally suited as a candidate for fault monitoring and diagnosis, 
control, and risk evaluation in complex systems, such as nuclear power plants (Uhrig R. 1989). 
The objective of this task is to develop and apply one or more neural network paradigms for 
automated sensor validation during both steady-state and transient operations. The use of 
neural networks for signal estimation has several advantages. It is not necessary to define a 
functional form relating a set of process variables. The functional form as defined by a 
neural network system is implicitly nonlinear. Once the network is properly trained, the 
future prediction can be interpolated in real-time. The state estimation is less sensitive to 
measurement noise compared to direct model-based techniques. As new information about 
the system becomes available, the network connection weights can be updated without 
relearning the entire data set. These and other features of neural networks will be exploited 
in developing an intelligent system for on-line sensor qualification. 
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We believe that researchers and instrumentation designers of new generation of NPPs  will 
use novel approaches to conduct real-time multidimensional mapping of key parameters via 
optical sensor networks, distributed and heterogeneous sensors designed for harsh 
environments of nuclear power plants and spent nuclear fuel respository. Recent events on 
Japanese NPP “Fukushima-1” are characteristic that within two weeks the information from 
gages, as NPP was without power supplies, was inaccessible and electronic gages couldn't 
transmit the important measuring information for condition monitoring of NPP. 
Contemporary OFS, as it is known, are radiation-hard and don't need power supplies, and 
the optoelectronic transceiver can be installated on distance to 80 km from NPP that will 
allow to supervise NPP during any critical periods and to accept the right decisions on 
elimination of failures. 
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Under Routine and Emergency Conditions 
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1. Introduction 
The main purpose of environmental monitoring is to quantify the levels of radioactivity in 
the various compartments of the environment disregarding its origin: natural or 
anthropogenic, under routine or accidental conditions, in view of assessing the health effects 
on man and his environment. However, because of their historical background, which is 
connected to the development of nuclear industry, the monitoring programmes established 
in the European countries focus on artificial radioactivity.  
Man-made radioactive matter can get into the biosphere by means of legally permitted 
discharges from nuclear installations or infrastructures where radioactive material is being 
used, e.g. hospitals and industry, or as the result of an accident. For each cause, specific 
sampling and monitoring programmes, as well as systems for internationally exchanging 
their results, have been implemented in the European Union and are still evolving.  
Routine monitoring is done on a continuous basis throughout the country by sampling the 
main environmental compartments which lead to man; typically these are airborne 
particulates, surface water, drinking water and food (typically milk and the main constituents 
of the national diet). The aim of routine monitoring is then also to confirm that levels are 
within the maximum permitted levels for the whole population (Basic Safety Standards, (EC, 
1996)) and to detect eventual trends in concentrations over time. A comprehensive overview of 
the sampling strategies and principal measurement methods in the countries of the EU will be 
given, as well as how this information is communicated to the general public. 
In case of an accident, monitoring (i.e., sampling, measuring and reporting) is tailored to the 
nature of the radioactive matter released and to the way in which it is dispersed. In particular 
during the early phase of an accident with atmospheric release it is essential to be able to 
delineate the contamination as soon as possible to allow for immediate and appropriate 
countermeasures. Afterwards, once the radioactivity has deposited, it is important to have 
detailed information of the deposition pattern; a detailed deposition map at a fairly early stage 
will serve to steer medium and long term countermeasure strategies (e.g. agricultural, 
remediation). A summary of the most commonly used techniques, as well as a discussion of 
the various sampling network types (emergency preparedness, mobile) will be given. 
The Chernobyl NPP accident on 26 April 1986 also triggered the European Commission to 
develop, together with the EU Member States, systems for the rapid exchange of 
information in case of a nuclear/radiological accident (European Community Urgent 
Radiological Information Exchange (ECURIE), European Radiological Data Exchange 
Platform (EURDEP)). Also these systems will be further described. 
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2. Types of monitoring networks 
Depending on the risk, networks have been developed for various purposes. In the first 
place there is the monitoring of radioactivity releases at nuclear installations, which aims at 
verifying the authorised discharges. In addition, in most European countries an 
environmental monitoring programme is operated for the main compartments of the 
biosphere, i.e., air, water, soil, foodstuffs. The purpose of such an environmental 
radioactivity monitoring programme is to verify compliance with the basic safety standards 
for the public. 
However, this objective is influenced by the source of radioactivity as well as the 
environmental compartment(s) affected. Radioactive material mainly comes into the 
environment by means of discharges into the atmosphere and/or the water. These 
discharges can happen in a controlled or in an accidental way. Therefore a distinction 
should be made between routine and emergency situations. In general one can distinguish 
between the following types of monitoring networks: 
• surveillance monitoring networks around nuclear installations to ensure that releases to 
the atmosphere and acquatic compartment remain below authorized limits, and to 
verify potential, chronic accumulation of radioactivity in the environment. Results 
obtained in this way may be used to estimate radiation exposure to critical groups (i.e., 
members of the public who have been identified as likely to receive the highest doses) 
(Hurst & Thomas, 2004). In case of accidental release, these networks can also provide 
information about the off-site contamination close to the installation, usually by means 
of ambient dose rate or by air concentration measurements; 
• national surveillance networks that generally cover the whole territory. These 
contribute to ensuring compliance with the basic safety standards for the population at 
large. These networks are operated on a national basis and cover the whole biosphere; 
• emergency preparedness networks continuously check levels of mainly ambient dose 
equivalent rate and airborne radioactivity, in order to detect accidental releases and 
subsequently monitor the evolution of the radioactive plume. Depending on the 
country, the monitors belonging to these networks are positioned along national 
borders and/or distributed over the national territory; 
• mobile equipment: depending on the size and the type of accident (release into the air 
and/or the aquatic phase, types of radionuclides dispersed etc.), additional mobile 
equipment (terrestrial or airborne) will be needed to obtain more detailed information 
for more highly contaminated areas. 
Whereas the first two types of network mainly have been designed for routine conditions, 
the latter two types have been designed in view of accidents. Most of the information during 
the early (or release phase) of an accident will come from the emergency preparedness 
network and to a lesser extent from the national surveillance networks. 
Ideally, an emergency monitoring strategy combines routine monitoring procedures with 
special requirements set by the emergency e.g. by combining measurement results from 
fixed monitoring stations (static network) with those from mobile or intervention teams.  
During the aftermath of an accident, emergency monitoring is not only important for effective 
post accident management but also to reassure the general public. Therefore, during a nuclear 
emergency the measuring and laboratory activities, as well as the general preparedness to 
perform situation analysis, are enhanced and intensified and special measuring systems (in 
particular mobile monitoring equipment) are used when appropriate (Lahtinen, 2004). 
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3. Environmental sampling and measuring techniques 
3.1 Exposure pathways 
Atmospheric discharges may result in exposure from four pathways, leading to doses to the 
population: 
• external contamination; 
• inhalation; 
• ingestion; 
• external radiation. 
To estimate the consequences of the external contamination and inhalation pathways,  
monitoring by air sampling is performed. For the ingestion pathway this happens by of 
means of food sampling, e.g., milk, whereas external radiation is determined by direct 
measurements of external dose or by soil analysis. 
Liquid discharges may irradiate man through three pathways: 
• ingestion; 
• external contamination; 
• external radiation. 
The monitoring of dose from ingestion in this case is usually carried out through sampling 
of fish and shellfish. The other two pathways are monitored by sampling of water, aquatic 
bio-indicators (e.g., seaweed, fish, molluscs) and sediments, and by direct measurements of 
doses from handling fishing gear or residing on beaches (Aarkrog, 1996). 
Internal contamination, as a result of inhalation and/or ingestion, can also be measured 
directly by whole body counting equipment (see also section 4.4.3.1). In specific radiological 
situations, like in the case of contamination with pure alfa and beta emitting radioisotopes, 
monitoring of the internal contamination can be performed by analysis of the blood, urine 
and/or faeces. 
3.2 Air 
3.2.1 Introduction 
The purpose of monitoring airborne radioactivity in the environment is to check domestic 
and foreign facilities. Depending on the meteorological conditions, airborne radioactive 
material can be rapidly transported over long distances in any direction. Man can become 
contaminated immediately through inhalation or external contamination, or indirectly by 
deposition and transfer of the radionuclides into the food chain. Therefore, monitoring the 
air is particularly important in order that contamination be detected as early as possible. 
In general, one distinguishes two sampling and measuring techniques for air: 
• particulates (alpha/beta or nuclide specific); 
• gases (e.g., gaseous iodine, noble gases). 
Airborne particulate radioactivity concentration is difficult to measure directly, since the 
artificial activity concentrations are typically lower than the natural radioactivity 
concentrations. Therefore accumulation methods are being used. The airborne dust is collected 
by drawing air through a filter material, which can be made of paper, glass fibre or 
polypropylene. The sampling devices may be located in diverse environments (in an open 
field or a courtyard, at ground level or on the roof of a building), which however 
complicates the intercomparability of measurements and their representativeness. Natural 
radionuclides include radon and its short-lived decay products (typically 1 - 20 Bq⋅m-3 in 
outdoor air), 7Be and 40K.  
Depending on the response time of the measurement systems, one should make a 
distinction between on-line and off-line sampling/measuring devices. 
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3.2.2 On-line measurements 
Based on the nuclide category to be measured, generally two measuring methods are 
considered: 
Alpha/beta measurements:  
Large area proportional counter tubes are used to measure the accumulated activity. Fixed 
filter devices only permit sampling periods of maximum one week and require thus 
considerable operational service. Automated filter changing mechanisms allow automatic 
operation up to six months and are particularly used in automatic monitoring networks; 
their drawback, however, is that they require regular maintenance. It is common practice for 
monitors to have flow rates of up to 25 m3⋅h-1, and detect artificial alpha and beta activity 
concentrations down to 0.1 Bq⋅m-3 in less than one hour in a natural background of several 
Bq⋅m-3. By increasing the filter speed (in case of a ribbon filter) or by increasing the 
frequency of the filter exchange, one is able to measure up to 106 Bq⋅m-3 (Frenzel, 1993). 
 
 
Fig. 1. On-line (left) and off-line (right) aerosol monitoring networks in a number of 
European countries (Bossew, P. et al, 2008) 
Widely used measuring methods are: 
• gross alpha: i.e., total alpha minus natural alpha radioactivity. The measurement is 
made by gas flow proportional counters, with or without anti-coincidence. Lower 
detection limits range between 1x10-5 and 4x10-2 Bq⋅m-3; 
• gross beta: i.e., total beta radioactivity with correction for natural radioactivity (mostly 
influenced by radon daughters). The measuring instruments used are: Geiger-Müller, gas 
flow proportional counter with different active surfaces and plastic scintillators with ZnS 
coating for simultaneous coincidence of alpha contamination. Depending on the methods 
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used, the lower detection limits range between 5x10-5 and 1 Bq⋅m-3. Distinction between 
natural and artificial radioactivity can be done very effectively by simultaneous 
coincidence counting of alpha decay and by assuming that there is no contribution of 
artificial alpha emitters. In this way concentrations of artificial radioactivity down to  
0.1 Bq⋅m-3 can be detected. One may also perform a second, delayed beta-counting after, 
e.g., 12 h (most short-lived daughters, except 212Po, will then have decayed). This is a valid 
procedure for routine monitoring, but in emergency situations the alarm level will still be 
determined by the natural background (on the order of 10 Bq m-3) (Janssens et al, 1991). 
Nuclide specific (gamma) measurements:  
The filter is measured by solid state detectors: 
• semi-conductor detectors (lithium drifted (GeLi) or high purity (HPGe) germanium 
detector); Measuring systems in inaccessible locations, such as high mountains or 
remote islands, become independent from the liquid nitrogen by using electrically 
cooled Ge detectors; 
• or scintillation counters (NaI). 
Nowadays nuclide-specific identifications are increasingly performed by means of high 
purity Ge detectors. To ensure optimum early warning, these instruments are designed to 
allow simultaneous alpha-beta measurement and nuclide-specific measurement. In the 
automatic mode, modern instruments are capable of reaching low detection limits  
(50 mBq⋅m-3 for 60Co in 1 h) and can analyse spectra for up to 100 different nuclides. Mostly 
137Cs and 60Co and some natural nuclides such as 7Be are measured. 
3.2.3 Off-line measurements 
Artificial airborne radioactivity in the range of μBq⋅m-3 cannot be detected by automatic 
instruments in ‘real-time’, since the natural radioactivity level is too high. Most institutes 
perform correction from natural radioactivity by waiting 2 to 5 days before measuring the 
filter, to allow for short-lived radon/thoron daughters to decay.  
Typically, high-volume air samplers (HVAS) with air flow rates ranging from 100 to  
1,000 m3⋅h-1 collect airborne particulates during one week. In case of an emergency, the 
sampling frequency can be increased to daily. By means of gamma spectroscopy detection 
levels of a few μBq⋅m-3 or less can be obtained (e.g., 137Cs concentrations on the order of  
0.1 μBq⋅m-3 can be measured in a 3x105 m3 filter sample). Chemical treatment of certain filters 
afterwards allows the analysis of pure alpha or beta emitters (e.g., 239Pu and 90Sr) (Frenzel, 1993). 
3.2.4 Measuring gaseous components 
Iodine is selectively accumulated in the thyroid gland and retains special attention because 
of its potential health hazard. Iodine in air can be bound to aerosols or can be gaseous, each 
requiring special measuring techniques. When bound to aerosols, iodine is measured with 
techniques as described previously. 
Gaseous iodine is sampled by means of special filters (e.g., silver impregnated activated 
carbon). The active carbon adsorbs and thus accumulates the gaseous iodine. The drawback of 
these filters is that, depending on the airborne iodine concentration, they become saturated 
and have to be replaced. This method may also be used for collecting noble gases (e.g., 85Kr). 
The active carbon cartridge surrounds the detector or is located directly next to it. The specific 
peak of 364 keV of 131I is usually measured with scintillation (NaI) detectors. Although HPGe 
detectors are used for measuring the contribution of different iodine radioisotopes, nowadays 
131I concentrations in the order of hundreds of mBq⋅m-3 can be measured in 1 hour. 
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3.3 Surface water 
Surface water includes river, lake or sea water. It is one of the environmental compartments to 
which radioactive effluents from nuclear installations can be directly discharged. Some of the 
sampling methods are automatic and continuous and are designed to detect contamination of 
water purification stations by radioactive effluents from industrial and research laboratories, 
hospitals having a nuclear medicine, etc... (e.g., the Telehydroray system installed on French 
rivers, and the Belgian automatic monitoring system on the river Meuse (Debauche, 2004). 
These automatic devices are designed to perform total gamma counting and to measure 
concentrations of 131I, 99mTc and 137Cs with detection limits in the order of 1 Bq⋅l-1. 
The time and frequency of sampling is very important for rivers with large differences in 
seasonal hydrological variations. In all cases, additional information on the river flow rate is 
very important. Radionuclides can be found in the water phase and associated with 
suspended particles, becoming eventually incorporated into sediments and living species. 
Natural radionuclides in surface water include 3H (0.02 - 0.1 Bq⋅l-1), 40K (0.04 - 2 Bq⋅l-1) 
radium, radon and their short-lived decay products (< 0.4 – 2 Bq⋅l-1). 
For routine conditions, river water samples can be taken continuously (or daily) and are 
then bulked into monthly or quarterly analysis. Alternatively spot samples are taken 
periodically and analysed individually. 
Some laboratories (e.g., in France) filter their surface water prior to measurement. 
Measurement is then performed on the filtered water and the suspended material 
separately. More elaborate chemical separations are needed for 90Sr, whereas 3H, which is 
also produced by nuclear industry, is measured after multiple distillation or electrolytic 
enrichment of the sample. Usually, residual beta (total beta less 40K activity) contamination 
is reported (De Cort et al., 2009), although there is a clear tendency in many countries to 
perform nuclide-specific measurements. 
With the exception of tritium in rivers with nuclear industry, usually the levels of 
radionuclide contamination in surface water are below the detection limit, due to the 
diluting factor. Hence countries nowadays make more use of biological indicators (aquatic 
moss, molluscs, vegetation) as these organisms have the capacity to concentrate specific 
chemical (stable and radioactive) elements. Fish is also frequently sampled, being a better 
activity integrator in the longer term (Sombré & Lambotte, 2004). 
3.4 Soil/sediments/deposits 
Airborne particulates are removed from the atmosphere by gravitational settling and turbulent 
transfer to ground surfaces (dry deposition) or by incorporation in or scavenging by rain 
droplets (wet deposition). The latter is the predominant process in European countries, and 
monitoring networks do not generally measure the two components separately.  
Depending on the circumstances and the objectives of the measurement, deposition can be 
sampled and measured in many different ways:  
• for routine measurements, the radioactivity is mostly accumulated on artificial 
collection surfaces, with active surface areas ranging from 0.05 to 10 m2. The materials 
used for the collecting areas vary (stainless steel, plastic, polyester, PVC). In most cases 
these are designed for collecting precipitation. Some detectors distinguish between wet 
and dry deposition (they open and close appropriately in response to rainfall), but most 
sample total (wet + dry) deposition. The rainwater may be directly fed to a bottle or to 
an ion exchange column where the nuclides are fixed. Measuring the activity in the 
collected rainwater and the amount of rainfall allows calculating the average total 
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deposition during the sampling period. Between the different European countries 
sampling periods range from daily, over weekly to monthly (De Cort et al., 2009); 
• in case of emergency with large transboundary release to the atmosphere, vast areas can 
be contaminated. Once the radioactive material has deposited, it is important that, in 
order to determine appropriate countermeasures in the immediate post-accident 
management period and to reassure the public, rapid and reliable monitoring of 
contaminated areas is performed. Airborne gamma ray spectrometry is a fast and effective 
means to monitor large areas for deposited radioactivity. It is performed by solid-state 
detectors (usually by means of high volume scintillation detectors (NaI), high purity 
germanium detectors or a combination of both) mounted on an aeroplane or helicopter 
that flies at constant speed and low altitude (typically 50-100 m). Along the flight track, 
time-integrated gamma ray spectra (typically 1 s) are recorded which, along with the 
information obtained from on-line GPS and radar-altimetry for automatic position and 
height correction, allow terrestrial radioactivity levels to be quantified and mapped. One 
of the main sources of uncertainty arises from the uncertainty in the activity depth 
distribution in the soil. Most commonly nowadays calibration is done by comparison with 
ground based spectrometry on representative radiation fields. Beyond its obvious benefits 
in case of a large nuclear accident, airborne gamma ray spectrometry is also applied for 
geological mapping for mineral exploration, soil mapping for agriculture, pollution 
studies and lost sources. (Dickson, 2004) 
• core sampling is a conventional technique and together with high resolution spectrometry 
it can be highly accurate and sensitive. It is the only method for radioisotopes which do 
not emit gamma rays (eg. 90Sr). It serves as an indicator of long-term build-up of 
radioactivity in the environment and is therefore essential for studies of vertical profiling 
and measurements by alpha, beta or mass spectrometry. It has the drawback of being 
time-consuming. Migration in the soil depends on the chemical form of the radionuclide, 
the soil type, hydrology and agricultural practices. Most artificial radionuclides are found 
in the upper 30 cm soil layer. Because of the possibility of large micro-scale variations in 
deposition, it is important to take a sufficient amount of soil samples in order to obtain a 
reasonable estimate of the deposition of radioisotopes at a given site. Subsequently the 
samples are thoroughly mixed in order to obtain a representative aliquot which can then 
be further analysed and measured (Aarkrog, 1996); 
• in-situ measurements, where a gamma spectrometer is placed at 1m above the ground, 
properly shielded by lead to measure in solid angle and thus reducing ambient gamma 
radiation (Raes, 1989). In-situ gamma-spectrometry measurement of the mean surface 
radioactivity concentration for a large area (~1 ha) in a relatively short time (generally 15-
30 minutes for a deposition of 10 kBq m-2 of 137Cs) (Dubois & Bossew, 2003). The 
uncertainty of the measurement is influenced by local topographic variations (buildings, 
trees,…), by vegetation cover and by the vertical activity distribution of the radionuclide. 
Good results have been obtained by means of an advanced analysis of the measured 
gamma spectrum, referred to as ‘Peak-to-valley’ method (Gering et al., 1998; Tyler, 2004). 
In-situ measurements are also common practice in emergency preparedness networks 
where gamma dose-rate detectors (usually Geiger-Müller probes, proportional counters, 
ionisation chambers) monitor continuously the ambient gamma dose-rate. 
• herbage is also a readily available indicator of deposition and of incorporation into 
green vegetables. Furthermore herbage forms part of the milk pathway to man (Hurst & 
Thomas, 2004). 
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3.5 Food chain 
3.5.1 Drinking water 
Radioactivity in drinking water is an important indicator of radionuclide transfer from the 
environment to man. The most important natural radionuclides in water for drinking 
consumption are 3H (0.02 - 0.4 Bq l-1), 40K (typically 0.2 Bq l-1 but widely variable), radium, 
radon and their short-lived decay products (0.4 - 4 Bq l-1). 
The sampling of drinking water varies in the European countries, depending on the national 
water resources and distribution systems. Drinking water thus may be sampled from 
ground or surface water supplies, from water distribution networks, mineral waters and 
table water in bottles. After sampling, the water is mostly evaporated for direct 
measurement of the residue or is separated on ion-exchange columns. More elaborate 
chemical separations are needed for 90Sr, whereas 3H is measured by liquid scintillation after 
purification of the water sample by multiple distillations (De Cort et al., 2009). 
The European Commission has issued a directive on water quality, including radioactive 
aspects. In particular, a limit of 100 Bq l-1 of tritium and a total indicative annual dose of 0.1 
mSv (natural radioisotopes not included) from water intended for human consumption has 
been established (EC, 1998). Member States are adapting their national monitoring 
programme to meet this demand. 
3.5.2 Milk 
Milk constitutes a principal pathway for exposure to airborne effluents. In addition it is an 
important foodstuff because it is produced continuously in large quantities, and it is consumed 
as such or it forms the basis for other foodstuffs (e.g., dairy products). It is essential for 
children, and the most important fission products such as 90Sr, 131I and 137Cs are secreted in it.  
At national level, milk samples are mostly taken at dairies that cover large geographical 
areas (in order to obtain representative samples), at farms (from raw milk) or at the super 
market (from bottled milk). To complete the national programme, supplementary milk 
samples are usually collected at single farms close to nuclear installations. Generally the 
samples are taken on a monthly basis, but sometimes only over the pasture season. Usually 
the milk samples are dried before gamma spectrometric analysis. Chemical separation is 
applied for the determination of 90Sr activity and separation of the water phase with 
subsequent distillation for the separation of 3H.  
In addition, the concentrations of the stable isotopes Ca and K are determined because of the 
similarity of their metabolic behaviour with Sr and Cs, respectively. Typical values in milk 
are 1 - 2 g l-1 for Ca and 1 - 3.5 g l-1 for K (De Cort et al., 2009). 
In case of an accidental atmospheric release, only a few days after deposition occurred, 
radionuclides already reach their maximum activity concentration in the milk (eg 2-4 days 
for 131I, 4-6 days for 137Cs or 90Sr) (Mercer et al, 2002). Hence immediate monitoring is 
required. However, in the immediate aftermath of an accidental release, some information 
may be available on the source and scale of the release, but it is very unlikely that any 
measurement data on environmental materials will be available.  
Predictive models, eventually in combination with data on activity deposited in soil, are 
essential at this point to provide an initial estimate of the dispersion of the activity released. 
Estimates of the evolution of activity concentrations in milk are required in the early stages 
following an accident. These are determined by the time of the year the deposition occurred 
(greater contamination of milk in summer and autumn when cattle are grazing in the pasture 
or delayed contamination can occur when contaminated fodder has been harvested).  
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Within this time, an extended monitoring programme with intensified sampling of milk at 
affected dairies would have to be started, and subsequently samples sent to laboratories. 
Results for gamma ray emitting radionuclides (eg 131I or 137Cs) would be available within 1 
hour, whereas the determination of pure beta emitters (like 90Sr) would require several days. 
An efficient alternative has been developed by the Radiation Protection Division/Health 
Protection Agency, UK. It consists of a portable specialised NaI detector to measure 
individual milk samples at bulking depots located in the vicinity of the contaminated area. 
Information on the radionuclide composition would be required to ensure a proper 
calibration of the measuring equipment. A minimum detection limit of 100 Bq l-1 within 100 
s of counting time is achievable (Mercer et al, 2002). 
Information on the radionuclide composition of the deposited activity is a priority for a 
sampling and measurement programme. This enables the radionuclides of primary 
radiological interest to be identified and the analytical strategy to be determined. Gamma-
emitting radionuclides can be determined rapidly without destroying the sample. However, 
it is also important to determine the contributions from beta emitters like 89Sr and 90Sr. 
(Mercer et al, 2002) 
3.5.3 Foodstuffs 
Foodstuffs are measured as separate ingredients (e.g., cereals, meat, fish, vegetables and 
fruit) or as whole meals (e.g., in canteens of factories or schools). The reason for measuring 
ingredients is to complete the monitoring programme for migration of radionuclides in the 
food chain or to check contamination of the public at large through ingestion, whereas 
sampling the whole meal gives a more direct estimate of the dose received by the 
population through ingestion. For general surveillance programmes the latter is more 
representative for the ingestion dose of the population, although ingredient monitoring is 
generally applied to obtain information on the propagation of radioisotopes in the food 
chain. Ingredients are measured particularly in case of emergencies to monitor the evolution 
of radioactive contamination of specific foodstuffs. 
In some European countries (e.g., Denmark, United Kingdom and Finland), an important 
programme for monitoring fish has been established. This is needed to determine radionuclide 
transfer in the aquatic environment. Usually, fish types most commonly caught for human 
consumption are sampled. They are sorted by their origin, species and size (Saxen 1990). 
Because of differences in the composition of national diets, there is a tendency in the EU to 
sample complete meals at schools or factory canteens in order to give a representative figure 
for contamination in a mixed diet (expressed in Bq⋅d-1 per person). Knowledge of the 
contamination of the different ingredients together with the composition of the national diet 
can also lead to a representative figure for the radioactivity level in a mixed diet. 
The radioactivity levels legally permitted in foodstuff in the EU are laid down in the 
appropriate EC legislation (EC, 1989; EC, 2000a). Monitoring of foodstuff in the aftermath of 
a large scale nuclear accident will require major and specific efforts, depending on the type 
and scale of the atmospheric release. Crop monitoring programmes can be significantly 
rationalised by using results from airborne gamma spectrometry surveys of the 
contaminated area, combined with appropriate food chain models.  
In the long term it is important that specific food types continue to be monitored, in 
particular foodstuffs coming from affected areas, even when radioactivity contamination 
levels in agricultural products have returned to normal. Typical examples are semi-natural 
foodstuffs that concentrate Cs, such as mushrooms, reindeer (through lichen), wild boar and 
carnivorous lake fish (EC, 2003).  
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3.6 Ambient dose equivalent 
External radiation is measured as an instantaneous gamma dose-rate or a gamma dose 
integrated over a certain time period. It is non-nuclide specific and provides information 
covering large areas. For emergency preparedness purposes it is of specific importance as it 
can provide ‘real-time’ information about the progression of the radioactive cloud. Therefore 
all European countries already have or are establishing automatic monitoring networks for 
ambient gamma dose rate. Table 1 illustrates how the mean distance between stations ranges 
from approximately 10 km to 150 km (values for Iceland and Russia excepted because of the 
non uniform spatial distribution of the stations considered in this study). 
 
Country Area (1000 km2) No. stations Mean distance* (km) 
Albania 29 5 76 
Austria 84 346 16 
Belarus 208 22 97 
Belgium 31 192 13 
Bulgaria 111 26 65 
Cyprus 91 7 36 
Czech Republic 79 413 14 
Denmark 43 13 58 
Estonia 43 10 66 
Finland 305 263 34 
France 544 157 59 
Former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia (FYROM) 26 1 160 
Germany 357 2 067 13 
Greece 132 24 74 
Hungary 93 77 35 
Iceland 103 5 144 
Ireland 70 14 71 
Italy 301 57 73 
Latvia 65 17 62 
Lithuania 65 21 56 
Luxembourg 2.6 18 12 
Malta 316 1 18 
Netherlands 34 191 13 
Norway 324 28 108 
Poland 313 35 95 
Portugal 92 17 74 
Serbia & Montenegro 103 5 143 
Slovak Republic 49 63 28 
Slovenia 20 42 22 
Spain 505 914 23 
Sweden 411 35 108 
Switzerland 41 116 19 
United Kingdom 244 93 51 
* The mean distance is obtained by the square root of the surface of the national territory divided by the 
amount of monitors. 
Table. 1. Number of automatic gamma dose-rate monitoring stations per country (Bossew, 
P. et al, 2008) 
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Fig. 2. Gamma dose rate monitoring networks in a number of European countries (Bossew, 
P. et al, 2008) 
The detectors most frequently used are energy-compensated, gas-filled counter tubes, 
mostly Geiger-Müller (GM), ionization chambers and proportional counters. Occasionally 
scintillation detectors (NaI crystals) or even germanium spectrometers are used, in 
particular to determine the nuclide composition of the cloud by gamma spectroscopy. Some 
countries, e.g. Germany, are exploring to replace a part of their GM tubes by detectors that 
provide nuclide specific information of the ambient radiation, such as CdZnTe semi-
conductors that operate at room temperature. 
In order to cover the measuring range from natural radiation up to high dose-rate levels 
encountered during accidental releases, two counters are usually built into a detector, one 
for low-range and one for high-range measurements. Modern detectors are equipped with 
local electronics for data transfer. They may also feature data storage and perform automatic 
background correction. 
A drawback, however, is that local dose rate measurements are very sensitive, so that even 
minor variations of the natural radioactivity concentration can be detected (e.g., due to 
radon daughters during precipitation or a pressure drop – see Fig. 3.).  
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Fig. 3. Example of the effect of precipitation (lower left) on the ambient dose equivalent rate 
(middle left), due to radon daughter washout (http://eurdep.jrc.ec.europa.eu) 
Furthermore, time-integrated dosimeters (film badges and thermo-luminescent dosimeters 
(TLDs)) are used, mostly on the perimeter fence of nuclear installations in order to obtain a 
cumulative measurement of the direct gamma radiation of the plant. Results from film 
dosimeters have to be treated with care, especially for low doses. They may also be affected 
by temperature and humidity (Hurst & Thomas, 2004). 
4. Monitoring networks 
4.1 Legislative background – information exchange and access 
It is obvious that the use of radioactive and nuclear materials holds an increased risk for 
health. Therefore monitoring of environmental radioactivity is subject to strict legal 
obligations. This paragraph describes more into detail which legislation is in place and 
which measures have to be taken by the EU Member States. 
It is normal practice to monitor not only exposure of critical groups but also to review 
exposure of the population at large. Within the European Community there is an obligation 
to do so both in terms of Article 35 of the Euratom Treaty and in terms of Article 13 and 14 
of the Basic Safety Standards (EC, 1996). 
Chapter III of the Euratom Treaty deals with Health and Safety aspects of the development 
and growth of nuclear industries and in particular with the establishment of uniform safety 
standards to protect the health of workers and of the general public. Article 35 deals with 
radioactivity levels in the air, water and soil. 
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Consequently Member States have set up programmes to monitor radioactivity levels in the 
air, water and soil over their entire territory. The main responsibility for establishing an 
environmental monitoring programme lies with the Member States. Under Article 35 the 
Commission also has access right to the monitoring facilities in order to verify their 
operation and efficiency.  
The authorities shall keep the Commission informed of radioactivity levels to which the 
population is exposed, by periodically communicating data obtained with the facilities 
referred to in Article 35. The data are transmitted to the Commission in accordance with 
Article 36 of the Euratom Treaty. The Commission adopted a Recommendation to Article 36 
(2000/473/ Euratom) (EC, 2000b) which specifies in much more detail the sample type and 
corresponding nuclide measurements that should be reported on, as well as the sampling 
frequency and the way in which these data have to be submitted to the European 
Commission. The routine environmental monitoring data are transmitted by the European 
Union (EU) Member State authorities to the Radioactivity Environmental Monitoring (REM) 
data base. This database is the basis for preparing the annual reports describing the 
radioactivity levels in the EU. Both REM database and the annual reports can be consulted 
by the public (http://rem.jrc.ec.europa.eu). 
The vastness of the radioactive contamination following the Chernobyl accident also 
emphasized the need for improved international collaboration on emergency response. 
Shortly after the accident a legal framework was realised by establishing common 
international procedures for notification, data and information exchange and mutual 
assistance (i.e., the Conventions on Early Notification and Early Assistance by the 
International Atomic Energy Agency, and Council Decision 87/600 of the European 
Commission); these procedures were subsequently adopted in the national legislation of the 
Member States. The official notification system of the EC is the ECURIE system, which is the 
technical implementation of Council Decision 87/600. An EU Member State that in case of a 
radiological or nuclear emergency decides to take countermeasures to protect its population 
against an increase of radioactivity must promptly notify the European Commission. Upon 
receipt and verification, the EC will immediately forward this information to all Member 
States, after which the latter are required to inform the EC at appropriate intervals about the 
measures they take and the radioactivity levels they have measured.  
EURDEP is a system by which automatic monitoring results (currently mainly ambient dose 
equivalent rate, but also air concentration data) are exchanged, irrespective of an emergency 
situation or not. Countries using EURDEP are exempted of sending the same radioactivity 
measurement results by ECURIE. 
Although it has been designed originally for Europe, there are concrete plans between the 
EC and IAEA to extend the system to a world-wide coverage. At this moment about 4400 
detectors in 35 European countries exchange continuously gamma dose rate measurements. 
The information can also be accessed by the public (see http://eurdep.jrc.ec.europa.eu) 
4.2 Routine monitoring 
The routine monitoring programme, which has been developed in parallel to nuclear 
industry, essentially aims at verifying: 
• the discharge authorisation of nuclear installations; 
• compliance with the dose limits or constraints laid down for protecting the 
population. 
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Therefore one should distinguish between national monitoring programmes and 
surveillance of nuclear installations.  
The national monitoring programme has been designed to verify compliance of the Basic 
Safety Standards. Hence the monitoring programme should aim at providing information 
on the overall dose received by the population at large. The monitoring network is therefore 
to be designed so that the results are representative on a national level. This means that 
sampling locations must be far enough from nuclear installations in order to avoid direct 
influence of discharges, that sampling must be made of all the compartments of the 
environment and that sampling intervals must be performed at time periods that allow 
verification of dose limits (EC, 1996). 
In addition there are environmental monitoring programmes for nuclear facilities in 
operation. These depend on the type of discharges, whether into the atmosphere and/or to 
the water. Verification of releases from nuclear installations is best performed by installing 
equipment in the stack and in the liquid effluent discharge line of the plant. Monitoring 
stations installed in the immediate vicinity of the plant ensure independent but indirect 
verification by the authorities. A network located at short distance and in an appropriate 
number of wind directions and downstream of the discharge point in the river or sea, 
assures this. In addition, estimation of the actual doses received by the critical groups 
requires that local foodstuffs be sampled and analysed. 
Usually, for routine conditions, radioactivity levels are below the detection levels so that 
there is a trend to make more use of bio-indicators such as lichen, aquatic mosses and algae 
to trace accumulated radioactivity (EC, 2000b). 
4.3 Emergency preparedness monitoring 
4.3.1 The need for emergency preparedness monitoring 
Any notification message about an emergency at a nuclear facility, warning that a significant 
amount of radioactivity has been released or is likely to be released, should come from the 
plant operator. This information will then be further disseminated through the proper 
communication channels on regional, national and international level (De Cort et al, 2007). 
Nevertheless many countries have set up mechanisms for early warning based on 
nationwide gamma dose-rate monitoring networks. This would allow the emergency 
situation to be identified independently and irrespective of whether the release was of 
domestic or foreign origin. 
For this purpose it is necessary to be able to identify the source and to circumscribe the 
extent of the radioactive cloud with reasonable accuracy. Identification and circumscription 
are possible only if the density of the network is sufficiently high and if data from 
neighbouring countries can be relied upon in case of a transboundary movement. 
4.3.2 Network design criteria 
The basic requirement of an emergency preparedness network is its ‘early-warning’ 
capability, by which is meant that it must be able to detect a cloud resulting from an 
accidental release. Next it must be able to delineate the extent of the cloud and to track its 
progression over a territory. 
Although they are mainly designed for the early detection of accidental releases, gamma 
dose-rate monitoring networks have limited value for circumscribing and monitoring the 
evolution of such clouds because they cannot readily discriminate between airborne and 
deposited radioactivity. Continuous aerosol monitoring devices are therefore preferred, 
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but they have the drawback of having higher maintenance costs. Also out of financial 
budgetary reasons, a limited amount of gamma spectrometers is usually incorporated  
in an on-line network to give qualitative information about the composition of the  
cloud. After the passage of the cloud, the latter in combination with the gamma  
dose-rate readings, allow for the assessment of the amount of radioactivity deposited to 
the ground. 
Gamma detectors, in view of their relatively low installation and maintenance cost and 
wider range of sensitivities, best serve the alarm function of the national monitoring 
networks. Geiger-Müller detectors, proportional counters, ionisation chambers or 
scintillation crystals may equally be preferred. The existence of so many systems has the 
drawback of differences in energy response. For the mere alarm function an accurate 
calibration (and knowledge of the nuclide composition of the cloud) is not a priority, but 
when absent, it may create problems when data from different networks are brought 
together.  
Irrespective of the topology of the network, the representativeness of the gamma dose-rate 
measurements depends on many factors, such as the presence of trees (which enhance dry 
deposition), the presence of surfaces that promote surface runoff of radioactive material 
reavenged by precipitation (e.g., paved surfaces, roofs), attenuating obstructions (e.g., vicinity 
of buildings, walls), the surface roughness and the detector position above ground (e.g., terrain 
or roof). Differences of more than one order of magnitude may occur between different sites 
which have been contaminated under the same conditions. As is shown in (Sohier, 2002), these 
differences can be characterised by environmental parameters, on which basis the measured 
data can be interpreted correctly. In addition this parameterisation could be used to improve 
harmonisation between different national networks. 
When a network is being designed, a number of general factors should be taken into 
account: 
4.3.2.1 Natural background subtraction 
Gamma detectors are also very sensitive to variations in background count rates. Apart from 
regional variations for which corrections can be made, there are also slow and fast temporal 
variations due to the dependence of radon daughter concentrations in air and soil on 
meteorological parameters (e.g., an enhanced soil exhalation in case of a pressure front 
passing by or a cyclonic pressure drop, or washout of atmospheric aerosols in case of rain). 
Automatic data processing for pattern recognition of such phenomena or correlation is 
difficult and in general one relies on the judgement of the operator in the central station for 
data collection. 
Nevertheless alarm levels can be set at dose rates on the order of 100 nSv h-1 above 
background, which is certainly low enough. 
Continuous aerosol monitors are preferable because they are not affected by ground 
deposition. However they consist of moving and consumable parts, so maintenance costs 
are higher. Continuous beta monitoring can be performed, e.g., by putting a beta detector in 
front of a slowly rotating paper ribbon. As already mentioned in section 3.2.2, there is the 
additional complication of having to subtract counts from radon daughters. 
A distinction between natural and artificial radioactivity can also be achieved by gamma ray 
spectroscopy. Knowledge of the radionuclide composition of the release is of interest for 
predicting further transport and deposition of the cloud and for assessing population doses. 
The composition is not likely to vary quickly in the course of time, so it is sufficient to 
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perform such measurements only in a few stations. Detection levels achieved by sampling 
on step-feed filters and on-line counting with a germanium detector are on the order of 0.05 
Bq m-3 (typically 2 hours measuring time). 
4.3.2.2 Sampling/counting time  
For continuous monitoring systems sampling and counting times are identical. In view of 
the alarm function of such systems one might be tempted to reduce the sampling/counting 
time at the expense of statistical error which in turn would demand an increase in alarm 
levels. This is particularly true for continuous beta detectors. In the case of gamma detectors 
it is to a large extent possible to choose a more sensitive instrument. 
Counting times should nevertheless be sufficiently short so that the network yields 
information on the speed, direction and longitudinal elongation of the cloud. On the other 
hand, counting times too short may cause the central processing unit to be overloaded with 
redundant data, i.e., the ‘pace’ of the network (average distance between the stations 
divided by the sampling time) should be comparable to the wind velocity. 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. Location of automatic gamma dose-rate monitoring stations that contribute to  
the EURDEP system (situation of April 2011), showing the topographic diversity of the 
national emergency preparedness networks. 
4.3.2.3 Spatial homogeneity 
The detection capacity of a network also depends on its spatial homogeneity. An elegant 
analysis of the impact of homogeneous coverage of the territory and of the limited extent of 
the network (countries’ dimensions) can be made in terms of the ‘factual’ dimension of both 
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the network and the cloud. Such an analysis demonstrates the need for integrating networks 
on the largest possible scale and for comparable network densities (Raes et al., 1991; Sohier, 
2002). Figure 4 which shows the automatic monitoring stations for gamma dose-rate that 
contribute to the EURDEP system, demonstrates the lack of spatial homogeneity between 
the national emergency preparedness networks. 
4.4 Monitoring after an accident 
4.4.1 General considerations 
Even though a thorough analysis of continuous monitoring data may improve the accuracy 
of predicting further transport and dispersion of the cloud, which may prove critical for 
timely assessing its possible impact and for preparing adequate countermeasures, additional 
means are necessary in case of a real accident. 
Early decisions such as exhorting the population to seek shelter could be based directly on 
reading of gamma detectors or aerosol monitors. Evacuation or the distribution of iodine 
tablets on the other hand might be considered either as a precautionary measure when a 
major release is expected or otherwise after the plume has passed, but only after the current 
radiological situation has been assessed. Static networks are inappropriate for this purpose 
because exposure pathways depend to a large extent on ground deposition. In the absence 
of rain and in case of a well-circumscribed cloud, calculated values for ground deposition 
may be available. However the Chernobyl accident has taught us that in case of rainfall one 
must cope with a patchy deposition pattern, which can be assessed only by portable and 
preferably mobile equipment. 
4.4.2 Monitoring strategies 
In case of a possible accidental release of radioactivity, the monitoring programme aims at 
answering the following questions: 
• has an abnormal release occurred; 
• is there an action to be taken; 
• which remedial measures should be implemented. 
As for operational monitoring the design of the programme depends on the nature of the 
environment which has received the contamination. It is, however, important in any 
emergency that the results are obtained relatively quickly, which means that rapid methods 
should be used for making measurements. This usually means a lower sensitivity and thus a 
greater risk of errors. On the other hand if the contamination is substantial, fast 
measurements are possible without losing much in sensitivity. Last but not least, at all times 
one should be aware that equipment can become contaminated, leading to incorrect 
measurements. 
4.4.3 Mobile equipment 
4.4.3.1 Terrestrial equipment 
Vans have been fitted with all equipment needed for in-situ measurement of dose rates, and 
for collecting air samples with aerosol filters and charcoal cartridges, and possibly for soil 
and biological samples, and for their immediate counting and spectrometric analysis. The 
fitting of such vans, their maintenance, the provision and permanent training of personnel 
involves considerable costs. It is a matter of choice whether resources are allocated to the 
extension of static networks or to mobile equipment. 
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The mobile equipment should also have adequate means of communication and data 
transmission with the co-ordination centres (GPS navigational instruments and radar 
altimeter). 
The need for environmental radioactivity measurements in case of an accident is not limited 
to rapid and detailed assessments prior to the implementation of countermeasures. Also in 
case of a remote accident involving a moderate release, it will be necessary to perform a 
large number of measurements in different media in order to perform an accurate a 
posteriori assessment of its radiological impact. Such an assessment fulfils the need for 
adequately informing the public and may also serve scientific investigations. 
These kinds of measurements may be pursued over longer periods of time. The assessment 
of the impact of short-lived nuclides such as iodine and ruthenium isotopes will be possible 
only if measurements are performed within a few weeks after the accident. 
The direct monitoring of internal contamination of people is usually done by means of 
whole body counters (WBC). The monitoring infrastructure is usually of a stationary type 
and installed at nuclear power plants, fuel cycle plants, research centres, hospitals with 
nuclear medicine, etc... However certain countries, such as France, also dispose of mobile 
equipment, usually in the form of intervention trailers, for monitoring contaminated 
persons. This equipment consists of vehicles equipped with ‘partially body counters’ (e.g., 
thyroid, thorax) and some even with WBC capacity (including appropriate shielding to 
reduce the background radiation). Detection limits (e.g. 500 Bq 137Cs for 10 minutes and 100 
Bq for 30 minutes counting time) are higher than those for fixed installations; however they 
allow inspectors to sort people according to their internal contamination. In order to make 
full use of these resources in case of emergency, the main problem is to have available 
enough personnel sufficiently trained to guarantee that this infrastructure is full used 
(Fiedler & Voigt, n.d.). 
4.4.3.2 Airborne equipment 
During the release phase, given the limitations of ground-based monitoring equipment for 
three-dimensional circumscription of the cloud, aircraft may prove very useful to carry out an 
aerial mapping at higher altitudes, in particular above the mixing boundary layer (e.g., 1500 m).  
As soon as the release has ceased, airborne gamma ray spectrometry allows for rapid 
monitoring of vast areas contaminated by radioactivity. The technique has been described in 
section 3.4. Since the Chernobyl nuclear power plant accident, many European countries 
have become capable of deploying measurement teams within hours of an accident being 
notified, in order to measure levels and pattern of deposited radioactive material. In view of 
combining national efforts in case of a large scale nuclear accident, European teams have 
been collaborating and exercising on various occasions over the past years. This capacity to 
act jointly and produce, in real-time, a composite map of an area in Southern Scotland has 
been demonstrated in the ECCOMAGS project (Sanderson et al, 2004). 
5. Discussion and conclusions 
Competent Authorities of the European Union Member States have to ensure that the 
exposure of their population is compliant with the Basic Safety Standards (EC, 1996). To 
reach this objective European countries have set up environmental monitoring programmes 
which provide continuously the basic information, i.e., the radioactivity levels in the various 
compartments of their environment. Subsequently the doses received by the population can 
be assessed by means of radioecological models. The latter thus play an important role in 
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designing sound environmental monitoring programmes, including the definition of 
potentially important pathways and critical groups by determining the most representative 
sample types and sample locations (Vandecasteele, 2004). Also in the case of radiological or 
nuclear emergency, and based on the available monitoring and modelling information, 
Member States are required to submit emergency procedures and practices in accordance 
with the Basic Safety Standards. At this moment, the latter is being revised to allow for the 
new ICRP Recommendations (Publication 103) as well as to consolidate all EU radiation 
protection legislation in a single BSS Directive (Janssens, 2009). 
Since the Chernobyl nuclear power plant accident, European countries continue to enhance 
their capacity and infrastructure to monitor radioactivity in their environment. They also 
continue to improve their capacity to transfer and handle the monitoring data in real time, 
combining them with radioecological models and/or decision support systems, in order to 
convert them into information based on which decisions may be made.  
In case of an emergency with radioactive release to the atmosphere, during the release phase 
most of the information about the environmental contamination will come from the ‘static 
networks’, i.e., the emergency preparedness network and the routine monitoring networks, 
as these operate permanently. Such monitoring data, together with information about the 
release and appropriate models to forecast the atmospheric dispersion of the cloud, will be 
used by the authorities to decide on early countermeasures. However, atmospheric 
dispersion models can give rise to uncertainties in model results, which may lead to 
different approaches for early countermeasures on the national level. In order to harmonise 
the information coming from various countries and to work out a reconciled and 
comprehensive European long range atmospheric dispersion ensemble forecast, the 
ENSEMBLE system has been developed (http://ensemble.jrc.ec.europa.eu) by the European 
Commission Joint Research Centre. (Galmarini et al, 2008).   
Once the release has stopped and the radioactive material is deposited, it is important to 
know, as soon as possible, the detailed deposition pattern of the affected areas. Airborne 
and in-situ gamma spectrometry is currently considered the most efficient way to do this. 
Combining such results with appropriate food chain models can significantly rationalise 
milk and crop monitoring programmes. 
The vastness of the radioactive contamination following the Chernobyl accident also 
emphasized the need for improved international collaboration on emergency response. 
Shortly after the accident both the EC and the IAEA realised a legal framework for 
notification, data and information exchange and mutual assistance. This need to exchange 
monitoring data on international level raised questions regarding the representativeness of 
measurements coming from the various national monitoring networks. The current national 
monitoring networks are mainly based on historical, political and budgetary constraints. It 
is most unlikely that these will be converted into a unified operational European monitoring 
network. Hence the only practical and sustainable approach for the future is to harmonise to 
the maximum extent possible the data and information produced by these networks as far 
as they are to be exchanged on an international level. This means that we have to 
understand fully how monitoring is performed in the various European states. International 
intercomparison exercises only provide a part of the answer, as they mainly focus on the 
measurement aspect of monitoring, and usually do not address issues such as sampling and 
reporting techniques, including representativeness. Notwithstanding this, it is worthwhile 
to mention that a number of initiatives have already been taken to address this problem, in 
particular for measurements which are usually performed during the release phase or the 
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early post-release phase (i.e., the environmental parameterisation of gamma dose-rate 
detectors and the European collaboration of airborne gamma-ray spectrometry teams). 
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1. Introduction
The activation products in a reactor’s primary coolant loop is a main reason why Nuclear
Power Plants (NPPs) use a chain of two or three coolant loops linked by heat exchangers, but
isolated against matter exchange. However, during routine operations, damages are likely to
occur, and the formation of micro-cracks represents a way of leakage for activation products.
Through the same way, also leakage of material directly from the reactor core can take place:
ﬁssion products and several isotopes of actinides, 235U, 238U, 239Pu and those heavier isotopes
produced by single and multiple neutron capture on them. The explosion of a nuclear bomb
leads itself to releases of radioactive material, which, in this case, could be widespread in the
environment up to a global scale.
Moreover, undeclared nuclear activities and/or illegal use and transport of nuclear fuel can be
detected through determination of the isotopic ratios of U and Pu in such samples. As all the
activities related to nuclear technology have been, since the second half of the past century,
responsible of changes in the concentration of the anthropogenic radionuclides over global
scale, it would be not inappropriate referring to a further Global Environmental Change which
is recognizable within every environmental matrix: soil, superﬁcial and ground-waters and
living organisms. The outcome of the interactions of ionizing particles with living matter is,
already, unluckily, well known, that’s why a number of studies have been ﬂourishing in order
to assess the radiological risk, by analyzing the environmental pathways of radionuclides and
their behavior within the human food chain. In parallel, accurate assessment and monitoring
of every source of radioactive contamination are required from the point of view of the
prevention from this new scenario of radiological exposition (Quinto, 2007). Quantifying
the releases and tracing their dispersion in the environment has traditionally been the task
of Alpha Spectrometry (AS (O’Donnell et al., 1997; Sanchez et al., 1992) or, more recently, of
Inductively Coupled Plasma Mass Spectrometry (ICP-MS) (Ketterer et al., 2003; Ketterer &
Szechenyi, 2008; Wyse et al., 2001) or Thermal Ionization (TI-MS) (Beasley et al., 1998; Richter
et al., 1999). Although these are mature methodologies, each has its limitations, which are
largely surmounted by the relatively new technique of Accelerator Mass Spectrometry (AMS)
(Fiﬁeld, 2008; Steier et al., 2010). In the chapter the origin of actinides is discussed as well as
the potential of actinides to serve as a tracer for geomorphologic processes and as sensitive
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ﬁngerprints of releases from nuclear facilities (Quinto et al., 2009; Sakaguchi et al., 2009; Steier
et al., 2008).
Moreover the sensitivity of the different actinides measurements method and the peculiarity
of the AMS technique with respect to AS and CMS techniques are illustrated. Furthermore
the principles and methodology of heavy-element AMS as applied to U and Pu isotopes are
described, and the ways in which these have been implemented in various laboratories around
the world are discussed with particular attention to the CIRCE (Center for Isotopic Research
on Cultural and Environmental Heritage) and ANU (Australian National University)
accelerator facilities (Fiﬁeld et al., 1996; Terrasi et al., 2007).
2. Origin and detection of actinides
2.1 Sources of contamination
The discovery of the ﬁssion properties of 235U and 239Pu and the capability to sustain chain
ﬁssion reactions, have opened the way to several applications of nuclear energy. Nuclear
Power Plants are used to generate thermal, and then electric, power, while Nuclear Weapons
use the destructive effects of supercritical chain reactions. Both of these applications of nuclear
energy, together with all the activities correlated with production, transport and reprocessing
of nuclear fuel, lead to releases of a wide range of radioactive elements in the environment.
The free neutrons produced by ﬁssion are partly adsorbed by other nuclei of ﬁssile material,
allowing, in the appropriate conditions, the self-sustainability of the chain reaction, and partly
adsorbed by other elements in the air and the ground, during ﬁssion in nuclear explosions,
and by structural and cladding materials and coolant circuits, during the exercise phase of
NPP. The production of activation products in a reactor’s primary coolant loop is a main
reason why NPPs use a chain of two or three coolant loops linked by heat exchangers, but
isolated against matter exchange. However, during routine operations, damages are likely to
occur, and the formation of micro-cracks represents a way of leakage for activation products.
Through the same way, also leakage of material directly from the reactor core can take place:
ﬁssion products and several isotopes of actinides, 235U, 238U, 239Pu and those heavier isotopes
produced by single and multiple neutron capture on them. The input of these radionuclides in
the outer coolant circuit results in their release in the environment within airborne and liquid
efﬂuents during the routine running of a NPPs. Of course, other ways of leakage would be
accidents leading to uncontrolled explosions of the reactor or any kind of exceptional damage
at various structural devices. The diffusion area of contamination from routine exercise of
NPPs is restricted to a local scale, affecting the surroundings, the river or artiﬁcial channel,
which provides and drains the reactor cooling water and the following areas connected with
the river water circulation (Quinto, 2007). On the some grounds, the above radionuclides can
be dispersed in the environment by the explosions of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere or
underground.
Schematically it is possible to divide the sources of contamination into large and small scale
contamination:
1. large scale source of radionuclide contamination includes the explosion of a Nuclear bomb.
The contamination could be widespread in the environment up to a global scale. Several
atmospheric nuclear tests conducted between 1945 and 1963 by the US and Soviet Union,
by UK between 1952 and 1963, by France until 1974 and by the People’s Republic of China
until 1980, projected their debris into the stratosphere, from where, due to the global wind
circulation, they have been deposited around the world within what is called global fall
168 Nuclear Power – Control, Reliability and Human Factors
Origin and Detection of Actinides: Where do we Stand with the Accelerator Mass Spectrometry Technique? 3
Actinides T1/2(y) Emitted radiation
234U 2.5 · 105 α
235U 7.0 · 108 α
236U 23.0· 106 α
238U 4.5 · 109 α
238Pu 88.0 α
239Pu 2.4 · 104 α
240Pu 6.6 · 103 α
241Pu 14 β−
242Pu 3.8 · 105 α
243Pu 5.7 · 10−4 β−
244Pu 82.0 · 106 α
Table 1. Half-lives, T1/2 and decay mode of Uranium and Plutonium isotopes in year, y, units.
out. Another large scale source of contamination is due to one of the worst accidents in the
history of nuclear energy that occurred on 26 April, 1986, at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power
Station near Kiev in Ukraine, affecting mainly Central and Northern Europe, although
137Cs was detectable even in Southern Italy (Roca et al., 1989).
2. small scale includes the operation and decommissioning activities of a NPP which could
lead to airborne and liquid releases of radionuclides. At the same level, several steps in the
fuel cycle, up to the reprocessing of spent fuel, can release activation and ﬁssion products,
as well as the ﬁssile material itself.
Obviously, given that the relative concentrations of plutonium and uranium isotopes depend
on the nature of the source material and on its subsequent irradiation history, all these sources
of contamination do not give the same contributions of contamination. As it will be shown
in the following, useful tools to solve among different contributions are the isotopic ratios:
236U/238U, 240Pu/239Pu, 242Pu/239Pu, 244Pu/239Pu and 238Pu/239+240Pu,. Table 1 shows the
half lives of the relevant isotopes of U and Pu.
2.2 Different contamination sources
The relative concentrations of plutonium and uranium isotopes depend on the nature of the
source material and on its subsequent irradiation history; all these sources of contamination
do not give the same contributions of contamination.
Here are shown some example of different contamination sources:
• Being ﬁssile material, 239Pu is the most abundant isotope in weapon-grade plutonium.
The average ratio of 240Pu/239Pu, before detonation is 240Pu/239Pu≤ 0.07 while after
detonation is 240Pu/239Pu 0.35 (Diamond et al., 1960), for the US tests. After detonation
239Pu isotope is still the most abundant because the ratio is always less than one.
239Pu is produced from 238U via neutron capture where 238U is the most abundant isotope
of uranium in nature, 238U 99.275%, 235U 0.720% and 234U 0.005%. During detonation
of nuclear weapons and running of nuclear reactors, 239Pu undergoes neutron capture
to generate 240Pu, and also the heavier 241Pu, 242Pu and 244Pu are produced through
successive neutron captures.
The resulting short-lived 239U (T1/2 = 23.45 min) decays by β− into 239Np, which in turn
decays by β− (T1/2 = 2.356 days) into 239Pu:
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238U n−→ 239U β
−
−→ 239Np β
−
−→ 239Pu n−→ 240Pu n−→ 241Pu n−→ 242Pu.....
In weapon test fallout, the ratio 240Pu/239Pu varies depending on the test parameters in
the range of 0.10-0.35. The average for the Northern hemisphere is about 0.18, (Koide et
al., 1985).
Signiﬁcantly different values, in the range 0.035-0.05, are found in Mururoa and Fangataufa
atoll sediment, because of the particular nature of French testing, (Chiappini et al., 1999)
and (Hrneceka et al., 2005).
• In nuclear reactors, as mentioned before, due to the different composition of fuels, uranium
enrichment and burn-up degree, characteristic relative abundances of plutonium isotopes
will be obtained: 240Pu/239Pu increases with irradiation time, which, in turn affects
238Pu/239+240Pu.
238Pu is produced by neutron capture from 237Np, which is itself produced by two
successive neutron captures from 235U:
235U n−→ 236U n−→ 237U β
−
−→ 237Np n−→ 238Np β
−
−→ 238Pu
or via the fast-neutron induced 238U(n,2n)237U reaction:
238U(n, 2n)237U
β−−→ 237Np n−→ 238Np β
−
−→ 238Pu
The ratio 238Pu/239+240Pu is useful to resolve between different sources in case they show
similar 240Pu/239Pu, e.g., irradiated nuclear fuel in a PWR (Pressurized Water Reactor)
with 7-20% of 235U and burn-up 1.4-3.9 GW·d (GWatt·day) reaches 240Pu/239Pu isotopic
ratios of 0.13, a value, that could be ascribed also to global fall out. On the other side, these
two sources show quite different 238Pu/239+240Pu activity ratio, 0.025-0.04 for the global
fallout and 0.45 for that nuclear fuel, (Quinto, 2007).
• Another valuable tool to identify a nuclear reactor origin of a radionuclide contamination is
236U/238U isotopic ratio. The dominant 236U mode of formation is the capture of a thermal
neutron by 235U, a secondary contribution being the alpha decay of 240Pu. Its concentration
in nature has been heavily increased as a consequence of irradiation of enriched uranium in
nuclear reactors. Several orders of magnitude of difference between the 236U/238U isotopic
ratios in naturally-occurring uranium (10−9 to 10−13) and in spent nuclear fuel (10−2 to
10−4) imply that also a small contamination from irradiated nuclear fuel in natural samples
is able to increase signiﬁcantly the 236U/238U ratio measured in the whole sample.
2.3 Needs for actinides monitoring
The nuclear safeguard system used to monitor compliance with the Nuclear Non-proliferation
Treaty relies to a signiﬁcant degree on the analysis of environmental samples. Undeclared
nuclear activities and/or illegal use and transport of nuclear fuel can be detected through
determination of the isotopic ratios of U and Pu in such samples. Accurate assessment and
monitoring of every source of radioactive contamination are required from the point of view
of the prevention from radiological exposure.
Both the operations of decommissioning of the existing NPPs and the possible future
operation of new plants demand accurate investigations about the possible contamination
by radioactive releases of nuclear sites and neighboring territory and of structural
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materials of the reactors. The monitoring activity of surveillance institutions uses assessed
radiometric techniques, but more and more ultrasensitive methodologies for the detection
and quantiﬁcation of ultralow activity radionuclides is requested at international level.
Most of U and Pu isotopes are long lived alpha emitters with very low speciﬁc activity:
their detection and the measurement of their concentration and isotopic abundance demands
very high sensitivity, so that they are included among the so called "hardly detectable"
radionuclides. As it will be shown in the following, the required sensitivity is often not
achieved using conventional analytical techniques, such as counting of the radiation emitted
in the decay or conventional mass spectrometry. The main task of the present work is to
illustrate an ultrasensitive methodology for the detection of ultralow level radionuclides
belonging to the actinides subgroup of the periodic table.
The method is based on a combination of AS and AMS: the reason for such a combination lies
in the fact that it may be necessary to be able to measure the Pu isotopes at the fg level and
the U isotopes where the total uranium content may be at the ng level or with a sensitivity as
low as 10−13 in the measurement of the 236U/238U isotopic ratio in samples incorporating a
total of about 1 mg of U. AMS will be shown to be the only technique able to achieve such a
sensitivity together with unparalleled suppression of molecular isobaric interferences for the
detection of rare isotopes of elements with (quasi)stable isotopes many orders of magnitude
more abundant, such as U.
Nevertheless, the measurement of 238Pu abundance is heavily suffering interference from
the atomic isobar 238U, about seven orders of magnitude more abundant, and cannot be
achieved by any mass spectrometric technique; on the other hand ultra-low activity AS
can isolate this isotope, while alpha particles from the decay of 239Pu and 240Pu cannot be
energetically resolved. Combination of the two techniques provides the determination of the
abundances of the full suite of Pu isotopes. Moreover, AS plays an important role also for the
calibration of the spikes used as carriers for the AMS measurements and as overall cross check
of the employed methodologies. An important role in pursuing the goal of ultrasensitive
detection of actinide isotopes is played by the sample preparation procedures, which has to
be performed in a very clean environment with ultralow contamination. The procedure to
be setup will be able to isolate the elements of interest and produce samples in the form
suitable for both AS and AMS. In the ﬁrst case very thin and uniform layers have to be
achieved, while puriﬁcation respect to elements which can produce molecular interferences
is of paramount importance for AMS. Preliminary sampling and conditioning of a properly
representative sample; uranium and plutonium are separated from the sample following a
systematic chemical protocol of pre-enrichment/separation; fractions of U and Pu are puriﬁed
from every possible element that could cause radiochemical interference to AS; fractions of U
and Pu must be converted into useful chemical and physical-chemical forms (De Cesare, 2009;
Quinto et al., 2009; Wilcken et al., 2007).
Finally, besides the application of the developed technique to the assessment of actinide
contamination of the NPP site and plant, a more general objective is to provide an
ultrasensitive diagnostic tool for a variety of applications to the national and international
community. Applications range across a broad spectrum. Isotopes of plutonium are ﬁnding
application in tracing the dispersal of releases from nuclear accidents and reprocessing
operations, in studies of the biokinetics of the element in humans, and as a tracer of soil loss
and sediment transport. 236U has also been used to track nuclear releases, but additionally
has a role to play in nuclear safeguards and in determining the extent of environmental
contamination in modern theaters of war due to the use of depleted uranium weaponry.
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2.4 Alpha-spectroscopy and mass spectroscopy
236U and 239Pu are present in environmental samples at ultra trace levels (236U concentration
is quoted to be in the order of pg/kg or fg/kg and 239Pu around 100 pg/kg) and are long-lived
radionuclides (Perelygin & Chuburkov, 1997).
If one considers alpha-spectroscopy for the detection of 239Pu, assuming an efﬁciency of 50 %
and a counting time of one month, one gets 64 counts (with a statistical uncertainty of 12%)
with a total activity of 50 μBq, which correspond to about 40 million atoms, or about 15 fg.
In addition, alpha-particle counting is unable to resolve the two most important plutonium
isotopes, 239Pu and 240Pu, because their alpha-particle energies differ by only 11 keV in 5.25
MeV. Hence, the information on their isotopic ratio readily difﬁcult to extract.
The 23·106 y half-life of 236U limits the utility of alpha-particle spectroscopy for this isotope.
For the detection of such small amounts one can exploit the sensitivity of mass spectrometric
techniques. Conventional Mass Spectrometry, CMS, methods give information on the
240Pu/239Pu ratio, and potentially have higher sensitivity than alpha-particle counting with
values as low as 1 fg, but are sensitive to molecular interferences. Both 236U and xPu isotopes
have been measured using either Thermal Ionization (TI-MS) or Inductively Coupled Plasma
(ICP-MS) positive ion sources. For plutonium isotopes, abundance sensitivity is not a problem
due to the absence of a relatively intense beam of similar mass. Molecular interferences such as
238UH−, 208Pb31P, etc. may be a problem (Fiﬁeld, 2008). For uranium, isotope variability both
in the molecular (238UH−) and in tail contributions of main beam of 238U limits the sensitivity
of ICPMS to 236U/238U ratios of ∼10−7. TIMS ion sources, on the other hand, produce both
much lower molecular beams and much less beam tail and so a sensitivity of ∼10−10 in the
236U/238U ratio is reached.
So that, the measurements of these isotopic ratios requires the resolution of mass spectrometric
techniques, but only AMS allows the sensitivity needed e.g. 236U/238U ratios of ∼10−13, 0.1
fg of 236U with about 1 mg of U, as well as for the 239Pu.
Although AMS has advantages over the other techniques for 239,240,242,244Pu, there are
two other isotopes, 238Pu and 241Pu, which are of interest in some applications. Since
the concentration of 238U is seven orders of magnitude higher than that of 238Pu, no
chemical procedure is efﬁcient to separate uranium and plutonium fractions to allow the
mass spectrometric measurement of 238Pu. So alpha-spectroscopy remains the only suitable
technique for the measurement of 238Pu concentration. The β− emitter 241Pu can be measured
with either AMS or with liquid scintillation counting. Its short half-life of 14 years results,
however, in higher sensitivity for the latter (Fiﬁeld, 2008).
2.5 AMS of actinides isotopes
Actinides AMS measurements were pioneered at the IsoTrace laboratory in Toronto (CA)
(Zhao et al., 1994; 1997), where the 236U content in an U ore was determined using the 1.6 MV
AMS system. Moreover, the relative abundances of Pu isotopes were measured at 1.25 MV.
Then, at the Australian National University (AUS) (Fiﬁeld et al., 1996; 1997) the utilization
of a higher terminal voltage (4 MV) allowed to improve the sensitivity of the method, both
for the detection limit as the minimum detectable number of U atoms in the sample, and
for the lower limit of isotopic ratio measurable in samples at high concentration. Similar
detection system have been developed at the Vienna Environmental Reasearch Accelerator
(VERA - AU) (Steier et al., 2002), at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL -
USA) (Brown et al., 2004), at the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation
(ANSTO - AUS) (Hotchkis, 2000), at much lower energies at the Eidgenössische Technische
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Hochschule - ETH in Zurich (CH) (Wacker et al., 2005), at Munich facility (GE) (Wallner et al.,
2000) and at the accelerator of Weizmann Institute, Israel (Berkovits et al., 2000). New AMS
actinides line based on 1MV and 3 MV tandems have recently been and will be installed,
respectively, in Seville (Spain) and in the Salento (Italy). In both cases, they will be upgraded
to perform actnides AMS measurements, being the injection and the analyzing magnets
overdimensioned.
Two recent review papers (Fiﬁeld, 2008; Steier et al., 2010) summarize the results obtained in
the laboratories active in the ﬁelds of actinides AMS. Summarizing, the two systems aiming
to the best isotopic ratio sensitivity (ANU and VERA) have shown that it is possible to reach
a sensitivity of 10−13 for 236U in samples including about 1 mg of U. The ANSTO and LLNL
laboratories quote a sensitivity respectively of about 10−8 and 10−9 with U amounts of the
order of 1 ng. In the case of plutonium, there is no stable abundance isotopes available; the
plutonium isotopic ratio is not a problem and a 239Pu concentration background of about 0.1
fg (2.5×105 atoms) is achieved, limited by the process blank count rate. In both cases these
limits surmount by several orders of magnitude alpha spectrometry and conventional mass
spectrometry. In nature, U stable abundant isotopes exist. For that reason, the sensitivity limit
for the isotopic ratio depends on the U concentration in the sample. Thus, the AMS task is,
for environmental samples, to push the sensitivity in the isotopic ratio measurement down
to natural abundances (236U/238U10−9-10−13) in samples with sizeable amounts of U (∼ 1
mg). On the other hand, for anthropogenically inﬂuenced samples, the required sensitivity for
the measurement of the isotopic composition is alleviated, but signiﬁcantly smaller amounts
of U have to be used (down to 1 ng). For Pu, where no stable isotope interferences are present,
the goal is the maximum possible detection efﬁciency, allowing few hundred counts from less
than 1 million atoms in the sample.
The CIRCE laboratory is one of the few systems in the world able to perform such a
measurement (De Cesare et al., 2010a) and the only one in Italy. Moreover it is 1 order of
magnitude higher (De Cesare et al., 2010b) with respect to the 2 systems (ANU and VERA)
providing the best 236U/238U isotopic ratio sensitivity of 10−13, in samples including about 1
mg of U; it has low uranium contamination background, less then 0.4 μg of 236U (De Cesare et
al., 2011). The CIRCE actinides group aims to reach and to exceed the isotopic ratio sensitivity
goal with the upgrade: the utilization of a TOF system and, in case, the installation of a
magnetic quadrupole doublet. Regarding the Plutonium background results, the CIRCE is
one of the best systems in the world (De Cesare, 2009).
3. AMS facilities
In this paragraph the facilities where the author was mainly involved will be illustrated:
CIRCE and ANU AMS systems.
3.1 CIRCE system
CIRCE is a dedicated AMS facility based on a 3MV-tandem accelerator (Terrasi et al., 2007).
In contrast to many nuclear physics applications, the pre-treated sample material (a few mg
is pressed into a 1 mm diameter Al cathodes and put in the ion source) itself is analyzed by
two mass spectrometers which are coupled to the tandem accelerator. A schematic layout of
the CIRCE facility is shown in Fig. 1.
The caesium sputter ion source is a 40-sample MC-SNICS (Multi Cathode Source for Negative
Ions by Cesium Sputtering). A total injection energy of 50 keV is used; 50-300 nA 238U16O−
molecules are energy selected by a spherical electrostatic analyzer (nominal bending radius
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Fig. 1. Schematic layout of the CIRCE accelerator and of CIRCE accelerator upgrade with the
actinides line and also the ERNA separator line, Astro line, besides the 14C original line: the
switching magnet already inserted and the start and the stop TOF-E detector not yet inserted.
FC denotes Faraday Cup (LFC in the actinides line is Last Faraday Cup), C denotes the
Collimator in the heavy isotope line and the arrows indicate a slit system. ERNA is the
acronym of European Recoil separator for Nuclear Astrophysics.
r= 30 cm, plate gap= 5 cm) which cuts the sputter low energy tail of the beam, with a bending
angle of ±45◦ and it is operated up to ±15 kV. The maximum electric ﬁeld strength is 6
kV/cm, resulting in an energy/charge state ratio of 90 keV/q. The 90◦ double focusing Low
Energy (LE) injection magnet (r = 0.457 m, vacuum gap= 48 mm, ME/q2 = 15 MeV·amu/e2)
allows high resolution mass analysis for all stable isotopes in the periodic table, mass
resolution is M/ΔM∼ 500 with the object and image slits set to ± 1 mm, (De Cesare et al.,
2010a). The insulated stainless steel chamber (MBS) can be biased from 0 kV to +15 kV for
beam sequencing (e.g. between 238U16O−, 236U16O− and between 239Pu16O−, 240Pu16O−,
242Pu16O−).
The accelerator is contained inside a vessel ﬁlled with sulphur hexaﬂuoride (SF6) at a pressure
of about 6 bar. Two charging chains supply a total charging current to the terminal; about
100 μA are delivered to the terminal for operation at 3.000 MV. Stabilization is achieved by
GVM feedback on the charging system high voltage supply; the long term stability is about
1 kV peak-to peak. At the terminal the ions lose electrons in the gas stripper, where Ar is
recirculated by two turbo-pumps. The working pressure is about 1.3 mTorr for 238U5+ at
2.875 MV.
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The ions with positive charge states are accelerated a second time by the same potential.
The High Energy (HE) magnet, efﬁciently removes molecular break-up products (De Cesare
et al., 2010a;b). The double focusing 90◦ HE bending magnet has r= 1.27 m, ME/q2 = 176
MeV·amu/e2 and M/ΔM = 725, with slit opening of ±1 mm both at object and image points.
The two 45◦ electrostatic spherical analyzers (r = 2.54 m and gap = 3 cm) are operated up to
±60 kV; energy resolution is E/ΔE = 700 for typical beam size. A switching magnet (Bmax=
1.3 T, r=1.760 m and ME/q2= 252.5 MeV·amu/e2 at the 20◦ exit) is positioned after the ESA.
Finally the selected ions are counted in an appropriate particle detector, either a surface barrier
detector or a telescopy ionization chamber. The control of the entire system, is handled by
the AccelNet computer based system via CAMAC interfaces or Ethernet, and the acquisition
system is ether AccelNet itself or FAIR (Fast Intercrate Readout) system, (Ordine et al., 1998).
3.1.1 CIRCE actinides measurement procedures
In this paragraph a description of the various steps of the 236U and xPu isotopes measurement
are given. The relative abundance of 238U in environmental samples is several order of
magnitude (up to 13) larger than the 236U. For this reason, while the number of events of
236U are measured in the ﬁnal detector, 238U is measured as current in the high energy side.
For the xPu isotopes, since no natural and so abundant isotopes exist, they are all measure
in the ﬁnal detector. Before performing measurements of samples, a tuning of the transport
elements up to the ﬁnal detector is made by setting the accelerator parameters to the detection
of 238U. Then the MBS, the TV and the high energy ESA are scaled to select the rare isotopes.
The sample preparation provides material that is sputtered as xUyO− and zPuwO−. The
negative molecular ions, ex. 238U16O−, are accelerated to an injection energy of Einj= 50 keV.
To select different masses without changing the magnetic ﬁeld, the energy of the ions inside
the injection magnet is varied by applying an additional accelerating voltage to the bouncing
system. The injected 238U16O− ions are accelerated by the positive high voltage towards the
stripper, where they loose electrons and gain high positive charge states. The positive ions are,
then, accelerated a second time by the same potential in the high energy tube of the tandem.
This for 238U5+ results in an energy of E= 17.3 MeV with a terminal voltage of V= 2.900 MV.
Ar is recirculated in the terminal stripper by two turbo-pumps; the working pressure is about
1.3 mTorr for 238U5+ at 2.875 MV (De Cesare et al., 2010b) and the stripping yield achieved for
238U5+ achieved is around 3.1%.
Molecular break-up products with mass over charge ratio (M/q) different from that of
the wanted ion, are removed by the combination of the high energy (HE) magnet and an
electrostatic analyzer (ESA) whose object point is the image point of the analyzing magnet.
For heavy ion measurements, the object and image slits of the injection magnet are closed
to ±1 mm, the slits of the analyzing magnet are closed to ±2 mm and a collimator of 4 mm
diameter is positioned in the beam waist at the 20◦ beam line.
The tuning procedure at CIRCE is made by the optimization of HE magnet and ESA in the
high-energy side: they are optimized by maximizing the 238U5+ current in the Last Faraday
Cup (LFC). The transmission efﬁciency between the HE magnet and LFC at 20◦ is 80 %, with
the 4 mm collimator in.
Once the setup for the pilot beam 238U5+ is found, the voltage at the chamber of the injection
magnet, the terminal voltage and the voltage of the ESA are scaled to transmit 236U5+. In order
to measure the 236U/238U ratio, the measurement procedure is composed of three automatic
steps:
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1. measurement of 238U5+ current at the high energy side in FC04.
2. the voltage on the magnet vacuum chamber, the terminal voltage and the ESA are then
scaled to transmit 236UO−and a measurement of the count rate of 236U5+ in the detector is
performed.
3. repetition of step 1
Steps 1 and 3 are necessary to estimate, by linear interpolation, the value of 238U5+ current at
high energy side which would be measured simultaneously with 236U5+ counting.
In order to measure the xPu isotope ratios, the measurement procedure is composed of
automatic steps:
1. tune the beam with the 238U5+ current up to LFC.
2. the voltage on the magnet vacuum chamber, the terminal voltage and the ESA are then
scaled to transmit xPuO− and a measurement of the count rate of xPu5+ in the detector is
performed.
3. repetition of step 2 for all the plutonium isotopes are needed (ex. 242Pu5+ spike for 18 s,
240Pu5+ for 60 s and 239Pu5+ for 30 s).
4. repetition of step 3 for 3 times.
3.1.2 CIRCE actinide results
Before the installation of a dedicated actinides beam line at CIRCE, preliminary results for
the 236U/238U background ratio level at 0◦ line, rutinelly used for 14C measurements, was of
the order of 1·10−9 (De Cesare et al., 2010a). The measurement was obtained with the "K. k.
Uranfabric Joachimisthal" sample, the VERA in-house U standard, (6.98±0.32)×10−11 (Steier
et al., 2008).
The main upgrade so far has been the addition of a switching magnet placed 50 cm after
the exit of the high-energy ESA. The position of the magnet was decided by means of COSY
inﬁnity (Makino & Berz, 1999) magnetic optics simulation (De Cesare et al., 2010a), Fig. 2.
This magnet provides a supplementary dispersive analyzing tool.
The abundance sensitivity results, using a 16-strip silicon detector, have shown that, in the
upgraded CIRCE heavy ions beamline after the switching magnet installation, a background
level < 5.6×10−11 has been reached, Fig. 3, compared to 3.0×10−9 obtained previously (De
Cesare et al., 2010b; Guan, 2010).
Although most of the 238U are suppressed at the injector side, by the analyzing magnet and
electrostatic analyzer, a small fraction of this intense beam can still interfere with the 236U
measurement. The main reasons for this "leakage" of interfering ions are charge exchange
processes due to residual gas in the system. Scattering on the residual gas, electrodes, slits or
vacuum chamber walls can also allow the background to pass a ﬁlter. However, the scattering
cross-section is in the order of 10−20 cm2 whereas the cross section of charge changing is
10−16-10−15 cm2 (Betz, 1972; Vockenhuber et al., 2002).
Moreover, in the upgraded CIRCE heavy ions beamline, after the TOF-E installation, a
background level of about 2.9×10−11, summing over the central six strips, has been reached,
compared to ∼ 5.6×10−11 obtained with a 16 strip silicon detector alone. This small
background reduction is attributed to the 1.6 ns time resolution mainly due to the thickness
of the 4 μg/cm2 LPA (Maier-Komor et al., 1997; 1999) carbon foil, (De Cesare, 2009).
The CIRCE laboratory is not so far from the two systems (ANU and VERA) that provide the
best 236U/238U isotopic ratio sensitivity of 10−13, in samples including about 1 mg of U.
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Fig. 2. The COSY inﬁnity magnetic optics simulation is shown, where the development of
two beams has been analyzed, starting from the waist of the high-energy magnet with a
relative energy difference of ΔE/E = 0.001 (corresponds to the resolution of the ESA). The
adopted beam proﬁles are approximately Gaussian, with a halfwidth of 0.15 cm. A
maximum divergence of 3 mrad was assumed. Simulations were performed for different
geometric conﬁgurations. The distance ESA-SM (energy electrostatic analyzer-switching
magnet), SM-DB (switching magnet-magnetic quadrupole doublet) and DB-FP (Focal Plane
= the doublet focusing position) are shown in the upper part. The density relative frequency
in function of beam distance in the x-plane is shown in the lower part. The central (solid line)
peak is 236U5+ and the dashed and dotted are the 238U beams in the two opposite x positions,
where the dashed one is not shown in the simulation
An overview of the planned upgrade of the CIRCE system using a TOF-E system, with a ﬂight
path of 3 m and a thinner DLC carbon foil, 0.6 μg/cm2 is described in (De Cesare, 2009).
Regarding the concentration sensitivity results, a 4μg uranium concentration sensitivity has
been reached using only with the 16 strip silicon detector. That correspond to about 40 fg of
236U and 108 236U atoms for a sample with isotopic ratio of 10−8 (De Cesare et al., 2011).
For the 239Pu concentration sensitivity results, the uranium background corresponding to the
239Pu settings is at the level of 1 ppb. This is to be compared with the 10 ppm of ANSTO and
100 ppb of ANU. The CIRCE Lab. has at present a 239Pu sensitivity level less than 0.1 fg, since
500 ng of uranium is required to produce an apparent 239Pu concentration of 0.1 fg (De Cesare
et al., 2011); for the Pu background level, CIRCE is one of the best system in the word.
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Fig. 3. Normalized counts (counts in the detector in 300 s over FC04 current corrected for the
transmission ∼ 80% between FC04 and LFC) versus horizontal position of the 16-strip silicon
detector. Ch= 3.625 mm is the distance between the center of two adjacent strips. A photo of
the 16-strip detector is also shown. The bigger peak represents the position on the detector of
the 236U obtained with a spike sample; the nominal ratio is 236U/238U∼ 10−8. The lower 236U
peak is obtained with the KkU VERA in house U standard, see text. The arrow indicates that
the normalized counts at that position are lower than 1×10−2 counts/nA.
3.2 ANU system
The ANU AMS system is based on a 15MV-tandem accelerator (Fiﬁeld et al., 1996). The high
terminal voltage is required to apply certain techniques of isobar separation effectively, this
makes the ANU tandem the best suited accelerator for the heavier isotopes e.g., 36Cl and
53Mn (Winkler, 2008). When the lower energy is necessary, for 236U and xPu isotopes, sections
of the accelerator tube are shorted out, in order to optimize the ion optics for maximum
transmission.
The pre-treated sample material (a few mg is pressed into a 1 mm diameter Al cathode and
put in the ion source) itself is analyzed by two mass spectrometers which are coupled to the
tandem accelerator. A schematic layout of the ANU 15 MV tandem facility is shown in Fig. 4.
The caesium sputter ion source is a 32-sample MC-SNICS. This multi-cathode arrangement
allows for measuring many samples without opening the source or employing a more
complicated single cathode exchange mechanism. A total injection energy of 100 keV
was used and ∼ 20 nA of 238U16O− molecular ions are mass rigidity selected by the 90◦
double focusing Low Energy (LE) injection magnet (r = 0.83 m, Bmax = 1.3 T, ME/q2  56
MeV·amu/e2). This allows high resolution mass analysis for all stable isotopes in the periodic
table. In contrast to the CIRCE system, there is no electrostatic analyzer, and hence the
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Fig. 4. Schematic lay out of the 15 MV ANU 14-UD (Units Doubled) Accelerator and the 236U
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low-energy sputter tail is not removed prior to injection into the accelerator. For this reason,
it is preferred to tune the system with 232Th16O− rather than 238U16O− (see next section).
A beam proﬁle monitor (BPM) before the magnet and Faraday cups after the magnet (LE-Cup
and Tank-Cup) are used to monitor the beam during the tuning. The injection beam line also
features an electrostatic chopper that allows to reduce the beam intensity in cases where the
beam currents are too high for injection into the tandem accelerator or counting rates that
would be too high for the detector (e.g. 234U). An electrostatic quadrupole and steerers are
available to have the ions pass on an optimum trajectory for injection into the accelerator.
The terminal is charged by chains made of metal pellets which are isolated from each other by
nylon links. The pellets supply a total charging current to the terminal of about 230 μA. The
accelerator is contained inside a vessel ﬁlled with sulphur hexaﬂuoride (SF6) at a pressure of
about 6 bar. The voltage is measured by a generating voltmeter. Regulation is achieved by
employing a controlled corona discharge from ground to terminal. Both a gas stripper and a
foil stripper are available at the terminal. At the terminal the ions lose electrons in the stripper,
where O2 is recirculated by two turbo-pumps; the working pressure is about 1 mTorr for
238U5+ at 3.995 MV. Molecular ions are dissociated and the now atomic ions stripped to higher
positive charge states (Litherland, 1980). The choice of charge state for heavy ions depends
critically on a compromise between its stripping yield and the capability of the subsequent
analyzing magnet to bend such ions. At ∼ 4 MV, ME/q2 is ∼ 226 MeV·amu/e2 for 238U5+
and ME/q2 is ∼ 293 MeV·amu/e2 for 238U4+; since the double focusing HE magnet reaches
a maximal ME/q2∼ 225 MeV·amu/e2, the 5+ represents the lowest charge state which can be
bent by the HE magnet. Although the stripping yield to 4+ charge state is higher than 5+, it
would be necessary to operate at lower terminal voltage in order to bend the ions. Since the
transmission (due to the larger scattering angle) and the energy of the ions at this voltage is
lower there is no gain to use the lower charge state.
The ions with positive charge states are accelerated a second time by the same potential. The
High Energy (HE) magnet, efﬁciently removes molecular break-up products. The double
focusing 90◦ HE bending magnet has r = 1.27 m, Bmax = 1.7 T, ME/q2  225 MeV·amu/e2.
A switching magnet (Bmax= 1.5 T, r=2.92 m and ME/q2 926 MeV·amu/e2 at the 15◦ exit) is
positioned after the HE magnet. A Wien ﬁlter (Bmax= 0.25 T, Vmax= ± 60 kV with a Plate Gap=
3 cm) is employed to remove backgrounds.
Finally the selected ions are counted in a ﬁnal detector. The control of the acquisition system
is handled via Ethernet interfaces.
3.2.1 ANU actinides measurement procedures
In this paragraph a description of the various steps of the 236U and xPu isotope measurements
will be given. The relative abundance of 238U in environmental samples is many orders of
magnitude (up to 13 ) larger than the 236U. For this reason, while the number of events of
236U are measured in the ﬁnal detector, 238U is measured as a current at the high energy side.
Before performing measurements of samples, a tuning of the transport elements up to the ﬁnal
detector is required in order to maximize the ion optical transmission. The tuning is made by
setting the parameters of the beam line to the detection of 232Th. In order to have a good
negative ion yield, molecular negative ions 232Th16O− are extracted from the ion source. The
negative molecular ions, 232Th16O−, are accelerated to injection energy of Einj= 100 keV.
The injected ions are accelerated by the positive high voltage towards the gas stripper, where
they lose electrons and gain high positive charge states. The positive ions are then accelerated
a second time by the same potential in the high energy tube of the tandem. For 232Th5+,
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this results in an energy of E= 24.424 MeV with a terminal voltage of V= 4.098 MV. The
stripping yield is the ratio between the 232Th5+ beam current at the Faraday cup after the
analyzing magnet (St-C) divided by 5 and the 232Th16O− current measured at the entrance to
the accelerator (T-C), and is about 3%. Molecular break-up products with mass over charge
ratio M/q different from that of the wanted ion are removed by the analyzing magnet and
switching magnet. The Wien ﬁlter is employed to remove backgrounds which have the same
ME/q2 as the ions of interest but different velocities in the actinides line. For heavy ion tuning,
the object and image slits of the injection magnet are closed to±1 mm, the slits of the analyzing
magnet are closed to ±1.25 mm and an aperture of 1.5 × 4.0 mm2 is used if high selectivity is
required just after the Wien ﬁlter. For actual measurements, the object and image slits of the
injection magnet are opened to ±2 mm, the slits of the analyzing magnet are opened to ±3
mm and the aperture is out.
For Uranium measurements, once the setup for the pilot beam 232Th5+ is found, the ﬁelds
of the injection magnet, the terminal voltage of the accelerator and the electric ﬁeld of the
Wien ﬁlter are scaled to 238U5+ for a ﬁne tuning and then to the other wanted masses. For
236U/238U, the measurement procedure is composed of two loops of three steps. Each loop
consists of integration of the 238U5+ beam current for 10 s in the L-C, counting of 236U5+ ions
for 5 min in the TOF-E system and a ﬁnal 238U5+ integration. For 233U (tracer), 234U and 236U,
the measurement procedure is composed of two loops of four steps. The isotope sequence
would usually start with the reference isotope 233U followed by 234U and 236U, and ﬁnishing
with 233U. All of them are counted with the TOF-E system. The typical counting intervals
were 1 minute for 233U, 1 minute for 234U and 5 minutes for 236U.
For Plutonium measurements, once the setup for the pilot beam 232Th5+ is found, since 238U5+
may cause interference for 239Pu5+, the ﬁelds of the injection magnet, the terminal voltage of
the accelerator and the electric ﬁeld of the Wien ﬁlter are scaled to the Pu wanted masses,
239Pu, 240Pu and 242Pu (tracer). The measurement procedure is composed of two loops of four
steps; the isotope sequence would usually start with the reference isotope 242Pu followed by
240Pu and 239Pu, and ﬁnishing with 242Pu. All of them are counted with a multiple electrode
ionization chamber that is routinely used for measurements of xPu isotopes. The typical
counting intervals were 1 minute for 242Pu, 5 minutes for 240Pu and 3 minutes for 239Pu.
3.2.2 Detection systems and ANU actinide results
Although most of the 238U are suppressed at the injector side and by the analyzing magnet and
Wien ﬁlter, a small fraction of this intense beam can interfere with the 236U measurement even
if the expected separation in the ion-optical ﬁlters is large, paragraph 3.1.2. For this reason
the detection of the 236U at ANU is made with a TOF-E detection. The conﬁguration of the
TOF detection system is as follows (Wilcken, 2006; Winkler, 2008); the start detector assembly
is based on a MCP and a foil is placed at an angle of 45◦ to the beam. The MCP detects the
backscattered electrons from a 0.6 μg/cm2 thick diamond-like carbon (DLC) (Liechtenstein et
al., 1999; 2002; 2004; 2006) foil that is used in the start detector to minimize scattering. The
stop detector is a 200 mm2 silicon surface barrier detector which also provides a total energy
signal. The foils are mounted on a Cu mesh with a transparency of ∼ 75%. The MCP detector
was operated with the anode at ground, the accelerating grid and the front face of the MCP
at -1.8 kV, and the carbon foil at -2.8 kV. The presence of the foil, which is oriented at 45◦ to
the beam, has two important consequences for the system. First, it causes scattering, which if
through a large-enough angle can cause ions to miss the stop detector. This can be minimized
by using the thinnest possible foil. Secondly, the 45◦ tilt introduces differences in path length
181
Origin and Detection of Actinides: 
Where Do We Stand with th  Accelerator Mas  ectrom try Technique?
16 Will-be-set-by-IN-TECH
and therefore also in ﬂight time due to the ﬁnite size of the beam at the start detector. The
effect of the ﬂight path variations on the resolution of the system is minimized by using an
aperture that is 3.5 mm wide in the horizontal plane. This is attached on top of the grid-foil
assembly.
For plutonium measurements no interfering ions exist; an ionization chamber is suitable for
such a detection. The ANU conﬁguration of the ionization chamber (Fiﬁeld et al., 1996;
Wilcken, 2006; Wilcken et al., 2008) are the following; ∼ 50 torr of propane is used as the
detector gas and the window is a 0.7 μm thick Mylar foil. Applied voltages are: cathode 
-600 V, detector window  -300 V, ﬁrst grid at ground, second grid at  +200 V and anode
 +600 V. The energy of the 239Pu5+ ions is ∼ 24.5 MeV. At this energy, the range of the
plutonium ions in the ANU detector is ∼ 35 mm, which is roughly 18% of the length of the
detector. The energy loss and straggling in the detector window are approximately 4.5 MeV
and 450 keV, respectively. In addition, according to the manufacturer, a typical value for the
surface roughness of the Mylar window is 38 nm, which is 5% of the thickness of the window
and contributes an additional 140 keV of straggling. All of these result in an energy resolution
of ∼ 4 %.
Regarding the abundance sensitivity results, the ANU is the best system in the word
together with VERA laboratory (Steier et al., 2010). The ANU is able to obtain values of
236U/238U10−13 (Wilcken et al., 2008), in samples including about 1 mg of U. This results
is obtained with a time of ﬂight of 2.3 m.
Preliminary results have been obtained with a 6 m ﬂight path; the longer ﬂight path confers
a substantial improvement in the ability to separate 235U and 236U with little reduction in
efﬁciency (Fiﬁeld, 2011).
The concentration sensitivity limit is of the order of ∼ 1 μg of uranium.
As regard the 239Pu concentration sensitivity results, the uranium background at the 239Pu
settings is at the level of 100 ppb of the uranium concentration, i.e. 1 ng of uranium in the
sample results in a background equivalent to 0.1 fg of 239Pu (Fiﬁeld, 2008).
4. Summary and conclusion
The actinides detection technique described in this chapter can be applied in the assessment
of contaminations from nuclear facility and used as sensitive ﬁngerprints of programmed
and accidental releases; a more general goal of this technique is to provide an ultrasensitive
diagnostic tool for a variety of applications to the international community. Moreover the
origin of actinides are discussed as well as the potential of actinides to serve as a tracer for
geomorphologic processes.
The sensitivity of the different actinides measurements method and the peculiarity of the AMS
technique with respect to AS and CMS techniques have been illustrated. Furthermore the
principles and methodology of heavy-element AMS as applied to U and Pu isotopes, and
the ways in which these have been implemented in various laboratories around the world,
have been discussed. In particular the measurement procedures and the concentration and
abundance sensitivity results of two systems, CIRCE and ANU, have been described in more
details.
Those are two of the few systems in the world able to perform such measurements; the CIRCE
is the only one in Italy.
The CIRCE system is at level of ∼10−12 236U/238U isotopic ratio sensitivity which is still one
order of magnitude higher then the ANU and VERA systems.
82 Nuclear Power – Control, Reliability and Human Factors
Origin and Detection of Actinides: Where do we Stand with the Accelerator Mass Spectrometry Technique? 17
As future plan the CIRCE actinides group foresees to reach and exceed this sensitivity ratio
goal with the new upgrade: the utilization of a TOF-E system with a thinner carbon foil and,
if necessary, with a longer time of ﬂight.
Regarding the Plutonium background results, the CIRCE is one of the best systems in the
world; it is at the level of 1 ppb. This is to be compared with ANSTO where the uranium
background is at the level of 10 ppm, and the ANU system where it is at the level of 100 ppb.
The CIRCE laboratory has at present a 239Pu sensitivity level less then 0.1 fg.
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1. Introduction  
Because safety is of paramount importance in the nuclear industry, numerous efforts have 
been made to guarantee structural integrity against sudden accidents. In the past, design 
against a Double Ended Guillotine Break (DEGB) was accomplished through the 
construction of massive pipe whip restraints and jet impingement shields to minimize the 
secondary damage to other structures in close proximity to ruptured piping. However, 
through long-term operating experience, the commercial nuclear industry has recognized 
that, for most damaged piping, fluid leakage from through-wall cracks occurs prior to a 
DEGB accident. Hence, if the leakage can be detected reliably at an early stage of fracture, a 
DEGB accident can be prevented by shutting down the reactor prior to the DEGB. Leak-
Before-Break (LBB) design is based on this concept. For a piping system where LBB design is 
applied, a leak detection monitoring system must be installed to detect crack initiation while 
construction of massive pipe whip restraints and jet impingement shields become 
unnecessary. Thus, LBB design focuses on the ability to detect cracks for structural integrity 
while DEGB design focuses on preventing secondary damage. Since the mid-1980s, the LBB 
design concept has been widely applied on nuclear high energy piping systems. In Korea, 
the LBB design concept based on U.S. nuclear regulatory commission (USNRC) standard 
review plan 3.6.3 and NUREG-1061 has been applied to reactor coolant piping systems ever 
since the Yong-Gwang units 3 & 4 nuclear power plants were approved in 1994 (J.B.Lee & 
Choi, 1999).  
The LBB design applied to nuclear piping systems is based on the premise that a piping 
break accident can be prevented by detecting leakage from a through-wall crack by leak 
detection instrumentation prior to a DEGB accident. To meet LBB design criteria, the nuclear 
piping material must have excellent fracture toughness characteristics so that a sudden 
break will not occur even if the piping has a large through-wall crack that corresponds to a 
detectable leakage rate. For LBB design, material properties for stress – strain curves and J-R 
curves as a function of resistance to stable crack extension at service temperatures are 
needed. The stress – strain curve is for use in the determination of detectable leakage crack 
length and the elastic-plastic finite element analysis of the piping with a through-wall crack. 
The J-R curve is for use in the crack stability evaluation of piping under normal operating 
loads and safe shutdown earthquake loads. In the Korean standard nuclear power plant, 
shown in Fig. 1, carbon steel with stainless steel cladding is used for the hot leg pipe and the 
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cold leg pipe of the reactor coolant piping system. For carbon steel, it is reported that 
fracture toughness is dependent on loading speed due to dynamic strain aging (J.W.Kim & 
I.S.Kim, 1997). In addition to static J-R curve testing, the dynamic J-R curve, which is a part 
of facture toughness data, is also required to verify satisfaction of LBB when applying 
seismic loading for carbon steel nuclear piping. However, until now it has been difficult to 
obtain a reliable dynamic J-R curve for ferritic steel due to the fast loading condition. In this 
paper, the measurement method for obtaining a reliable dynamic J-R curve for integrity 
analysis of nuclear piping systems is proposed and discussed.  
 
 
Fig. 1. Reactor coolant piping system 
2. Dynamic J-R curve using DCPD and normalization methods  
A dynamic J-R curve can be obtained by two different test methods; direct current potential 
drop (DCPD) (Joyce, 1996) and the Normalization method (Landes et al., 1991; ASTM, 2001). 
With DCPD on ferritic steel, a pulse drop phenomenon of output voltage occurs due to its 
ferromagnetic characteristics, making it difficult to determine a reliable J-R curve. On the 
other hand, the Normalization method, which was recently designated by the American 
Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) code, has its strong point in that the J-R curve can 
be obtained by load - displacement curve without additional crack length measurement 
instrumentation such as needed by DCPD. In Korea, dynamic J-R curves have been obtained 
for piping materials in several nuclear power plants, and a database has been developed for 
dynamic J-R curves on each material based on these test results. According to the ASTM 
code at the time, the dynamic J-R curves were obtained by DCPD, but more recently, they 
are obtained by the Normalization method for newly constructed power plant projects. To 
utilize previous dynamic J-R curve data obtained by DCPD for piping material, the effect of 
test methods was investigated.  
2.1 Experimental procedure 
To compare the dynamic J-R curves between the DCPD and normalization methods, 
dynamic J-R curve testing was performed for base and weld metals of reactor coolant piping 
systems. Test specimens were 1 inch compact tension specimens. A test speed of 1,000 
Steam Generator Pressurizer 
Cold Leg Pipe 
Hot Leg Pipe 
Reactor Vessel 
Reactor Coolant Pump 
Surge Line Pipe 
Evaluation of Dynamic J-R Curve  
for Leak Before Break Design of Nuclear Reactor Coolant Piping System 
 
191 
mm/min for dynamic J-R testing was determined on the basis of the natural frequency 
method proposed at Battelle (Scott et al., 2002) according to Eq. (1) 
 VLL = 4 × natural frequency (mode 1) × Di       (1) 
where Di is the load line displacement at crack initiation of the static J-R curve testing. This 
test speed also satisfies the criterion of ASTM E1820 A14 (Nakamura et al., 1986; ASTM, 
2009) in which test time tQ should be longer than minimum test time tw  
 w
s eff
2t
k M
      (2) 
where ks is specimen load line stiffness in N/m, Meff is effective mass of the specimen, taken 
here to be half of the specimen mass in kg. 
Table 1 represents tested materials for each pipe and number of tests. Each hot leg is a 42 
inch inner diameter pipe of SA508 Cl.1a material with a 3-½ inch nominal wall thickness. 
The cold leg is a 30 inch inner diameter pipe of SA508 Cl.1a material with a 3 inch nominal 
wall thickness. The elbow is SA516 Gr.70. The straight pipe and elbow are welded by 
submerged arc welding (SAW) and shielded metal arc welding (SMAW). Table 2 shows the 
chemical composition of the tested material and weld deposit. The comparison between 
DCPD and the Normalization method is summarized in Table 3. For DCPD, potential drop 
instrumentation was used for crack length measurement during the experiment but for the 
Normalization method, J-R curve was estimated only by the load – displacement curve 
without any crack length measurement device during the test. Therefore, in this study, 
dynamic J-R curve testing was performed using DCPD and analyzed by both DCPD and 
Normalization methods for each specimen with the test results compared between the two 
methods. Comparison tests were performed on two power plants, Shin-Kori units 3 & 4 and 
Shin-Wolsung units 1 & 2. For Shin-Kori, physical crack extension length did not exceed the 
lesser of 4mm or 15% of the initial uncracked ligament in accordance with normalization 
method. For Shin-Wolsung, tests were performed until full coverage of crack opening 
displacement (COD) gage, 10mm in accordance with previous DCPD method as performed 
at our test laboratory. Test temperature was 316C; same as the operating temperature of the 
piping system. Additionally, in the case of Shin-Wolsung, tests were performed at hot 
standby temperature, 177C. Table 1 shows the number of test specimens and test 
temperatures for dynamic J-R curve testing.  
 
Item Material 
Dynamic J-R curve testing 
Shin-Kori 
units 3 & 4 
Shin-Wolsung units 
1 & 2 
316oC 177oC 316oC 
Base 
metal 
Main loop 
piping 
Hot leg SA508 Cl. 1a 1 1 1 
Cold leg SA508 Cl. 1a 1 1 1 
Elbow SA516 Gr. 70 1 1 1 
Weld 
metal 
Main loop piping 
segments 
SMAW 1 1 1 
SAW 1 1 1 
Total  15 
Table 1. Fracture toughness test conditions of the coolant piping 
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Pipe C Si Mn Cu Mo V Ni 
Hot leg & cold leg <0.30 0.15~0.40 0.70~1.35 <0.2 <0.1 <0.03 <0.4 
Elbow <0.30 0.15~0.40 0.85~1.20 <0.4 <0.12 <0.03 <0.4 
SMAW <0.17 <0.75 <1.60 - <0.30 <0.08 <0.30 
SAW <0.15 <0.80 1.25~2.10 <0.06 0.40~0.65 <0.03 <0.20 
Table 2. Chemical composition of base materials and weld joints for reactor coolant piping 
(%, wt) 
 
Item DCPD method Normalization method 
Crack length 
measurement device DCPD N/A 
Crack length 
estimation method 
during the test 
By variation of output voltage 
when constant current is applied 
to specimen 
By only load-displacement 
record 
Effective crack 
extension length 
Not more than 4mm or 15% of the 
initial uncracked ligament, 
whichever is less as physical crack 
extension length 
Not more than 25% of the initial 
uncracked ligament as effective 
data region at data analysis 
Table 3. Comparison of dynamic J-R curve testing method 
2.1.1 DCPD method 
The schematic diagram of the dynamic J-R curve testing apparatus is shown in Fig. 2. The 
specimen was isolated from the load frame by inserting Bakelite plates between the connecting 
rods, and constant current was applied to the specimen using a power supply in order to 
measure crack growth length during the test. A sufficiently high current of 100 amperes was 
used to minimize error due to ferromagnetic phenomenon. (Landow & Marschall, 1991; 
B.S.Lee et al., 1999) Current input wires were mechanically fastened to both sides of the 
specimen with screws at points A and B in Fig. 3, and voltage measurement wires, 0.7mm in 
diameter were spot welded at the points C and D. Using high-speed data acquisition, the 
variation of load, crack opening displacement (COD) value and output voltage were acquired 
digitally during the test. Prior to the dynamic J-R curve testing at high temperature, to 
compensate for the thermal effect, the reference voltage was measured from the specimen with 
current off at the test temperature. Voltage measurement was normalized by subtracting the 
reference voltage from measured voltage during the dynamic J-R tests. The variation of crack 
length was calculated based on Johnson’s equation, Eq. (3) (Johnson, 1965). 
       
1
1
0 0
cosh y 2Wa 2 cos
W cosh U U cosh cosh y 2W cos a 2W


           
     (3) 
where U0 and a0 are initial output voltage and initial crack length, respectively. According to 
the ASTM code (ASTM, 2009), as shown in Fig. 4(a), crack initiation point is determined as the 
intersection point of the measured DCPD curve and the 5% offset line based on a linear best-fit 
line of the data over the range from 0.1~0.5 Pmax. However, as shown in Fig. 4(b), in the case of 
the tested ferritic steel, pulse drop phenomenon in the early loading stage of testing occurs due 
to the sudden reorientation of ferromagnetic domain nearby the crack tip (Hackett et al., 1986). 
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This pulse drop phenomenon makes it difficult to determine the crack initiation point. To 
resolve this problem, a backtracking technique proposed by Oh (Oh et al., 2002) was selected.  
 
 
Fig. 2. Data acquisition system for dynamic J-R curve testing 
In the backtracking technique, the crack initiation point is estimated by using final crack 
length measured in the fractured specimen. The backtracking technique is as follow; First, 
prior to crack initiation, it is assumed that crack extension length is in accordance with the 
standard blunting relation of Δa=J/(2σY), namely, a0 in Eq. (3) is substituted for a0+JB/(2σY) 
where JB=J at crack initiation. Next, with changing U0, the variation of crack length for each 
loading point can be obtained. Through this iterative process, U0 is obtained such that the 
calculated final crack length is in agreement with the measured final crack length. Finally, 
the J-R curve is calculated using U0.  
 
 
Fig. 3. Specimen geometry for dynamic J-R curve testing  
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                   (a) HY130 steel (Joyce, 1996)                          (b) SA508 Gr.1a steel  
Fig. 4. Potential rise versus crack opening displacement  
2.1.2 Normalization method 
In the Normalization method (ASTM, 2009), dynamic J-R curve can be estimated using load 
- displacement data pairs. At first, load - displacement data is normalized by considering 
specimen size and crack length per Eqs. (4) and (5) 
 
pl
i
Ni
bi
PP
W aWB
W
    
     (4) 
 pli i i ipli
v v P Cv'
W W
         (5) 
where abi=a0+Ji/(2σY), PNi is normalized load, Pi is load, W is specimen width, B is specimen 
thickness, ηpl is plastic η factor, ν’pli is normalized displacement, ν is load line displacement, 
and Ci is compliance. Using final crack length measured at the broken specimen surface, 
final normalized load displacement pair can be obtained from Eqs (4) and (5). Fitting 
coefficients a, b, c, d are obtained by curve fitting with Eq. (6) for effective data pair (PNi, 
ν’pli) including final normalized load displacement pair designated in ASTM E1820 A15.  
 
2
pl pl
N
pl
a bv' cv'
P
d v'
        (6) 
The crack length ai coinciding with PNi in Eq.(4) and with PN in Eq.(6) is calculated for each 
ν’pli by checking with slightly increasing crack lengths from initial crack length a0. Finally, 
using load, load line displacement and the calculated crack length data, the J-R curve can 
then be calculated. 
2.2 Test results and discussion 
Figure 5 shows the comparison of dynamic J-R curve between DCPD and the Normalization 
method for Shin-Kori units 3 & 4 when testing in accordance with crack extension criteria of 
the Normalization method. The dynamic J-R value at given crack extension length is well 
within the deviation range of ±5%. In the case of hot leg pipe and SAW, the dynamic J-R 
data using DCPD method tend to be 10% higher at the crack initiation point compared to 
that using the Normalization method. However, in the case of other materials, the dynamic 
Evaluation of Dynamic J-R Curve  
for Leak Before Break Design of Nuclear Reactor Coolant Piping System 
 
195 
J-R curves are coincident with each other. Figure 6 shows the comparison of dynamic J-R 
curve between DCPD method and normalization method for Shin-Wolsung when testing 
until load line displacement of 10mm is reached. Note: hereafter short crack extension 
means the crack extension length is not more than 4mm or 15% of the initial uncracked 
ligament, whichever is less, and long crack extension means the crack extension length is 
over 4mm and 15% of the initial uncracked ligament. Except cold leg pipe material at 177oC 
and 316oC and elbow material at 316oC with long crack extension, the dynamic J-R curve is 
coincident for different test methods. Therefore we know that for short crack extension, the 
dynamic J-R curve is coincident for different test methods, but for long crackextension, the  
J-R curve using DCPD is estimated to 10~30% higher than that using normalization method.  
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Fig. 5. Comparison of dynamic J-R curve between DCPD and normalization method when 
testing in accordance with crack extension criteria of normalization method 
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Fig. 6. Comparison of dynamic J-R curve between DCPD and normalization method when 
testing until load line displacement of 10mm  
When applying DCPD, the pulse drop phenomenon on the displacement versus DCPD output 
voltage relationship makes it difficult to determine an accurate dynamic J-R curve. The output 
voltage increases slightly, decreases sharply and then recovers in a early loading stage for this 
ferritic steel as shown in Fig.4(b) by superimposition of the induced voltage due to sudden 
reorientation of ferromagnetic domain nearby the crack tip. Since Johnson’s equation, Eq.(3), 
considers only the variation of output voltage with specimen geometry including crack length, 
some errors for estimation of crack length can occur in this case where output voltage includes 
the induced voltage. Despite this problem with DCPD, for short crack extension, dynamic J-R 
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curve using DCPD is similar to that using normalization. On the other hand, at long crack 
extension a difference in dynamic J-R curve between two test methods appears. However, in 
this case, normalization method is also not effective since a crack extension criterion is violated 
according to ASTM code. The difficulty of obtaining reliable J-R curve for long crack extension 
can be explained as follow; For normalization method, the normalization is based on the 
principle of load separation following Eq.(7) (Sharobeam & Landes, 1991; Landes et al., 1991) 
    N plPP H WG a W                 (7) 
where PN is normalized load, P is load, a is crack length, νpl is plastic displacement and W is 
specimen width. In Eq.(7), if crack length is fixed, normalized load PN value is easily 
calculated. However, to obtain J-R curve, normalized load in accordance with normalized 
function of Eq.(3) should be calculated based on actual crack length variation instead of fixed 
initial crack length. When load - displacement curve is normalized as fixed specimen geometry 
and crack length, the normalized curve is described by the open symbols in Fig. 7(a). 
According to ASTM code, to obtain the normalized load - displacement curve considering the 
variation of actual crack length, final data pairs estimated from measured final crack length 
and effective data pairs prior to crack initiation point in accordance with the method 
designated in ASTM E1820 code were selected. By performing a best fit for selected data pairs 
using Eq.(6), the normalized load - displacement curve can be estimated reflecting crack length 
variation. Crack extension length is estimated from the difference of two normalized curves  
as shown in Fig. 7(b), so for estimation of dynamic J-R curve, it is important to estimate  
reliable normalized load - displacement curve. In normalization method, normalized  
load - displacement curve at crack propagation region is estimated by interpolation using 
Eq.(6). In the case of small crack extension, this interpolation is reasonable because the region 
to be interpolated is narrow but in the case of long crack extension, interpolation errors can 
occur. If the position of normalized data pairs at the middle point between crack initiation 
point and final point is incorrectly estimated, the final estimated J-R curve is also in error from 
the actual J-R curve. It is therefore important to estimate the middle point exactly between 
crack initiation point and final point in the long crack extension case. If the position of middle 
point can be measured exactly through experiment, the reliable J-R curve will be able to 
evaluate for long crack extension beyond the crack extension length designated at ASTM code. 
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Fig. 8. The illustration diagram for the variation of the normalized load - displacement curve 
with the position of middle point  
3. Proposal of modified normalization method for measurement of dynamic  
J-R curve with long crack extension  
3.1 Importance of J-R curve for long crack extension 
In LBB analysis, as an integrity analysis method against instability fracture of cracked 
piping, J-integral, tearing modulus (J/T) method (Ernst et al., 1979, 1981) and the limit load 
method were used. While the limit load method is appropriate for the analysis of stainless 
steel piping, J/T method is appropriate for the analysis of both carbon and stainless steel 
piping. For ductile material, final instability rupture occurs after stable crack extension with 
increasing load value. This instability point where piping rupture occurs can be determined 
using J/T method based on J-integral parameter. The stable growth criterion is 
 Rapp mat2 2
f f
E dJ E dJT T
da da
               
     (8) 
where Tapp is applied tearing modulus, Tmat is material tearing modulus, E is elastic 
modulus, f is effective yield strength as defined by the average value of tensile strength 
and yield strength, J is J-integral value to be calculated from finite element analysis for the 
cracked piping and JR is J-integral value to be obtained from J-R curve testing.  
As shown in Fig. 9, tearing instability point is determined from intersection point of two J/T 
curves. From this instability point, critical load Pmax value is determined, and the safety 
factor is defined as the ratio between the critical load Pmax and applied load P. If the safety 
factor is larger than 1, the structural integrity can be verified by Eq. (8). For reliable stability 
analysis, Tmat curve should be evaluated experimentally to determine the intersection point 
between Tapp curve and Tmat curve. However, when testing using normalization method for 
the dynamic J-R curve, Tmat curve can not sufficiently be measured due to the restriction of 
crack extension length. In this case, Tmat curve corresponding to long crack extension should 
be estimated from the limited Tmat curve with short crack extension by extrapolation as 
shown in Fig. 9. As an analytical approach of extrapolation, Wallen, K (Wallen, 2009) 
suggested additional two applicable best-fit methods from limited Tmat curve in addition to 
Evaluation of Dynamic J-R Curve  
for Leak Before Break Design of Nuclear Reactor Coolant Piping System 
 
199 
conventional fitting method for tearing modulus curve. However, analytical approach has 
uncertainty basically by fitting. In this paper, to evaluate reliable Tmat curve at long crack 
extension region experimentally, we have researched the method for measurement of 
dynamic J-R curve with crack extension as long as possible. 
 
 
Fig. 9. Graphical illustration of J/T method 
 
 
Fig. 10. The illustration diagram for estimation of crack instability point for J/T method 
3.2 Dynamic J-R curve testing for long crack extension 
To obtain the effective J-R curve under the condition of long crack extension, two specimens 
were used where one is for short crack extension and the other is for long crack extension. 
By using two test data, the dynamic J-R curve was evaluated over the crack extension length 
range according to ASTM code. Table 1 shows test matrix for reactor coolant piping base 
metal for Shin-Wolsung.  
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Item Material Pipe size (Inner Dia.) 
Number of test 
Short crack 
extension 
Long crack 
extension 
Main Loop 
Piping 
Hot Leg SA508 Gr. 1a 42 in. 1 1 
Cold Leg SA508 Gr. 1a 30 in. 1 1 
Elbow SA516 Gr. 70  1 1 
Table 4. Dynamic J-R test conditions for short and long crack extension conditions  
The load - displacement curve for each piping material is shown in Fig 11. In the dynamic J-
R curves obtained by normalization method, for hot leg pipe and elbow materials, dynamic 
J-R curves were similar regardless of crack extension length; whereas for cold leg piping 
material, J-R curve for short crack extension length was lower than that for long crack 
extension length as shown in Fig.12. To analyze the reason for the difference between short 
and long crack extension for cold leg pipe, normalized load-displacement curve is described 
in Fig. 13. Normalized load-displacement curve, PN - ν’pl curve shows different shape 
between two tests with different crack extension length. In general, normalized load – 
displacement curve should maintain a constant shape regardless of crack extension size. 
Therefore, optimal normalized PN - ν’pl curve should be calculated by considering both PNi - 
ν’pli data pair for short and long crack extension. 
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Fig. 11. The load versus load line displacement curves for each material 
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Fig. 12. The comparison of dynamic J-R curve by normalization method between the tests 
for short and long crack extension 
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Fig. 13. Normalized load, displacement data pair and its each fitting curve for short and 
long crack extension of cold leg piping material 
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3.3 Combined analysis 
Based on this concept, combined analysis is proposed as the evaluation method of J-R curve 
to long crack extension using the test results with two different crack extensions. The 
procedure is as follows; At first, the PNi - ν’pli data pair is obtained by using load – load line 
displacement curve for long crack extension length in accordance with Eqs.(9) and (10), and 
final PNi - ν’pli data pair is obtained for two specimens respectively, where final PNi - ν’pli 
values are  
 
pl
f
Ni
f
PFinal P
W aWB
W
    
        (9) 
 f f fpli
v P CFinal v'
W
            (10) 
A line is drawn from the final PNi - ν’pli data pair of short crack extension tangent to the PN - 
ν’pl curve of long crack extension. The right side data to the tangent point and data with ν’pli 
<0.001 are excluded from effective PNi - ν’pli data pair. The coefficients of the fitting function 
of Eq.(11) instead of Eq.(6) are calculated for two final PNi - ν’pli values and the effective PNi - 
ν’pli data pair.  
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The following least square method is used for curve fitting of the function of Eq.(11). 
     22 3N pl pl pl plz P e v' a bv' cv' d ' min.             (12) 
The coefficient values, a, b, c, d, e can be calculated directly by Eq.(13). 
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Figure 14 shows normalized load - displacement curve best-fit by Eq.(11) for two final 
points of short and long crack extension cases and the effective PNi - ν’pli data pair. Next, the 
crack length ai coinciding with PNi in Eq.(4) and with PN in Eq.(11) is calculated for each ν’pli 
by checking with slightly increasing crack lengths from initial crack length a0, where load - 
displacement curve for long crack extension length is used. However, J-R curve obtained 
using combined analysis was deviated from individual J-R curve for short and long crack 
extension respectively in the case of hot leg pipe material as shown in Fig. 14. This reason is 
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that load - displacement curve between short and long crack extension have slightly 
different shape as shown in Fig. 11. Therefore, it is needed to adjust the position of middle 
point by reflecting the characteristics of J-R curves for short and long crack extension. To do 
so, the coincidence level is evaluated by comparing the J-R curves between normalization 
analysis by only short crack extension and combined analysis. As a method of evaluation for 
coincidence, best fit curve of Eq.(14) for the J-R curve of short crack extension is used.  
               mJ C a       (14) 
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Fig. 14. The best fit curve by Equation (11) on effective data pair for combined analysis 
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Fig. 15. Dynamic J-R curve for hot leg pipe material prior to adjustment of middle point on 
normalized load versus displacement curve in combined analysis  
Next, the standard deviation σ of Eq.(15) is calculated from J value by combined analysis 
and J value obtained by J-R curve of Eq.(14). Such that, the data of combined analysis to 
short crack extension are used in calculating σ 
            2fit combinedJ J
n 1
  
      (15) 
 
Nuclear Power – Control, Reliability and Human Factors 
 
204 
where Jfit is J value obtained by fitting function of Eq.(14) Jcombined is J value obtained by 
combined analysis and n is the number of effective J-R data to short crack extension. 
Optimal middle point on the normalized load-displacement relationship is determined as 
a point when standard deviation σ value of Eq.(15) is reached to minimize by adjusting PN 
value at ν’pl value at final point of short crack extension. Using the optimal middle point, 
final PNi - ν’pli data pair of long crack extension and effective PNi - ν’pli data pairs, J-R 
curve can be estimated. Figure 9 shows the comparison of dynamic J-R curve among the 
combined method and normalization method of short and long crack extension. For all 
three kinds of piping, dynamic J-R curve by combined analysis is well described with the 
behavior of that for two different crack extensions. From this combined analysis, we could 
obtain reasonable dynamic J-R curve until long crack extension for nuclear piping 
materials. In combined analysis, one J-R curve is obtained using two specimens. 
Therefore, the scatter of material properties with the position of taking specimen is 
required not to be large. In LBB analysis, the lowest material property is used among 
three test results for material property scatter. In this approach, the J-R curve tends to be 
estimated as an average J-R data for two test results. Further investigation is therefore 
needed for low bound curve of J-R curve with long crack extension effectively based on 
the statistical concept.  
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Fig. 16. The dynamic J-R curve by combined analysis for each material 
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4. Conclusion 
From the comparison test results between DCPD and normalization method as a dynamic J-
R curve testing method, short crack extension, dynamic J-R curves were similar but, for long 
crack extension, J-R curve estimated by normalization was higher by 10~30% at the initial 
loading stage than that by DCPD. For reliable J/T analysis for LBB design of nuclear piping, 
material J-R curve for long crack extension is needed. However, normalization method is 
applicable for only short crack extension. To overcome this problem, combined analysis 
based on normalized method was proposed. In combined analysis, dynamic J-R curve with 
long crack extension is estimated by two dynamic J-R curve tests with different crack 
extension length. The dynamic J-R curve beyond the crack extension length range 
designated by ASTM code could be estimated using the combined analysis.  
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Feed Water Line Cracking in  
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1. Introduction 
As early as 1979, a through wall crack was detected in a pressurized water reactor (PWR) 
plant. This crack initiated at the counter bore region of the pipe, adjacent to the weld joint 
attaching the pipe to the steam generator feed water nozzle. Subsequent inspection of the 
remaining feed water piping revealed cracking in the same vicinity but these were limited to 
partial wall penetration. As a result of this incident, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
issued a directive to all operating plants requiring them to perform inspection of their feed 
water lines. The cracks were subsequently detected in the immediate vicinity of the steam 
generator nozzles in a number of plants. An exhaustive investigation was undertaken 
subsequently and this revealed that the primary cause of cracking was due to a fatigue 
loading mechanism induced by thermal stratification and high cycle thermal oscillations 
(striping) during low flow conditions.  
Thermal stratification phenomenon results from a temperature differential across the pipe 
cross section with the top fluid stream hot and bottom stream relatively cold. During normal 
plant operations at low flow conditions, when the feed water nozzle is not completely full, 
hot water from the steam generator remains in the nozzle to fill up the rest of the volume. 
The difference in buoyancy between the hot and cold fluids inhibits their mixing so that the 
feed water becomes and remains thermally stratified. Separation of these two flow regions is 
due to the density difference in the hot and cold streams. The stratified temperature 
conditions can produce very high stresses, and can occur may times during normal low 
power operations; therefore this has the potential to initiate cracks in a relatively short 
period of time. Thermal striping is a local phenomenon that occurs at the interface between 
hot and cold flowing fluids. The interface level oscillates with periods ranging from 0.1 to 10 
seconds. The oscillating fluid temperature gives rise to fluctuating stresses. The magnitudes 
of the striping stresses are not as high as those due to stratification itself, but the number of 
cycles is so large that they contribute significantly to fatigue crack initiation.  
During normal plant operation, a series of temperature measurements has been taken 
around the pipe circumference at the vicinity of the of the feed water nozzle/pipe weld. 
Analysis of the data indicates that the stratified temperature distributions may be grouped 
into a handful of basic profiles corresponding to different levels of the interface between the 
hot and cold fluids. For analysis purposes these profiles could be assumed to be at steady 
state conditions because of their long duration observed during the tests.  Nuclear piping 
systems (Class 1) are designed according to the rules of NB 3600 of the ASME Boiler and 
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Pressure Vessel Code, Section III. The loads producing the stresses originate from the 
internal pressure, mechanical loads due to deadweight, seismic and thermal expansion and 
the operating thermal transients. Normally piping systems are not designed for 
circumferential temperature variation. The effect of the thermal stratification on the state of 
stress in the pipe is manifested in two ways: (a) the difference in temperature between the 
top and bottom of the pipe causes greater thermal expansion at the top tending to bow the 
pipe. When such bowing is restrained global bending stresses result; (b) the interface 
between the two fluid layers causes a local stress in the pipe due to thermal discontinuity 
across the pipe section. The fatigue damage produced by thermal stratification and the 
associated thermal striping are a good indication of the contribution of these phenomena to 
the observed feed water line cracking.  
A detailed finite element stress analysis has been carried out using a three dimensional 
model that includes the steam generator shell, the feed water nozzle, and the elbow/pipe. 
The shell nozzle/elbow model contains three distinct regions with different heat transfer 
characteristics between the metal and the adjacent fluid. Each of the stratification profiles 
produces a complex state of stress throughout the nozzle and the elbow (pipe). Different 
levels of interface produce peak stresses at different locations around the circumference. 
Since the interface level varies during low flow operating conditions, each point in the 
counter bore area is subjected to a state of varying stresses of large magnitudes. A maximum 
range of stress intensity analysis was carried out prior to fatigue evaluation to determine 
whether the simplified elastic plastic analysis procedure would be required, and if so, to 
calculate the plastic intensification factor Ke by which the peak alternating stresses would be 
multiplied. The analysis predicted crack locations that that correlated well with the 
observed cracking.  
The major cause of growth of the cracks is due to the thermal stratification cycles, which 
occur during low flows, primarily at hot standby.  The thermal striping phenomenon or the 
oscillations occurring at the interface between hot and cold fluids has some influence on the 
crack growth, but it certainly impacts the crack initiation predictions.  Thermal stratification 
causes a stress distribution in a pipe that is similar to what happens in a bimetallic strip. In 
the hot upper region compressive stresses develop as a result of constrained expansion, with 
the tensile stresses occurring in the lower region. This has been demonstrated using a 
simplified 2-dimensional finite element model. These are essentially the membrane stresses 
in the axial direction. Since the piping is flexible, the thermal moment gives rise to a bending 
stress that is added to the membrane stresses to obtain the total stresses.  
It is suggested that the equations for obtaining stresses in piping systems as outlined in the 
ASME Code contain a term addressing circumferential temperature gradients in the pipe. A 
number of remedial measures have been implemented or suggested in operating power 
plants to minimize the stress amplitudes and frequency of load cycling during the 
stratification events. 
In recent years, thermal stratification phenomenon has been observed to exist on several 
piping systems in pressurized water reactors. Damages have been observed in the main feed 
water lines, pressurizer spray lines, unisolable branch piping connected to reactor coolant 
piping, and pressurizer surge lines, with evidence linked to thermal stratification. The 
stratification phenomenon results from a temperature differential across the pipe cross-
section with the top fluid stream hot and the bottom stream relatively cold. This condition 
occurs under relatively low flow conditions by cold feed injection into a stagnant hot pipe 
region or vice versa. Separation of two fluid flow areas is due to density differences in the 
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hot and cold streams. This gives rise to gross thermal bending moments across the pipe 
section resulting in bowing deformation of the pipe. 
In May 1979, a pressurized water reactor plant in operation approximately a year developed 
a through-wall crack in one of its feed water lines at the entrance to the steam generator. 
Subsequent investigation of the remaining lines revealed cracking in the same vicinity but 
limited to partial wall penetration. As a result of this incident, the United States Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission submitted a directive to all PWR operating plants to perform 
inspection of their feed water lines. A number of plants produced same degree of cracking 
in the same general area with wide variety of size, orientation and length of plant operation.  
Because of the involvement of many variables, it was impossible to immediately identify the 
specific mechanisms of crack initiation and growth. A number of activities were initiated to 
investigate the structural, thermal, hydraulic, operational and environmental conditions 
which individually or collectively contributed to the observed cracking.  
2. Observed crack locations  
Figure 1 illustrates the feed water pipe to steam generator nozzle junction where majority of 
cracking occurred. Cracks were found to be oriented circumferentially and located in the 
base metal outside the heat affected zone. There were intermittent pitting throughout the 
inside surface. The deepest cracks were found at the base of the counter-bore transition 
 
 
Fig. 1. Location of Cracks in PWR Feed water Pipe to Nozzle Attachment Region [1] 
Typically a majority of PWR plants produced the circumferential cracking, the pattern of 
depth orientation varied considerably for different plants. Generally the deepest cracking 
was observed at the top, although in a number of plants this was found to occur at the sides, 
as well as the bottom. With the exception of one through-wall condition, most plants 
produced relatively small shallow cracks.  
3. Metallurgical studies 
The metallurgical investigations revealed that although corrosion may have been a major 
factor in initiating the cracks, the primary driving force for crack growth was mainly 
mechanical in nature. The corrosion fatigue may have resulted the cracking; both high and 
low cycle fatigue were involved, with high cycle initiating the fatigue and the low cycle 
propagating it. The fracture appearances were studied at high magnification by electron 
microscopy. Striations were found (Figure 2) substantiating the evidence that crack growth 
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was taking place by fatigue, although the striation spacing was unreliable as a measure of 
the growth rate, since a large range of temperatures were involved (200 - 450°F). 
 
 
Fig. 2. Fractographs of the tip of a Deep Crack [1] 
Instrumentations were installed at various plants to measure vibration and displacements of 
the feed water piping as well as temperatures in the vicinity of pipe to nozzle junction. The 
plants (both with and without observed cracking) were surveyed to determine their 
transient operation history and chemistry control. Particular attention was paid to the feed 
water oxygen content because of the presence of pitting. Thermocouple data of the on-site 
testing demonstrated the existence of persistent pipe thermal stratification during low feed 
water flow operations such as feed water makeup cycling during hot standby. 
4. Flow model studies 
Based on flow model tests it was shown that the temperature profile in a stratified cross 
section is mainly correlated with two thermal hydraulic parameters: (a) the flow rate in the 
line, and (b) the temperature difference between the top and the bottom of the pipe cross-
section under consideration. The flow model test was a full scale feed line and nozzle 
assembly made of Plexiglas for visual observation and fluid temperature measurement 
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(Figure 3). The test was designed to establish the temperature profile of the stratified water 
more accurately than the field measurements and to determine that thermal striping exists 
at the stratified interface, and if so determine the magnitudes and frequencies.    
 
 
Fig. 3. Flow Model Test showing Stratification: upper clear layer hot water, lower gray layer 
cold saline solution [2] 
The fluid temperature oscillations were recorded and it was subsequently confirmed that 
thermal striping mechanism led to feed line thermal fatigue. 
5. Structural analysis 
`During normal plant operation at low power conditions water is supplied to the steam 
generators at very low flow rates. When the flow rate is not high enough to completely fill 
the nozzle, hot water from the steam generator remains in the nozzle to fill up the rest of the 
volume. The difference in buoyancy between the hot and cold fluids inhibits their mixing so 
that the feed water becomes and remains thermally stratified as long as the flow rate is less 
that that required to completely fill the nozzle.  During normal plant operation a series of 
temperature measurements was taken around the pipe circumference at the vicinity of the 
pipe weld. Analysis of the test data indicated that the stratified temperature distributions 
may be grouped into six basic profiles corresponding to different levels of the interface 
between the hot and cold fluids and are shown in Figure 4. 
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Fig. 4. Stratified Temperature Profiles [3] 
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A finite element model has been prepared that includes a part of the steam generator shell, 
the feed water nozzle and the connecting elbow. The model uses 20-node isoparametric 
solid elements, two elements through the thickness and twelve around the circumference of 
the model.   
The shell/nozzle/elbow model contains three distinct regions with different heat transfer 
characteristics between the metal and the adjacent fluid. The first region is that of the 
inside of the steam generator shell exposed to slowly moving hot water. The other regions 
are the section of the nozzle under the thermal sleeve, and the rest of the nozzle and the 
elbow.  
Each of the stratification profiles produces a complex stress state throughout the nozzle and 
the elbow. The highest stresses occur in the weld counter bore region at the root of the 
elbow transition. For each profile there is a zone of compressive stress above the hot/cold 
interface and a region of tensile stress below it. Different interface levels produce peak 
stresses at different locations around the circumference. Since the interface level varies 
during low flow operating conditions, each point in the counter bore area is subjected to 
varying stress state. 
Fatigue evaluations have been performed around the circumference for the counter bore 
transition root and along the top and side of the counter bore region. The load conditions 
and the number of cycles were combined with a pressure of 7.6 MPa. A maximum range of 
stress intensity analysis was performed prior to each fatigue evaluation to determine 
whether the simplified elastic plastic analysis procedure would be required and if so, to 
calculate the plasticity intensification factors, Ke factors by which the peak alternating 
stresses are to be multiplied. 
The results for a typical plant fatigue evaluation [3] indicate that the peak usage factors are 
well above 1.0 and occur at the top and sides. These correlate with the observed locations of 
the deepest cracks for that plant.  The high usage factors conclusively implicate thermal 
stratification and thermal striping during low flow conditions as prime contributors to the 
observed feed line cracking. 
6. Analytical studies 
An analytical technique has been developed to evaluate the stresses due to circumferential 
temperature gradient during thermal stratification. The associated numerical solution is 
an approximate one that uses the standardized profiles of Figure 4. The mean 
temperatures at various circumferential pipe segments are calculated and shown in  
Figure 5. 
The stress distributions for the Profiles 1 through 6 has been computed using the 
approximate numerical model and are shown in Figure 6. 
The maximum range of stresses occurs at the top of the pipe and equals 72-(-124) = 196 MPa 
(based on profiles 2 and 1). Although the peak stress due to through the thickness 
temperature has not been explicitly considered, a conservative value of 2.0 is used.  This 
makes the alternating stress amplitude as 196 MPa, which gives the allowable number of 
cycles about 30,000 using the design curve of [5]. The plant data in [4] indicates a 
comparable number of stratification temperature excursions. This leads to a significant 
fatigue usage factor at the top of the pipe that correlates with the fatigue cracks observed at 
this location. 
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Fig. 5. Calculated Temperature input to the Approximate Numerical Model [4] 
 
 
Fig. 6. Stress Distribution across Pipe Diameter for Profiles 1 through 6[4] 
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1. Introduction  
The pressure vessel constitutes the most important structural component in a nuclear 
reactor from the point of view of its safety. The core of the reactor, that is, the nuclear fuel, is 
accommodated inside the vessel. This material is composed of fissile nuclides that undergo 
chain nuclear reactions of an exothermic nature, thus generating usable energy. Uranium 
235 (U-235) is the only isotope in Nature which is fissile with thermal neutrons; hence, it is 
used as nuclear fuel in Light Water Reactors (LWRs). Two technologies of LWRs can be 
distinguished, Pressurized Water Reactors (PWRs) and Boiling Water Reactors (BWRs). 
Currently, more than 400 nuclear reactors operate in the world of which, approximately, 
57% are PWR and 22% BWR. The original design lifetime for LWRs is 40 calendar years; 
nevertheless, the current target for most plants in many countries in Europe, Japan and the 
USA is to extend their operative lifetime up to 60 years. 
The nuclear vessel is a virtually irreplaceable element which is subjected to operating 
conditions that lead to a progressive degradation in time of its constituent steel. The chain 
fission reactions of U-235 entail the emission of high energy neutrons that inevitably 
impact the internal surface of the vessel. These collisions give rise to a complex series of 
events in the nano and microstructural scale that, in the end, modify the mechanical 
properties of the steel leading to its embrittlement, that is, the decrease in its fracture 
toughness. This phenomenon is most intense in the so called beltline region (which is the 
general area of the reactor vessel near the core midplane where radiation dose rates are 
relatively high). The total number of neutrons per unit area that impact the internal 
surface of the vessel represents the neutron fluence; in practice, only that fraction of the 
energy spectrum corresponding to a neutron kinetic energy higher than 1 MeV is 
considered to be capable of triggering damage mechanisms in the vessel steel; these 
neutrons are referred to as fast neutrons. Typical design end of life (EOL) neutron 
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fluences (E>1 MeV) for BWRs are in the order of 1018 n/cm2, whereas for PWRs this 
number is about 1019 n/cm2. 
In Section 2 of this chapter, the embrittlement of nuclear vessel steels is described from a 
purely phenomenological perspective as well as from the point of view of the legislation 
currently in force. The phenomenon of the ductile to brittle transition and the influence of 
embrittlement on it are particularly stressed. In Section 3, a brief description of the main 
characteristics of the nuclear power plants surveillance programmes is presented; the 
requirements that they envisage as well as the information that they allow to be obtained are 
pointed out. The physical mechanisms that take place in the nano and micro levels leading 
to the material embrittlement are detailed in Section 4 where a brief exposition concerning 
the most relevant predictive models for embrittlement is also presented. Finally, in Section 
5, the promising method of the Master Curve is described; this represents an improved 
methodology for the description of the fracture toughness of vessel steels in the ductile to 
brittle transition region, susceptible to be incorporated in the current structure of the 
surveillance programmes. 
2. The embrittlement of nuclear vessel steels and its influence on the ductile 
to brittle transition region: Phenomenology and regulations 
2.1 The phenomenology of the embrittlement and the ductile to brittle transition 
region 
As mentioned above, neutron irradiation reduces vessel steel toughness. To understand the 
concept of material fracture toughness, Fracture Mechanics theory must be referred to. In 
this section, the basic principles of Fracture Mechanics are briefly presented. Material 
toughness can be understood as its resistance to be broken when subjected to mechanical 
loading (forces, stresses) in the presence of cracks / flaws (that is, a sharpened 
discontinuity). Traditionally, RPV toughness variation has been indirectly quantified by 
means of Charpy impact tests. These tests were introduced by the French researcher George 
Charpy in 1905. The preparation, execution and interpretation of Charpy tests are currently 
regulated by the ASTM E 23 standard (ASTM E 23, 2001). The test consists of breaking a 
small dimension (10 x 10 x 55 mm3) specimen by the impact of a pendulum released from a 
controlled height and measuring the height it achieves after the breaking (see Figure 1). 
First, a notch has to be machined in the specimen that acts as stress concentrator, forcing the 
fracture process. The expression “notch” refers to a blunted defect and, therefore, must not 
be misunderstood as a crack or flaw (described above). The main numerical result provided 
by the Charpy test (though not the only one) is the energy absorbed during the specimen 
breaking, also called resilience, which is used as a semi-quantitative estimation of the 
material fracture toughness. 
Because of its simplicity of execution and for historical reasons, this experimental technique 
is still employed in several industries such as the naval, building and pressure vessel design 
and, in particular, in nuclear vessels. However, several limitations associated to the Charpy 
impact test can be mentioned. First, the fracture process occurs under highly dynamic 
conditions and, therefore, can hardly be extrapolated to quasi-static fracture processes (as 
the ones occurring in many components and, predictably, in nuclear vessels). Moreover, it 
has been demonstrated that the results provided by the Charpy test, such as the resilience, 
do not represent genuine material properties, which can be applied to components of 
different dimensions and loading conditions; as mentioned above, the resilience may be 
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considered only as a semi-quantitative estimator. Finally, the standard specimen notched 
geometry, which facilitates its breaking, is far from simulating an ideal crack, that is, a 
sharpened discontinuity embedded in the material. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Sketch of the Charpy pendulum and the standard Charpy specimen 
Experience shows that the vessel steel fracture properties drastically depend on 
temperature. This phenomenon is clearly appreciated in the resilience curves, which are 
obtained from Charpy tests carried out at different temperatures. Thus, in Figure 2, it can be 
appreciated how the absorbed energy in the specimen breaking process varies from low 
values at low temperatures, in the region called brittle or Lower Shelf, to high absorbed 
energies at high temperatures, in the ductile region or Upper Shelf. The intermediate 
temperatures constitute what is called the Ductile to Brittle Transition Region, DBTR. One 
additional property of the DBTR is that the resilience values present an important scatter, as 
can also be inferred in Figure 2. In order to simplify the analysis, it is common practice to fit 
the data according to mathematical expressions such as the hyperbolic tangent, see Figure 2 
(the free parameters A, B, C and D must be obtained through the fitting procedure, typically 
a least squares method). The existence of three regions and the scatter of the results in the 
DBTR are also observable in the fracture toughness curves. According to this, the 
description of the vessel steels toughness in the DBTR represents a remarkable engineering 
problem because, on the one hand, this property changes ostensibly with temperature and, 
on the other hand, it shows an important scatter. 
Figure 3 shows an example of a vessel steel neutron irradiation embrittlement. In this figure, 
Charpy impact test results (absorbed energy vs. temperature) from unirradiated and irradiated 
material, respectively, are represented. As can be seen, the most remarkable effects are a shift 
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of the curve in the DBTR towards higher temperatures accompanied by a reduction in the 
absorbed energy in the Upper Shelf, that is, a generalised embrittlement process. 
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Fig. 2. Influence of temperature on the results (absorbed energy) of the Charpy test; the data 
were fitted to a hyperbolic tangent curve 
In regard to nuclear vessel structural integrity assessment, it is of great interest to determine 
the neutron irradiation effect on the fracture properties in the DBTR. In the nuclear industry, 
it is common to simplify this phenomenon by means of the definition of standard 
temperatures that are considered as representative. Among these, the most used ones are 
T28J and T41J, that is, the temperatures where the Charpy impact test absorbed energies are 28 
J and 41 J, respectively (obtained after fitting the results to a hyperbolic tangent curve). 
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Fig. 3. Description of the influence of neutron irradiation on the Charpy curves (absorbed 
energy vs. temperature) 
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2.2 The ASME curves and the reference temperature RTNDT 
Since 1905, the year when George Charpy proposed his famous test, until the present, the 
knowledge of the mechanics that control the fracture process has experienced an important 
qualitative progress (a historic review can be found in the reference (Anderson, 1995)). 
Briefly summarising, at the end of the 50’s the formulation of the so-called Linear Elastic 
Fracture Mechanics1 (LEFM) discipline was available. LEFM accurately describes the 
fracture processes of brittle materials, that is, the materials that show a linear elastic 
response until failure (without the occurrence of previous relevant yielding). LEFM 
demonstrates that, the presence of an ideal crack in this type of materials when subjected to 
loading implies a stress state tending to infinite in the proximity of the crack front. On the 
other hand, it can also be demonstrated that the stress and strain fields, see Figure 4, in the 
proximity of the crack front depend exclusively on one parameter known as stress intensity 
factor (SIF or KI), which is a function of the applied load () and the defect size (a). It is 
worth mentioning that the subscript ‘I’ refers to the fracture mode I (tensile mode) as 
represented in Figure 4, which is the prevailing one in most cases of interest. 
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Fig. 4. Sketch of a cracked component / specimen and the stress state in the proximity of the 
crack front 
Then, as KI controls the stress-strain field in the fracture process zone (mode I), breaking will 
occur when KI reaches a determined critical value, which will be dependent on the material. 
This reasoning provides a valid definition of the fracture toughness as the SIF critical value, 
KIc, and also the following fracture criterion (1): 
    ,I IcK a K material   (1) 
The SIF (and consequently the toughness KIc) are usually expressed in MPa·m1/2. Toughness 
KIc is determined following the rules of the ASTM E 399 standard (ASTM E 399, 2009) or 
some other equivalent procedure. 
                                                 
1 Thanks to the works of A.A. Griffith (Griffith, 1920), C.E. Inglis (Inglis, 1913), G.R. Irwin (Irwin, 1956, 
1957) or H.M. Westergaard (Westergaard, 1939). 
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Unfortunately, LEFM is not valid for tough materials (such as reactor vessel steels), because 
these develop important yielding regions in the crack front before the occurrence of the 
breaking. In the 60’s, several theoretical solutions describing the fracture processes in tough 
materials were proposed. The works of A.A. Wells (Wells, 1961) and J.R. Rice (Rice, 1968) 
allows the validity of LEFM to be extended, thus establishing the foundations of the so-
called Elastic-Plastic Fracture Mechanics, EPFM. A new parameter, the J integral (which, like 
the SIF, depends on the loading state and the defect size) characterises the stress and strain 
fields in the crack front and, therefore, enables the fracture toughness to be defined 
generally, as the J integral limit value, Jc (sometimes also named JIc when it refers to the 
tensile fracture mode I). Also the following fracture criterion2 can be presented (2): 
    , cJ a J material   (2) 
The J integral (and therefore the toughness Jc) are usually expressed either in kJ· m-2 or in 
kPa· m. 
Then, since the 70’s, once the Wells and Rice postulations were recognised, a more founded 
theoretical basis was made available to address material fracture, either brittle (LEFM) or 
ductile (EPFM). However, in the 60’s, the period when Generation III reactors (LWR those 
covered in this text among them) started operating, EPFM was not available to the power 
plant design engineers. Among the different possible choices to address this problem, the 
one adopted by the USA authorities (represented by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
NRC) is especially noteworthy. This regulation is contained in the ASME (American Society 
of Mechanical Engineers) Code. 
The ASME International Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (ASME Code) establishes rules of 
safety governing the design, fabrication and inspection of boilers and pressure vessels, and 
nuclear power plant components during construction. This standard is currently in force for 
USA designed pressure vessels. The ASME Code is made up of 11 sections and contains 
over 15 divisions and subsections. The Sections II (Materials), III (Rules for Construction of 
Nuclear Facility Components) and XI (Rules for In-service Inspection of Nuclear Power 
Plant Components) are of relevance for the contents of this chapter. 
The researchers who elaborated the ASME code were aware of the intrinsic limitations of the 
LEFM; in particular, they knew that, a tough material breaks in a brittle manner (that is, in 
the LEFM range), only when large specimens are used. Thus, for example, the ASTM E 399 
standard (ASTM E 399, 2009) includes requirement (3) on the thickness B of a toughness 
specimen in order to obtain a valid result according to the LEFM requirements.  
 
2
2.5 Ic
Y
KB 
    
 (3) 
where σY represents the material yield stress. 
This possibility, however, is not applicable as the best solution to carry out the follow-up of 
the RPV steel because the space available inside the vessel is limited. Hence, it was decided 
to develop a different methodology, making use of Charpy impact specimens in the 
surveillance programmes (see Section 3) to subsequently correlate the results with the 
                                                 
2 Rigorously, this criterion describes the ductile fracture, that is, a fracture process with no stable 
propagation and non negligible yielding. 
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toughness values as defined by the LEFM principles. No doubt, this is an indirect and 
tortuous path but also the only one available to the ASME society researchers at that time. 
This decision, motivated by the theoretical limitations at the time it was made, is the cause 
of the conservatism of the current regulation. 
Therefore, from the end of the 60’s and the beginning of the 70’s, an important experimental 
campaign was carried out, testing different vessel steels in the DBTR according to the LEFM 
stipulations. As explained above, in order to obtain representative results for tough steels (as 
those of nuclear vessels), the LEFM requires the employment of large specimens, which are 
difficult to be fabricated, handled and tested. The weight of some of these specimens reached a 
value of several tons. Due to the high cost of manufacturing, handling and testing these 
specimens, the reference curves were named as the “one million dollars curves”. After 
compiling all the available data, it was appreciated that the curves obtained for the different 
steels showed, on the whole, a similar appearance; independently of the steel heat or 
composition, the most remarkable difference was its location on the temperature axis, see 
Figure 5. In consequence, the universal validity of the curves was established and a new 
parameter was defined for any sort of vessel steel, called reference temperature RTNDT, which 
allows its toughness-temperature curve to be located in the abscissa axis. Thus, representing in 
the abscissa axis the corrected scale (T – RTNDT), see Figure 5, all the different curves overlap in  
one single curve which is assumed to be the universal curve for the material behaviour. 
In this sense, the toughness behaviour of the vessel material in the DBTR before irradiation 
(unirradiated material) is described by the reference temperature RTNDT(U) which is obtained 
from a combination of the results of Charpy (ASTM E 23, 2001) impact and Pellini drop 
weight tests (ASTM E 208, 1995). Thus, this procedure implies correlating the fracture 
material behaviour from dynamic tests with uncracked specimens (only notched). This is 
not rigorously justified, either theoretically, or experimentally. RTNDT is used to index two 
generic curves, developed in 1973, provided by the ASME Code relating toughness vs. 
temperature: the KIc curve describes the lower envelope to a large set of KIc data while the 
KIR is a lower envelope to a combined set of KIc, KId (dynamic test) and KIa (crack arrest test) 
data, being therefore more conservative than the former. Three important features can be 
appreciated: first, it is assumed that the ASME curves are representative of any vessel steel; 
second, in both curves, LEFM is considered; finally, the large scatter in the DBT region is 
removed by taking into account lower envelopes. Consequently, the method provides high 
conservatism in most cases. 
 
 
Fig. 5. Description of the process to obtain the ASME curves; definition of the reference 
temperature RTNDT. 
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Figure 6 represents the ASME curves along with the experimental population which 
allowed their definition. The following equations (4, 5) are the mathematical expressions of 
the two curves: 
      0.036· º º1/2· 36.45 22.766· NDTT C RT CIcK MPa m e      (4) 
      0.0261· º º1/2· 29.40 13.776· NDTT C RT CIRK MPa m e      (5) 
This procedure must be considered as a compromise solution, that is, an engineering tool 
with relevant limitations and inconsistencies. As will be mentioned in Section 5 of this 
Chapter, currently an alternative methodology, the Master Curve method, is available. This 
approach, besides offering a higher simplicity from the methodological and experimental 
point of view, also provides a complete robustness from the theoretical perspective. The 
Master Curve procedure enables a realistic follow-up of the surveillance programme vessel 
steel toughness evolution (see Section 3), avoiding the use of questionable correlations 
which unnecessarily penalise the representativeness of the subsequent structural 
calculations.  
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Fig. 6. ASME curves with the experimental data set used for their definition 
2.3 Influence of the neutron irradiation on the reference temperature RTNDT 
Although the physical mechanisms which lead to the vessel steel embrittlement will be 
extensively described in Section 4, it is considered convenient to include here some points in 
order to facilitate the comprehension of Section 3. The reduction of the material toughness 
due to neutron irradiation in the DBTR is currently estimated through semi-empirical 
methods based on the shift experienced by the Charpy impact curves obtained from the 
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surveillance capsule specimens (see Section 3). As stated in 10CFR50 (10CFR50, 1986), the 
effect of neutron fluence on the behaviour of the material is predicted by the Regulatory 
Guide 1.99 Rev. 2 (RG 1.99 (2), 1988) which provides equation (6) for the calculation of the 
evolution of RTNDT: 
  NDT NDTNDT URT RT RT M     (6) 
where ΔRTNDT represents the shift in the reference temperature due to irradiation which is 
assumed to be equal to the shift of the Charpy transition curve indexed at 41J; thus, 
ΔRTNDT = ΔT41J. The third term, M, is the margin that is to be added to obtain a 
conservative estimation. The procedure in (RG1.99 (2), 1988) allows ΔRTNDT to be obtained 
even when no credible surveillance data are available by means of an equation based on 
the chemistry of the steel and the neutron fluence received (this issue is extensively 
described in Section 4). 
3. Surveillance programmes of nuclear power plants 
For decades, the nuclear industry has known of the above described problems and, in 
consequence, has acquired the appropriate tools to be able to evaluate in advance the 
degradation of the vessel steel properties. Surveillance programmes are the tools currently 
employed to perform the follow-up of the evolution of the RPV steel properties throughout 
the operating lifetime of the reactor. These programmes consist of placing inside the reactor, 
from the beginning of plant operation, surveillance capsules containing specimens; these are 
made of a steel (base material, weld metal or heat affected zone material – see comments 
below regarding to this point) identical to the one which constitutes the vessel – along with 
flux wires necessary to estimate the neutron fluence and temperature gauges. 
Surveillance capsules must be located within the reactor vessel, in the beltline, so that the 
specimen irradiation history duplicates as closely as possible, within the physical constraints 
of the system, the neutron spectrum, temperature history and maximum neutron fluence 
experienced by the reactor vessel. The fabrication history (austenitizing, quenching and 
tempering, and post-weld heat treatment) of the test materials will be fully representative of 
the fabrication history of the materials in the beltline of the reactor vessel. Because the 
capsules are located closer to the core than the inner vessel wall, the specimens suffer 
accelerated neutron fluence doses and, therefore, provide advanced information about the 
evolution of the embrittlement process. This phenomenon is described through the 
surveillance capsule lead factor (i.e., the ratio of the neutron fluence rate at the specimens in 
a surveillance capsule to the neutron fluence rate at the inner vessel wall, E > 1 MeV). It is 
recommended that the surveillance capsule lead factor be greater than one and less than or 
equal to three. This range of lead factors has been selected to minimise the calculation 
uncertainties in extrapolating the surveillance measurements from the specimens to the 
reactor vessel wall. 
Periodically, taking advantage of the plant refuelling outages, specimen removal is carried out 
(along with flux wires and temperature gauges) from inside the capsules. These specimens are 
subsequently tested, thus providing realistic information about the evolution of the material 
properties throughout the plant operating period. This is a method for assessing the material 
degradation caused by neutron irradiation. The issues related to the surveillance programme 
design along with the rules for the interpretation of the results of such programmes are 
 
Nuclear Power – Control, Reliability and Human Factors 
 
224 
regulated in several ASTM standards (ASTM E 185, 2002; ASTM E 2215, 2002; ASTM E 853, 
2001). Next, the minimum requirements considered in these standards for the design of a 
surveillance programme for monitoring the radiation-induced changes in the mechanical 
properties of ferritic materials in the beltline region are summarised; it is worth noting, for the 
sake of clarity, that the following list of characteristics is mainly focused on those aspects 
related with the material’s behaviour; other issues, as the measurement of neutron fluence 
through dosimetry or the measurement of temperatures, are not considered of relevance for 
the purposes of the present contribution. 
 It is recommended to obtain the baseline (i.e., unirradiated) data during the design of 
the surveillance programme. Alternatively, the specimens may be placed in secured 
storage for testing at the time the first surveillance capsule is withdrawn for 
evaluation. 
 A minimum test programme shall include material taken from the following 
locations: (1) base metal from each plate or forging used in the beltline, and (2) each 
weld metal made with the same heat of weld wire and lot of flux and by the same 
welding procedure as that used for each of the beltline welds. The base metal used to 
fabricate the weld shall be one of the base metals included in the surveillance 
programme. 
 Charpy V-notch specimens (corresponding to the Type A specimen described in Test 
Method E 23 ASTM E 23, 2001)) shall be used. Tension specimens of the type, size, and 
shape described in Test Method E 8 (ASTM E 8, 2009) are recommended. Fracture 
toughness test specimens shall be consistent with the guidelines provided in Test 
Methods E 1820 (ASTM E 1820, 2001) and E 1921 (ASTM E 1921, 2009). 
 A minimum of 15 Charpy specimens shall be tested to establish a full transition 
temperature and upper- shelf curve for each material. It is recommended that at least 
six tension test specimens be provided to establish the unirradiated tensile properties 
for both the base metal and the weld metal. A minimum of two specimens at room 
temperature and two specimens at reactor vessel beltline operating temperature should 
be tested. The remainder of the specimens may be tested at intermediate temperatures 
as needed to define the effects of temperature on the tensile properties. It is 
recommended as well that a minimum of 8 fracture toughness specimens be tested to 
establish the reference temperature, T0, through Test Method E 1921 (ASTM E 1921, 
2009) (see Section 5 for details about this issue) for the limiting beltline material and/or 
other fracture toughness tests be performed following Test Method E 1820 (ASTM E 
1820, 2001). 
 The first step in the implementation of a surveillance programme is the estimation of 
the peak EOL vessel inside surface fluence (EOL ID) and the peak EOL vessel 1⁄4-T (T 
being the thickness of the vessel) fluence3 (identified as EOL 1⁄4-T). This data allows the 
transition temperature shift, ΔRTNDT, to be estimated. The reference temperature shift 
can be determined from the relationship found in Guide E 900 (ASTM E 900, 2002) (for 
details and alternative procedures, see Section 4 in this chapter). 
                                                 
3 The neutron fluence at any depth in the vessel wall attenuates as a consequence of the s 
cattering processes that occur between the neutrons and the crystal structure of the steel; these 
scattering processes are, in turn, responsible of the damage mechanisms leading to material’s 
embrittlement. There are different models to predict this phenomenon, see, for example (RG 1.99 (2), 
1988; ASTM E 900, 2002). 
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 A sufficient number of surveillance capsules shall be provided to monitor the effects of 
neutron irradiation on the reactor vessel throughout its operating lifetime. The basis for 
the number of capsules to be installed at the beginning of life is the predicted transition 
temperature shift, ΔRTNDT.  
 The minimum number of tests on irradiated specimens (base and weld materials) for 
each irradiation exposure set (capsule) shall be as follows: 15 Charpy specimens, 3 
tension specimens and 8 fracture specimens (only fracture toughness specimens from 
the limiting material are required. It is suggested that a greater quantity of specimens be 
included in the irradiation capsules whenever possible). 
 The capsule withdrawal schedule should permit periodic monitoring of long-time 
irradiation effects. The suggested withdrawal schedule is provided in Table 1. At a 
minimum, the surveillance programme should consist of two priority 1 capsules (see 
Table 1) including samples of all irradiated materials (if there is no weld in the beltline, 
then there is no requirement to include weld material in the surveillance programme. 
Moreover, experience has shown that it is no longer necessary to include the heat-
affected zone material in the surveillance programme). The specimens in these capsules 
must be tested with target fluences corresponding to EOL-ID and EOL 1/4-T, 
respectively. If the estimated EOL ΔRTNDT is less than 56°C (100°F), the vessel 
embrittlement may be adequately monitored by testing only these two priority 1 
capsules. The priority 2 capsule is required for plants that exceed this limit; this capsule 
should be scheduled for withdrawal early in the vessel life to verify the initial 
predictions of the surveillance material response to the actual radiation environment. 
Past practice for PWRs has shown that a target fluence of 5.3 1018 n/cm2 (E>1 MeV) is 
adequate; a lower target fluence is appropriate for BWRs. The priority 3 capsule is 
included to better define the embrittlement trend in materials with large projected EOL 
ID ΔRTNDT values greater than 111°C (200°F). 
 
Sequence Target fluence Priority 
First PWRs: 5·1018 n/cm2 (E>1 MeV) 2 (required if ΔRTNDT > 56°C) 
Second EOL ¼-T 1 (required for all materials) 
Third EOL ID 1 (required for all materials) 
Fourth (EOL ¼-T – 1st Capsule)/2 3 (required if ΔRTNDT > 111°C) 
Subsequent Supplemental Evaluations Not required 
Table 1. Suggested Withdrawal Schedule 
 Additional capsules may be needed to monitor the effect of a major core change or 
annealing of the vessel, or to provide supplementary toughness data for evaluating a 
flaw in the beltline or for monitoring the vessel over the extended lifetime. 
Supplementary testing may also be based on reconstitution of previously tested 
specimens following Guide E 1253 (ASTM E 1253, 1999). 
4. The physical mechanisms of embrittlement, predictive models 
The recognition of the importance of embrittlement processes led to the establishment of 
surveillance programmes as a strategy for monitoring the material properties of the vessel. 
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The limited data available from each specific monitoring programme is insufficient to 
predict the shift in the transition temperature. To get round this problem, the most widely 
used strategy is to turn to predictive formulas based on the statistical analysis of large 
populations of data from the monitoring programmes of several plants (Eason et al., 1998). 
The physical models developed in recent times include temperature, Ti, fluence and the 
neutron flux with energies above 1 MeV, Φ and φ, respectively, the contents of copper, 
nickel and phosphorus, and the form presented by the steel (plate, forging or welding). 
Recent studies have revealed minor influences associated with the presence of manganese 
and the heat treatment applied (Odette & Lucas, 1998). The phenomenon of the recovery of 
properties after an annealing treatment along with the subsequent embrittlement are 
scarcely documented at present and require further study. Given the large number of 
variables involved in the process, it is not feasible to elaborate predictive expressions of a 
purely empirical nature, particularly when these are to be extrapolated to high neutron 
doses. Fortunately, knowledge of the physical processes involved in the embrittlement 
enables reliable expressions to be proposed for estimating the shift in the transition 
temperature in terms of these variables. 
It should be noted that all of the predictive equations for embrittlement used in the nuclear 
sector and gathered in the codes and regulations of each country are based on the results of 
the Charpy impact test. Most of these expressions were obtained for manganese-
molybdenum-nickel steels, (typically used in the United States, Western Europe, Japan and 
Korea) or chromium-molybdenum-vanadium and chromium-molybdenum-nickel-
vanadium steels (used in the WWER reactors of Eastern Europe). These models express the 
embrittlement as a function of the presence of chemical elements (such as copper, 
phosphorus and nickel) and the value of fast neutron fluence. Sometimes, the irradiation 
temperature and the nature of the steel (weld or base material) are taken into account. It is 
also worth mentioning that, for most of the regulations, the fast neutron fluence is defined 
as the portion of the neutron spectrum with E> 1 MeV, while in the Russian WWER reactors, 
the fraction with E> 0.5 MeV is used. 
4.1 Physical mechanisms of embrittlement 
The mechanism of embrittlement is primarily based on the hardening produced by 
nanometric features that develop as a consequence of the impact of the neutrons on the 
crystal structure. The main embrittlement processes include (Odette & Lucas, 2001):  
 Generation of lattice defects in displacement cascades by high-energy recoil atoms from 
neutron scattering and reactions. These primary defects are in the form of single and 
small clusters of vacancies and self-interstitials (Frenkel defects).  
 Diffusion of primary defects also leading to enhanced solute diffusion and formation of 
nanoscale defect-solute cluster complexes, solute clusters and distinct phases, mainly 
copper-rich precipitates (CRPs).  
 The presence of these nanofeatures can arrest the advance of the dislocations.  
 As a consequence, this hardening process leads to the shift of the transition temperature 
detected experimentally, thus facilitating the material fracture through cleavages. 
Obtaining a predictive expression to determine the transition temperature shift can be 
achieved by developing physical submodels of the above mentioned processes which 
depend on the metallurgical (Cu, Ni, P ,…) and irradiation (Φ, φ, Ti) variables (Eason et al., 
1998; Odette & Lucas, 1998). The current understanding of the mechanisms of damage 
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production is essentially based on molecular dynamics (Stoller et al., 1997) and Monte Carlo 
numerical simulations (Wirth & Odette, 1999), combined with indirect experimental 
measurements. Thermodynamic-kinetic models are used to track the transport and fate of 
irradiation defects and solutes and to predict the number, size distribution and composition 
of the evolving nanofeatures. The characterization methods include: X-ray and neutron 
scattering, various types of electron microscopy, three-dimensional atom probe-field ion 
microscopy and positron annihilation spectroscopy. These researches allowed at 
establishing the following sequence (Odette & Lucas, 2001): 
Neutrons create vacancies and interstitials, separated by some distance, by displacing atoms 
from their normal crystal lattice sites. The displacements are produced in cascades resulting 
from highly energetic primary recoiling atoms (PRA) generated by neutron scattering and 
reactions. The interaction of a high-energy neutron with an atomic nucleus results in 
significant energy transfer (R). For example, a 1 MeV neutron transfers up to about 70 keV to 
an iron PRA (Odette & Lucas, 2001). Part of the recoil energy is lost in the electronic cloud; 
hence, a lower kinetic energy is available for atomic collisions, Rd < R. The PRA kinetic 
energy is transferred by secondary, tertiary and n-subsequent generations of collision 
displacements, producing 2n recoiling atoms at lower energies (~Rd/2n). The process 
terminates when the kinetic energy of the nth-generation of recoils falls below that needed 
to cause additional displacements. On average, a PRA creates Rd/2D displacements, where 
D~0.05 keV. Thus, a typical value Rd = 20 keV is able to produce a cascade of ~200 
displacements.  Closely spaced interstitials and vacancies quickly recombine and only about 
one third of the initial displacements survive. Typically, this leaves a vacancy-rich cascade 
core, surrounded by a shell of interstitials. 
Most of interstitials quickly cluster to form small, disc-shaped features that are identical to 
small dislocation loops. Along with the interstitials, these loops are very mobile. Diffusion of 
interstitials and loops within the cascade region causes additional recombination prior to 
their rapid long-range migration (unless they are strongly trapped by other defects or 
solutes). Although they are less mobile than the interstitials, vacancies also eventually 
diffuse. Through a series of local jumps, the vacancies and solutes in the cascade quickly 
begin to evolve to lower energy configurations, forming small, three-dimensional clusters, 
while others leave the cascade region. The small clusters are unstable and can dissolve by 
vacancy emission. However, the small clusters also rapidly diffuse and coalesce with each 
other, forming larger nanovoids, which persist for much longer times. Solute atoms bind to 
the vacancies and segregate to clusters. The vacancy emission rate is lower from vacancy- 
solute cluster complexes. Small solute clusters remain after all the vacancy clusters have 
been finally dissolved. 
The neutron dose or damage exposure can be expressed in terms of displacements-per-atom 
(dpa) which partially accounts for the effect of the neutron energy spectrum. For a typical 
RPV neutron spectrum, an end of life Φ =3·1019 n·cm-2 (E>1 MeV) produces about 0.1 dpa. 
However, most of the vacancies and interstitials eventually migrate and annihilate at sinks 
long distances from the cascade region. Thus long-range diffusion results in additional 
nanostructural evolution. 
As a consequence of the above mentioned mechanisms three broad categories of 
nanofeatures can be distinguished: 
 Copper rich or manganese-nickel rich precipitates (CRPs/MNPs).  
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 Unstable matrix defects (UMD) that form in cascades even in steels with low or no 
copper, but that anneal rapidly compared to typical low Φ irradiation times.  
 Stable matrix features (SMF) that persist or grow under irradiation even in steels with 
low or no copper. 
 Grain Boundary Segregations (GBSs) of embrittling elements as phosphorus (Server et 
al., 2001).  
Whereas the contributions of SMDs and CRPs imply the creation of obstacles blocking the 
displacement of the dislocations, the GBSs can reduce the intergranular cohesion thus 
modifying the mechanisms and properties of fracture. As a consequence, a change from 
transgranular to intergranular fracture can ocurr. This phenomenon has not been observed 
in USA vessels but in Brtitish (Server et al., 2001). 
4.2 Standard models for predicting the material embrittlement 
This section includes a brief revision of the models proposed by the legislation currently in 
force that allows the embrittlement of the steel of the vessel to be determined throughout its 
operative lifetime. The vessels designed or manufactured in the USA are subjected to the 
regulations of that country. Specifically, the code of federal regulations 10CFR50 (10CFR50, 
1986) is the reference document. According to this law, the Regulatory Guide 1.99 Rev. 2 
(RG1.99 (2), 1988) establishes the procedure to determine the material embrittlement (see 
equation (6)); on the other hand, it points out that the plant surveillance programme must be 
prepared in agreement to that stipulated in the standard (ASTM E 185, 2002) which, in turn, 
refers to the standard (ASTM E 900, 2002) for the prediction of the material embrittlement. 
For these reasons, Section 4.2.1 is devoted to the first of the procedures mentioned (RG1.99 
(2), 1988) while the last one is described in Section 4.2.2. Finally, it is worth noting that 
alternative models, which can be found in the scientific literature, have been developed: see 
for example (Odette and Lucas, 1998, 2001; Eason, Wright and Odette, 1998; Yamashita, 
Iwasaki, Dozaki, 2010); however, these models are considered to be beyond the scope of the 
present chapter. 
4.2.1 The Regulatory Guide Rev. 2 
The U.S. Regulatory Guide 1.99, Revision 2 (RG 1.99 (2), 1988) provides the current generic 
basis to evaluate ΔRTNDT (which is considered to be equivalent to ΔT41J) in terms of the 
copper and nickel contents of the steel and fast neutron fluence (E > 1 MeV) for weld and 
plate product forms. The model equations for (RG 1.99 (2), 1988) were statistically fitted to a 
small surveillance database (177 data points) on steels irradiated in surveillance capsules at 
flux levels somewhat higher than at the vessel wall. The (RG 1.99 (2), 1988) model was 
derived prior to 1985 and reflects the emerging, but far from complete, physical 
understanding of embrittlement mechanisms.  
The actual (or adjusted) reference temperature RTNDT for each material in the beltline region 
is given by expression (6). RTNDT(U) is the reference temperature for the unirradiated 
material as defined in (ASME Code). If measured values of initial RTNDT for the material in 
question are not available, generic mean values for that class of material may be used if 
there are sufficient test results to establish a mean and standard deviation for the class.  In 
the case of Linde 80 welds, a generic value RTNDT(U)=0ºF is accepted whereas for Linde 0091, 
1092, 124 and ARCOS B-5, RT NDT(U)=-56ºF. As stated in (RG 1.99 (2), 1988), ΔRTNDT must be 
obtained by applying equation (7); the basis for equation (7) is contained in publications 
Degradation Due to Neutron Embrittlement of Nuclear Vessel Steels:  
A Critical Review about the Current Experimental and Analytical Techniques… 
 
229 
(Guthrie, 1984) and (Odette et al., 1984). Both contributions used surveillance data from 
commercial power reactors. The bases for their regression correlations were different in that 
Odette made greater use of physical models of radiation embrittlement. The two papers 
contain similar recommendations: (1) separate correlation functions should be used for weld 
and base metal, (2) the function should be the product of a chemistry factor and a fluence 
factor, (3) the parameters in the chemistry factor should be the elements copper and nickel, 
and (4) the fluence factor should provide a trend curve slope of about 0.25 to 0.30 on log-log 
paper at 1019 n/cm2 (E > 1 MeV), steeper at low fluences and flatter at high fluences.  
    0.28 0.10·log· fNDTRT CF f    (7) 
CF (°F) in equation (7) is the chemistry factor, a function of copper and nickel content. CF is 
tabulated in (RG 1.99 (2), 1988) for welds and base metal (plates and forgings). Linear 
interpolation is permitted. If there is no information available, 0.35% copper and 1.0% nickel 
should be assumed. 
The neutron fluence at any depth x in the vessel wall, f(x) (1019 n/cm2, E > 1 MeV), is 
determined following equation (8): 
   0.24·· xSURFf x f e  (8) 
where fsurf (1019 n/cm2, E > 1 MeV) is the calculated value of the neutron fluence at the inner 
surface of the vessel, and x (in inches) is the depth in the vessel wall measured from the 
vessel inner surface. Alternatively, if dpa calculations are made as part of the fluence 
analysis, the ratio of dpa at the depth in question to dpa at the inner surface may be 
substituted for the exponential attenuation factor in equation (8). 
The third term in (6), M, is the quantity, °F, that is to be added to obtain conservative, upper-
bound values of the adjusted reference temperature. M is obtained through equation (9). 
 2 22· UM     (9) 
Here, σU is the standard deviation for the initial RTNDT. If a measured value of initial RTNDT 
for the material in question is available, σU is to be estimated from the precision of the test 
method. If not, generic mean values for that class of material are used. The standard 
deviation in ΔRTNDT, σΔ, is 28ºF for welds and 17ºF for base metal, except that σΔ need not 
exceed 0.50 times the mean value of ΔRTNDT. 
Finally, when two or more credible surveillance data sets become available from the reactor 
in question, they may be used to determine the adjusted reference temperature of the 
beltline materials. In this case, if there is clear evidence that the copper or nickel content of 
the surveillance weld differs from that of the vessel weld, the measured values of ΔRTNDT 
should be adjusted by multiplying them by the ratio of the chemistry factor for the vessel 
weld, (CF)V, to that of the surveillance capsule weld, (CF)C, see equation (10). 
       · VNDT NDTV C C
CF
RT RT
CF
    (10) 
Second, the surveillance data should be fitted using equation (7) to obtain the relationship of 
ΔRTNDT to fluence. To do so, calculate the chemistry factor, CF, for the best fit by 
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multiplying each adjusted ΔRTNDT by its corresponding fluence factor, summing the 
products, and dividing by the sum of the squares of the fluence factors. The resulting value 
of CF will give the relationship of ΔRTNDT to fluence that fits the plant surveillance data in 
such a way as to minimise the sum of the squares of the errors. 
4.2.2 Standard ASTM E 900 - 02 
The purpose of ASTM Standard E 900-02 (ASTM E 900, 2002) is to establish an improved 
correlation in respect of that proposed by the Regulatory Guide (RG1.99 (2), 1988) which 
allowed the transition temperature shift, ΔT41J, to be obtained as a function of the neutron 
fluence. The data base used in this case consisted of 600 data; thus, it is much more robust 
than that of the Regulatory Guide where only 177 data were available.  Here, the 
expressions are not purely phenomenological but physically guided, taking into 
consideration when possible the nanofeatures participating in the process (described above). 
Another interesting feature is that the ASTM E 900-02 formulation is based on robust 
statistical techniques for the treatment of the large data set (non-linear, least-square 
regression analysis). It is worth noting that the origin of this procedure relies on the 
expressions proposed by (Eason et al., 1998). The procedure distinguishes between the three 
mechanisms described in Section 4.1: 
 Stable matrix damage (SMD) associated with the presence of point defects and loop 
dislocations.  
 Copper rich precipitates (CRPs).  
 Grain Boundary Segregations (GBSs) of embrittling elements as phosphorus. 
As there is no evidence of the influence of this last mechanism on USA vessels, the form of 
the correlation involves only the two major embrittlement terms: the SMD and the CRP; 
nevertheless, the influence of phosphorus is indirectly present through the SMD. The mean 
value of the transition temperature shift is calculated as follows (11): 
 Shift SMD CRP   (11) 
The formulas for both terms must take into consideration the empirical reality; specifically, 
the CRP mechanism saturates with fluence while, on the contrary, the SMD damage process 
grows monotonically, apparently without limit.  
Expression (12) represents the transition temperature shift, in ºF, due to the SMD 
  
20730
0.5076460186.70·10 · ·iTSMD e    (12) 
The main characteristics as well as the meaning of the variables are explained below: 
 The influence of irradiation temperature, Ti, in ºF, in the range 275-295 ºC (527 – 563 ºF, 
respectively) is modelled by means of an exponential function. 
 The effect of the irradiation, which is expressed in the neutron fluence, Φ (n·cm-2, E > 1 
MeV), increases indefinitely, without saturation. 
 There is no explicit dependence on the neutron flux, φ. 
The second term in (11) which represents the shift in the transition temperature due to the 
CRP mechanism, in ºF, responds to formula (13), together with expressions (14) and (15): 
      1.173· 1 2.106· · ·CRP B Ni F Cu G    (13) 
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    0.5770.072F Cu Cu   (14) 
where Cu≤0.305 in general and  Cu≤0.25 for Linde 80 and 0091. 
    log 18.241 1·2 2 1.052G Tanh
          (15) 
The relevant features in (13-15) and the meaning of the variables is explained in the 
following: 
 The coefficient B takes different values depending on the material (B=234, for welds; 
B=128 for forgings; B=208 for combustion engineering plates; B=156 for other plates). 
 There is a strong influence of the nickel content, Ni (expressed in % wt.). 
 The influence of Cu is taken into consideration through F(Cu) (14); this effect occurs 
only for Cu>0.072% and saturates for Cu>0.305% (0.25% for Linde 80 and 0091) 
 The irradiation temperature is not considered to play a role.  
 The neutron fluence Φ influence is represented through the term G(Φ) where the 
saturation is modelled as a hyperbolic tangent function. 
Moreover, a term corresponding to the standard deviation σTTS=22ºF must be considered. It 
takes into consideration the uncertainties in the input data and in the preparation of the 
model. 
5. The Master Curve model for the description of the fracture toughness in 
the DBT region 
5.1 Description of the model 
Advances in fracture mechanics technology have made it possible to improve the semi-
empirical indirect methodology described above, currently in force to describe the 
fracture toughness in the DBT region in different aspects. First, the development of EPFM 
allows fracture toughness values to be determined using much smaller specimens and 
utilising J integral techniques, that is, measuring values of KJc instead of KIc. Moreover, 
the analytical techniques for structural integrity assessment can now be expressed in 
terms of EPFM. The first issue, which is considered relevant for the contents of this 
chapter, is described in the present section; indeed, the scope is explicitly focused on the 
Master Curve (MC) approach to describe the fracture toughness of vessel steels in the 
DBT region. 
The MC model, originally proposed by Wallin (Wallin, 1984; Wallin et al. 1984; Wallin, 
1989; Wallin, 1995), provides a reliable tool based on a direct characterisation of the 
fracture toughness in the DBT region. This approach is a consequence of the 
developments in EPFM together with an increased understanding of the micro-
mechanisms of cleavage fracture. Valiente et al. (Valiente et al., 2005) have briefly but 
comprehensively reviewed the previous contributions made to understand cleavage in a 
ferritic matrix that leads to the MC approach. The basic MC method for analysis of brittle 
fracture test results is defined in the standard ASTM E 1921 (ASTM E 1921, 2009). The 
mathematical and empirical details of the procedure are available in (Merkle et al., 1998; 
Ferreño, 2008; Ferreño et al. 2009). The main features and advantages of the method are 
hereafter summarised: 
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 MC assumes that cleavage fracture in non austenitic steels is triggered by the 
presence of particles close to the crack tip. Therefore, fracture is mainly an initiation 
dependent process. As a consequence, fracture is governed by weakest link statistics 
which follows a three parameter Weibull distribution. For small-scale yielding 
conditions, therefore using EPFM, the cumulative failure probability, Pf, is given by 
equation (16): 
 
min
0 0 min
·
1
m
JcK KB
B K K
fP e
        (16) 
where KJc is the fracture toughness for the selected failure probability, Pf , K0 is a 
characteristic fracture toughness corresponding to 63.2% cumulative failure probability, 
B is the specimen thickness and B0 a reference specimen thickness, B0 = 25.4 mm. The 
experimental data allows the Weibull exponent, m=4, to be fixed (Merkle et al., 1998) 
and the minimum value of fracture toughness for the probability density function,  
Kmin = 20 MPa·m1/2. Therefore, only K0 must be estimated from the empirical available 
data. 
 The dependence between K0 (in MPa·m1/2) and temperature (ºC) for cleavage fracture 
toughness is assumed to be (17): 
  00.019·0 31 77· T TK e    (17) 
where T0 is the so-called MC reference temperature; it corresponds to the temperature 
where the median fracture toughness for a 25 mm thickness specimen (1T, according to 
ASTM terminology) has the value 100 MPa·m1/2. 
 One of the main advantages of the method is that it allows data from different size 
specimens to be compared. As thickness increases, the toughness is reduced, due to the 
higher probability of finding a critical particle for the applied load. The ASTM standard 
(ASTM E 1921, 2009) provides expressions to relate the fracture toughness for 
specimens of different thicknesses. Equation (16) can be re-written considering the same 
failure cumulative probability, Pf, for two specimens of different thickness, namely B1 
and B2, thus leading to expression (18): 
  
1
42
,2 min ,1 min
1
·
c cJ J
BK K K K
B
        (18) 
 The distribution fitting procedure involves finding the optimum value of T0 for a 
particular set of data. For this task, all data are thickness adjusted to the reference 
specimen thickness B0 = 25.4 mm using equation (18). The procedure can be applied 
either to a single test temperature or to a transition curve data, Ti being the generic 
temperature of the different tests. In the latter approach (the former is just a particular 
case) T0 is estimated from the size adjusted KJC data (KJC,1T) using a multi-temperature 
maximum likelihood expression (see equation (19)). To estimate the reference 
temperature, T0, a previous censoring of the non size-adjusted data must be applied. 
Fracture toughness data that are greater than the validity limit given by equation (20), 
as defined in (ASTM E 1921, 2009), are reduced to the validity limit, KJc(lim) and treated 
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as censored values in the subsequent estimation stage (δi =0 in expression (19)). This 
condition is imposed to guarantee high constraint conditions in the crack front during 
the fracture process.  
 
 
 
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 
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e e

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  
     
   (19) 
  0(lim) 2· ·30· 1YJc E bK     (20) 
In equation (20) σy is the yield strength at test temperature, E is the Young’s modulus, b0 
the initial ligament and ν is the Poisson’s ratio. It must be stressed that factor 30 in 
equation (20) is currently under discussion (Merkle et al., 1998) and that, for instance, 
the ASTM E1820-01 Standard (ASTM E 1820, 2001) imposes a more demanding limit 
with a factor 50 or 100 depending on the nature of the steel. 
 The standard deviation in the estimate of T0, expressed in ºC, is given by (21): 
 0T r
   (21) 
where r represents the total number of valid specimens (not censored results) used to 
establish T0. The values of the factor β are provided in (ASTM E 1921, 2009). 
 The statistical analysis can be reliably performed even with a small number of 
fracture toughness tests (usually between 6 and 10 specimens). Moreover, as an EPFM 
approach is used, the specimen size requirement, equation (20), is much less 
demanding than that of the LEFM (ASTM E 399, 2009). These remarks are of great 
relevance in nuclear reactor surveillance programmes where the amount of material 
available is usually very limited and consists of small size samples (Charpy 
specimens). 
 By rearranging equations (16) and (17) it is possible to obtain expression (22) which 
provides an estimate of KJc for a given cumulative failure probability, Pf, once T0 has 
been determined. In this way, the confidence bounds of the distribution (usually taking 
Pf = 0.01 or 0.05 for the lower bound and 0.95 or 0.99 for the upper bound) can be 
obtained. As a particular case, the expression for the median fracture toughness (Pf = 
0.5) (see Equation (23)) is determined. 
    00.25 0.019·, min ln 1 · 11 77· T Tc fJ P fK K P e             (22) 
    00.01930 70·c
T T
J medK e
   (23) 
 Finally, any test that does not fulfil the requirement for crack front straightness or that 
terminates in cleavage after more than a limit of slow-stable crack growth will also be 
regarded as invalid. 
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5.2 Open issues concerning the Master Curve approach 
The MC has become a mature tool for characterising the fracture toughness of ferritic steels 
in the DBT region. Considerable empirical evidence provides testament to the robustness of 
the MC procedure. One of the main advantages of this procedure relies on the possibility of 
assessing the state of a RPV vessel by direct measurement of fracture toughness rather than 
through the use of the currently accepted correlative approaches, based on Charpy tests.  
The procedure currently accepted to assess the steel neutron embrittlement partially 
incorporates the MC reference temperature concept, T0; in this sense, to enable the use of the 
MC methodology without completely modifying the structure of the ASME code the 
approach stated in code cases N-629 (ASME CC 629, 1999) and N-631 (ASME CC 631, 1999) 
was adopted. It consists of defining a new index temperature, RTT0, for the KIc and KIR 
ASME curves (4, 5), as an alternative to RTNDT. The definition of RTT0 is given in equation 
(24). This value of RTT0 is set, see (VanDerSluys et al., 2001), by imposing that the ASME KIc 
curve indexed with RTT0 in place of RTNDT will bound the majority of the actual material 
fracture toughness data. In this sense, RTT0 was set such that the corresponding ASME KIc 
curve falls below the MC 95% confidence bound for at least 95% of the data generated with 
1T specimens. 
 
0 0 19.4 ºTRT T C   (24) 
Evidently, this approach, currently in force, is merely a compromise solution that attempts 
to fit the new concepts into the old structure. Apart from this practical aspect, several other 
open issues remain concerning the application of the MC as well as theoretical aspects. The 
following issues must be emphasised: 
 There is no experimental data that allows the MC to be used in special applications such 
as irradiated materials with high neutron fluence, materials susceptible to intergranular 
fracture or materials showing exceptional lower-shelf or transition behaviour. Indeed, 
the main feature of the MC method consisting of assuming that the dependence of the 
fracture toughness of a material on temperature in the transition range is not sensitive 
to characteristics such as the mechanical properties and the microstructure is purely 
speculative for the cases mentioned above. 
 The published literature shows that the PCCv (Pre Cracked Charpy-V Notched) 
specimen analysed using the ASTM Standard E 1921 (ASTM E 1921, 2009) generally 
shows a reference temperature ~10 °C lower than the CT (compact tension) specimen. 
Compared with the inherent scatter in the transition temperature, this difference is 
small. However, it has been observed in many materials. Although different hypotheses 
were proposed a decade ago in order to explain this fact, the current consensus in the 
scientific community is that this difference is motivated by the different level of 
constraint in single edge notch bend and CT geometries.  
 The above issue is a particular case of the general question of how crack-tip constraint 
effects (stress tri-axiality in the vicinity of the crack tip) can be described. In fracture 
mechanics, it is well known that crack-tip constraint can be influenced by loading (out 
of plane or multi-axial loading) or by the crack shape and crack depth to ligament ratio.  
Nevertheless, to date, there is no agreement about how to manage crack tip constraint 
in the practical application of structures and components containing postulated or real 
cracks and made of ferritic steel.  
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 The MC approach procedure standardised in ASTM E1921 (ASTM E 1921, 2009) is 
defined for quasi-static loading conditions. However, the extension of the MC method 
to dynamic testing is still under discussion although a great effort has been made over 
the last decade to qualify the method for dynamic loading conditions and to use it for 
structural purposes. 
This list of questions currently under discussion reveals that, although the MC methodology 
is increasingly being recognised as an attractive alternative for describing the fracture 
toughness of ferritic steels in the DBT region, further research needs to be done in order to 
properly deal with the open issues mentioned above. 
6. Conclusions 
The purpose of this chapter was to provide the readers with an introductory text, self-
contained insofar as possible, concerning the current state of the art in the process of 
embrittlement that takes place in nuclear vessel steels, paying particular attention to the 
ductile to brittle transition region. It was the purpose of the authors to introduce the topics 
in a logical sequence in an attempt to explain the scientific and historical arguments that 
justify the different methods and tools currently available. A phenomenological and 
scientific description of the causes and consequences of material embrittlement was 
presented. An explanatory description of the characterisation tools that are available for the 
nuclear facilities -implemented in their surveillance programmes- to determine the 
evolution of the fracture toughness of the vessel steel throughout the operative lifetime of 
the plant, emphasising their advantages and limitations, was also included. This leads, in a 
natural way, to the Master Curve methodology, as an alternative procedure for obtaining, in 
the context of Elastic-Plastic Fracture Mechanics, the material fracture toughness; as stressed 
in the text, this procedure offers many advantages and few limitations, which is why it is 
widely used at present in a great number of ambitious scientific research projects. It is the 
opinion of the authors that all of the evidence available points to the fact that the Master 
Curve approach is set to become an indispensable ingredient in the future of surveillance 
programmes. 
7. References 
ASTM E 23–01. Standard Test Methods for Notched Bar Impact Testing of Metallic 
Materials. 
Anderson, T.L. (1995). Fracture Mechanics. Fundamentals and Applications (2nd Ed.), CRC Press, 
ISBN-13: 9780849342608, USA. 
Griffith, A.A. (1920). The Phenomena of Rupture and Flow in Solids, Philosophical 
Transactions, Series A, Vol. 221, pp. 163-198. 
Inglis, C.E. (1913). Stresses in a Plate Due to the Presence of Cracks and Sharp Corners, 
Transactions of the Institute of Naval Architects, Vol. 55, pp. 219-241. 
Irwin, G.R. (1956). Onset of Fast Crack Propagation in High Strength Steel and Aluminium 
Alloys, Sagamore Research Conference Proceedings, Vol. 2, pp. 289-305. 
Irwin, G.R. (1957). Analysis of Stresses and Strains near the End of a Crack Traversing a 
Plate. Journal of Applied Mechanics, Vol. 24, pp. 361-364. 
 
Nuclear Power – Control, Reliability and Human Factors 
 
236 
Westergaard, H.M. (1939). Bearing Pressures and Cracks. Journal of Applied Mechanics, Vol. 6, 
pp. 49-53. 
ASTM E399 - 09e2. Standard Test Method for Linear-Elastic Plane-Strain Fracture Toughness 
KIc of Metallic Materials. 
Wells, A.A. (1961). Unstable Crack Propagation in Metals: Cleavage and Fast Fracture, 
Proceedings of the Crack Propagation Symposium, Vol. I, Paper 84. 
Rice J.R. (1968). A Path Independent Integral and the Approximate Analysis of Strains 
Concentration by Notches and Cracks. Journal of Applied Mechanics, Vol. 35, pp. 379-
386. 
ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code. American Society of Mechanical Engineers, New 
York. 
ASTM E 208 – 95a. Standard Test Method for Conducting Drop-Weight Test to Determine 
Nil-Ductility Transition Temperature of Ferritic Steels. 
Rules and Regulations Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 50.61, Appendix G 
(1986). Fracture Toughness Requirements for Protection Against Pressurized 
Thermal Shock Events, Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 
Regulatory Guide 1.99-Rev 2 (1988). Radiation Embrittlement of Reactor Pressure Vessel 
Materials, U.S. Government Printing Office, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
NRC, Washington D.C.. 
ASTM E 185 – 02. Standard Practice for Design of Surveillance Programs for Light-Water 
Moderated Nuclear Power Reactor Vessels. 
ASTM E 2215 – 02. Standard Practice for Evaluation of Surveillance Capsules from Light-
Water Moderated Nuclear Power Reactor Vessels. 
ASTM E 853 – 01. Standard Practice for Analysis and Interpretation of Light-Water Reactor 
Surveillance Results, E706(IA). 
ASTM E8 / E8M - 09 Standard Test Methods for Tension Testing of Metallic Materials 
ASTM E1820-01. Standard Test Method for Measurement of Fracture Toughness. 
ASTM E1921-09-a. Test Method for the Determination of Reference Temperature T0 for 
Ferritic Steels in the Transition Range. 
ASTM E 900-02. Standard Guide for Predicting Radiation-Induced Transition Temperature 
Shift in Reactor Vessel Materials, E706 (IIF). 
ASTM 1253-99. Standard Guide for Reconstitution of Irradiated Charpy Specimens. 
Eason, E.D., Wright, J.E., Odette, G.R. (1998). Improved Embrittlement Correlations for Reactor 
Pressure Vessel Steels. NUREG/CR-6551, MCS 970501, U.S. Government Printing 
Office, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NRC, Washington D.C.. 
Odette, G.R., Lucas, G.E. (1998). Recent Progress in Understanding Reactor Pressure Vessel 
Embrittlement. Radiation Effects and Defects in Solids, No. 144, pp. 189-231. 
Odette, G.R., Lucas, G.E. (2001). Embrittlement of Nuclear Reactor Pressure Vessels. JOM, Vol. 
53, No. 7, pp. 18-22. 
Stoller, R.E., Odette, G.R., Wirth, B.D. (1997). Primary Damage Formation in BCC Iron. Journal 
of Nuclear Materials, No. 251, pp 49-60. 
Degradation Due to Neutron Embrittlement of Nuclear Vessel Steels:  
A Critical Review about the Current Experimental and Analytical Techniques… 
 
237 
Wirth, B.D., Odette, G.R. (1999). Kinetic Lattice Monte Carlo Simulations of Cascade Aging in 
Dilute Iron-Copper Alloys. Microstructural Processes in Irradiated Materials, MRS 
Symp. Proc. 540, ed. J. Zinkle el al. , pp. 637-642. 
Server, W., English, C., Naiman, D., Rosinski, S. (2001). Charpy Embrittlement 
Correlations-Status of Combined Mechanistic and Statistical Bases for U.S. RPV 
Steels (MRP-45), PWR Materials Reliability Programme (PWRMRP), 1000705, 
EPRI Final Report. 
Yamashita, N., Iwasaki, M., Dozaki, K. (2010). Industry Practice for the Neutron Irradiation 
Embrittlement of Reactor Pressure Vessels in Japan. J. Eng. Gas Turbines Power, Vol. 
132, Issue 10. 
Guthrie, G.L. (1984). Charpy Trend Curves Based on 177 PWR Data Points. LWR Pressure 
Vessel Surveillance Dosimetry Improved Program. NUREG/CR-3391. 
Odette, G.R. et al. (1984). Physically Based Regression Correlations of Embrittlement Data from 
Reactor Pressure Vessel Surveillance Programs. Electric Power Research Institute, NP-
3319. 
Wallin, K. (1984). The scatter in KIC-results. Engineering Fracture Mechanics, Vol. 19, Issue 6, 
pp. 1085-1093. 
Wallin K, Saario T & Törrönen K (1984). Statistical model for carbide induced brittle fracture 
in steel. Metal Sci , Vol. 18, pp. 13–16. 
Wallin K. (1989). A simple theoretical Charpy V–KIc correlation for irradiation 
embrittlement. Innovative approaches to irradiation damage and fracture analysis, PVP 
170. ASME. pp. 93–100. 
Wallin, K. (1995). The size effect in KIC results. Engineering Fracture Mechanics, Vol. 22, Issue 
1,  pp. 149-163. 
Valiente, A. Ruiz J. & Elices, M. (2005). A probabilistic model for the pearlite-induced 
cleavage of a plain carbon structural steel. Engineering Fracture Mechanics, Vol. 72, 
Issue 5, pp. 709-728. 
Merkle J., Wallin K. & McCabe D. (1998). Technical basis for an ASTM Standard on 
determining the reference temperature, T0, for ferritic steels in the transition range. 
Washington, DC: Oak Ridge National Laboratory. NUREG/CR-5504, ORNL/TM-
13631. 
Ferreño, D (2008). Integridad estructural de vasijas nucleares en base a la curva patrón 
obtenida mediante probetas reconstruidas. PhD thesis, University of Cantabria, 
Spain. 
Ferreño D., Scibetta M., Gorrochategui I., Lacalle R., van Walle, E. & Gutiérrez- Solana, F. 
(2009). Engineering Fracture Mechanics, Vol. 76, Issue 16, pp. 2495-2511. 
ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code–Code Case N-629. Use of fracture toughness test 
data to establish reference temperature for pressure retaining materials, Section XI, 
Division 1, 1999. 
ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code–Code Case N-631. Use of fracture toughness test 
data to establish reference temperature for pressure retaining materials other than 
bolting for class 1 vessels, Section III, Division 1, 1999. 
 
 
Nuclear Power – Control, Reliability and Human Factors 
 
238 
VanDerSluys, W.A., Hoffmann, C.L., Yoon, K.K., Server, W.L., Lott, R.G., Rosinski, S., Kirk, 
M.T., Byrne, S., Kim, C.C. (2001). Fracture toughness master curve development: 
Application of master curve fracture toughness methodology for ferritic steels, 
Bulletin 458, Welding Research Council, WRC, New York. 
13 
Corrosion Monitoring of the Steam  
Generators of V-th and VI-th Energy  
Blocks of Nuclear Power Plant “Kozloduy” 
Nikolai Boshkov, Georgi Raichevski, Katja Minkova and Penjo Penev 
Institute of Physical Chemistry, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences 
Nuclear Power Plant “Kozloduy” 
Bulgaria 
1. Introduction 
Corrosion resistance and erosion wear of the metal equipment (body, pipe bundles, steam 
generators etc.) are of great importance for the operating time limit of the nuclear power 
plants (NPP) bearing in mind their extremely heavy technological and water-chemical 
regime (WCR). The horizontally placed steam generators (SGs) used in the Energy Blocks of 
NPP “Kozloduy” work at exploitation conditions leading to corrosion and erosion provoked 
processes (Andreeva M. et. al., 2008).  Similar is the situation in the greater part of the 
modern power plants (R.W. Staehle & J.A. Gorman, 2003; R.W. Staehle & J.A. Gorman, 2004; 
R.W. Staehle & J.A. Gorman, 2004). This fact predetermines the necessity of very careful 
daily and also periodical monitoring concerning the real operating state of the equipment 
during its exploitation time (Sviridenko, I., 2008; Hadavi, S.M.H., 2008; Viehrig, H.-W., et. 
al., 2006; Slugen, V., et. al., 2005). The evaluation and explanation of the obtained results for 
the electrochemical-corrosion parameters will ensure a realistic base for a precise prognosis 
and trouble-free operation of the installations (J. Congleton et all, 1985; Raichevski G. et al.,. 
2007; Hojna A. et. al, 2007; Kaczorowski D. et. al., 2006). 
Markedly dangerous negative influences leading to technical failures and damages have the 
conglomerated corrosion products (CPs) the latter appearing as a result of the WCR mainly 
in the second contour of NPP. Considerable part of them enters the condense-feeding part of 
SGs and deposit as loose layers on the pipe surface or falls as middling slime on the bottom 
changing in such a way the overall electrochemical and hydrodynamic situation in the 
internal volume during the operation procedures. 
In general, CPs presenting in the steam generators consist of iron and copper oxides and 
hydroxides. If their adhesion to the surface is enough strong (for example, like in the case of 
magnetite – Fe3O4) it can be expected that a passive layer will appear on the surface of the 
equipment and in such a way this part of the installation will be additionally protected. If 
CPs are crumbly the operative situation in the SGs will be worsen since these deposits often 
lead to accelerated formation and development of local corrosion phenomena – holes, pits, 
cracks, including appearance of stress corrosion cracking process etc., the latter being one of 
the most dangerous events due to its practical invisibility up to the moment of the sudden 
physical-mechanical destroying (Zubchenko, A.S., et al., 2004; Slugen, V., et al., 2002;  Lunin, 
G.L., et al., 1997; N.D. Budiansky, et al., 2005).  
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The presence of sulphate, copper and especially chloride ions additionally contributes to the 
corrosion damages resulting in local ruptures with different sizes. When CPs have loose 
structure and high porosity the concentration of Cl- ions in their volume increases due to the 
flowing capillary processes. This effect is stronger expressed in the contact places of the 
pipes with the distance grid as well as at the lowest placed rows of the pipe bundles in SGs.   
In general, the aim of the present investigation is to determine and evaluate the role of 
different aggressive components presenting in the technological medium on the corrosion 
behavior of austenitic stainless steel of the type 18Cr10NiTi which material is used to 
produce the pipe bundles in the SGs of the second contour of Energy blocks No. V and No. 
VI of NPP “Kozloduy”. Some of the results obtained by polarization technique are 
compared with the experimental data of low-alloyed steel. 
2. Experimental  
2.1 Samples 
Two different steel sample types with dimensions 1 x 1 cm (working area of 2 cm2) are used: 
- High-alloyed (HAS) austenitic stainless steel 18Cr10NiTi which is applied as a main 
construction material for the pipe bundles in the SGs of NPP “Kozloduy” (composition: 
Cr – 18 wt.%; Ni – 10 wt.%; Ti – about 1 wt.%; balance – Fe). 
- Low-alloyed (LAS) steel 38GN2MFA (composition: Cr, Ni, Mn and Si – about 6 wt.% 
total; balance - Fe) used in general as a construction steel and as a comparative sample. 
2.2 Corrosion medium 
The corrosion tests are carried out in a model corrosion medium (MCM)  consisting of trebly 
distilled demineralised water (specific electric conductivity ≤ 1 μS/cm), hydrazine (25 μg/L) 
and in definite cases selected anions or cations (Cl-, SO42-, Na+, Cu+, Cu2+ - both latter 
presented in the text as Cutotal). The pH value is about 9 aiming the modelling of conditions 
maximal close to the exploitation ones. Special attention is paid to the effectiveness of the 
added compound that inhibits the development of the damaging processes on the surface 
and in the depth – monoethanolamine (MEA) at concentration of 2 mg/L. 
2.3 Sample characterization 
2.3.1 Potentiodynamic (PD) and potentiostatic (PS) polarization curves  
Potentiodynamic (PD) polarization curves (scan rate of 1 mV/s.) are carried out at two 
selected operating temperatures (35 oC and 95 oC, respectively) in a three-electrode 
experimental glass cell using “VersaStat” (AMETEK PAR) device. The cell has a volume of 
300 cm3 and Luggin capillary for minimizing the Ohmic resistance. Platinum plate serves as 
a counter electrode and saturated calomel electrode (SCE) - as a reference electrode.  
The investigations of the local corrosion phenomena are realized in a special constructed test 
electrode the latter allowing simulation of the processes taking place in cracks with different 
widths. This electrode consists of ceramic body, separators (mica lamellas), titanium linings 
etc. giving the opportunity to work also at high temperatures and pressures aiming the 
modelling (approaching) of the real operating conditions in the SGs.  
In order to receive also several results at conditions maximal close to the exploitation ones 
an autoclave system is used for some of the electrochemical and corrosion measurements. 
The autoclave volume is approximately 1,5L and its maximum capacity is to work at 
temperatures of 350 oC and pressures of 150 atm. Aiming better safety the experiments are 
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carried out in the interval of about 220 - 230 oC and pressure of 150 atm. Three-electrode 
electrochemical Teflon cell with working volume of 300 cm3 and Ag/AgCl reference 
electrode assembly is mounted in the autoclave unit. The polarization studies in that case 
are carried out in a potentiostatic way contrary to the anodic and cathodic polarization 
curves realized at the abovementioned temperatures and at atmospheric pressure. 
2.3.2 Scanning electron microscopy  
SEM images and EDX analysis complete the results of the investigation giving more 
information about the surface morphology of the tested samples and of the collected CPs. A 
scanning electron microscope JEOL JSM-5300, Japan (equipped with EDX device) is used for 
registration of the morphology changes on the sample surfaces of HAS after the treatment in 
the medium. This device is used also for quantitative analysis of the element composition in 
selected special places – pits, cracks etc. The results obtained by this method ensure the 
possibility to present more realistic prognosis about the future exploitation of the SGs. 
2.3.3 Moessbauer spectroscopy 
Moessbauer spectroscopy completes phase analysis of the chemical compounds for 
characterization of the type and quantity of the iron compounds presenting on the sample. 
This method is based on the high sensitivity of Fe in relation to the resonance adsorption 
toward the beams of the radiation source applied. In the present investigations the 
absorption variant of the method is used which allows to receive information from the 
whole thickness of the CPs. The separation of the phases is realized with high sensitivity 
accepting that the whole amount of all compounds presenting is 100%. Actually, 
Moessbayer spectra are carried out at room temperature using electromechanical 
spectrometer working at conditions of a constant acceleration with a 57Co/Cr source 
(activity  60 mCi) and -Fe probe as a standard. Experimentally obtained spectrum is 
additionally calculated using a special program based on the method of the least squares. 
The content of iron ions in every component is determined under the conditions of the 
presumption of identical Moessbayer-Lamb factor. 
2.3.4 X-ray photoelectron spectroscopy 
XPS analysis is carried out with ESCALAB MkII (VG Scientific) electron spectrometer  
characterizing with base pressure in the chamber up to 5 x 10-10 mbar (during the test 1 x 10-8 
mbar) with MgK X-ray source (excitation energy h = 1253,6 eV). 
Due to the weak signals for Ni2p and Cr2p as well as the presence of a broadly expressed 
Fe2p line an accelerating energy value of 50 eV and a sighthole with 6 mm width 
(entry/exit) is used. Instrumental resolution measured as full width at a half maximum 
(FWHM) of the photo electron peak of Ag3d5/2 is lower than 1 eV. The binding energy scale 
is corrected to the maximal C1s peak at 285 eV for electrostatic charge. The spectra obtained 
are additionally analyzed using symmetric fitting Gauss-Lorenz curve after eliminating the 
background accordingly to the requirements of the method of Shirley.   
3. Results and discussion 
3.1 Potentiodynamic polarization investigations  
3.1.1 Potentiodynamic investigations of low-alloyed steel (LAS) 
The results for the corrosion behavior of LAS at 35 oC are demonstrated in Figure 1 and are 
used to characterize this steel and as a benchmark for comparison with high-alloyed steel.  
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Fig. 1. PD polarization curves of LAS at 35 oC in:  
1 – MCM; 2 – MCM with addition of 10 μg/L Cl-. 
It can be registered that even at low concentration of the added corrosion activators - Cl- 
ions (10 μg/L), curve 2 - their unfavourable influence is well expressed. As seen from the 
results the corrosion potential value (Ecorr) of the tested steel sample is strongly shifted in 
negative direction in that case with about 170 mV compared to the same parameter in the 
initial MCM (curve 1). Accordingly to this observation and as could be expected, the 
corrosion current density (icorr) and the rate of the active anodic dissolution in the presence 
of chloride ions are about 2-3 times higher leading to accelerated damaging processes 
(greater anodic dissolution) under the conditions of external polarization.  
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Fig. 2. PD polarization curves of LAS at 35 oC in:  
1 – MCM with 300 μg/L Cl-; 2 – MCM with 300 μg/L Cl- and 2 mg/L MEA;  
3 – MCM with 1 mg/L Cl- and 2 mg/L MEA. 
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Fig. 3. PD polarization curves of LAS at 35 oC in:  
1 – MCM;    2 – MCM with 300 μg/L SO42-;  
3 – MCM with 300 μg/L SO42- and 2 mg/L MEA.  
Further increasing of the Cl- ions concentration up to 300 μg/L (Figure 2, curve 1) results in 
another potential shift in the negative direction with about 200 - 230 mV compared to the 
case in MCM without addition of activators (Figure 1, curve 1) and with about 70 mV 
compared to case with the lower Cl- concentration (Figure 1, curve 2). Corrosion current 
density value also increases especially in the potential range between -300 and 0 mV (SCE). 
The addition of MEA even at not very high concentration (that could be applied in the 
practice) plays definitely a positive role – curve 2 – leading to lower corrosion and anodic 
current density values and fixing the further shifting of the corrosion potential. Even at very 
high concentration of corrosion activators (1 mg/L chloride ions – Figure 2, curve 3) the 
presence of the added corrosion inhibitor MEA decrease partially the cathodic (oxygen 
reduction) and also the anodic (metal dissolution) reactions demonstrating lower corrosion 
current - icorr – values and ensuring better protection against corrosion.  
Similar effect of MEA is observed also in the case when sulphate ions are used as corrosion 
activators in the same model medium and at the same experimental conditions (Fig. 3). The 
corrosion potential is shifted with about 220-230 mV in negative direction (curve 2) and icorr 
increases about 4 – 5 times. After the addition of MEA the anodic dissolution rate is slowed 
down (curve 3) which demonstrates the positive influence of this compound. That result 
leads also to the conclusion that the protecting mechanism of MEA is most probably similar 
in aggressive media with different corrosion activators.  
It is very important for the practice to register and estimate the effects also in the case when 
some of the most dangerous corrosion activators (Cl-, SO42- and Cutotal) simultaneously 
present in the medium at their extreme high concentrations.  
The results obtained for LAS treated in this type of model solution are demonstrated in Fig. 
4. It is evident that Ecorr is strongly shifted in negative direction again and the corrosion 
current density values are very high which can be expected at these conditions. Also at these 
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extremely aggressive medium the addition of MEA decreases the icorr and the dissolution in 
the whole anodic region. The reason for this positive result is that the influence of MEA 
simultaneously slow down the cathodic (reduction of depolarizer) and the anodic 
(dissolution of the metal) reaction rates. It can be supposed from these observations that the 
used compound MEA is an inhibitor of a “mixed” type.  
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Fig. 4. PD polarization curves of LAS at 35 oC in:  
1 – MCM with 1 mg/L Cl-, 1 mg/L SO42- and 5 μg/L Cutotal;                                                  
2 – MCM with 1 mg/L Cl-, 1 mg/L SO42-, 5 μg/L Cutotal and 2 mg/L MEA.  
The potentiostatic studies in the autoclave realized in MCM containing chloride ions show a 
slight shift of the corrosion potential in cathodic direction and about 3,5 times increase of the 
corrosion current density value for this steel type.  
3.1.2 Potentiodynamic investigations of high-alloyed steel (HAS) 
The results obtained for HAS which is practically used in the steam generators are 
demonstrated in Figure 5. It can be observed that low Cl- ions concentration in the model 
medium (10 μg/L) – curve 2 - increases significantly (about 4-5 times) the corrosion rate. 
Additionally, well expressed shift of Ecorr in negative direction of about 300 mV can be 
registered. Nevertheless, compared to the case of LAS (see Figures 1 and 3, curves 1) icorr is 
about 5 – 6 times lower at these conditions. The registered differences are attributed to the 
better protective influence of the alloying components presenting in HAS. The addition of 
MEA (curve 3) expresses strong favourable effect leading to the shifting of Ecorr in positive 
direction with about 350 mV while icorr decreases about 4 times compared to the case of 
MCM with addition of Cl-, but without MEA (compare curves 2 and 3).  
Similar is the influence of MEA also in the case when SO42- ions present as activators at 
equal concentrations in the model medium (Figure 6). As can be registered sulphate ions 
extremely increase the corrosion current density but the addition of MEA leads to inhibiting 
of the corrosion and anodic processes.  
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Fig. 5. PD polarization curves of HAS at 35 oC in:  
1 – MCM;     2 – MCM with 10 μg/L Cl-;  
3 – MCM with 10 μg/L Cl- and 2 mg/L MEA. 
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Fig. 6. PD polarization curves of HAS at 35 oC in:  
1 – MCM;    2 – MCM with 300 μg/L SO42-;  
3 – MCM with 300 μg/L SO42- and 2 mg/L MEA. 
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Fig. 7. PD polarization curves of HAS at 35 oC in:  
1 – MCM with 1 mg/L Cl-, 1 mg/L SO42- and 5 μg/L Cutotal;                                                  
2 – MCM with 1 mg/L Cl-, 1 mg/L SO42-, 5 μg/L Cutotal and 2 mg/L MEA.  
In the case, when the combination of the most dangerous activators (Cl-, SO42- and Cutotal) is 
applied in MCM the corrosion activity is also very strong demonstrated - Figure 7. It is 
evident from the figure that the corrosion rate in that case is much greater and the corrosion 
potential is additionally shifted to the negative direction up to the value of about -410 mV. 
Nevertheless, the inhibiting effect of MEA is also very strong (curve 2) - the corrosion 
potential is placed in positive direction, icorr value is more than 10 times lower and the 
anodic dissolution seems to be partially hampered. The latter can be explained with the 
process of the effective inhibitor adsorption exactly on the active anodic zones on the metal 
surface. Finally, it could be prognosticated that MEA will slow down the corrosion 
processes also at exploitation conditions in the case when the three activators 
simultaneously present in their extreme high for the practice concentrations. 
The potentiostatic investigations in the autoclave show more clearly expressed shift of the 
corrosion potential in cathodic direction with about 100 mV and about 4 times increase of 
the corrosion current density value for this steel. Despite of these results the new data 
obtained from this test are much lower compared to the case of LAS.  
3.1.3 Potentiodynamic investigations of HAS in cracks 
As a result of the operating conditions and WCR the equipment in NPP and in particular the 
SGs can be effective damaged by large number of cracks, holes, slits etc. This is a specific 
type of local corrosion and these dangerous places strongly differ in their morphology and 
element content compared to the whole surface of the unit. For example, in the case of 
newly appeared cracks the electrochemical potentials in and outside can be extremely 
different which will lead to appearance of galvanic macro-elements with own electromotive 
force. It is very important to know that local corrosion phenomena can appear not only in 
the already existing constructive slits. During the exploitation new cracks can occur 
especially in the cases where different materials or media are in contact or as a result of 
simultaneous action of electrochemical and mechanical forces.   
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Fig. 8. PD curves of HAS in MCM with 1 mg/L Cl-, 1 mg/L SO42- and 5 μg/L Cutotal: 
1 – in crack 0,5 mm at 35 oС; 3 - in crack 0,1 mm at 35 oС; 
2 - in crack 0,5 mm at 95 oС; 4 - in crack 0,1 mm at 95 oС.  
It such a case it is very important to know the current density value into the crack that can 
be mould out of a specially constructed for this case electrode. It allows simulating the 
corrosion processes in cracks with different preliminary fixed widths. The present 
investigations are realized using two artificially constructed widths (sizes of 0,1 and 0,5 mm 
respectively). For practical purpose the special electrode has being filled in with the 
experimental solutions (with or without addition of corrosion activators) directly before the 
beginning of the test aimed to eliminate possible diffusion limitations.  
The polarization investigations presented here (Fig. 8 and Fig. 9) are carried out in MCM 
containing the extreme high concentrations of the corrosion activators – 1 mg/l Cl-, 1 mg/l 
SO42- and 5 μg/l Cutotal – with and without addition of MEA, respectively. Comparing the 
characteristic parameter Ecorr following can be summarized – Fig. 8: 
- at 35 oС Еcorr for the narrower crack (0,1 mm – curve 3) is strongly replaced in negative 
direction with about 100 mV compared to the wider one (0,5 mm - curve 1) as a result of 
the reasons described above;  
- at 95 oС Еcorr of both samples are relative closer – compare curves 2 and 4. 
The oscillations of the curves are most probably on account of the inhibition of the processes 
of access and taking away the oxygen into the depth of the crack. In the anodic region the 
current density values are higher in the case of the narrower crack which means that the 
processes of dissolution are strongly expressed.  
The addition of MEA in concentration of 2 mg/l shows favourable effect – Еcorr shifts in 
positive direction for all investigated samples (compare Figures 8 and 9). Additionally, the 
observed icorr values are also lower at both temperatures and crack widths – Fig. 9 – which is 
a sign for inhibiting of the corrosion processes. The electrochemical behavior of the steel in 
the narrow cracks and holes characterizes with some peculiarities mainly as a result of the 
transportation difficulties – inhibited access of the corrosive and passivating agents and 
difficult take away of CPs from these places. In neutral medium Fe shows increased rate of 
the anodic process and decreased – of the cathodic one. The lower oxygen concentration in 
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the cracks leads to more negative potentials of iron ionization with predominantly 
formation of bi-valence ions and their compounds the latter in general possessing 
insufficient protective properties.  
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Fig. 9. PD curves of HAS in MCM with 1 mg/L Cl-, 1 mg/L SO42-, 5 μg/L Cutotal and 2 mg/L 
MEA: 
1 – in crack 0,5 mm at 35 oС; 3 - in crack 0,1 mm at 35 oС; 
2 - in crack 0,5 mm at 95 oС; 4 - in crack 0,1 mm at 95 oС.  
The passive state of the metals owed mainly to the presence of oxygen may be affected by 
inhibited access of this component leading to depassivating and accelerating of the anodic 
reaction. Additionally, the cathodic reduction of the depolarizer becomes slowly, Еcorr and PD 
curves shift to negative direction. The reason for this effect is the fact that the electrolyte 
situated in the cracks does not intermix convectively any more and the oxygen transportation 
occurs only by molecular diffusion. The inhibited refreshing of the electrolyte leads to relative 
fast change of the pH value of the medium in these places compared to the surface outside the 
cracks. The composition of the electrolyte in these close volumes also changes during the 
exploitation process and as result oxides, hydroxides etc. accumulate on the surface. Their 
concentration depends in general on the product of solubility value of the CPs. The main 
changes of the corrosion medium in the cracks appear as a result of the macro-element activity 
between these places and the “bare surface”. The metal inside the cracks works as an anode 
and after incubation period during which the current of the galvanic element is very low the 
“inner” electrolyte becomes more acidic that leads to beginning of depassivation process.  
After prolonged exploitation of the equipment the corrosion damages in the cracks become 
extremely dangerous due to the fact that the appearance of the passive state of the steels is 
ensured mainly from the oxygen in the medium. The permanent lack of this element into the 
deep volume of the cracks leads to depassivating of different places and acceleration of local 
corrosion processes. These results confirm that the modelling (although approximately) of 
the exploitation conditions is useful and necessary in order to receive experimental data for 
dangerous corrosion phenomena and their detrimental influence as well as to give the 
opportunity to prognosticate them. 
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3.2 SEM and EDX investigations 
3.2.1 SEM investigations  
Steel samples are initially placed in the special electrode for investigation of the corrosion 
processes in cracks with different widths. Thereafter the same electrode is putted in an 
autoclave and leaved at Еcorr in MCM containing the extreme high concentrations of 
chloride, sulphate and copper ions. One 24 hours-cycle test consists of 4 hours stay at the 
operating conditions (selected temperature and pressure) followed by 20 hours for 
equalizing with the room temperature (slow cooling process). The SEM images of HAS 
samples are presented in Fig. 10(A,B). The results are obtained after preliminary preparation 
of the corrosion treated steel samples – rinsing with distilled water and drying with hot air.  
Figure 10A shows typical corrosion damages of HAS samples placed in the electrode with 
0,5 mm width after 3 cycles of the corrosion treatment described above. It can be registered 
that after the treatment a damaged place appears on the surface. Much hardly attacked 
seems to be the sample simulating the crack with 0,1 mm width – Fig. 10B. The reasons for 
this result are most probably the lower oxygen concentration in the solution. Additional risk 
is the accumulation of loose corrosion products in which mass the activators concentration 
will be greater.  
 
 
          
Fig. 10. SEM images of steel morphology after corrosion treatment of HAS samples: 
A – in simulated crack with 0,5 mm width; B – in simulated crack with 0,1 mm width. 
3.2.2 EDX investigations 
The method gives the opportunity to determine the element composition in selected places 
on the steel surface characterized with different phenomena and processes - local holes, 
cracks etc. appeared after ruptures of the passive film. It is well known that after a definite 
time period the passive film in or over the crack or pitting can be totally destroyed and as a 
result open pits take shape. The average results from the analysis inside selected separate 
pits registered on the surface of the sample placed in the special electrode for investigation 
of the corrosion processes in the cracks and tested in MCM are presented in Table 1.  
The main differences in the composition of the pits registered with and without MEA refer 
to the alloying components – Cr and Ni – both latter demonstrating higher percentages in 
the case with MEA. This is a clear positive effect since higher Ni and Cr amounts inhibit the 
penetration of the corrosion processes into the depth. The higher amount of iron detected 
when MEA present in MCM means that the dissolution of this metal is slowly.  
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Element Content (in wt.%) after treatment in MCMwithout MEA with МЕА
Fe 63,6 66,3
Cr 15,7 18,7
C 9,9 3,8
Ni 8,5 10,0
Si 1,9 0,8
Ti 0,4 0,4
Table 1. EDX analysis in selected pits and influence of MEA 
3.2.3 SEM investigations of CPs 
As already presented above the presence of MEA in the exploitation (or model) medium 
plays a positive role concerning the corrosion processes leading to their inhibiting. This 
compound can influence the appearance and development of the corrosion damages 
especially in places with limited oxygen access. The looseness, adhesion and the average 
size of the CPs particles are also of great importance in that case.  
In the steam generators the corrosion products deposit on the body, pipe bundles, distance 
grids, bottom etc. and have in general sizes between 1 and 10 μm. On some places a compact 
film with good adhesion and low solubility consisting mainly of magnetite (Fe3O4) can 
appear. Additionally, a loose mass of new porous and with bad adhesion layers accumulate 
on it. As a result a strong increase of the local concentrations of Cl-, SO42- and Cutotal ions 
occur which leads to depassivation and appearance of pits on several places. In that sense 
some changes in the WCR leading to CPs with high dispersion are desirable aiming the 
easier removing of the particles from that zones. 
The addition of MEA results in obtaining of CPs with high dispersion having average 
particle sizes less than 1 μm. Positive sign is also the fact that MEA do not lead to changes in 
the element and phase composition of CP. These effects are presented in Fig. 11. 
 
             
Fig. 11. SEM images of corrosion products: 
A – without MEA in the medium;  B – in the presence of 2 mg/l MEA. 
3.3 Moessbauer investigations 
The Moessbauer analysis (Fig. 12) of the surface film of corrosion products collected from 
characteristic places from the inner volume of the SGs during the shut-down procedure 
Corrosion Monitoring of the Steam  
Generators of V-th and VI-th Energy Blocks of Nuclear Power Plant “Kozloduy” 
 
251 
show that the film consists of magnetite - Fe3O4 - and alpha-hematite -  – Fe2O3. As well 
known, these compounds are low soluble and highly resistive oxides, even in aggressive 
corrosion medium. This fact suggests that the corrosion products on the bundle surfaces 
may form a layer with high protective properties the latter impeding the penetration of the 
destructive corrosion processes in the depth of the metal tubes. The obtained average results 
are presented in Table 2. 
 
Components Weight % 
Sxt 1 -  Hematite,  – Fe2O3 
Sxt 2 - Magnetite – tetra,  Fe3O4 
Sxt 3 - Magnetite - octa, Fe3O4 
62 
15 
23 
Table 2. Results from Moessbauer investigations 
The experimental Moessbauer spectra include two types of components: 
- components without super fine magnetic structure – quadruple doublets 
- components with expressed super fine magnetic structure – sextets 
In the present case the models for computer calculating of the Moessbauer spectra include 
only sextets (three sextet components).  The values of the determined parameters of the six-
component lines in the spectra (marked as Sxt 1, Sxt 2 and Sxt 3 in Table 2) can be attributed 
to the presence of iron-oxide phases – –hematite (Sxt 1) and magnetite (Sxt 2 and Sxt 3). 
These two phases characterize with well expressed super fine magnetic structure (sextet 
components).  
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Fig. 12. Moessbauer spectra of CPs taken from SGs (average results) 
The registered parameters for Sxt 1 demonstrate that all iron ions exist in the third oxidized 
state and octahedral surrounding. The appearance of two components of the magnetic 
phase, Sxt 2 and Sxt 3, is due to the existence of Fe in the third oxidized state and in 
tetrahedral surrounding. This is the reason for the presence of Sxt 2 in the spectrum as well 
as to a spectral appearance of iron ions with interstitial oxidized state (Fe2.5+) in octahedral 
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position (its spectral expression is Sxt 3). As well known, magnetite is one of the widely 
distributed mixed valence compound with high frequency electron exchange between the 
ions 3d6Fe2+ ↔ 3d5Fe3+. Magnetite characterizes with cubic symmetry and the results 
demonstrate that it is with low degree of non-stoichiometry - Fe3O4-х, while the vacancies are 
localized most probably in the octahedral places.  
3.4 XPS investigations 
The results described below are related to powder CPs selected from different places in the 
volume of the SGs during the shut-down procedure. The data presented in Table 3 are 
summarized for all test samples.  
 
Element O 1s Fe 2p Cu 2p Cr 2p Ni 2p 
Binding energy, eV 
(main peaks) 
529,9 
531,2 711,1 
932,9 
934,5 576,8 855,2 
Percentage, at.% 76 8 14 1 1 
Table 3. Results from XPS investigations of CPs taken from the inner volume of SGs 
(average results from all investigated samples) 
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Fig. 13. XPS measurements for O1s from the CPs of the SGs (average results) 
The XRD spectra obtained for different registered elements are presented with more 
details in the Figures 13 – 17. In general, these experimental results are in correlation with 
the Moessbauer investigations and also in fair agreement with the conclusions from the 
potentiodynamic polarization curves and SEM images. The presence of Cu is not a desired 
event since it could lead to local corrosion damages being more cathodic compared to 
iron.  
As can be observed the main element with the highest content (in atomic percent) is oxygen 
followed by copper and iron as well as by much smaller amounts of Cr and Ni. In such a 
case it could be expected that the compounds on the surface will be mainly iron, copper or 
iron-copper oxides and hydroxides. The very low amounts of chromium and nickel 
compounds clearly demonstrate that their participation in the occurred corrosion processes 
is weaker expressed.   
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Fig. 14. XPS measurements for Fe2p from the CPs of the SGs (average results)  
 
Element Binding energy E, eV/ (at.%) Possible compounds 
O 1s 
530,1  / (56,3)
531,6  /  (37,0) 
533,2  /  (6,7)
Fe2O3; FeO; CuO 
FeOOH; Cu(OH)2 
H2O
Cu 2p 932,8  / (57,0)934,4  / (43,0)
Cu2O; Cu.
CuO; Cu(OH)2; CuCr2O4 
Table 4. Results after mathematical deconvolution of XPS investigations of CPs  
However, the iron content is not very high which means that the used construction is to a 
definite degree protected at these conditions. The alloying elements nickel and chromium 
which are also registered during the investigations show practically their positive influence 
for the increased corrosion resistance of the used alloy.  
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Fig. 15. XPS measurements for Cu2p from the CPs of the SGs (average results) 
Aimed to receive clear results the XPS spectra obtained are additionally mathematically 
calculated using a special software aimed to determine also another peaks of possible 
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compounds that present in the sample but are not enough visible. This additional 
mathematical treatment known as “deconvolution process” gives more adequate 
information about the real situation in the samples. The results obtained are presented in 
Table 4 for two of the main elements – O1s and Cu2p. 
The experimental data for the binding energy values of the main component presenting in 
the samples - oxygen – support the expectation that predominantly iron and copper oxides 
and hydroxides as well as water amounts appear - see Tables 3 and 4.   
It follows from these data that the most possible iron compounds seems to be the oxides of 
Fe2+ and Fe3+ ions both latter presenting also in the composition of magnetite. This is a very 
important result as far as being in good correlation with the Moessbauer spectroscopy. 
Additionally, FeOOH has been detected but its amount seems to be lower compared to the 
quantities of bi- and trivalent iron oxides. The Cu spectrum demonstrates that this element 
has been detected mainly as pure metal and in its first oxidized state – in the form of Cu2O 
and Cu. Their concentrations are comparable with the amounts of bivalent copper 
compounds – CuO, Cu(OH)2 and most probably CuCr2O4. 
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Fig. 16. XPS measurements for Cr2p from the CPs of the SGs (average results) 
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Fig. 17. XPS measurements for Ni2p from the CPs of the SGs (average results) 
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As already discussed above the other two elements (Ni and Cr) detected by XPS method are in 
much smaller amounts – about 1 at%. Nickel is in the form of Ni2+ ions, most probably as 
oxides and hydroxides - NiO/Ni(OH)2. Chromium is registered in its third and sixth valencies 
(Cr2O3 and CrO3) in a correlation between them of about 7:1. As can be registered these results 
differ to a certain degree with the results in Table 3 due to the mathematical treatment but 
from other side they confirm the general tendency of appearance of iron and copper 
hydroxides and other compounds. Main positive conclusion is that they are in agreement with 
the other used methods. 
4. Conclusion 
At model conditions and water chemistry regime applied, the corrosion current for 
austenitic stainless steel 18Cr10NiTi used in the construction is much lower compared to the 
low-alloyed steel. The investigations carried out at two operating temperatures and also at 
conditions close to the exploitation ones demonstrate the influence of selected corrosion 
activators on the most dangerous cases in the exploitation practice.  
Having in mind the obtained results it can be concluded that the application of 
monoethanolamine significantly decrease the corrosion current density and leads to better 
corrosion resistance of the used steel. This compound also leads to appearing of middling 
slime with higher dispersion that can be easily removed from these places. 
The corrosion processes occurring in the narrower cracks are more intensive compared to 
the processes in the wider cracks especially at higher temperatures and lead to faster 
destroying of the equipment at operating conditions. The application of MEA which is a 
“mixed” type inhibitor decrease partially the cathodic (oxygen reduction) and also the 
anodic (metal dissolution) reactions ensuring lower corrosion current density values and 
better protection against corrosion. 
The presence of the protective layer of corrosion products of iron on the surface of the 
equipment is confirmed using Moessbauer spectroscopy and XPS investigations which are 
in fair agreement with the results obtained by the electrochemical polarization technique, 
SEM and EDX analysis. Taking into account that at real operation conditions in NPP 
“Kozloduy” and prolonged exploitation of the steam generators a film composed mainly of 
magnetite and hematite is readily formed on the pipe surfaces, it can be expected that the 
actual corrosion rate should be much lower.  
Very important factor which influence the corrosion damages is the iron and copper 
concentration in the water of condense-feeding part of the SGs. This also affects their content 
in the corrosion products. Better exploitation conditions will be realized by periodical 
removing of the deposited corrosion products on the pipe bundles and on the other places 
in the steam generators where they appear.   
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1. Introduction
This study originated from a speciﬁc problem that arose in conjunction with the IRIS
(International Reactor Innovative and Secure) project (Carelli et al., 2004; Carelli, 2009). IRIS
adopts an integrated primary system reactor (IPSR) conﬁguration with all the primary loop
components of a classical Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) contained inside the vessel (Fig.
1). Among the reactor core internals are the steam generator (SG) units (Cinotti et al., 2002)
with the primary ﬂuid ﬂowing outside the tube bundles and subjecting them to signiﬁcant
external pressure. In this situation buckling affects the tube collapse modality and codes
become extremely conservative, to the point that up to ﬁve years ago design procedures
based on the ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel code (Section III) required an external diameter
to thickness ratio (D/t) less than 8.5, leading to an increased thermal resistance in the heat
exchange process between primary and secondary ﬂuids, with detrimental consequences on
the dimensioning of the heat transfer surface. A reduction in the tube thickness would allow
the reduction of the overall heat transfer surface needed to exchange the same amount of
power, with consequent saving on tube lengths and/or number of tubes. On the other hand,
if the design of the steam generator units is not modiﬁed, an increase in the exchanged thermal
power and a consequent up rating of the reactor can be obtained.
Besides IRIS, other recent proposals for next generation power plants based on PWR
technology consider an IPSR design (Ingersoll, 2009; Karahan, 2010; Ninokata, 2006).
Such integrated design is particularly suitable for small sized units, i.e., reactors with a
power less than 300 MWe following the IAEA’s deﬁnition (IAEA, 2007). A signiﬁcant
number of small sized PWR IPSRs is currently under development (e.g., RITM-200,
ABV, CAREM, SMART, MRX, NHR-200, Westinghouse SMR, mPower, NuScale, see
http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf33.html). Packing all the PWR primary components
into the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) (Fig. 2) offers several advantages (Ingersoll, 2009): (i) all
large coolant pipes are eliminated (only small feed water and steam outlet pipes penetrate the
vessel wall); (ii) the total inventory of primary coolant is much larger than for an external
loop PWR (this feature increases the heat capacity and thermal inertia of the system and
hence yields a much slower response to core heat-up transients); (iii) typically the heat
exchangers are placed above the core creating a relatively tall system that facilitates more
effective natural circulation of the primary coolant in the case of a coolant pump failure; (iv)
the vessel accommodates a relatively large pressurizer volume that provides better control
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Fig. 1. IRIS reactor pressure vessel module (Reproduced from (Luzzi & Di Marcello, 2011))
of under/overpressure transients; and (v) the extended riser area provides the possibility for
internal placement of the control rod drive mechanisms, thus avoiding the potentially serious
accident scenario represented by the rod ejection.
All these solutions entail the presence of tubes or pipes pressurized from outside and, as for
IRIS, their sizing has to face the severity of the code. It was felt that ASME code requirements
were exceedingly conservative and both numerical (Corradi et al., 2009) and experimental
(Lo Frano & Forasassi, 2009) investigations were performed to assess the collapse pressure
of the tubes. The ﬁrst results obtained within this framework contributed to the approval
of Section III Code Case N-759 (ASME, 2007), which permits considerable thickness saving.
From a regulation point of view the problem of excessive thickness was overcome, but the
question of the collapse behavior of tubes in this thickness range remains open. These tubes
are thicker not only than the very thin shells typical of aerospace applications, but also than the
moderately thin tubes employed in oil industry as pipes or casings. On the other hand, they
are not as thick as those that are encountered in high pressure technology and their behavior
has been the object of a limited amount of study so far.
Very thin shells fail because of elastic buckling and very thick tubes because of plastic collapse,
so that their ultimate pressures can be established on theoretical ground, by exploiting well
established results (Budiansky, 1974; Mendelson, 1968). In the intermediate range, on the
contrary, plasticity and buckling interact and, in principle, the strength of the tube can
only be assessed numerically. Attempts at reproducing numerical results with empirical
design formulas were also made at the end of the last century (e.g., (Haagsma & Schaap,
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(a) (b)
Fig. 2. Integrated primary system reactors of small size. (a) Westinghouse SMR-200 MWe
(Small Modular Reactor); (b) SMART-90 MWe (System Integrated Modular Advanced
Reactor). Reproduced from http://www.westinghousenuclear.com/smr/fact_sheet.pdf and
from (Ninokata, 2006), respectively
1981; Tamano et al., 1985; Yeh & Kyriakides, 1988)): such results are adequate in the range
of interest for oil industry, but become questionable for the thicker tubes required by the
nuclear applications mentioned above. In this range, collapse is dominated by yielding, but
interaction with buckling is still signiﬁcant and reduces the pressure bearing capacity by an
amount that cannot be disregardedwhen safety is of primary concern.
The problem is similar to that of beam columns of intermediate slenderness, which also
fail because of interaction between yielding and buckling and that have been studied in
detail. A simple predictive formula was proposed in this context, which turns out to be
reasonably accurate for any slenderness and several code recommendations are based on it
(e.g., (EUROCODE 3, 1993)). An attempt at adapting such formula to the case of tubes was
made in (Corradi et al., 2008), but a direct modiﬁcation was successful only in the medium
thin tube range, where the formula appears as a feasible alternative to other proposals. With
increasing thickness the formula becomes conservative and only provides a, often coarse,
lower bound to the collapse pressure. A correction was proposed which, however, is to a
large extent empirical and based on ﬁtting of numerical results.
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In this study a different proposal is advanced, which is felt to better embody the physical
nature of the phenomenological behavior. Comparison shows that tubes behave essentially
as columns for D/t ≥ 25 − 30, but differences make their appearance and grow up to
signiﬁcant values as this ratio diminishes. One reason is of geometric nature: the curvature
of the tube wall increases with diminishing D/t ratio and the analogy with a straight column
no longer applies. Another source of discrepancy is the stress redistribution capability that
thick tubes, in contrast to columns, possess and can exploit with signiﬁcant beneﬁt. This
aspect is not purely geometric: stress redistribution capability is still function of thickness,
but the possibility of exploiting it is inﬂuenced by material properties as well. By properly
interpreting these aspects, a formula is obtained that appears reasonably simple and accurate.
In addition, it is felt that it provides a deeper understanding on the collapse behavior of
cylindrical shells in a thickness range so far overlooked.
A comment on terminology is in order. Labels like “thick” or “thin” when applied to tubes
are to some extent ambiguous, since they are used in a different sense in different contexts. A
pipeline in deep sea water would be considered as a thick tube by an aerospace engineer and
as thin one by high pressure technology people. Often, the term “thin tube” is used when thin
shell assumptions, which consider stresses to be constant over the thickness, apply, but this
deﬁnition also becomes questionable outside the elastic range. In this study, reference is made
to the failuremodality. A tube is called thin if it fails because of elastic buckling and thick when
only plastic collapse is relevant. In the intermediate region the two failure modalities interact,
with different weight for different slenderness. In moderately thin (or medium thin) tubes,
buckling is the critical phenomenon even if plasticity plays some role; similarly, in moderately
thick tubes failure is dominated by yielding, but interaction with buckling has non negligible
effects. The separation line is not very sharp (in oil industry applications, for instance, the
two phenomena have comparable weight), but the tubes of prominent interest in this study
deﬁnitively belong to the moderately thick range.
2. Collapse of cylindrical shells pressurized from outside
2.1 Basic theoretical results
Consider a cylindrical shell of nominal circular shape, with outer diameter D and wall
thickness t, subjected to an external pressure q. The shell is long enough for end effects to
be disregarded. The material is isotropic, elastic-perfectly plastic and governed by von Mises’
criterion. E and ν are its elastic constants (Young modulus and Poisson ratio, respectively)
and σ0 denotes the tensile yield strength.
In the theoretical situation of a perfect tube, the limit pressure is given by the smallest among
the following values
Elastic buckling pressure qE = 2
E
1− ν2
1
D
t
(
D
t − 1
)2 (1a)
Plastic limit pressure q0 = 2σ0
t
D
(
1+
1
2
t
D
)
(1b)
The ﬁrst expression is well known (Timoshenko & Gere, 1961), while equation (1b) was
established in (Corradi et al., 2005) and is a very good approximation to the exact value for
D/t > 6.
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Equations (1) apply to possibly thick tubes, which demand that stress variation over the
thickness be considered. Nevertheless, the average value S of the hoop stress σϑ is a
meaningful piece of information. Its value is dictated by equilibrium only and reads
S =
1
2
q
D
t
(2)
For thick cylinders, peak stresses may exceed signiﬁcantly the value (2), which is simply an
alternative, often convenient, way to refer to pressure. In particular, the theoretical limits (1)
may be replaced by the expressions
SE =
E
1− ν2
1(
D
t − 1
)2 S0 = σ0
(
1+
1
2
t
D
)
(3)
which are obtained by substituting in equation (2) either of the values (1) for q.
As the thickness decreases, local values approach their average and equation (2) becomes
meaningful as a stress intensity measure for sufﬁciently thin tubes, which are usually studied
by assuming σϑ ≈ S. Also, the difference between the outer face of the tube, where the
pressure acts, and the middle surface, where the resultant of hoop stresses is applied, is
ignored. Within this framework, equations (1) become
Elastic buckling pressure pE = 2
E
1− ν2
(
t
D
)3
(4a)
Plastic limit pressure p0 = 2σ0
t
D
(4b)
or, in terms of average hoop stress
FE =
E
1− ν2
(
t
D
)2
F0 = σ0 (5)
Here (and in the sequel) p is used instead of q and F instead of S when computations are based
on thin shell assumptions.
In the theoretical situation, the two critical phenomena of elastic buckling and plastic collapse
are independent from each other. The quantity
Λ =
√
q0
qE
=
√
1
κ
(
D2
t2
− 3
2
D
t
+
1
2
t
D
)
(6)
or, if thin shell approximation is adopted
Λ =
√
p0
pE
=
1√
κ
D
t
(7)
is known as slenderness ratio. The parameter
κ =
1
1− ν2
E
σ0
(8)
is a dimensionless material property. Λ = 1 is the transition value, separating the range of
comparatively thin tubes (Λ > 1, qE < q0), theoretically failing because of elastic buckling,
from that of comparatively thick ones (Λ < 1, q0 < qE), when the critical situation is plastic
collapse. Fig. 3 depicts schematically the two failure modalities.
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q q
elastic buckling mode plastic collapse mechanism
Fig. 3. Failure modalities for a long tube
2.2 Effects of imperfections
The situation above is “theoretical” in that it refers to the ideal case of a perfect tube. A real tube
is unavoidably affected by imperfections, which introduce an interaction between plasticity
and instability. As a consequence, the ultimate pressure is lower than the theoretical value.
Fig. 4 depicts some aspects of the solution of a tube with an initial out of roundness (ovality):
the pressure-displacement curve grows up to a maximum value, corresponding to failure, and
then decreases; at the maximum, the tube is only partially yielded, i.e., plastic zones (in color)
nowhere spread across the entire tube thickness (Fig. 4a). The “four hinge” mechanism is
is attained in the post-collapse portion of the curve only (Fig. 4b). Failure occurs because
of buckling of the partially yielded tube: even if not forming a mechanism, plastic zones reduce
the tube stiffness and make the buckling load diminish. Failure corresponds to the elastic
buckling of a tube of variable thickness, consisting of the current elastic portion.
(a) (b)
Fig. 4. Response of an initially oval tube. (a) plastic zones at failure; (b) four hinge
mechanism in the post-collapse phase
To compute the failure pressure, complete elastic-plastic, large displacement analyses up to
collapse are required, explicitly accounting for different kinds of possible imperfections. A
systematic study was undertaken at the Politecnico di Milano and results are summarized in
(Corradi et al., 2009; Luzzi & Di Marcello, 2011). Imperfections of both geometrical (initial out
of roundness, non uniform thickness) andmechanical (initial stresses) nature were considered.
As in a sense expected, it was found that all of them have similar consequences, causing a
signiﬁcant decay of the failure pressure with respect to the theoretical one for slenderness
ratios close the transition value, with interaction effects diminishing as Λ departs from one
in either direction. In any case, some decay was experienced in the entire range 0.2 ≤ Λ ≤
5, covering all situations of practical interest, except possibly high pressure technology or
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aerospace engineering. The slenderness ratio of tubes for the aforesaid nuclear applications
is low, but not enough to disregard the effects of interaction with instability: the IRIS steam
generator tubes bundles, if sized according to Code Case N-759, correspond to Λ ≈ 0.4.
When the study was started, Code Case N-759 was not available and ASME Section III rules
required an external diameter to thickness ratio D/t = 8.27 (Λ ≈ 0.25). Such a design is
surprisingly severe and it was felt that the code assumed an a-priori conservative attitude for
tubes belonging to a range scarcely studied both from the numerical and the experimental
points of view, reﬂecting a substantial lack of knowledge on the phenomena involved. The
numerical campaign was intended as a ﬁrst step toward the deﬁnition of a suitable failure
pressure, a reliable reference value permitting the derivation of an allowable working pressure
through the use of a proper safety factor (Corradi et al., 2008). Computations had to include
imperfections (one drawback of ASME III rules was that imperfections were not explicitly
considered) but, since the effects of all of them were found to be similar, only the most
signiﬁcant was considered. This was identiﬁed with an initial out of roundness, or ovality,
deﬁned by the dimensionless parameter
W =
Dmax − Dmin
D
(9)
where Dmax and Dmin are themaximum andminimumdiameters of the ellipsis portraying the
external surface of the tube (see Fig. 8a in the subsequent section) and D is their average value
(nominal external diameter). To the failure pressure qC computed in this way (a reasonable
choice for the reference value) a safety factor is applied so as to reproduce ASME Section III
sizing for medium thin tubes, a well known and well explored range, in which the code can
be assumed to consider the proper safety margin (see (Corradi et al., 2008) for details). If the
same factor is applied to thicker tubes as well, signiﬁcant thickness saving is achieved without
jeopardizing safety.
The requirement that the reference pressure be computed numerically makes the procedure
cumbersome and an attempt at reproducing numerical results with an empirical formula was
made (Corradi et al., 2008). The formula is adequate for practical purposes, but the approach
is not completely satisfactory for a number of reasons: (i) the formula is involved and a
simpler expression is desirable; (ii) its empirical nature does not help the understanding of
the mechanical aspects of the tube behavior, and (iii) the formula is not equally accurate for all
materials. Its coefﬁcients were determined by considering the material envisaged for the IRIS
SG tube bundles, i.e. Nickel-Chromium-Iron alloy N06690 (INCONEL 690) and the formula is
fairly precise for 700 ≤ κ ≤ 1100, where κ is deﬁned by equation (8). Somematerials, however,
either because of high tensile yield strength σ0 or low Young modulus E, have values of κ
signiﬁcantly below the lower limit; in these instances, the formula entails errors up to 10%,
even if always on the safe side. Table 1 lists some of the materials investigated, with the
properties employed in (Corradi et al., 2008) for computations and that will be used in this
study as well. Trouble was experienced with aluminum and titanium alloys.
3. Interaction domains
3.1 Preliminary: load bearing capacity of struts
The proposal advanced in this study originates from the approach used to evaluate the
collapse load of compressed columns, which is brieﬂy outlined to introduce the procedure.
Consider the strut in compression illustrated in ﬁgure 5a. Its center line has an initially
sinusoidal shape of amplitude U. The critical section, obviously, is the central one, where
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material E (GPa) σ0 (MPa) ν κ
(
D
t
)
Λ=0.2
stainless steel UNS S31600 200 200 0.31 1106 7.44
nickel-chromium-iron alloy N06690 183 240 0.29 832 6.56
aluminum alloy UNS A96061 70 240 0.35 332 4.46
titanium alloy UNS R56400 110 830 0.34 150 3.28
Table 1. Material properties for the considered materials
P U
M
1
2
M0
Me
N
N0=Ne
(a) (b)
l
Fig. 5. Compressed column with initial imperfection
the axial force is N = P (compression positive) and the bending moment M is expressed as
M = PU
1
1− PPE
(10)
where PE is the Euler buckling load (PE = π2EI/l2) and 1/ (1− P/PE) the magniﬁcation factor.
Equation (10) is exact in the elastic range since the initial imperfection has the same shape as
the buckling mode (Timoshenko & Gere, 1961).
The behavior of the cross section is subsumed by the interaction diagrams in ﬁgure 5b. Line 1 is
the elastic limit and for N − M values on it one ﬁber is about to yield; line 2 is the limit curve,
bounding the domain of N − M combinations that can be borne. The gray zone is the elastic
plastic region, corresponding to partially yielded sections. Ne and Me are the values that
individually bring the section at the onset of yielding, N0 and M0 the corresponding values
exhausting the sectional bearing capacity. Obviously, it is Ne = N0, since in pure compression
stresses are uniform. The elastic limit is given by
N
Ne
+
M
Me
= 1 (11a)
while the equation of the limit curve depends on the sectional shape. For rectangular cross
sections one has
(
N
N0
)2
+
M
M0
= 1 (11b)
with M0 = 32 Me.
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By substituting equation (10) for M into (11a), a quadratic equation for P is obtained, which
is easily solved to give the load Pel exhausting the elastic resources of the strut and bounding
from below its load bearing capacity PC. The same procedure applied with (11b) replacing
(11a) provides an upper bound to PC. In fact, at collapse some ﬁbers of the central section
are still elastic (Fig. 6) and the corresponding N − M point is inside the limit domain. Some
collapse situations are indicated by dots in ﬁgure 5b (the representation is qualitative, the
location of the points being inﬂuenced to some extent by the strut slenderness). Observe
also that the expression (10) for the maximum bending moment looses its validity outside the
elastic range.
Fig. 6. Typical column at collapse: plastic strains develop in the red zone
A reasonable approximation to the collapse load is obtained by assuming that the N − M
points at collapse are located on the straight line
N
N0
+
M
M0
= 1 (12)
(dashed in ﬁgure 5b) and that the elastic relation (10) holds up to this point. One obtains
PC =
1
2
⎛
⎝N0 + PE
(
1+U
N0
M0
)
−
√(
N0 + PE
(
1+U
N0
M0
))2
− 4N0PE
⎞
⎠ (13)
For rectangular (b× h) cross sections it is N0 = σ0bh, M0 = 14σ0bh2 and the column slenderness
can be written as λ = 2
√
3 lh . By considering the slenderness ratio
Λ =
√
N0
PE
=
λ
λ0
(14)
where
λ0 = π
√
E
σ0
(15)
is the transition slenderness (a material property) and by introducing the dimensionless
imperfection measure
W =
U
l
(16)
one can write equation (13) in the form
PC =
1
2
(
N0 + PE (1+ Z)−
√
(N0 + PE (1+ Z))
2 − 4N0PE
)
(17a)
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with
Z = U
N0
M0
=
2√
3
λ0ΛW (17b)
Equation (17) is a good approximation to the numerically computed failure load of
compressed columns, as depicted in Fig. 7 where results for two materials with strongly
different properties and a few initial imperfection magnitudes are compared. Several codes,
including EUROCODE 3, base their recommendations on it (Dowling, 1990).
(a) INCONEL 690 (λ0 = 86.8) (b) Titanium alloy (λ0 = 36.2)
Fig. 7. Formula (17) vs computed results (dots). Λ deﬁned by equation (14)
3.2 Interaction domain for an oval tube
Consider now a cylindrical shell with an initial imperfection controlled by W, equation (9), as
illustrated in ﬁgure 8. Because of W, the external pressure q will cause, besides compressive
hoop stresses, a bending moment with peak values given by the relation
M = MI
1
1− qqE
(18a)
where
MI =
1
8
qD2W (18b)
is the value predicted within the small displacements framework (geometric linearity) and qE
is the Euler buckling pressure (1a). The expression (18) for M is exact in the elastic range if the
initial imperfection has the same shape as the buckling mode (Timoshenko & Gere, 1961).
As for beam columns, the behavior of the tube wall can be interpreted on the basis of suitable
interaction domains, with the external pressure q playing the role of the compression force and
equation (18) replacing (10) to express the peak value of the bending moment. The domains
are sketched in ﬁgure 8b: as in the equivalent picture for the strut, line 1 bounds the elastic
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Fig. 8. Interaction domain for the tube cross section
region and line 2 is the limit curve. Reference values are assumed as follows (Corradi et al.,
2008)
qe = 2σ0
t
D
(
1− t
D
)
q0 = 2σ0
t
D
(
1+
1
2
t
D
)
(19a)
Me =
σ0√
1− ν+ ν2
1
4
(
b2 − a2)2 − a2b2 (ln ba)2
2b2 ln ba − (b2 − a2)
M0 ≈ σ0t
2
2
√
3
(19b)
where qe, Me and q0, M0 are the pressure and moment values that individually bring the tube
at the onset of yielding and exhaust its load bearing capacity. b = D/2 and a = b− t are the
external and internal nominal radii, respectively.
The values above refer to materials governed by von Mises’ criterion. Elastic stresses are
computed from the well known plane solutions for a round cylinder under external pressure
and for a curved beam subject to constant bending moments (Timoshenko & Goodier, 1951)
and the values of qe, Me are obtained on this basis. q0 is given by equation (1b), rewritten
for completeness; the value (19b)2 of M0 actually refers to a straight beam and, for tubes thick
enough to demand that curvature be considered, entails an error not completely negligible but
acceptable: bending moments being caused by imperfections, only the portion of the domains
close to the q axis is of interest.
The interaction domains for the tube and the strut of rectangular cross section exhibit some
differences that become signiﬁcant with increasing tube thickness. First of all, while the ratio
M0/Me maintains more or less the value of 1.5, q0 exceeds qe by an amount that must be
considered for D/t < 25. Moreover, in thick tubes the hoop stresses due to pressure are not
uniform, which provides additional stress redistribution capabilities, so that the limit curve is
expected to be external to that of the equivalent strut (the situation is sketched in ﬁgure 8b,
where curve 3 (thinner) portrays the parabola (11b) with q replacing N). As a consequence,
the region of partially yielded tubes (in gray), which contains the collapse situations, widens
considerably, augmenting the uncertainties in estimating the failure pressure.
Nevertheless, the extension to tubes of the beam-column procedure is spontaneous and an
attempt in this sense is made by introducing equation (18) for M in the linear expression
q
q0
+
M
M0
= 1 (20)
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corresponding to the dashed segment in Fig. 8b. As for columns, a second order equation is
obtained; its smallest root reads
qC =
1
2
[
q0 + qE (1+ Z)−
√
(q0 + qE (1+ Z))
2 − 4q0qE
]
(21a)
with
Z =
√
3
2
(
D
t
+
1
2
)
W (21b)
The analogy with equation (17a) is immediately apparent.
(a) INCONEL 690 (κ = 832) (b) Titanium alloy (κ = 150)
Fig. 9. Formula (21) vs computed results (dots). Λ deﬁned by equation (6)
The results provided by equation (21) are plotted in Fig. 9 (solid lines). Dots refer to the
results computed in (Corradi et al., 2009), where indication on the assumptions made, the
ﬁnite element model used and the solution procedure adopted can be found. For graphical
purposes, the ultimate pressure is expressed in terms of the average hoop stress equation (2).
Agreement is good for Λ > 1 but, as the thickness increases, lower bounds rather than good
approximations are obtained. It can be concluded that thin or moderately thin tubes behave
essentially as straight columns of rectangular cross section, but some fundamental aspects of
the structural response change drastically as the thickness increases beyond a certain limit.
A ﬁrst reason for this change is of purely geometric nature, i.e. it depends on the value of D/t
only. For comparatively large values the tube wall behaves essentially as a straight column,
but curvature increaseswith diminishing D/t and differences becomemore andmore evident.
Secondly, thick tubes exhibit stress redistribution capabilities that columns do not have and
this provides additional resources in terms of overall strength. It must be observed that stress
redistribution capability depends on D/t only, but the possibility of actually exploiting it is
conditioned by tube slenderness Λ which, as equation (6) shows, depends on both D/t and
the material properties subsumed by the dimensionless parameter κ, equation (8).
Fig. 9 indicates that the second effect is dominant. Because of the strong difference in κ, Λ = 1
corresponds to D/t ≈ 30 for INCONEL 690 and to D/t ≈ 13 for titanium alloy. The two
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pictures do show some differences, but not as strong as the discrepancy between the two D/t
values would suggest: computed results for titanium depart from formula predictions for a
slightly greater Λ than for INCONEL, but the overall response seems to depend more on Λ as
a whole than on D/t only.
In any case, equation (21a) provides conservative estimates for the failure pressure of thick
tubes. In (Corradi et al., 2008) this result was considered effectively as a lower bound and
a corresponding upper bound, consisting in the plastic collapse load of the ovalized tube
computed by neglecting geometry changes, was associated to it. The two bounds were
combined by introducing a suitable weighting factor, determined by ﬁtting a number of
computed results for tubes of different materials (including those listed in Table 1). As it
was already mentioned, the procedure produced acceptable results, but it is felt that it could
be both simpliﬁed and improved.
4. The proposed procedure
Both equations (17) for columns and (21) for cylindrical shells predict that the failure
pressure coincides with the theoretical limit when the relevant parameter Z vanishes. This
obviously occurs for any slenderness ratio when no imperfections are present (W = 0) but,
independently of the presence of imperfections, both structures are expected to become stocky
enough to make negligible interaction with buckling. In other words, it should be Z = 0 for
any W when slenderness attains a sufﬁciently low value.
Equation (17b) in fact implies Z → 0 for Λ → 0, so that one obtains PC = N0 for inﬁnitely
stocky columns, independently of the imperfection amplitude. However, to give Z = 0 for
W = 0, equation (21b) requires Dt = − 12 , a value with no physical meaning. This is another
reason for the increasingly conservative nature of the approximation as Λ diminishes.
The remarks above suggest that the approximation can be improved by operating on the
expression (21b) of Z so to make it vanish for sufﬁciently small D/t. A minimal choice
is D/t = 2, the lowest possible value, which however turns out to be still too restrictive.
Moreover, the discussion in the preceding section shows that, to obtain an approximation
reasonably accurate for all materials, slenderness ratio Λ is preferable to D/t as a measure of
the limit stockiness. On the basis of the numerical results in (Corradi et al., 2009), this can be
reasonably identiﬁedwithΛ = 0.2 and the corresponding values of D/t for differentmaterials
can be obtained by numerically solving equation (6). For the materials considered in Table 1,
the resulting values, labeled as (D/t)Λ=0.2, are listed in the last column.
The correction consists in replacing the term (D/t + 1/2) with (D/t − (D/t)Λ=0.2) in
equation (21b). This improves the approximation for Λ < 1, but shifts the curves upward
everywhere by an amount of some signiﬁcance, even if not dramatic and diminishing with
increasing Λ. For compensation, the imperfection amplitude is artiﬁcially increased by
multiplying W by a factor that, empirically, was identiﬁed with 1.2. Thus, the expression
for Z becomes
Z =
√
3
2
(
D
t
−
(
D
t
)
Λ=0.2
)
1.2W (22)
If equation (21b) is replaced by the expression above, equation (21a) produces the results
depicted in Fig. 10 for the four materials listed in Table 1, covering a range of values of κ that
can be regarded as exhaustive. Plots depart from the value of Λ corresponding to D/t = 5,
which is different for different materials. Formula predictions show a very good agreement
throughout with numerical results (dots). For materials with low values of κ (aluminum and
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(a) Stainless steel (κ = 1106) (b) INCONEL 690 (κ = 832)
(c) Aluminum alloy (κ = 332) (d) Titanium alloy (κ = 150)
Fig. 10. Proposed formula vs computed results. Λ deﬁned by equation (6)
titanium alloys) they remain a little conservative for stocky tubes, but improvement with
respect to the unbridged formula is signiﬁcant.
5. Shortcomings of thin shell approximation
In the formula above the theoretical limit values are deﬁned by equations (1) and, as a
consequence, the slenderness ratio by equation (6). Use of these expressions is mandatory in
a context that includes thick and moderately thick tubes, in that they incorporate the effects of
stress redistribution over the wall thickness, which were seen to be signiﬁcant and which the
“thin shell” equations (4), (7) ignore. Nevertheless, the latter expressions often are preferred
and the implications of their use are worth exploring.
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(a) Stainless steel (κ = 1106) (b) INCONEL 690 (κ = 832)
(c) Aluminum alloy (κ = 332) (d) Titanium alloy (κ = 150)
Fig. 11. Results obtained with thin shell approximation. Λ deﬁned by equation (7)
Formally, modiﬁcations are straightforward. It sufﬁces to replace in equation (21a) q0 and qE
with p0 and pE, as deﬁned by equations (4). One obtains
pC =
1
2
[
p0 + pE (1+ Z)−
√
(p0 + pE (1+ Z))
2 − 4p0pE
]
(23a)
The value of Z still could be given by equation (22), whith (D/t)Λ=0.2 computed from
equation (7). However, the choice for a limiting value of D/t associated to a material
independent slenderness ratio is justiﬁed by the dominant effect of stress redistribution,
associated withΛ. Thin shell approximation does not account for stress redistribution and the
only cause of departure of the tube response from that of the straight column is the geometric
curvature, so that a limiting value of D/t seems the most appropriate choice. An acceptable
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compromise, valid for all materials, turns out to be (D/t)lim = 6 and one can write
Z =
√
3
2
(
D
t
− 6
)
1.2W (23b)
The results provided by equations (23a) are depicted in Fig. 11. Results are not as accurate
as those in Fig. 10, but still acceptable in the moderately thin and thin tube range. As
well expected, predictions become grossly conservative with increasing thickness, which
underlines the importance of properly accounting for stress redistribution. To assess the
pressure bearing capacity of the tube, thin shell theory is adequate only to more than
moderately thin tubes (i.e., thinner than those for which an elastic solution still is acceptable)
and a formulation aiming at covering the entire slenderness range must consider more precise
expressions. One cannot even claim that these shortcomings are compensated by greater
simplicity: equations (23a) are not simpler; only they are based on more usual deﬁnitions.
6. Conclusions
Long cylindrical shells subjected to external pressure have been considered. The study was
motivated by the necessity of assessing the collapse behavior of the moderately thick tubes
involved by some recent nuclear power plant proposals, but tubes of any slenderness were
considered, even if little attention was devoted to very thin tubes, which buckle when still
elastic according to well known modalities and that do not need additional investigation.
In previous papers it was demonstrated that a reliable reference value for the pressure causing
tube failure can be obtained by performing complete non linear ﬁnite element computations
under suitable assumptions. Purpose of this study was the derivation of an accurate and
simple formula permitting the deﬁnition of this value without performingnumerical analyses.
It does not seem too daring to state that this goal has been attained with equations (21a), (22):
the formula is fairly simple and the results it provides are in good agreement with numerical
outputs for different materials, imperfection amplitudes and slenderness ratios. Obviously,
only a few materials, imperfections and slendernesses have been checked, but the range of
parameters used is wide enough for this statement to be considered of general validity.
The formula can be used both for preliminary design purposes and as a reliable reference
value for the deﬁnition of allowable working pressure. This second aspect, however, no
longer is a must: since Code Case N-759 was approved, tubes can be sized adequately by
using existing regulations and alternatives are not required. In the authors’ opinion, however,
this fact does not diminish the interest of the result achieved. The ingredients used to build
the formula enlighten some aspects of the collapse behavior of moderately thick tubes, a
range so far little explored. Tubes of intermediate slenderness fail because of interaction
between buckling and plasticity, but differences show up at slendernesses about the transition
value. Medium thin tubes behave essentially as straight columns and column formulas can be
employedwith straightforwardmodiﬁcations. As thickness increases, however, the geometry
dependent effect of curvature and the slenderness dependent effect of stress redistribution
enter the picture and the tube wall no longer behaves as a straight beam. To account for these
aspects, a correction was introduced to the original formula. The accuracy of the consequent
results can be taken as the indication that the fundamental aspects of the mechanical behavior
are correctly represented.
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Resistance of 10GN2MFA-A  
Low Alloy Steel to Stress Corrosion  
Cracking in High Temperature Water 
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1. Introduction 
In the second half of the last century the pressure vessel and the cold and hot collector 
bodies, ranking among the most stress and corrosion exposed components of the WWER 
1000 (Water-Water Energy Reactor) horizontal  steam generator (SG), were manufactured of 
the low alloy steel of type 10GN2MFA, the chemical composition of which  is shown in tab. 
1 (IAEA-EBP-WWER-07, 1997). 
 
C Mn Si S P Cr Ni Mo V Cu 
0,08-0,12 0,80-1,10 0,17- 0,37 ≤ 0,020 ≤0,020 ≤0,030 1,8-2,3 0,40-0,70 0,03-0,07 ≤0,30 
Table 1. Chemical composition of 10GN2MFA steel in line with standard element mass 
content, [%] 
In the period from 1986 to 1995 cracks due to stress corrosion cracking (SCC) have been 
revealed after 7000 to 60 000 hours of  operation  in the ligaments between tube holes on the 
cold collectors  in 25 steam generators at 9 units operated in the former Soviet Union 
(WWER SC 076,1993; Matocha, Wozniak, 1996, IAEA-EBP-WWER-07, 1997).  
The cause analysis of collector cracking, carried out in the former Soviet Union, showed that 
the steel used, in all cases where cracking was experienced, has been produced by the open 
hearth furnace process (IAEA-EBP-WWER-07, 1997). Open heart furnace melted collector 
metal had local impurity concentrations, including manganese sulphide, which have 
deleterious effect on SCC resistance of low alloy steels in high temperature water 
environment. 
 Since the beginning of 1989 a number of modifications have been introduced in the former 
Soviet Union  in the steam generators or in their operational conditions process (IAEA-EBP-
WWER-07, 1997). One of them was the modification of the steelmaking process.  Only steel 
produced by electroslag remelting has been used for the manufacturing of collector bodies. 
The electroslag  remelting   process (ESR)  allows to enhance considerably micro-cleanliness 
of the steel and consequently the resistance of the 10GN2MFA steel to SCC in high 
temperature water environment.  
In the period from 1991 to 1994, the eight steam generators were manufactured in 
VÍTKOVICE, J.S.C. for WWER 1000 Temelín NPP.  The collector bodies of Temelín NPP 
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steam generators were made of doubly vacuum treated 10GN2MFA steel (first on DH 
equipment and then by pouring in vacuum) so as to minimize the gas concentration and to 
secure a homogeneous chemical composition. Steps were taken in all heats to keep down the 
content of impurity elements. The typical chemical composition of the steel is shown in tab. 
2 (WWER SC 076, 1993).  
 
 
C Mn Si S P Cr Ni Mo V Cu 
0,10 0,86 0,27 0,008 0,009 0,19 2,16 0,43 0,05 0,08 
Table 2. The typical chemical composition of 10GN2MFA steel  of Temelín NPP collector 
bodies  [mass %] 
No occurrence of environmentally assisted cracking has been noticed till now after 
approximately  79 000 hours of  operation of  the steam generators at Temelín NPP.  
According to contemporary Russian technical specifications TU 0893-014-00212179-2004, the 
WWER 1000 SG collector body must be manufactured of the electroslag remelted   
10GN2MFA steel (10GN2MFA-S).   Sulphur content must be kept lower than 0,005% and the 
concentration of phosphorus must be lower than 0,008%. The requirement for the chemical 
composition and tensile properties of the 10GN2MFA-S steel are summarized in tab.3 and 
tab.4. 
 
 
 C Mn Si P S Cu Ni Cr Mo V Ti Al 
min. 0,08 0,80 0,17 - - - 1,80 - 0,40 0,03 - 0,005 
max. 0,12 1,10 0,37 0,008 0,005 0,30 2,30 0,30 0,70 0,07 0,015 0,035 
Table 3. The requirements for the composition of the steel used for the manufacture of the 
WWER 1000 collector body. 
 
 
Test 
temperature Yield point Yield strength
Tensile 
strength Elongation 
Reduction of 
Area 
+20oC 345-590 MPa  540-700 MPa 18% 60% 
350oC  min. 295 MPa min. 490 MPa 15% 55% 
Table 4. Requirements for the tensile properties of the 10GN2MFA steel. 
In the course of the nineties of the last century, the significantly modernised technology of 
the 10GN2MFA steel production (electric arc furnace, refining in ladle furnace, vacuum 
degassing, bottom pouring under argon protection into mould) was established in 
VÍTKOVICE Heavy Machinery, J.S.C. It enables to guarantee the content of sulphur lower 
than 0,005% and the content of phosphorus lower then 0,008%.  
However Vítkovice Heavy Machinery J.S.C. does not own the electroslag remelting plant. 
To be able to manufacture the WWER 1000 collector bodies for AES 2006 reactor plant, it 
was necessary to prove that there is no difference between electroslag remelted 10GN2MFA 
steel (10GN2MFA-S) and the steel manufactured by modernised VÍTKOVICE Heavy 
Machinery technology (10GN2MFA-A) from the point of view of fracture behaviour and  
resistance to stress corrosion cracking in high temperature water environment.  For this 
purpose three forgings of WWER 1000 SG collector body were manufactured in VÍTKOVICE 
Heavy Machinery, J.S.C. (see Fig.1).   
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Fig. 1. Dimensions of the collector body after rough machining 
This work summarizes the results of the evaluation of the tensile properties, fracture 
behaviour and resistance to stress corrosion cracking in high temperature water 
environment of the collector body forging No 1 material. The resistance to SCC in high 
temperature water environment was evaluated both in laboratories of MATERIAL & 
METALLURGICAL RESEARCH, Ltd. (M&MR, Ltd.) and also in laboratories of 
CNIITMASH, a joint-stock company,  Moscow (Russia).  The testing procedure used was 
proposed by CNIITMASH. The obtained results were compared with the results published 
by CNIITMASH for the 10GN2MFA-S steel (Yukhanov,V.A. & co-workers, 2009, 
Yukhanov,V.A. & co-workers, 2010). 
2. Testing material and experimental techniques 
The testing ring ZK1 (see Fig.1) after simulated post weld heat treatment was used as a 
testing material. Its chemical composition is shown in tab.5. 
 
C Mn Si P S Cu Ni Cr Mo V Ti Al 
0,12 0,90 0,22 0,006 0,002 0,05 1,88 0,048 0,55 0,042 0,004 0,021 
Table 5. The chemical composition of the testing material. 
Metallographic analysis proved very low content of non-metallic inclusions of globular 
shape. The fine grained microstructure of the steel is bainitic with the average initial 
austenitic grain size G= 6-7. 
Fig.2 illustrates schematically the location and orientation of the test specimens used for 
the determination of tensile and fracture characteristics (impact tests, fracture mechanics 
tests) and the round bar tests used for the evaluation of resistance to SCC by slow strain 
rate test.   
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Fig. 2. Orientation of the test specimens in the testing block 
As the characteristic feature of the fracture behaviour of 10GN2MFA steel at temperatures 
from 20°C to 320°C was found to be a ductile stable crack growth (Matocha,K., Wozniak,J., 
1995, Matocha,K., Rožnovská,G. & Hanus, V.,2007), the variation in J with crack growth 
(J-R curve) was investigated at 290°C using multiple specimen method . 1CT (compact 
tension, 25 mm in thickness) specimens were used for the determination of  JIC.  Tests were 
carried out in a stroke control at the speed of 0,5 mm/min. in accordance with GOST 25.506-
85 on MTS 500 kN servo-hydraulic testing machine. Loading of the test specimens was 
realized in the three zone furnace specially developed for the determination of the fracture 
toughness at elevated temperatures. The design of the furnace enables to measure the crack 
mouth opening during the test (see Fig.3). 
The slow strain rate tests of both round bar test specimens 5 mm in diameter and fatigue 
pre-cracked 1CT test specimens (ISO 7539-7:2005, ISO 7539-9:2003) were used for the 
evaluation of the resistance of the 10GN2MFA-A steel to SCC in high temperature water 
environment (260°C, 290°C). The testing parameters for the evaluation of resistance of the 
steel against stress corrosion cracking  (strain rates, initial dissolved oxygen content) were 
proposed by CNIITMASH. 
SCC tests were performed in static autoclave 11 l in volume fitted with INOVA servo-
hydraulic testing machine. Slow strain rate tests of round bar test specimens were carried 
out under stroke control in demineralised water at temperatures 260°C and 290°C at strain 
rate  1,4.10-7  s-1.   Initial concentrations of dissolved oxygen 0,5 ppm, 1,5 ppm and 4,5 ppm 
were obtained by adding  50% H2O2  into demineralised water which was  got rid of carbon 
dioxide.  The susceptibility to SCC is evaluated on the basis of a comparison of reduction of 
area determined in air and in water environment at the same testing temperature. Slow 
strain rate tests of the fatigue pre-cracked 1CT specimens were carried out also under stroke 
control only at 260°C at initial concentration of dissolved oxygen 4,5 ppm and stroke rate 
1,8.10-6 mm/s. 
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Fig. 3. The testing facility used for the determination of J-R curve in air environment at 
290°C 
3. Results and discussion 
Summary of tensile characteristics is shown in table 6. Tensile tests at +20°C, 260°C, 290°C 
and 350°C were carried out on MTS 100 kN servo-hydraulic testing machine using round 
bar test specimens 5 mm in diameter like the test specimens used for the slow strain rate 
tests in high temperature water environment. 
 
Test 
temperature 
[°C] 
Yield point 
[MPa] 
Yield strength
[MPa] 
Tensile 
strength 
[MPa] 
Elongation 
[%] 
R.A. 
[%] 
+20 512  615 25,9 78 
260  458 609 20,5 74 
290  460 606 24,0 75 
350  442 567 23,4 76 
Table 6. Results of tensile tests of the studied steel at ambient and elevated temperatures. 
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Fig.4 and Fig.5 shows the temperature dependences of impact fracture energy and shear fracture 
area of the steel investigated the steel investigated in temperature range from -80°C to 320°C. 
 
 
Fig. 4. Temperature dependence of impact fracture energy in the temperature range from  
-80°C to 320° 
 
 
Fig. 5. Temperature dependence of shear fracture area  in the temperature range from -80°C 
to 320° 
Critical temperature of brittleness and FATT determined from the results of  impact tests 
were found to be Tk0 = -50°C and FATT = -31°C. Results of tensile and impact tests satisfy 
the requirements of the technical specifications TU 0893-014-00212179-2004. 
Table 7 summarizes the results of fracture mechanics tests of the studied steel in air at 290°C 
performed in accordance with GOST 25.506-85. Fig.6 shows the J-R curve obtained. Fracture 
toughness JIC determined from the J-R curve  equals to JIC = 237 N/mm. 
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No of test 
specimen 
ao 
[mm] 
Pi 
[N] 
Api 
[N.mm] 
Δa 
[mm] 
Ji 
[N/mm] 
ZK1-40 26,0 74 671 211 395,1 1,68 629,8 
ZK1-41 25,7 73 103 102 362,1 0,53 336,4 
ZK1-42 25,6 75 662 144 246,0 0,78 447,2 
ZK1-43 25,8 71 759 78 031,2 0,39 273,2 
ZK1-44 25,8 72 069 172 442,1 1,28 517,2 
ZK1-45 25,7 69 036 52 448,2 0,19 200,6 
ZK1-47 25,9 71 008 242 460,2 1,80 700,7 
ZK1-48 25,6 75 152 312 651,9 2,09 874,3 
Table 7. Results of fracture mechanics tests in air at 290°C 
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Fig. 6. J-R curve of the studied  steel at 290oC determined by multiple test specimen method  
This value is in a very good agreement with JIC determined in air at 290°C for 10GN2MFA 
steel used for the manufacture of the collector bodies of Temelín NPP steam generators 
(Matocha,K., Wozniak,J., 1995). 
 Results of slow strain rate tests  of round bar test specimens, made of 10GN2MFA-A steel, 
in high temperature water environment performed in both laboratories  are summarized in 
table 8.  
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Test temperature Initial concentration of dissolved oxygen 
CNIITMASH M&MR 
Reduction of area [%] Reduction of area [%] 
260°C 
4,5 ppm 
9,3 8,6 
9,6 12,3 
8,7 12,4 
1,5 ppm 
69,9 > 54,1 
67,5 68,9 
66,5  
0,5 ppm 
76,3 73,2 
77,1 71,1 
290°C (M&MR)
300°C (CNIITMASH)
1,5 ppm 75,2 
4,5 ppm 74,8 77,0 
Table 8. Results of slow strain rate tests of 10GN2MFA-A  steel carried out in CNIITMAS 
and in M&MR, Ltd. 
Table 8 shows a very good agreement between the results obtained in both laboratories for 
all initial concentrations of dissolved oxygen investigated. Fracture surfaces of the failured 
test specimens were examined by scanning electron microscope JEOL JM-5510. Fracture 
surfaces of the test specimens having low level of reduction of area showed the same 
fractographic features formerly observed on fracture surfaces of 1CT tests specimens tested 
in aerated distilled water (see Fig.7), (Matocha,K., Wozniak,J., 1995). 
 
 
Fig. 7. Morphology of the fracture surface of the test specimen tested in water environment 
at 260oC (initial O2 = 4, 5 ppm, R.A. = 12, 4%) 
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Metallographic evaluation of test specimen cross sections showed that the transverse 
microcracks observed on the fracture surface (see Fig.7) were initiated in the process zone 
ahead of the growing crack and probably contributed to the increase of crack growth rate 
(see Fig. 8),  (Matocha,K., Rožnovská,G. & Hanus,V, 2007). In all cases the stress corrosion 
cracks were initiated from the pits (see Fig.9). 
 
 
Fig. 8. The occurrence of transverse microcracks on fracture surface and in process zone of 
the growing crack (Matocha,K., Rožnovská,G. & Hanus,V, 2007). 
 
  
Fig. 9. Fracture surface of the test specimen tested in water environment at 260°C  
(initial O2 = 4,5 ppm, R.A. = 12,4%) 
Table 9 shows the comparison of  the slow strain rate tests results obtained in CNIITMASH 
using round bar specimens manufactured of 10GN2MFA-A and 10GN2MFA-S steels at a 
strain rate 1,4.10-7  s-1.  
 
Nuclear Power – Control, Reliability and Human Factors 
 
284 
Test temperature Initial concentration of dissolved oxygen 
10GN2MFA-A 10GN2MFA-S. 
Reduction of area [%] Reduction of area [%] 
260°C 
4,5 ppm 
9,3 7,8 
9,6 8,7 
8,7  
1,5 ppm 
69,9 54,9 
67,5  
66,5  
0,5 ppm 76,3 72,3 77,1  
300°C 4,5 ppm 74,8 75,4 
Table 9. Results of slow strain rate tests of the 1OGN2MFA-A and 10GN2MFA-S performed 
in CNIITMASH. 
The results obtained proved that the resistance of both steels against the stress corrosion 
cracking in high temperature water environment, evaluated by slow strain rate tests of 
round bars test specimens, is almost identical. 
Results of slow strain rate tests of fatigue precracked  1C(T) specimens carried out in water 
environment at 260oC, initial dissolved oxygen content 4,5 ppm ppm and stroke rate 1,8.10-6 
mm/s are summarized in table 10. The variation in δ (crack tip opening displacement) with 
crack advance Δa was investigated using a multiple specimen method. Fracture surfaces 
created by stable crack growth during autoclave tests were  examined by scanning electron 
microscope JEOL JM-5510. 
 
Load line displ. [mm] vpl [mm] Pmax  [N] δ [mm] Kδ [MPa.m1/2] Δa [mm] 
1,66 0,1 36595 0,053 100,7 3,05 
1,16 0 28970 0,019 60,3 0 
1,13 0 30160 0,019 59,7 0,51 
1,09 0,06 27213 0,031 79,6 0 
1,18 0,04 27810 0,027 74,5 1,74 
1,43 0,09 31783 0,048 98,7 2,94 
1,05 0,04 25428 0,024 69,6 0,35 
1,86 0,33 23865 0,134 165,4 8,66 
0,90 0,02 21462 0,015 54,7 0,68 
1,19 0,05 26857 0,029 77,3 1,87 
1,42 0,05 30003 0,033 82,8 3,27 
0,78 0 16370 0,005 32,7 0 
1,02 0,02 23913 0,017 59,0 0,93 
Table 10. Results of slow strain rate tests of 1CT specimen in demineralised water at 260°C 
and initial dissolved oxygen content 4,5 ppm. 
Fig. 10 shows the variation of Kδ with crack advance Δa. From the variance analysis of the 
results obtained follows that for the probability of 95% Kδin equals Kδin = 54 ± 16 MPa.m1/2. The 
average calculated environmentally assisted crack growth rate was found to be vcor  = 1,8.10-5 
mm/s. Fractographic analysis of the fracture surfaces created by SCC in high temperature 
water revealed the same fractographic features (see Fig.11) observed on  fracture surfaces of 
round bar test  specimens tested at the same initial dissolved oxygen concentration.  
Resistance of 10GN2MFA-A  
Low Alloy Steel to Stress Corrosion Cracking in High Temperature Water 
 
285 
 
Fig. 10. The variation of Kδ with crack advance Δa (initial O2 = 4,5 ppm, stroke rate  
1,8.10-6 mm/s). 
 
  
Fig. 11. Morphology of the fracture surface created by SCC, t = 260°C, O2 = 4,5 ppm,  
vcor = 3,7.10-5 mm/s 
4. Conclusion 
From the results obtained in this study it follows that: 
1. Results of tensile and impact tests of the 10GN2MFA-A steel manufactured by 
VÍTKOVICE Heavy Machinery, J. S. C., satisfy the requirements of the Russian technical 
specifications TU 0893-014-00212179-2004. 
2.  The resistance of 10GN2MFA-A and 10GN2MFA-S steels against the stress corrosion 
cracking in high temperature water environment with initial dissolved oxygen contents 
0,5 ppm, 1,5 ppm and 4,5 ppm was found to be almost identical. 
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3. Stress corrosion cracks observed on the fracture surfaces of the round bar test 
specimens failured due to slow loading in high temperature water with increased initial 
dissolved oxygen content were in all cases initiated from the corrosion pits. 
4. The crack growth in high temperature water with increased initial dissolved oxygen 
content was accompanied by the significant occurrence of transverse micro-cracks 
initiated in the process zone ahead of the growing crack. 
5.  Rates of corrosion crack growth determined by slow strain rate tests are typical for 
stress corrosion cracking of low alloy bainitic steels in high temperature water 
environment with increased initial dissolved oxygen content. 
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1. Introduction 
In recent decades, the aging of nuclear power plants, the upgrading of safety systems and 
the concern for life extension of licensed plants close to completing 40 years of operation 
have been considered by regulatory agencies. 
The extension of operating licenses for power reactors over 40 years has been a viable option 
for operators of nuclear power plants to ensure the adequacy of future capacity of power 
generation, in terms of economic benefits, compared with the construction of new power 
reactors.  
Routine reviews of nuclear power plant operation (including modifications to hardware and 
procedures, significant events, operating experience, plant management and personnel 
competence) and special reviews following major events of safety significance are the 
primary means of safety verifications. Rereviews include an assessment of plant design and 
operation against current safety standards and practices, and they aim at ensuring a high 
level of safety throughout the plant’s operating lifetime. They are complementary to the 
routine and special safety reviews and do not replace them (IAEA, 2009). 
In 1991, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued rules and associated 
documentation describing how the licensee must demonstrate that the unit can continue 
operating for 20 years following the expiration of the 40-year license. These rules were 
established in 10CFR51 (NRC, 2007a), environmental protection requirements, and 10CFR54 
(NRC, 2010a), technical requirements.  
In 1994, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) issued recommendations, guidance 
and associated documentation describing how the licensee must demonstrate that the unit 
can continue operating through a systematic safety reassessment, named periodic safety 
review (PSR) (IAEA, 1994, 2003). The safety guide has the purpose of providing 
recommendations and guidance on the conduct of a PSR each 10 years for an existing 
nuclear power plant, and it is directed at plant operating organizations and regulators. In 
addition, some member states have initiated this reassessment to evaluate the cumulative 
effects of plant aging and plant modifications, operating experience, technical developments 
and siting aspects.  
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Considering this scenario, it is important to pursue knowledge and competence to assess the 
impact of aging and degradation mechanisms in systems and equipment for a nuclear plant, 
and from this knowledge, to decide on the plant acceptability considering the operational 
experience. The knowledge of these effects can indicate what action is applicable (renewal or 
repair), and then assist in corrective actions to be adopted. 
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss and present an application of  probabilistic  
models for the rate of occurrence of failures of active repairable systems using stochastic 
point processes, to decide for the extension of qualified life of equipment. The model 
application is within the context of the Plant Life Management (PLIM) and the Plant Life 
Extension (PLEX) or License Renewal of Nuclear Power Plants. The basic literature on PLIM 
and PLEX is (NRC,  2010b,  2010c,  2005; IAEA, 1994,  2002,  2003, 2004; Young 2009a, 2009b, 
2009c).  
The emphasis for this subject is the maintenance rule (NRC, 1997, 2000, 2007b; NEI, 1996). 
This rule is a prerequisite for the license renewal for US plants (Young, 2009c), and it 
provides an aging management tool for active equipment. Its performance criteria 
monitoring combined with the license renewal rule, equipment qualification, and life cycle 
management provides a sound basis for extending operation periods (Saldanha et al., 2001; 
Saldanha & Frutuoso e Melo, 2009). 
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the aging concepts, aging 
management, equipment qualification, life extension and repairable systems. Section 3 
presents an overview of the regulatory aspects related to plant life management and plant 
life extension. Section 4 discusses the aging evaluation  for extension of qualified life of 
repairable sytems through stochastic point process (non-homogeneous Poisson model, 
NHPP). Section 5 presents a case study of service water pumps of a pressurized nuclear 
power plant. Section 6 presents conclusions and recommendations. References can be found 
in Section 8. It is noteworthy that NRC periodically updates paragraphs and appendices of 
10 CFR Part 50 and associated Regulatory Guides. The references to these documents are 
related with the dates of last update described in the address http://www.nrc.gov/reading-
rm/doc-collections/cfr/part050/. 
2. Basic concepts 
Operational experience at nuclear power plants has shown that two types of  
time-dependent changes occur in systems, structures and components/equipments (SSC):  
physical aging, or aging (that, henceforth, will be used in this text), which results  
in degradation (gradual deterioration) in physical characteristics; and  the obsolescence that 
is the condition that occurs in structures and components that cease to be useful,  
despite being in perfect condition, owing to the emergence of other technologically more 
advanced ones. 
Then, aging means the ongoing process by which physical characteristics of a system, 
structure and components or equipment (equipments and components will be used 
interchangeably in this text) change with time or usage. This process can proceed through a 
single aging mechanism or as the contribution of several mechanisms (cumulative effects).  
Aging can lead to large scale degradation of physical barriers and redundant components, 
which can result in common-cause failures. These conditions can reduce the margins of 
safety equipment to values below the plant design basis or regulatory requirements, and 
cause damage to safety systems. 
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The knowledge of the aging and degradation processes  and the developing of methods and 
guidelines for its management is important to the reliable and safe operation of nuclear 
power plants. The management of aging components can predict or detect the degradation 
of a component and take the appropriate corrective mitigation actions.  
Evaluation of the cumulative effects of both physical aging and obsolescence on the safety of 
nuclear power plants is a continuous process and is assessed in a periodic safety review or 
an equivalent systematic safety reassessment program, as a  renew  of operating licenses, 
(IAEA, 2009). 
The equipment qualification program of a nuclear power plant provides an effective aging 
management of plant components important to safety. The scope of the equipment 
qualification program should include equipment that performs safety functions and 
contributes to safety functions performance. Noteworthy is the demonstration that the 
equipment will continue performing its safety functions under harsh environmental 
conditions. These service  conditions are those that exist after the postulated initiating event, 
and they are significantly different from normal operating conditions, which have their 
functionality demonstrated by performance during normal operation (pre-operational tests 
and periodic testing). 
Qualified life (estabilished by equipment qualification program) is the period of time of 
normal operation for which an aging degradation would not prevent satisfactory 
performance of equipment if a postulated initianting event were to occur.  The qualified 
condition of equipment established is expressed in terms of one or more measurable 
condition indicators for which it has been demonstrated that the equipment will meet its 
performance requirements, (IAEA, 2009). 
Installed life is the period of time from the installation to the removal of equipment. A 
system, structure or equipment can have components whose qualified life can be lesser than 
the installed life. These components can be replaced (renewal) or undergo a repair program 
to maintain their qualification.  
According to (IAEA, 2009), it is important to demonstrate that aging issues have been 
correctly taken into account for the whole planned plant lifetime, by ensuring that: (1) 
qualification tests take into account potential aging effects, in light of international 
knowledge and practice; (2) environmental conditions at the site are monitored to detect any 
changes from assumed values; (3) procedures for modifying qualified lifetimes are 
provided, especially in the case of changes from assumed values or of increasing failure 
frequency of some item of equipment; and (4) procedures for adapting aging tests and their 
duration of validity are provided. 
The extension of qualified life should be approached through probabilistic methods. The 
evaluation based on deterministic methods defines the difference between the current state 
and condition of the item in the qualification phase, but does not define its probability of 
continuing performing its function adequately for a period longer than the one defined by 
its qualified life.  
The combination of deterministic and probabilistic methods in the evaluation stage of aging 
effects is necessary because the extension of qualified life is an item of upgrading to a new 
life cycle since the system or equipment has operated for a number of years.  
During operation, predictive, preventive and corrective maintenance work to maintain 
equipment in proper performance. Thus,  maintenance works in both:  functional equipment 
aspects, and  how to check its availability through periodic tests laid down in the technical 
specifications and operating procedures.  
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In the operation of a nuclear power plant, the effectiveness of maintenance becomes an 
essential parameter in assessing system reliability (NRC, 2007a). It can be observed that the 
pursuit of maintenance effectiveness can not be done without: (1) adequate knowledge of 
aging mechanisms, (2) to assess the conditions for qualification of equipment, and (3) 
knowledge of equipment performance and trends in the records of operational experience.  
A system may be defined as a collection of two or more components which must perform 
one or more functions. Nonrepairable systems are those which, when fail, must be replaced 
by new ones. Repairable systems are those which, after failure to perform at least one of 
their required functions, can be restored to perform all of their required functions by any 
method, other than the replacement of the entire system, and put into operation again under 
the same conditions before failure. By this definition, it is possible to repair without 
replacing any component (Asher &Feingold, 1984). 
The failure process of a repairable system depends on the failure mechanism of the 
equipment and the maintenance policy applied. Hence, the choice of the statistical model to 
analyze the failure data of a repairable system should take into account the maintenance 
policy applied to the equipment, (Calabria et al., 2000).  
The effects of aging increase the probability of equipment failures or even make it unavailable. 
These effects are traditionally calculated by using reliability models incorporating rates of 
time-dependent occurrence of failures. Thus, the behavior of components and systems in a 
plant are represented through changes in failure rates with time (Hassan et al., 1992).  
The idea of modeling aging effects by simply considering that time-dependent failure rates 
can model this effect is not necessarily adequate because failure times may not be 
independent and identically distributed. This leads to the use of point processes and the 
concept of rate of occurrence of failures. Then, it is necessary to carefully evaluate the rate of 
occurrence of failures behavior detected in periodic testing and maintenance performance 
on the equipment and on the system. These actions can significantly impact aging effects 
studies(Saldanha et al., 2001; Saldanha & Frutuoso e Melo, 2009). 
3. Regulatory aspects of plant life management and plant life extension  
There are two regulation concepts for long term operation of nuclear plants. One is based on 
the periodic safety review, the other on the license renewal. Most European countries use 
the periodic safety review. The renewal of licenses is the practice adopted in the US. Both 
approaches have been adapted in some IAEA member states, including approaches that 
combine those two concepts. More detailed information about the practices and experiences 
of IAEA member states can be  found in (IAEA, 2006, 2010).  
Technical requirements and elements of the life management program remain the same for the 
two concepts (preventive maintenance and aging management programs, time limited aging 
analysis, equipment maintenance and qualification of response to obsolescence issues).  
Considering regulatory aspects, it is important to control aging management practices of the 
operating organization and to verify the validity of forecasts for aging systems, structures 
and components important to safety. The environmental impact of long term operation, due 
to plant life management has to be assessed, although the study details depend on 
regulatory requirements (IAEA, 2006) 
3.1 Periodic safety review  
The periodic safety review is governed by the Safety Guide NS-G-2.10 (IAEA, 2003). It  is a 
systematic review of a nuclear power plant safety analysis conducted at regular intervals 
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(usually 10 years) to deal with aging cumulative effects (both  physical aging and 
obsolescence), modifications, operating experience, changes in international safety 
standards, to ensure a high level of safety through the operating lifetime of the plant. Thus, 
it has become an instrument for responding to requests by operating organizations allowed 
to continue operating plants beyond a deadline licensee or a specified period of safety 
evaluation. The process of periodic safety review is valid for nuclear power plants 
throughout its lifetime and guarantee that there remains a basis for valid licenses. 
The regulatory system does not limit  the number of periodic safety review cycles, even if 
the new cycle extends beyond the original design lifetime of the plant. The only condition is 
to demonstrate the plant safe operation for the next periodic safety review cycle, while 
maintaining safety margins. The periodic safety review is a tool that may be used by 
regulatory bodies to identify and solve safety issues (IAEA, 2006). 
According to (IAEA, 2009), the review objective of aging management in a periodic safety 
review by operating organization is: (1) to determine whether aging in a nuclear power plant 
is being effectively managed so that required safety functions are maintained, and (2) whether 
an effective aging management program is in place for future plant operation (IAEA, 2003).  
Therefore, the review of aging management within a periodic safety review therefore aims 
to establish whether: (1) for each SSC important to safety, all significant aging mechanisms 
have been identified; (2) there is a thorough understanding of relevant aging mechanisms 
and their effects; (3) the aging behaviour of SSCs over the period of operation is consistent 
with predictions; (4) there are adequate margins in respect to aging to ensure safe operation 
for at least the period until the next periodic safety review is due; (5) there is an effective 
aging management program (addressing operations, chemistry, maintenance, surveillance 
and inspection) in place for future plant operation, (IAEA, 2009).  
Aging management for nuclear power plants is governed by safety guide NS-G-2.12 (IAEA, 
2009). The objective of this safety guide is to provide recommendations for aging managing  
of  SSC  important to safety in nuclear plants. It focus on: (1) for the operating organization, 
providing technical support to establish, implement and make improvements of aging 
management program; and (2) regulatory organizations, providing technical support to 
prepare standards and regulatory guides to verify whether aging is being properly and 
effectively managed. It highlights the basic concepts of aging management and makes 
recommendations to make the proactive management of physical aging during the life of a 
nuclear power plant, presents a systematic approach to aging  management of nuclear 
plants in operation, management  of obsolescence, and  aging management review in 
support of long-term operation.  
IAEA has sponsored various programs and projects related to the aging of nuclear power 
plants, focusing on the management of aging, long-term operation reliability and 
economical aspects of life extension of licensed plants. The results of these programs are 
expressed in a series of technical documents related to methodologies for aging 
management, guide to operational data collection and maintenance for the management and 
evaluation mechanisms of aging (IAEA, 1992, 1992b, 1998, 1999, 2002,  2004, 2006, 2008). 
These documents can support and be references in the implementation of safety guide NS-
G-2.12 (IAEA, 2009).  
3.2 License renewal 
The operating licenses of US plants have been issued with its lifetime of 40 years of 
operation. This limit was established by the 1954 Atomic Energy Act, which considered the 
perspectives of energy consumption. 
 
Nuclear Power – Control, Reliability and Human Factors 
 
294 
The emphasis of this discussion focuses on the requirements of 10CFR54 (NRC, 2010a). The 
process of renewing the operating license is based on two principles: (1) the regulatory 
process, continued during the extended period of operation, is adequate to ensure that the 
licensing bases of all plants proceed at acceptable safety levels, with the possible exception 
of adverse effects of aging on certain systems, structures and components, and possibility of 
a few other issues related to safety during the extension period of operation; and (2) the 
licensing basis of each plant is maintained during the license renewal.  
10CFR54 (NRC, 2010a)  requires operators to identify all systems, structures and 
components: (1) that are related to safety; (2) whose failure may affect functions related to 
safety; and (3) that are able to demonstrate compliance with NRC fire protection 
requirements, 10CFR50.48 (NRC, 2007c), environmental qualification 10CFR50.49 (NRC, 
2007d), heat shock 10CFR50.61 (NRC, 2007e), reactor transient shutdown reactor provided 
without scram 10CFR50. 62 (NRC, 2007f), and total loss of electrical power into alternating 
current 10CFR50.63 (NRC, 2007g). 
Requirements should be included in the license renewal application in conformance to 
regulatory guide RG 1.188 (NRC, 2005), which will be assessed according to the 
standardized review plan, NUREG-1800 (NRC, 2010b). Structures and passive components 
are included in this item, they perform their functions without moving parts or without 
changes in the configuration, as follows: reactor, steam generator, piping, supports, seismic 
structures.  
Active equipments are considered adequately monitored by the existing regulatory process 
where aging effects that may occur are more easily detectable, and therefore, more easily 
corrected, either by the testing program, or by the maintenance program, or even through 
the indicators highlighted in this performance (NRC, 2007b; NEI, 1996).  
The important activity is the evaluation of the Analysis of Time-Limited Aging (TLAA), 
which is a set of analyses and calculations that involve systems, architectures and 
components that fall within the scope of the rule. TLAA should consider aging effects with 
approaches based on the original 40 years period, and: check the limits of  renewal period, 
review or recalculate these limits by determining whether the sentence is appropriate, and 
demonstrate that aging effects are  covered by the calculations. 
License renewals are based on the determination that each plant will continue to maintain 
an adequate level of safety and, over plant  life, this level should be increased by 
maintaining the licensing basis, with appropriate adjustments to consider new information 
from operational experience. The licensee may submit the license renewal to NRC 20 years 
before the end of the term of the current operating license. 
4. Aging evaluation for extension of qualified life  
The study of time-dependent failure rate models conducts to (Ascher & Feingold, 1969, 1978, 
1984; Ascher,1992; Ascher & Hansen, 1998). They discuss and establish the terminology and 
notation used for performing the statistical analysis of repairable systems. They emphasize 
the distinction between non-repairable and repairable systems related to times to failure. 
They also criticize the reliability  literature which considers repair as a renewal of the system 
to its original condition (the so-called ‘as good as new’ concept). They consider that this 
assumption is unrealistic for probabilistic modeling and leads to major distortions in the 
statistical analysis. 
The non-homogeneous Poisson process (NHPP) and the renewal process (RP), generally 
homogeneous Poisson process (HPP),   are commonly used models for repairable systems.  
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NHPP assumes that the unit is exactly at the same condition immediately after repair as it 
was  immediately before failure (“as bad as old” concept), assuming that the repair time is 
negligible, while for  the renewal process the repaired unit  is always brought to a like new 
condition (as good as new concept). These two models and their implications are discussed 
in detail in (Ascher & Feingold, 1984). 
NHPP application to the evaluation of the extension of qualified life can be useful due to the 
possibility, by controlling and monitoring the NHPP parameters, to identify whether the 
failure process is homogeneous in time. Then, by applying adequate corrective maintenance 
actions to mitigate aging effects, the repairable system can return to or be maintained under 
a homogeneous process. 
Non-homogeneous Poisson point processes have wide application, like the analysis of 
failure occurrence trends, (Asher & Feingold, 1984), optimal replacement problems, (Bagai & 
Jain, 1994), warrant data analysis, (Majeske, 2003) and accident sequence precursor analysis, 
(Modarres et al., 1996). NHPP applications have been extensively made to the reliability 
growth model, (Crow, 1974). This model has been applied to the defense and aerospace 
industries in the US. Krivtsov (2007a) considers some practical extensions in the reliability 
application of this model. 
It is possible to postulate a variety of point process models for the analysis of repairable 
systems. If one focus attention on the non-homogeneous Poisson process (NHPP), then it 
will be clearly seen that it is able to model time-dependent rates of failure occurrence. This 
model is conceptually simple and the relevant statistical methodology (maximum likelihood 
estimation and linear regression modeling) is well developed and easy to apply. 
The importance of NHPP resides in the fact that it does not require the conditions of 
stationary increments. Thus, there is the possibility that events may be more likely to occur 
during specific time intervals. The NHPP has memory. Then, it is an adequate tool to 
analyze events where there may be, for example, aging. 
By observing the successive failures of a repairable system, it  is generally advisable to 
consider first the NHPP and, if there are no trends in the occurrence of failures, test the 
homogeneous model. The adoption a priori of a homogeneous model (iid) can lead to an 
inadequate reliability assessment. 
The NHPP model has been tested and validated in several publications. The basis of this 
text, including the case study, is discussed in (Saldanha et al., 2001). 
In 2007, the Reliability Enginering & System Safety journal issued a special number  
concerning stochastic processes (Krivtsov, 2007b). It contains papers  on applications  of 
NHPP to repairable systems  (Asher, 2007; Krivtsov, 2007a; Finkelstein, 2007). In a workshop 
in the 17th International Conference on Nuclear Engineering, ICONE17, in 2009 in Brussels, 
the model called Crow-AMSAA (Pandey & Jyrkana, 2009) that uses the power law model 
for assessing the reliability of repairable systems was presented and discussed.  
4.1 Basis for defining the model to extend qualified life of equipment 
Safety analysis is the study, examination and description of a nuclear power installation 
behavior through its life, under normal and transient conditions, and also postulated events 
in order to determine safety margins provided in normal operation and transient regimes, 
and the adequacy of items to prevent consequences of accidents that might occur. It is 
essential for the safety assessment in the licensing process. The safety of the plant must be 
continuously monitored during operation and  have constant review to maintain the level of 
safety. The safety analysis can be performed in two different ways that are complementary:  
the deterministic and probabilistic approaches. 
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In the deterministic safety analysis, the plant behavior, after an initiating event or 
malfunction, is studied with model calculations that describe the physical processes in 
reactor systems. The objective of this type of analysis is to verify whether allowed values of 
key variables of the plant are exceeded.  
Probabilistic safety analysis (PSA) focuses on identifying the sequence of events that can 
lead to reactor meltdown, and on reliability studies of safety systems. The objective of this 
type of analysis is to indicate potential weaknesses in the design of systems and provide a 
basis for improving safety. It assumes that component failure rates are constant. When aging 
is explicitly considered, then changes in component failure rates as a function of aging 
should be considered.  
In the beginning of the installation life, the repairable system has a constant rate of 
occurrence of failures and it is governed by a homogeneous process. The study of aging 
impact becomes more coherent by observing its effects. It is more appropriate to study the 
behavior of equipments and systems failures under the action of time, defining its 
probability density function and probability distribution function, and comparing with the 
probability density function and probability distribution function when they were not under 
the action of time. 
Differences between probability distribution functions  will be related to the increases  
in the probability of failure due to aging and can be used to aging control and 
management to reduce the impact of  aging over system failures. They will be 
incorporated into studies of qualified life extension, and their effects on core damage 
frequency will be assessed. 
The following is a sequence of actions that can be performed to define the model : (1) 
identify the nature of the system, whether repairable or non-repairable; (2) identify the 
stochastic point process associated to system failures: (2a) for the repairable system, the 
impact of aging through occurrences of failures can be assessed and it defines the model of 
failure intensity (ROCOF), these failures can be critical or degradation; and (2b) for the non-
repairable systems, one can evaluate the impact of aging through replacements or renewals 
carried out. 
The equipment qualification requirements are defined to  repairable systems for a 
satisfactory performance in their qualified life, according to the requirements of the 
licensing basis established in the safety analysis report.  
In the reliability study of repairable systems, each time between failures and the time of the 
last failure shall be considered. It is possible to obtain the expected number of failures for 
the next cycle of operation.  
By monitoring and controlling the parameters of the probability model, during equipment 
operation, it is possible to check whether the equipment is leaving the basis of its 
qualification process, and so to check how the effects of time, degradation and operation 
modes can influence the equipment performance. The evaluation of the probability model 
parameters can be verified through the improvement (or degradation) of equipment. The 
knowledge of aging mechanisms allows reducing the values of these parameters and cast 
the model into a homogeneous process. 
Here, the extension of qualified life must be defined by considering the operational 
experience of the equipment and then to perform equipment maintenance in compliance 
with the qualification basis. In this case, it means the return of the equipment to the “as 
good as new” condition. For this purpose, one should use as operation criteria goals values 
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the parameters of the probabilistic model. If the equipment operates within these limits, the 
process of occurrence of failures will be very close to some of the homogeneous processes 
and the influence of aging effects will be reduced. 
4.2 Stochastic point process and repairable systems concepts 
A stochastic point process {N(t)} is a collection of usually interrelated random variables, 
each labeled by a point t on the time axis and such that N(t2) -N(t1)= N(t1,t2] expresses a finite 
nonnegative integer for all 2 1 0t t  .  
A stochastic point process is a mathematical model for physical phenomena characterized 
by highly localized events randomly distributed in a continuum. Thus, these processes can 
be designed to model a probabilistic experiment that arises in points, which can be named as 
"arrivals" on the time axis. Accordingly, failures of a repairable system can be represented as 
"arrivals" of a stochastic point process (Cox & Lewis, 1996). 
The distinction between repairable and non-repairable systems is crucial and it should  
be emphasized if terminology is not adequately explained (Asher &Feingold, 1984; Ascher, 
2007). 
The  concept of failure and how it must be taken into account quantitatively is not the same 
as the one for nonrepairable systems analysis. The classical idea of failure rate, traditionally 
employed is not adequate, as long as only the times to first component failures are 
considered. In this sense, after fixing a component which fails and is repaired, its particular 
history is investigated in terms of operational records. 
The reliability figure of interest of nonrepairable systems is the survival probability. The 
times between failures of a nonrepairable system are independent and identically 
distributed (Asher & Feingold, 1984).  
In the case of repairable systems, the reliability is interpreted as the probability of not failing 
for a given period of time. The analysis must be performed without assuring that the times 
between failures are independent and identically distributed. It is important to emphasize that 
there may be a system with repairable components which is different from a repairable system 
in the sense that the first may have nonrepairable components (Asher & Feingold, 1984). 
The first concept to discuss is the rate of occurrence of failures. For a repairable system, let 
N(t) be the number of failures in the interval (0, T] and t1 , t2 , ......., be the system failure 
times and Ti (i= 1, 2, 3....) the elapsed time between the (i-1)th and the ith failure. 
The behaviour of Ti  is of great importance in reliability analyses, for it allows the 
determination of trends in the times between failures, increasing (sad system), decreasing 
(happy system) or constant (Asher &Feingold, 1984).  
The rate of occurrence of failures (t) is defined as (Asher &Feingold, 1984; Crowder et al., 
1991) 
 ( ) { (0, ]}
dt E N t
dt
   (1) 
It is important to distinguish the concept of rate of occurrence of failures from that of failure 
rate, a concept traditionally employed in reliability engineering (Asher &Feingold, 1984).  
A natural estimator of (t) is given by (Crowder et al., 1991) and discussed by (Lai & Xie, 
2006): 
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{ ( , ]}ˆ ( )
N t t t
t
t
     (2) 
for an adequate t. The choice of this interval is arbitrary but like the choice of interval 
widths for histograms, the idea is to highlight the main features of the given data. 
The expected number of failures in the interval 2 1( )t t  is given by 
 
2
1
2 1[ ( ) ( )] ( ) ,
t
t
E N t N t v t dt    (3) 
and the reliability function is  
 
2
1
2 1( ) exp{ ( ) }.
t
t
R t t v t dt    (4) 
4.3 Model for rate of occurrence of failures (ROCOF) by Poisson processes 
A stochastic point process {N(t), t0} is said to be a homogeneous Poisson process (HPP)  if it 
satisfies the following conditions (Asher & Feingold, 1984): (1) N(0)=0; (2) it has independent 
and stationary increments; and  (3) the number of events in each time interval follows a 
Poisson distribution with mean m(t)= t , 0<  <  , so that: 
 { ( , ] }P N t t s k   = 1( ) ( !) exp( )kt k t    (5) 
for all t, t0 and k= 0,1,...... 
One possible generalization of a HPP is a nonhomogeneous Poisson process (NHPP), which 
has a time-dependent rate of occurrence of failures, M'(t)= [ ( )]dE N t dt = (t), t0, and the 
events, that are not independent and identically distributed, follow a Poisson distribution 
with mean m(t)= 
0
( )
t
v s ds , so that: 
 { ( , ] }P N t t s k  = ( ( )t s
t
v x dx
 ) 1( !)k  .exp[- ( )t st v x dx ], (6) 
By choosing a suitable parametric form for ( )t , a flexible model for failures of repairable 
systems can be obtained. In the literature, two NHPP failure models are widely used: the 
log-linear and the power law (Crowder et al., 1991). It is necessary to decide which of these 
models is preferable in each case. 
The NHPP with a log-linear rate of occurrence of failures is discussed by (Cox & Lewis, 
1966) and is given by: 
 0 11( ) ttv e  . (7) 
The ROCOF decreases (happy system) if 1 0  . If 1 0  , the ROCOF increases (sad 
system). If 1 0  ,  the ROCOF has a linear trend over short periods of time. 
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The second model is based on the Weibull distribution and is referred to as the power law, 
(Crow, 1974; Ascher and Feingold, 1984). It is given by 
 2
1( ) . .t tv    , 0, 0,    and 0t  . (8) 
If 1  , the ROCOF increases. The ROCOF decreases when 0 1  . For 2  , one has 
a linearly increasing ROCOF. 
If failures of repairable systems were observed for the time period 0(0, ]t  and the logged 
times of occurrence were 1 2, , ........ nt t t ., then the likelihood function could be obtained by 
analysing the probability of observing no failures in (0, t1), one failure in (t1, t1+t1), no 
failures in (t1+t1, t2) and so on, until the last interval of no failures in (tn+tn, t0), for small 
t1......tn and taking the limit as the tn go to zero. The likelihood function obtained from 
Eq. (3) is given by 
 1 01 ( )exp[ (0, )]
n
iL t N t . (9) 
Another possibility to observe failures of repairable systems is to record them until the 
occurrence of the nth failure. In this case, the likelihood function of Eq (9) or the 
loglikelihood is still valid but t0 must be replaced by tn, the time of occurrence of the nth 
failure. 
To fit a NHPP with a rate of occurrence of failures given by Eq (7) to a set of failure data of a 
repairable system, using statistical likelihood-based methods it is necessary to obtain the 
loglikelihood function of Eq (9). It is given by 
 
0 1 0
1 0 1
11
exp( )exp{( ) 1}
[
n
i
i
t
l n t
   
                  (10) 
From maximum likelihood equations 1 1 0l    , the maximum likelihood estimator of 1 
can be obtained by solving the transcendental equation: 
 
0
1
1 11
0
1 exp{ }
n
i
i
ntnl t
t 
                             (11) 
After obtaining 1ˆ , one has 
  10 1 0
ˆ
ˆ ln ˆexp 1
n
t
 
      
                (12) 
A natural test of hypothesis, when considering the reliability of a repairable system, is to 
check whether the rate of occurrence of failures is constant. For the log-linear model, it is 
1 0  . A commonly employed hypothesis test is the Laplace test, (Crowder et al., 1991),  
which is based on the statistic 
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
                (13) 
which under the null hypothesis approaches a standard normal distribution. If H1: 1 0  , 
one rejects H0 if |U| is large. On the other hand, if H1: 1 0  , one rejects H0 if U is large, 
and if H1: 1 0  , one rejects H0 if -U is large. 
For a NHPP with rate of occurrence of failures given by Eq (8), the loglikelihood function of 
Eq (3) is given by 
 2 0
1
[ln ln ( 1) ln ]
n
i
i
l t t   

                     (14) 
From maximum likelihood equations 2 0l    and 2 0l   , one obtains: 
 ˆ
0
ˆ n
t
                  (15) 
and 
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1
ˆ
ln ln


 n i
i
n
n t t
                 (16) 
In order to test whether the rate of occurrence of failures is constant, that is =1, the 
following statistic is employed (Crowder et al., 1991) 
 
0
1
2 ln
n
ii
t
V
t
                    (17) 
which under the null hypothesis follows a 2 (2 )n  distribution. Large values of V indicate 
reliability growth  0 1  , whereas small ones indicate deterioration  1  . 
A question that naturally arises in this context is which model to choose for ( )v t . It was 
suggested (Crowder et al., 1991) to make this choice using the models based on 
loglikelihood methods and after comparing with the models obtained by linear regression 
(graphical methods): (1) a first step is to plot the failure number i against the ti. The lack of 
linearity is an indication that the rate of occurrence of failures is not constant; (2) the second 
step is to obtain the expression for 1( )v t  and 2 ( )v t  by loglikelihood methods; and (3) the 
last step is to choose ( )v t  using linear regression (graphical method). 
The graphical method is based on the expected number of failures until time t,  ( )E N t . 
Using Eqs. (7) and (8) in Eq (3), one has: 
 
Aging Evaluation for the Extension of Qualified Life of Nuclear Power Plant Equipment 
 
301 
 - 1( )v t ,       ( )E N t  = 0 1( )
1
{ 1}te e
 
  ; and                (18) 
 - 2 ( )v t ,            ( )E N t  = t .               (19) 
Considering that the observation period 0(0, ]t is divided into k arbitrary intervals of the 
form 1(0, ]a , 1 2( , ]a a , ....... 1 0( , ]ka t , an estimate of  112 j jv a a    , is given by (Crowder et 
al., 1991): 
  112 j jv a a     = 11
( ) ( )j j
j j
N a N a
a a



               (20) 
for 1, 2, ......j k , where 0 00 ka and a t  . 
Making  112j j jb a a  , a plot of ( )j jv b x b  furnishes an indication of the shape of the 
rate of occurrence of failures, ( )v t . The choice of k  and ja  is left to the user. However, it 
is advisable to test different subdivisions of the observation interval in order to verify that 
the shape of the plot does not depend on the chosen subdivision. 
If 1 ( )v t  is appropriate for ( )v t , then the plot of ln ( )j jv b x b  will show a straight line with 
slope 1  and intercept 0 . On the other hand, if 2 ( )v t  is appropriate for ( )v t , the plot of 
ln ( ) lnj jv b x b  will also show a straight line, but with slope ( 1)   and 
intercept  ln ln  . If there is a competition between the models evaluated, the choice 
will be the model that has the highest value for the maximum likelihood function. 
For NHPP models, the extension of qualified life must be defined by the return of the 
equipment to the “as good as new” condition using the operation criteria goals presented in 
Table 1. As the equipment operates within these limits, the process will be very close to the 
homogeneous processes. 
 
ROCOF model homogeneity linear trend 
0 1
1( )
ttv e    (log-linear) 1 0   1 0   
1
2( ) . .t tv    (power law) 
0, 0,    and 0t   
0 1   2   
Table 1. Operating criteria for NHPP parameters for reducing aging effects 
5. An application of the NHPP model 
The following analysis is related to the service water pumps (SWP) of a typical PWR nuclear 
power plant. Considered was the degradation or critical failures for which corrective actions 
in parts, subsystems, and systems inside limits of SWP, for which maintenance corrective 
actions  were necessary (IAEA, 1988).  
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Failures of SWPs were revealed in operation by daily inspection (lub-oil level of pump 
systems components pump, discharge pressure, leaks, vibrations, etc) or malfunction 
indications by sensors or alarms. 
The failure times employed in the analysis were generated as follows. A time period of 1725 
calendar days has been considered, which is equivalent to approximately three burnup fuel 
cycles and reload periods. The corresponding operational time for the SWPs was 20,300 
hours, (NRC, 1988). 
The first step is to check whether the rate of occurrence of failures is constant. A plot of the 
accumulated number of failures versus the accumulated failures times (operation times) is 
displayed in Figure 1, which is based in data from the first and second columns of Table 2. 
No linearity is seen for the plotted points so that the rate of occurrence of failures is clearly 
time dependent. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Accumulated number of failures x accumulated operation time of SWP. 
 
i ti TEF ln tn/ti 
1 1080 2,875 
2 6840 5760 1,029 
3 18300 11460 0,045 
4 18360 60 0,042 
5 19140 780 0 
 = 63720 = 3,991 
i = failure number: ti= time to failure, in hours; and TEF= time between failures, in hours. 
Table 2. Data for loglikelihood-based methods for the rate of occurrence of failure models 
The second step in the analysis, it to check which model is applicable for (t), Eq (7) or Eq 
(8). The data is also presented  in Table 2.  
Solving Eq (10) for 1 ( )v t , one obtains 1ˆ 0.000112   and from this result, 0ˆ 9.51    from 
Eq (12). These values are tested through Eq (13), U= 1.98. This value is considered large by 
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(Crowder et al., 1991)  and the estimated parameters are considered adequate for the model 
(rejection of the 1=0 hypothesis). Then, for this case, Eq (7) is given by: 
    11 ( ) exp 9.51 0.000112v t t h                 (21) 
Solving Eqs. (15) and (16) for 2 ( )v t , one obtains ˆ 1.253   and ˆ 0.00000216  . These values 
are tested by Eq (17), 7.982V  . This value is considered small (Crowder et al., 1991)  and 
the estimated parameters are considered adequate for the model (rejection of the  =1 
hypothesis). Then, for this case, Eq. (8) is given by: 
 5 0.253 12 ( ) 2.71 10 ( )v t t h
   .                        (22) 
The third step in the analysis is the application of linear regression to the failure data in 
order to choose which model is applicable for (t), Eq (7) or Eq (8). The observation period 
(0.19140] has been divided into three distinct intervals, and the shape of ( )v t  has been 
checked through the plot ( )j jv b x b . Linear regression has been performed for each 
interval considering the plots of ln( ( ))j jv b x b , for 1 ( )v t  and of ln( ( )) ln( )j jv b x b , 
for 2 ( )v t . 
Table 3 presents the results obtained by linear regression methods for each interval and by 
the loglikelihood method. It may be inferred that the 1 ( )v t  model adequately fits the rate of 
occurrence of failures ( )v t , considering the results of interval splitting #2 and the 
loglikelihood method.  
Table 4 presents the performed interval splitting #2 for the data where nf represents the 
number of failures in the interval. Figures 2 and 3 show the shape of ( )v t  through the plot 
( )j jv b x b  and the scattering diagram for the data in Table 4, respectively. 
 
 
Parameter 1 0   
Interval splitting # 1 0.00015 -9.82 2.111 0.0005E-5 
Interval splitting #  2 0.00012 -9.33 1.862 0.0007E-5 
Interval splitting #  3 0.00008 -9.18 1.584 0.0760E-5 
Loglikelihood method 0.000112 -9.51 1.253 2.16E-5 
Table 3. Estimated parameters for choosing ( )v t  
 
interval (hr) nf bj ln bj (bj) ln (bj) 
0-6000 1 3000 8.006 0.000017 - 8.699 
6000-11000 1 8500 9.048 0.000020 - 8.517 
11000-18400 2 14700 9.596 0.000270 - 8.216 
18400-19140 1 18770 9.840 0.001350 - 6.607 
Table 4. Division 2 for the model of Eq (7) 
One can see that 1 ( )v t  is appropriate to model ( )v t , because the fit of the line 
ln ( ) lnj jv b x b  values in Table 3, obtained a slope 1ˆ 0.00012  , and an intercept 
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0
ˆ 9.33   , values that are close to those obtained through the maximum likelihood 
method. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Analysis of the model of Eq. (7) 
 
 
Fig. 3. Scatter diagram (data in Table 3), 1ˆ 0.00012  (slope) and 0ˆ 9.329   (intercept). 
Figure 4 exhibits the shape of ( )v t  for the observed period (0, 19140], using Eq. (21). An 
increasing trend in the failure occurrence and actions on degradation factors in pump 
performance can be observed. Thus, it is possible to obtain the expected numbers of failures 
in other burnup fuel cycles from Eq. (22). 
Considering that the SWPs will operate under the same model than that for the past three 
cycles, the evaluated time period will be (19140, 25500]. Using the parameters 1 and 2 in Eq 
(18), 6 failures have been obtained. Table 5 present these values. Figure 5 presents the 
expected cumulative number of failures in hours of operation until the C4 cycle. 
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Fig. 4. Rate of occurrence of failures ( )v t  in the operation period (0, 19140], in hours 
 
interval E[N]
19140 - 21140 1
21140 - 2314 2
23140 - 25500 3
Table 5. Expected numbers (E[N])  of failure for period  (19140, 25500] until the C4 cycle 
 
 
Fig. 5. Expected cumulative number of failures in hours of operation until the C4 cycle 
Supposing that in order to decrease the expected number of failures for the period (19140, 
25500] adequate aging management actions have been taken, like periodic testing and 
maintenance, then it would be possible to reduce the number of failures to 2 in the period, 
occurring, in time points, 22104 h and 23112 h, respectively. 
The impact of failure reduction may be quantified by the application of the NHPP model 
considering the period (0, 25500]. Using the same procedure discussed before, one obtains 
the following expression for v t( ) : 
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   14( ) exp 9.4 (9.9 5)cv t E t h                                  (23) 
Figure 6 shows the comparison between the rates of occurrence of failures considering the 
expected trend by Eq (21), Table 5, and considering management of aging and maintenance 
actions in the period (19140, 25500]. It can be observed that the corrective actions reduce the 
increasing trends in failures, ( 1 1 4ˆ ˆ0.00012 0.00009C    ). 
 
 
Fig. 6. Comparison of v t( )  by Eq (21) (trends) and Eq. (23) (released) in period (19140, 
25500], in operation hours 
 
 
Fig. 7. Comparison of the curves of SWP failure probability with improvements and without 
improvements to the C4 cycle 
Figure 7 shows the comparison of the SWP curves failure probability with improvements 
and without improvements to the C4 cycle. It can be verified that a repairable system with a 
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time-dependent rate of occurrence of failures can be influenced by management of aging 
and maintenance policies. 
6. Conclusion  
The equipment qualification program of a nuclear power plant provides an effective aging 
management of plant components important to safety. The knowledge of the aging and 
degradation processes and the development of methods and guidelines for its management 
is important to the reliable and safe operation of nuclear power plants. The management of 
aging components can predict or detect the degradation of a component and take the 
appropriate corrective mitigation actions.  
The extension of qualified life is a reality. It must bear combination of deterministic and 
probabilistic methods in the evaluation stage of aging effects. While the evaluation based on 
deterministic methods defines the difference between the current state and condition of the 
item in the qualification phase, probability methods define whether it can continue 
performing its function adequately for a longer period than is defined by its qualified life.  
It is possible to postulate a variety of point process models for the analysis of repairable 
systems for the extension of qualified life. If one focuses  attention on the non-homogeneous 
Poisson process (NHPP), then it will be clearly seen that it is able to model time-dependent 
rates of occurrence of failures.  
This model is conceptually simple and the relevant statistical methodology (maximum 
likelihood estimation and linear regression modeling) is well developed and easy to apply. 
By considering it, one eliminates the unrealistic assumption for the probabilistic modeling of 
the ROCOF that considers a renewal as a repair (‘as god as new’ versus ‘as bad as old’ 
hypothesis). Different models for the rate of occurrence of failures are possible and we 
discussed the two most common, namely, the log-linear and the power law.  
The application discussed is quite simple but this is not a methodology shortcoming. Our 
concern was to show how to perform the analysis by taking into account a general 
procedure for hypothesis testing. 
At first, one of those models should be adequate for the analyzed data but the hypothesis 
testing could reveal that none is appropriate. Sound statistical inference should always be 
employed for the obtained results in terms of the expected number of failures because the 
reliability for a given time period could be misevaluated. 
The pattern of successive failures of repairable systems will define the model to be used. If 
failures exhibit increasing trends, one applies the NHPP (time-dependent ROCOF); 
otherwise, one should apply the HPP (constant ROCOF). The NHPP model adequately 
includes the variations in the rate of occurrence of failures behavior due to periodic testing 
and maintenance activities performed in repairable systems. Then, it may be used to survey 
aging mechanisms during the operational life of repairable systems and to the assessment of 
maintenance effectiveness. 
The case study demonstrates that it is not difficult to perform failure data analysis, to 
evaluate trends and verify the impact of these trends  in the reliability analysis of repairable 
systems. Considering the requirements of the Maintenance Rule (NRC, 2007a), in the aging 
management for active equipments, the study of the SWPs shows that the MPLP complies 
with the licensing basis. 
In what concerns applications of other point processes models, (Saldanha & Frutuoso e  
Melo, 2009) discuss the application of the Modulated Power Law Process (MPLP) to 
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represent the ROCOF of repairable systems for evaluating the extention of qualified life as a 
generalization of the NHPP model that turns to be more realistic to represent the impact of 
maintenance actions. 
In the area of maintenance policies, applications of Generalized Renewal Process (GRP) are 
very recent in the field of reliability engineering. (Kahle, 2007) discusses the optimal 
maintenance policies for the models of standard GRP repair. (Garcia et al, 2008) address the 
scheduling of preventive maintenance using genetic algorithms for systems modeled by this 
class of point processes. (Damaso et al, 2009) consider again the GRP for the modeling of 
multi-objective optimization of testing policies of aging systems. 
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1. Introduction 
Worldwide a renaissance of the nuclear industry is obviously taken place and many 
countries favour nuclear power as one reliable opportunity to generate electrical energy at 
very low CO2 generating rates in order to avoid the green house effect in the earth 
atmosphere. However, since 1986 when the Tschernobyl accident was happening, nearly 
nowhere new nuclear power plants were established. The People Republic of China, India 
and in the last decade Japan, Finland and France are the exception. In other words, existing 
supply chains of former manufacturers were mainly destroyed or have changed its technical 
application field. Furthermore, a lot of technical expertise was lost as younger generations 
were influenced politically to find its interest in other scientific areas other than in nuclear 
physics or nuclear engineering. 
Even if we can observe today a change in mind in many countries concerning the acceptance 
of nuclear power the question seriously is to answer: Will we find enough well skilled 
technicians to reliably build all the planned nuclear power plants in the future? 
Therefore, life extension of existing plants the more plays an important role. This is truer as 
we have learnt in the last decades how many potential we have for life time extension even 
if we take into account ageing phenomena concerning the materials as thermal ageing, 
fatigue and neutron embrittlement when we think at steel components in the primary 
circuit; as there are the reactor pressure vessel, heat exchangers, surge line, pressurizer 
vessel, main cooling pumps and pipe lines. However, as in different countries life extension 
to an over all life time of 80 years is in discussion in future we have to take into account the 
infrastructure, i.e. bridges nearby, important for fluid traffic, emergency current generators, 
the concrete components of the containment and the cooling towers but also ageing 
phenomena of electric cable insulation, etc. 
Within these life time extension strategies the methodology of a continuously applied 
ageing management worldwide is seen as an important measure to guarantee nuclear 
safety. Besides the application of standardised non-destructive testing (NDT) technology 
during inservice inspection trials in order to perform a diagnosis of the material states on-
line structural health monitoring of components by enhanced and intelligent NDT-sensors 
and sensor-networks will play a forthcoming future role. 
In Germany actually code-accepted procedures to perform ageing management were finally 
discussed and approved by the authorities. However, research and development in the last 
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decade in the Nuclear Safety Research Programme of the German Ministry for Economy and 
Technology was continuously performed in order to develop and qualify NDT-technology 
for characterisation of ageing phenomena. 
The here presented chapter describes the objectives of this research and the final results 
obtained. In any case, the methodology of the micromagnetic NDT procedures was 
especially developed. This methodology is suitable for materials characterisation of 
magnetisable steels in terms of determination of mechanical properties. There are many 
similarities between movements of dislocations under mechanical loads and pinning of this 
lattice defects at vacancies, precipitates, grain and phase boundaries, contributing to the 
strength of the material and the movement of magnetic domains under magnetic loads, i.e. 
when the material is magnetised in a hysteresis loop. 
The methodology of the Micromagnetic, Multiparameter, Microstructure and Stess Analysis 
(3MA) is discussed which on a wide basis of different diverse as well as redundant 
information allows the sensitive materials characterisation. 
In case of a Cu-rich steel alloy precipitation hardening is discussed in combination with 
thermal ageing. It is shown that superimposed fatigue loads will enhance the thermal 
ageing effect. 
Fatiguing of austenitic stainless steel under some conditions is combined with phase 
transformation from the face-centred-cubic (fcc) lattice to body-centred-cubic (bcc) 
martensitic phase which is ferromagnetic of nature. Where the carbon content is low enough 
to avoid the phase transformation other NDT techniques based on electric conductivity 
effects or ultrasonic wave propagation phenomena have to be applied. 
3MA is sensitive to characterise neutron embrittlement in pressure vessel materials. Material 
of western pressure vessel design as well as of Russian design were characterised which 
shows that a new NDT technology for inservice inspection of the pressure vessel wall from 
the id-surface can be developed. 
2. Micromagnetic properties and micromagnetic NDT, the 3MA approach 
The reason to develop 3MA (Micromagnetic-, Multiparameter-, Microstructure-, and 
stress-Analysis) by Fraunhofer-IZFP, starting in the late seventies in the German nuclear 
safety program, was to find microstructure sensitive NDT techniques to characterise the 
quality of heat treatments, for instance the stress relieve heat treatment of a weld. George 
Matzkanin (Matzkanin, 1979) just has had published a NTIC report in the USA to the 
magnetic Barkhausen noise, nowadays very often called magnetic Barkhausen emission 
(MBE). The technique was sensitive to microstructure changes as well as to load-induced 
and residual stresses. Therefore a second direction of research started in programs of the 
European steel industry and the objective was to determine residual stresses in big steel 
forgings, like turbine shafts. Beside the magnetic Barkhausen effect a magneto-acoustic-
one became popular (Theiner & Waschkies, 1984). The technique has based on acoustic 
emission measurements during controlling the magnetisation in a hysteresis cycle but was 
– because of the high amplification – sensitive to electric interference noise. Therefore the 
acoustic Barkhausen noise technique has never found a wide-spread real industrial 
application. However, because influenced by only 90° Bloch-wall interactions in the 
laboratory the technique was an ideal sensor to enhance the basic understanding. Later, 
further micromagnetic techniques were developed: the incremental permeability 
measurement, the harmonic analysis of the magnetic tangential field and the 
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measurement of the dynamic or incremental magnetostriction by use of an EMAT 
(Altpeter, 2002). Basically the idea of Paul Höller, a former director of IZFP, was to 
develop the micromagnetic techniques in order to replace electron microscopy, i.e. to find 
algorithms to determine microstructural parameters like vacancy density and distribution, 
dislocation density and distribution, precipitation density and distribution, etc. However, 
because the need for calibration of the micromagnetic measuring parameters, the 
researchers very quickly understand to follow the more pragmatic direction, i.e. to 
directly correlate the micromagnetic properties with mechanical technological parameters 
like yield strength or hardness. The main argument for that decision was the large scatter 
in electron microscopy data and the fact of the strong propagation of errors in the 
calibration, when based on these data. 
2.1 Micromagnetic basics 
Ferromagnetic materials - even in a demagnetised or ’virgin’ state - consist of small, finite 
regions called domains (Kneller, 1966; Seeger, 1966; Cullity, 1972; McClure & Schröder, 
1976). Each domain is spontaneously magnetised to the saturation value of the material. The 
directions of magnetisation of the various domains, however, are such that the specimen as 
a whole shows no net magnetisation. The process of magnetisation is then one of converting 
the multi-domain state into a single domain magnetised in the same direction as the applied 
magnetic field H. The process is performed not continuously but stepwise by movement of 
the domain walls, named Bloch walls, and for stronger applied fields, by rotation of the 
magnetisation vectors in the domains into the direction of the applied field. In iron-based 
materials we find 180 and 90 Bloch walls. The indicated angle is the angle between the 
magnetisation vectors in two adjacent domains. Domains with directions parallel or nearly 
parallel to the magnetising field increase in their size while all others are annihilated. The 
Bloch wall movements as wall jumps take place discontinuously because the walls in a 
polycrystalline material are temporarily pinned by lattice defects as microstructural 
obstacles like dislocations, precipitates, phase- or grain-boundaries. The stepwise pull-out of 
the wall from the obstacle changes the magnetisation state locally and is called a Barkhausen 
event. The local magnetisation changes induce pulsed eddy currents in the vicinity of the 
events propagating in all spatial directions. The amplitudes of the eddy currents are 
damped according to a well known dispersion law, i.e. higher frequencies in the spectrum 
are damped more than lower frequencies. The eddy currents induce electrical voltage 
pulses, called Barkhausen noise, which may be detected by an induction coil surrounding 
the magnetised specimen. The time domain integral of the Barkhausen noise during a 
magnetisation reversal is the magnetic induction B, and B versus H is the hysteresis loop. 
Figure 1 documents the influence of different microstructures (ferrite / martensite) and 
Figure 2 presents the influence of load-induced or residual mechanical stresses. ‘Magnetic 
hard’ materials, like a martensitic steel microstructure, have larger coercivity (tangential 
magnetic field value Ht at B=0) and smaller remanence (B-value at Ht=0). In case of 
compressive stresses the hysteresis is sheared and tensile stress generates a slighter curve. 
Whereas the hysteresis - by definition - is measured by a coil surrounding the specimen 
under magnetisation, more suitable pick-up techniques for local, spatially resolved ND-
testing have been developed. 
Ferromagnetic materials show the property of magnetostriction (Cullity, 1972). When 
exposed to a magnetic field, its dimension changes. The effect can be measured as a function 
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of the applied magnetic field in profile-curves ((Ht) or L (Ht), L-lengthwise magnetised 
cylindrical specimen) by using strain gages (Figure 3 and Figure 4). The inverse effect, called 
Villari effect, is the spontaneous magnetisation of a virgin ferromagnetic material exposed to 
a mechanical stress field. This is the reason of the stress sensitivity of micromagnetic NDT 
(Sablik, Burkhart, Kwun, & Jiles, 1988; Burkhart & Kwun, 1989; Jiles 1988). In the lower part 
of Figure 4, according to a 4-domain model, the effect of increasing tensile stress on the 
domain wall movement is discussed. The domains with magnetisation direction in the 
tensile stress direction are preferred. 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Hysteresis loop and influence of microstructure 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Hysteresis loop and influence of mechanical stress 
 
Non-Destructive Testing for Ageing Management of Nuclear Power Components 
 
315 
 
Fig. 3. Lengthwise magnetostriction and influence of microstructure 
 
 
Fig. 4. Lengthwise magnetostriction and influence of mechanical stress 
2.2 Micromagnetic techniques in detail 
For the development of non-destructive (ND)-techniques, some special principles have been 
identified from the above mentioned basic physical facts, providing a selective interaction 
with the microstructure and stress fields. These are particularly micromagnetic techniques.  
Depending on the magnetic process performance irreversible and reversible processes have 
to be distinguished. Techniques using irreversible processes take advantage of the non-
linearities of the hysteresis which are the result of the above mentioned Bloch-wall jumps 
and rotational processes (Jiles, 1990). 
A distortion factor K can be derived from a Fourier analysis of one period of the time-signal 
of the magnetic tangential field strength Ht which is measured by a Hall element. K is the 
geometrical average (root-mean-square-value) of the power of the upper harmonics, 
normalised to the power of the fundamental (Pitsch, 1989). The distortion factor K is defined 
as shown in Figure 5. By empirical investigations it was documented that from the time 
dependence of the sum of all harmonics above the fundamental a coercivity value HC0 may 
be derived. This value correlates with the hysteresis coercivity HC. The investigations are 
confirmed by other authors (Fillon, Lord, &Bussiere, 1990). Thus, using this measurement of 
the tangential field strength, with only one sensor, two independent parameters (K and HC0) 
may be derived. The depth that is analyzed is controlled by the penetration depth of the 
applied field Ht. 
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Fig. 5. Fourier analysis of the magnetic tangential field 
 
 
Fig. 6. Hysteresis, Barkhausen noise, micromagnetic events: Bloch wall jumps, rotation 
processes 
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Fig. 7. Magnetic Barkhausen noise profile curve 
The Barkhausen noise is magnetically received – as said before - directly by a pick-up air-
coil, a ferrite-core-coil, or other inductive sensor as induced electric voltage pulses. After 
low-noise pre-amplification (60 dB fixed), band-pass filtering (cut-off frequencies to be 
adjusted), rectifying, low-pass-filtering in order to receive the envelope of the high-
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frequency content of the noise, and final amplification (variable up to 60 dB), the magnetic 
Barkhausen noise profile-curve M(Ht) is obtained (Theiner, Altpeter, & Reimringer, 1989). 
This type of measurement technique was proposed by Matzkanin.  
The spatial resolution is restricted by the sensor geometry. The mm-range can be achieved 
by using standard pick-up air coils. The band pass filter is needed to suppress the large 
magnitude of the fundamental magnetising frequency in the received signal in addition to 
its higher harmonics. This effect is stronger for magnetic soft materials than for hard ones. 
Soft materials have an essential higher harmonic content. Harmonics up to the 7th order are 
observed. The lower cut-off frequency of the band pass filter therefore has to be adjustable, 
depending on the material under inspection. It should be mentioned here, that this measure 
to suppress disturbing effects and to only receive the random Barkhausen noise limits on 
one hand the analyzing depth for technical steels in general to a depth of  2 mm. Because 
on the other hand the analyzing depth of the above mentioned distortion factor 
measurement is limited only by the magnetising frequency, this parameter K completes the 
information of the Barkhausen noise to a larger analyzing depth. Because of the random 
character of the Barkhausen-noise a large natural scatter in the data is observed due to small 
magnetic fluctuations from the environment superimposed on the driving field. Time 
averaging (up to ten magnetising cycles) is a help to obtain reliable data. In process 
applications at higher inspection speeds, the effect can hinder the use of Barkhausen-noise. 
Figure 6 shows a hysteresis loop as a continuous curve. Only with a higher amplification the 
fact of the discontinuous magnetisation in Bloch wall jumps is revealed. The Figure 
documents the fact of the interaction of the different Bloch-wall types at different magnetic 
field amplitudes. In the vicinity of the coercivity mainly the 180° walls contribute with their 
jumps to the magnetising process. The 90° walls need more energy for movement and 
therefore their contribution to magnetisation is in the knee region of the hysteresis followed 
by rotation processes. 
 
 
Fig. 8. Barkhausen noise peak maximum and peak separation as function of mechanical 
stress and stress sensitivity MMax / of the German pressure vessel steel 22 NiMoCr 37 
after welding and 72h stress relief annealing 
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Fig. 7 shows a Barkhausen noise profile-curve (M(Ht)) and the measuring parameters are 
presented. For some steel grades we can observe profile-curves with up to three peaks per 
magnetising half-cycle, depending on the materials microstructure. Besides the different 
peak maxima (MMaxi, i=1,…, 3) their separation (HCMi) as well as different half-width-values 
(for instance M50%) are measured. 
For residual stress characterisation (see Figure 8), the peak values are measured as a 
function of compressive and tensile stress, MMax versus stress . The magnetic stress 
sensitivity of a material microstructural state is characterised by the function MMax () /  
i.e., the inclination of the curve MMax() at  = 0. The fact of the decreasing of the peak 
amplitude of the Barkhausen noise at higher tensile stress levels is observed at a mechanical 
stress value in the tensile regime at which the magnetostriction curve under magnetisation 
(see Figure 4) starts directly with negative values. 
Due to magnetostrictive effects, Barkhausen-events excite, in their vicinity, pulsed 
magnetostrictive strains which result in magnetostrictively excited acoustic emission signals 
named acoustic Barkhausen noise (Theiner & Waschkies, 1984). This is named as MAE – 
magneto-mechanical-acoustic-emission in literature too (Buttle & Hutchings, 1992; Allen & 
Buttle, 1992). The acoustic emission (AE) is received by narrow band, sensitive AE-
transducers. Nevertheless, a high amplification of ~ 80 - 100 dB is needed and the technique is 
sensitive to disturbing noise. Typical AE-signal analysis equipments like RMS-voltmeters or 
energy-modules are in use. Because of its sensitivity for disturbing noise, the technique can 
reliably be applied only in the laboratory. Nevertheless investigations with this technique are 
of interest for comprehensive interpretation studies because here only the information of 90° 
Bloch wall movement and their interaction with the microstructure is observed. 
 
 
Fig. 9. Incremental permeability 
Applying reversible magnetic techniques, the material is magnetised with a much smaller 
field strength amplitude H compared to the coercivity (HC) of the material. The 
magnetisation follows linearly the magnetic field. Therefore, all eddy current techniques 
using low electric currents in the pick-up coil, resulting in small magnetic fields H (H << 
HC), are reversible techniques. Parameters influencing the coil impedance are the operating 
frequency f, the electrical conductivity el and the incremental permeability . The latter 
depends on the magnetic history of the specimen under inspection. An eddy current 
impedance spectroscopy is performed by tuning the frequency from high to low values. (el,  
) - gradients in near surface zones are sensed by changing the field penetration. The 
spatial resolution is the same as that for eddy current coils. 
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Fig. 10. Incremental permeability profile curves documenting the influence of mechanical 
stress, steel quality X20Cr13 
The incremental permeability profile-curve, (Ht), as a function of a controlled applied 
magnetic field Ht is a well defined property of the material and independent of the magnetic 
prehistory as long as HMax >> HC and H << HC. The frequency f of the incremental field 
H is a parameter for selecting the depth of the analyzed near surface zone; f should be 
chosen such that f  100  f, where f is the frequency of the applied field Ht , controlling the 
hysteresis. (Ht) is measured as eddy current impedance parallel to the hysteresis reversals. 
The hysteresis is modulated by the alternating field H, excited by the eddy current coil. 
The spatial resolution is the same as that for eddy current coils. Figure 9, shows the 
hysteresis with the inner loops, performed by the above mentioned modulation. By 
definition (Ht) is proportional to the inclination of each individual inner loop touching the 
hysteresis for magnetic field values Ht. In Figure 10 (Ht) profile-curves are presented, 
indicating the characteristic measuring parameters as function of mechanical stresses. 
The dynamic or incremental magnetostriction profile-curve E(Ht) is the intensity of 
ultrasound which is excited, and received by an EMAT (Electro-Magnetic-Acoustic-
Transducer) (Salzburger, 2009) for instance by measuring a back-wall echo, caused by 
magnetostrictive excitation as a function of the applied field Ht, controlling the hysteresis. 
The incremental, alternating field H in this case is excited by the EMA - transmitter using a 
pulsed current.  
The magnetostriction is modulated. (Figure 11, upper part) The spatial resolution - 
depending on the transmitter design - is of the order of ~ 5 mm. In order to achieve such a 
spatial resolution, an EMA - receiver was designed to transform the ultrasonic signal into an 
electrical signal only using the Lorentz-mechanisms (Koch & Höller, 1989). Figure 11, lower 
part, presents a half-cycle of the dynamic magnetostriction profile-curve E(Ht) in the 
magnetic field range < 300 A/cm. The amplitude value of the first peak as well as the 
corresponding tangential magnetic field value as well as the Ht-field position of the 
minimum are sensitive quantities for materials characterisation. 
The micromagnetic measurements are performed by an intelligent transducer consisting of a 
handheld magnetic yoke together with a Hall-probe for measuring the tangential magnetic 
field strength and a pick-up coil for detecting the magnetic Barkhausen noise or the 
incremental permeability. Normally a U-shaped magnetic yoke is used, which is set onto the 
surface of the material under inspection, i.e. the ferromagnetic material is the magnetic 
‘shunt’ of the magnetic circuit. Therefore all the well known design rules for magnetic 
circuits have to be observed. The mathematical methodology of the Micromagnetic-, 
Multiparameter-, Microstructure-, and stress- Analysis (3MA) in detail is described in 
(Altpeter, 2002). However, a short explanation is given here according to Figure 12. 
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Fig. 11. Dynamic or incremental magnetostriction 
With 3MA different micromagnetic quantities, let’s say Xi, i = 1, 2, 3, … are measured at 
‘well defined’ calibration specimens. These are derived by analysis of the magnetic 
Barkhausen noise M(Ht) and the incremental permeability µ(Ht) as function of a tangential 
magnetic field Ht which is analysed and by eddy current impedance measurements at 
different operating frequencies. 
 
 
Fig. 12. The 3MA-calibration 
‘Well defined’ here has the meaning that the calibration specimens are reliably described in 
reference values like mechanical hardness (according to Vickers or Brinell, etc.) or strength 
values like yield and/or tensile strength, or residual stress values measured, for instance, by 
X-ray diffraction. A model of the target function is assumed (for instance Vickers Hardness 
HV(Xi), or strength value like Rp0.2(Xi), or residual stress res(Xi)). This model is based on 
the development of the target function by using a (mathematically) complete basis function 
system, which is a set of polynomials in the micromagnetic measurement parameters Xi. The 
unknown in the model are the development coefficients, in Figure 12 called ai. These ai are 
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determined in a least square or other algorithm, minimizing a norm of the residual function 
formed by the difference of the model function to the target reference values. In order to 
stochastically find a best approximation, only one part of the set of specimens is used for 
calibration of the model, the other independently selected part is applied to check the 
quality of the model (verification test). By using for instance the least square approach the 
unknown parameters are the solution of a system of linear equations. 
3MA is especially sensitive to mechanical property determination as the relevant 
microstructure is governing the material behaviour under mechanical loads (strength and 
toughness) in a similar way as the magnetic behaviour under magnetic loads, i.e. during the 
magnetisation in a hysteresis loop. Because of the complexity of microstructures and the 
superimposed stress sensitivity there is an absolute need to develop the multiple parameter 
approach. 
3. NDT characterisation of thermal ageing due to precipitation 
Beginning in 1998 Fraunhofer-IZFP in co-operation with the Materials Testing Institute at 
the University Stuttgart (MPA) (Altpeter, Dobmann, Katerbau, Schick, Binkele, Kizler, & 
Schmauder, 1999) has investigated the low-alloy, heat-resistant steel 15 NiCuMoNb 5 (WB 
36, material number 1.6368) which is used as piping and vessel material in boiling water 
reactor (BWR) and pressurized water reactor (PWR) nuclear power plants in Germany. One 
argument for its wide application is the improved 0.2% yield strength at elevated 
temperatures. 
Conventional power plants use this material at operating temperatures of up to 450C, 
whereas German nuclear power plants apply the material mainly for pipelines at operating 
temperatures below 300C and in some rare cases in pressure vessels up to 340°C (e.g., a 
pressurizer in a PWR). Following long hours of operation (90,000 to 160,000 h) damage was 
seen in piping systems and in one pressure vessel of conventional power plants during the 
years 1987 to 1992 (Jansky, Andrä, & Albrecht, 1993) which occurred during operation and 
in one case during in service hydro-testing. In all damage situations, the operating 
temperature was between 320 and 350C. Even though different factors played a role in 
causing the damage, an operation-induced hardening associated with a decrease in 
toughness (-20%) was seen in all cases. The latter is combined with a shift in the transition 
temperature of the notched-bar impact test to higher temperatures (+70°C) and in the 0.2% 
yield strength of about +140 MPa.  
According its specification the steel has in between 0.45 and 0.85 mass% Cu (in average 
0.65%) in its composition. The half part of the Cu is in precipitation because of annealing 
and stress relieve heat treatment during production, the other half still is in solid solution 
and can precipitate when the material is exposed at service temperatures. The material can 
obviously be recovery annealed when after the service exposures again is heated-up at the 
stress relieve heat treatment temperature and hold some time. The precipitates are dissolved 
again in solid solution obtaining a microstructure state comparable but not identical to the 
‘as delivered’ state. 
Micromagnetic investigations at first were performed at ‘service exposed’ (57,000h at 350°c) 
and ‘recovery annealed’ (service exposed + 3h 550°C) material using cylindric (diameter 
8mm) test specimens. Whereas the hysteresis curves of the two microstructure states are 
nearly identical, differences were observed when the magnetic Barkhausen noise was 
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registered and when the lengthwise magnetostriction was measured. The specimens were 
measured in the stress-free state as well under variable tensile load (according to Fig. 8) in 
order to reveal the stress sensitivity of the microstructures. 
 
 
Fig. 13. Magnetic Barkhausen noise of service-exposed and recovery annealed WB36 
microstructures in the stress-free state 
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Fig. 14. The lengthwise magnetostriction of the microstructure states of Fig. 13 
In Figure 13 the profile curves of the magnetic Barkhausen noise related to the two material 
states are shown and Figure 14 documents the behaviour of the magnetostriction in the 
stress-free state. 
The service exposed microstructure has higher Barkhausen noise maximum and lower 
magnetostriction values. Both effects indicate the influence of tensile residual stresses 
induced by the Cu-rich precipitates in the iron matrix. In TEM and SANS investigations the 
precipitation state was studied. The particle size is in between 2nm – 20nm distributed. 
Particles < 6nm diameter have body centered cubic crystallographic structure like the iron 
matrix (coherent precipitates). As the atomic radius of Cu is larger compared with iron the 
Cu precipitate acts with compressive stresses which are balanced by tensile residual stress in 
the matrix. Particles with diameter > 20nm are face centered cubic and in between these two 
states a transition crystallographic structure exist. About 50% of the precipitates have this 
transition structure and especially contribute to micro residual stresses in the tensile stress 
regime in the matrix. Figure 15 shows the like coffee-beans shaped particles of the transition 
structure visible in the TEM and the diffraction pattern. 
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Fig. 15. TE micrographs and diffraction pattern of the Cu particles 
Fraunhofer-IZFP has performed experiments under load-induced tensile stresses too. Figure 
16 and Figure 17 show the result at the service exposed and recovery annealed 
microstructures. As discussed in Figure 8 the Barkhausen noise maximum Mmax () as 
function of the tensile load  increases with the load to an absolute maximum and then 
decreases again. The threshold load where this maximum occurs is exactly the load value 
where magnetostriction becomes directly negative in sign when the specimen additionally is 
magnetised. 
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Fig. 16. The service exposed microstructure 
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Fig. 17. The recovery annealed microstructure 
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Comparing the two microstructure states in its stress sensitivity the difference in the 
residual stress state due to the Cu precipitates can only be responsible to shift the maximum 
position about 17-20 MPa to smaller tensile loads in the case of the service exposed material. 
This value should be the amount of the average residual stress in the iron matrix which 
locally near the precipitate can be much higher but cannot be measured with another 
reference technique. 
Further investigations in order to statistically confirm the results were performed at 400°C 
in order to speed-up the precipitation process. 
 
 
Fig. 18. Coercivity HC0 derived from the harmonic analysis of the tangential magnetic field 
strength and Vickers hardness 10 
 
 
Fig. 19. 3MA approach to characterise the Cu precipitation microstructure state in terms of 
Vickers hardness 5 
Comparing the coercivity (Figure 18.) derived from the harmonic analysis of the tangential 
magnetic field strength with the measured Vickers hardness 10 as reference to characterise 
the thermally aged microstructure both quantities are correlated and meet a typical 
hardness maximum which is the critical material state for possible failure of a component if 
the design has not taken into account the strengthening ageing effect. When the exposure 
times are further enlarged hardness is decreasing by precipitation coarsening. In order to 
obtain the good correlation in the 3MA-approach beside micromagnetic characteristics eddy 
current impedances were implemented. These are especially suitable as the Cu precipitates 
contribute to an enhanced electrical conductivity. 
Parallel to the project activities in the German nuclear safety program a PhD thesis (Rabung, 
2004) was performed in different projects of the German National Science Foundation 
(DFG). Fe-Cu-model-alloys were investigated mainly to study the effect of the Cu 
 
Non-Destructive Testing for Ageing Management of Nuclear Power Components 
 
325 
precipitates without influences of the magnetic cementite-phase as in WB36. The Cu-content 
was varied in between 0.65% and 2.1% (Altpeter, I., Dobmann, G., Kröning, M., & Rabung, 
M., 2009). 
There was always the supposition that any form of energy, other than only heat, put in 
WB36 components will contribute to enhanced precipitation of Cu particles. The effect of 
low cycle fatigue at service temperature was therefore studied in a further project in the 
German nuclear safety program the last 4 years (Altpeter, I., Szielasko, K., Dobmann, G., 
Ruoff, H., & Willer, D., 2010). As in literature (Solomon & De Lair, 2001) dynamic strain 
ageing (DSA) was expected in the lower temperature regime (200°C) to be additionally a 
driver for WB36 thermal degradation two different heats were selected which were different 
in the Al/N-ratio in the composition. Because of the higher N content (Al/N (E2)=0.92) the 
heat E2 was assumed to be more prone for DSA than the heat E59 (Al/N (E59)=3.87). E2 
material came from a plate in the virginal condition (‘as delivered state’), named E2A. The 
E59 material came from a used vessel which at 350°C for 57,000 h was in service. The 
material was investigated in the state ‘recovery annealed’ (600°C, 3h) named E59 EG. 
Furthermore, some material of E59 was especially heat treated, ‘stepwise stabilised 
annealed’ in order to stabilise the Cu precipitation distribution in coarse particles, named 
E59 S4. Compared with E59 EG, E59 S4 should be less prone for further precipitation 
development under service conditions. 
Under LFF-conditions (mean strain-free, R=-1, strain-controlled with =1.05% at 220°C 
and 300°C) specimen of the heat E2A were cycled in one-step fatigue tests with cycle period 
(24s, load cycles 350 at 220°C; 2400s, load cycles 200 at 220°C; 2400s, load cycles 200 at 
300°C). The expected material behaviour was confirmed, i.e. degradation will be enhanced 
by accumulated elastic-plastic deformation; Figure 20 represents the result in terms of 
Charpy-test-energy versus test temperature. As documented, the 41J ductile-to-brittle 
transition temperature (DBTT, T41J) shifts to higher temperature with plastic deformation 
energy input. 
 
 
Fig. 20. Charpy tests at different thermally aged and LC fatigued material states, 
documentation of material degradation of the heat E2A 
A maximum shift T41J of 144.3°C can be observed. It should be mentioned here that the 
tests performed with the heat E59EG have shown much smaller effects in degradation, 
documenting the fact that the microstructure states in the state ‘as delivered’ and ‘recovery 
annealed’ are not identical when exposed to further thermal ageing and fatigue. 
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Fig. 21. Distortion factor K as function of cycle number measured after well defined fatigue 
intervals in test interruptions followed by a further fatiguing of the same specimen 
A very wide space for investigations was addressed to interval tests where all of the 3 heats 
were fatigued mean strain-free with =1.05% and a cycle period of 2,400s at different 
elevated temperatures (E2A (220°C, 300°C, and 350°C; E59EG (220°C, 250°C, 300°C, and 
350°C; E59S4 (220°C, 350°C). The specimen were fatigued to a certain load cycle number in 
terms of a fraction of the average live time (Na-averaged cycle number to failure, N=0.2 Na, 
N=0.5Na, N=0.8Na, and N=Na=800 cycles). The test then was interrupted for non-destructive 
tests followed by further fatiguing, etc. The over all result can be presented in 
micromagnetic life-cycle diagrams as shown exemplarily for instance in case of the 
measuring quantity K (distortion factor of the tangential field strength, measured according 
to Fig. 5) in Figure 21. 
Concerning the decreasing of K the material states of E2A show the strongest effect 
compared with the E59EG states in case of the fatigue test temperature of 300°C. The 
decrease here is stronger than for the test temperature of 350°C. Obviously most of the 
decrease is in the first fatigue time interval, followed only by a moderate further decreasing, 
what allows the interpretation that due to strain hardening and dislocation development 
local precipitation sources are generated enhancing the Cu precipitation. K seems more 
influenced by the dislocation strengthening effect than by the precipitation what is seen in 
the secondary fatigue interval. However, very rapidly critical material states are obtained 
which is documented by the fact that all specimens under these conditions early failed in the 
following fatigue intervals. 
As the first decrease in E2A fatigued at 350°C is smaller compared to the 300°C test the 
strain hardening effect seems to be smaller, may be, due to recovery effects by transverse 
dislocation slipping. This is confirmed by measurement of the volume fraction of Cu 
precipitates performing SANS. 
The smallest effects are observed with the stabilised annealed material. As due to this 
processing most of the Cu content is precipitated in coarse particles the decrease in K is 
mainly due to fatigue effects (dislocation cell development and cell size change and 
arrangement) and not due to thermal ageing, i.e. further pronounced precipitation. 
The overall 3MA approach, by taking in addition other 3MA-quantities in account and 
combining these, has used a generic algorithm (Szielasko, 2001) for prediction of the Vickers 
E2 A E59 EG E59 S4 (stabilised) 
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hardness 10 and the G- value (Figure 22, Figure 23) with very high confidence level and 
regression coefficient. The G-value is the electrical residual resistance ratio which is defined 
as the ratio of the specific resistance measured at ambient temperature to the specific 
resistance measured at nitrogen temperature. G is a measure of impurity (foreign atoms in 
the iron matrix) of a material and here therefore is a direct measure of the Cu content of the 
precipitates. The MPA measures G very carefully in the laboratory and has compared the 
results with SANS measurements. There is a linear correlation (Figure 24). 
 
 
Fig. 22. 3MA prediction of the G-value 
 
 
Fig. 23. 3MA prediction of the Vickers hardness 10 
 
 
Fig. 24. Change in the G-value (G) compared with the change in Vol.% Cu precipitation 
(VCu) determination with SANS (measurements from the years 2001 and 2009) 
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With 3MA there is therefore a reliable ability to characterise the degradation in terms of the 
Cu precipitates volume fraction as well as in hardness. 
Concerning the expected DSA-effects the investigations have shown serrations in the stress-
strain diagrams only in the small temperature window 130-185°C. At service temperature it 
does not play a role. 
4. NDT characterisation of fatigue at austenitic stainless steels 
Activities to the non-destructive characterisation of fatigue phenomena at austenitic steels 
were performed in a co-operation with the Institute of Material Science and Engineering of 
the Technical University Kaiserslautern, Germany and started in 1999 with 2 PhD thesis’s 
(Bassler, H.J., 1999; Lang M., 1999). 
Austenitic steel of the grade AISI 321 (German grade 1.4541 - Ti-stabilised and AISI 347 
German grade 1.4550 - Nb-stabilised) is often used in power station and plant constructions. 
The evaluation of early fatigue damage and thus the remaining lifetime of austenitic steels is 
a task of enormous practical relevance. Meta-stable austenitic steel forms ferromagnetic 
martensite due to quasi-static and cyclic loading. This presupposes the exceeding of a 
threshold value of accumulated plastic strain. The amount of martensite as well as its 
magnetic properties should provide information about the fatigue damage. Fatigue 
experiments were carried out at different stress and strain levels at room temperature (RT) 
and at T = 300°C. The characterisation methods included microscopic techniques such as 
light microscopy, REM, TEM and scanning acoustic microscopy (SAM) as well as magnetic 
methods, ultrasonic absorption, X-ray and neutron diffraction. Sufficient amounts of 
mechanical energy due to plastic deformation lead to phase transformation from fcc 
austenite without diffusion to tetragonal or bcc ferromagnetic ‘-martensite. As the 
martensitic volume fractions are especially low for service-temperatures of about 300°C 
highly sensitive measuring systems are necessary. Besides systems on the basis of a HTC-
SQUID (High Temperature Super Conducting Quantum Interference Device) special 
emphasis was on the use of GMR-sensors (giant magnetoresistors) which have the strong 
advantage to be sensitive for DC-magnetic fields too without any need for cooling (Yashan, 
2008). In combination with an eddy-current transmitting coil and universal eddy-current 
equipment as a receiver the GMR-sensors were used especially to on-line monitoring the 
fatigue experiments in the servo-hydraulic fatigue machine. 
 
 
Fig. 25. Fatigue at RT 
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Fig. 26. Fatigue at 300°C 
As function of fatigue these steels at room temperature show secondary hardening caused 
by continuously increasing martensite formation. Martensitic volume fractions created at 
service temperature T = 300°C are too small to cause cyclic hardening. Generally speaking, 
an accelerated martensite formation leads to shortened life times in cyclic deformation 
experiments. At room temperature crack initiation mainly takes place in martensitic regions 
(besides slip bands in the austenite phase) and often starting at carbonitrides. In martensitic 
regions a zigzag-shaped crack path is observed causing slower crack propagation. At 
T = 300°C crack initiation only occurs at slip bands. Increasing martensite formation is an 
indicator for increasing material damage subsequent to cyclic loading. The detection of 
martensite at austenitic components can be seen as a hint to local plastic deformation and 
thus local damage. Figure 25 and Figure 26 show the fatigue damage development and 
accumulation in the case of the 1.4541 material (Ti stabilised) at RT and at 300°C as can be 
revealed by optical and electron microscopy as function of the load cycles in cyclic 
deformation curves. The one-step fatigue test was performed stress controlled and mean 
stress-free. 
By using the GMR as eddy current receiver online and in real time the fatigue experiment 
was monitored in the servo-hydraulic testing machine. Figure 27 (one-step fatigue tests) and 
Figure 28 (multiple step loading and load mix) document results obtained during online 
measurement in real time. 
 
 
 
Fig. 27. One-step stress controlled fatigue tests at room temperature 
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Fig. 28. Multiple step stress controlled fatigue test with time dependent load mix at room 
temperature 
The NDT-quantity measured is the eddy current GMR-transfer impedance (Figure 27) 
which clearly indicates the fatigue behaviour and gives an early warning before failure. In 
the case where the secondary hardening effect due to the martensite formation is 
pronounced (stress > 380MPa) the impedance shows this secondary hardening effect too. In 
the multiple step experiment the impedance follows exactly the time function of the total 
strain but with an off-set indicating the martensite development. 
It should be mentioned here that these monitoring technique was performed at plain carbon 
steel too. However, here the measuring effects are one order in magnitude smaller because 
not phase transformation to martensite takes place and only changes in the dislocation cell 
structure are to observe in the microstructure. 
The online monitoring measuring technique was enhanced at the technical university 
Kaiserslautern and another type of sensor was integrated by IZFP (Altpeter, I., Tschunky, R., 
Hällen, K., Dobmann, G., Boller, Ch., Smaga, M., Sorich, A., & Eifler, D., 2011) into the servo-
hydraulic machine. Because fatigue experiments should be monitored at service 
temperature of 300°C the idea was to integrate ultrasonic transducers in the clamping device 
of the fatigue specimen and to monitor the ultrasonic time-of-flight (tof) of a pulse 
propagating from the transmitter to the receiver transmitting the fatigue specimen (Figure 
29). Because of the high temperature exposition coupling-free electromagnetic acoustic 
transducers (EMAT) were used based on a pan cake eddy current coil superimposing a 
normal magnetic field produced by a permanent magnet. By exciting Lorentz forces radially 
polarized shear waves are excited (Salzburger, 2009). 
 
 
Fig. 29. Schematic diagram of wave propagation: wave propagation direction ‘z’ and particle 
displacement ‘r’ (a), fatigue specimen and EMAT probes with radial polarized wave type 
(b), clamped fatigue specimens (1) in grips, which enclose the transmitter at the one end and 
received at the other as well as Ferritescope (2) and an extensometer (3) (c) 
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The Ferritescope is used at room temperature experiments to measure the content of the 
developing martensite phase. The material investigated was the meta-stable AISI 347 with 
low C-content (0.04 weight %) and high Ni-content (10.64 weight %). Because of this fact a 
martensite phase transformation develops only at room temperature fatigue experiments. 
The fatigue tests were performed strain controlled, mean strain-free at a cycling frequency 
of 0.01 Hz with strain amplitudes 0.8, 1.0, 1.2 and 1.6 %. Figure 30 shows the measurement 
procedure to measure the tof which is determined as an average value between the 
maximum and minimum value obtained in each cycle (Figure 31). 
 
 
Fig. 30. Time-of-flight (tof) measurement procedure 
 
 
Fig. 31. Determination of the average (mean) tof-value at ambient temperature 
 
 
Fig. 32. Cyclic deformation curves at ambient temperature 
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Fig. 33. Mean tof-curves at ambient temperature 
The mean tof-value measured online shows a distinct behaviour as function of the fatiguing 
and is different in the case of ambient temperature and at 300°C. Figure 32 shows the cyclic 
deformation curves and Figure 33 the respective mean tof-curves where clearly the 
martensite development can be identified. The behaviour at 300°C is documented in the 
Figures 34 and Figure 35. 
 
 
Fig. 34. Cyclic deformation curves at 300°C 
 
 
Fig. 35. Behaviour of the mean tof-values at 300°C 
For further development of the tof-technique in order to be used for online monitoring of 
plant components Rayleigh surface waves or shear horizontal waves excited and received 
by EMATs will be applied. 
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5. NDT for characterisation of neutron degradation 
In the case of power plant components, such as pressure vessels and pipes, the fitness for 
use under mechanical loads is characterised in terms of the determination of mechanical 
properties such as mechanical hardness, yield and tensile strength, toughness, shift of 
Ductile-to-Brittle Transition Temperature (DBTT), fatigue strength. With the exception of 
hardness tests which are weakly invasive, all of these parameters can be determined within 
surveillance programs by using destructive tests only on special standardized samples 
(Charpy V samples and standard tensile test specimens). The specimens are exposed in 
special radiation chambers near the core of the Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) to a higher 
neutron flow than at the surface of the pressure vessel wall in order to generate a worst case. 
From time to time these specimens are removed from the chambers and used for destructive 
tests. The number of the samples is limited and in the future it will be very important that 
reliable non-destructive methods are available to determine the mechanical material 
parameters on these samples without destruction of the specimens. Furthermore an in situ 
characterisation of the reactor pressure vessel inner wall through the cladding is of interest 
for inservice inspection, additionally to the measurements on samples. 
To solve this task a combination testing technique based on 3MA and the dynamic 
magnetostriction measurement by using an EMAT (Electromagnetic Acoustic Transducers) 
was developed. 
 
 
Table 1. Material description of investigated Charpy samples, base and weld material 
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The neutron induced embrittlement results in microstructure changes. These microstructure 
changes are the generation of vacancies and precipitations of Cu-rich coherent particles 
(radius: 1-1.5 nm). This results in an increase of yield strength and tensile strength, a 
decrease of Charpy energy upper shelf value and an increase of DBTT. 
The potential of micromagnetic testing methods for detection of Cu-precipitates was 
demonstrated in chapter 3. The interaction between dislocations and copper particles leads 
to an increase of mechanical hardness and the interaction of the copper particles and Bloch-
walls leads to an increase of magnetic hardness. Since the dynamic magnetostriction is 
sensitive for lattice defects it was assumed that a magnetostrictively excited standing wave 
in the pressure vessel wall should reflect the neutron embrittlement too and first 
experiments were performed with a special designed magnetostrictive transducer at Charpy 
specimens in the hot cell in order to principally demonstrate the potential. 
Using several electromagnetic measurements at the same time, a variety of measuring 
quantities is derived for each measurement cycle. When combined, they achieve the desired 
result (e.g. material property) more efficiently compared to individual measurement. By 
using a calibration function or pattern recognition the desired quantity of an unknown set of 
samples investigated by that method can be detected non-destructively. 
Depending on the specific design of a pressure vessel –which varies in different countries –
the pressure vessel material in nuclear power plants is exposed to neutron fluences in the 
range between 5.6×1018 n/cm2 and 86.0×1018 n/cm2. In order to characterise the neutron 
irradiation-induced embrittlement, Charpy samples exposed to neutron fluence in the above 
mentioned range have been investigated in a hot cell at AREVA NP whereby only the 3MA 
and EMAT sensors were arranged within the hot cell and the electronic equipment (3MA 
and EMAT device) was outside. These Charpy samples (base material and weld material) of 
Russian and western design have been provided by AREVA NP and the Research Centre 
Dresden-Rossendorf (see Table 1). 
The result of the 3MA-approach based on pattern recognition algorithms are shown in 
Figure 36 (base material) and Figure 37 (weld material) in terms of changes in the DBTT 
evaluated at Charpy energy of 41J (T41). 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 36. 3MA prediction of T41 in case of the base materials 
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Fig. 37. 3MA prediction of T41 in case of weld materials 
As can be seen, excellent correlation coefficients on high confidence levels were obtained. 
Very important in this context is the contribution of the dynamic magnetostriction which is 
measured as the sensitivity to excite an ultrasonic standing wave in the base material under 
the cladding in the pressure vessel wall. Here the electrical conductivity and magnetic 
permeability in the ferritic-martensitic steel structure is higher than in the austenitic 
cladding and therefore the efficiency to excite eddy currents is enhanced but this region is 
also the most influenced microstructure by the irradiation.  
The enhanced electrical conductivity and permeability facilitate the excitation and the large 
lift-off effect of the transducer due to the cladding can be compensated by the higher eddy-
current density. 
 
 
Fig. 38. Magnetostrictively excited standing wave in the PV-wall 
 
 
Fig. 39. Inspection quantity selected E60 
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Fig. 40. Correlation of the quantity E60 with the DBTT shift at 41J Charpy energy 
Figure 38 shows the measurement principle and Figure 39 defines the measurement 
quantity E60 which is the dynamic magnetostriction, i.e. the magnetostrictively excited 
ultrasound amplitude when the transducer is using a magnetic field magnitude which is 
60% of the maximum field delivered by the current generator. The linear correlation of E60 
with T41 is documented in Figure 40. 
6. Conclusion 
By use of micromagnetic non-destructive techniques the ability to characterise materials 
ageing was demonstrated, in terms of hardness enhancement and Cu precipitation due  
to thermal degradation, in terms of supplying an early warning before fatigue life is  
elapsed due to Low Cycle Fatigue, and in terms of indicating the DBTT 41J shift when 
material degradation is due to neutron embrittlement. The demonstration was at well 
defined laboratory-type specimens but a high sensitivity and confidence in the results was 
obtained. 
However, the next development step to perform is the demonstration of the techniques at 
real life components and the integration in inservice testing respectively in ageing 
management procedures of real plants. This will in addition include UT by using EMAT. 
As the special application of EMAT sensors has demonstrated its reliable use at a service 
temperature of 300°C the integration of this sensor type into plant lifetime management 
systems should be an engineering problem which is to solve concerning the proper selection 
of cooling devices for the driving microelectronic systems and heat resistant wires for coils 
and cables especially isolated for high temperature access. 
An EMAT itself is ‘no more’ than a magnet-inductive transducer of which the induced eddy 
current field is superimposed by a magnetic field. The last can be static as well as dynamic. 
When the superimposed magnetic field is changed dynamically in a hysteresis loop the 
EMAT can be applied to collect as well other micromagnetic quantities as a combination 
sensor for 3MA.  
One strong critic comes always up when micromagnetic techniques are discussed for 
materials characterisation. This is the need of defined calibration specimens and the efforts 
for recalibration when transducers have to be adapted or are to replace after repair. 
Therefore the scientific community works hard to define and optimise robust calibration 
procedures to reduce or even to avoid the efforts and first success can be reported. 
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When material microstructure states are needed for reference to fix absolutely a time scale, 
for instance in fatigue life estimation, the procedure can be applied always when a 
component starts into new life, for instance after a replacement. 
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1. Introduction 
The aim of this Chapter is to describe several important human aspects of NPP operator 
teams that have significant effect on safe and efficient operations. The first part of the 
Chapter provides an overview about the concept of high reliability organisations, safety 
culture, focusing on the question how to conceptualise and measure safety culture, 
presenting two distinct perspectives about background of human unsafe acts. Based on 
theoretical and empirical works made in high reliability organisations, the second part of the 
Chapter aims to detail the paradox of human factors, describing the main task, job and 
teamwork characteristics of first line personnel.  
The first line personnel in the NPP control room works in team. There have been several 
attempts to describe the characteristics of efficient teamwork, although little is known about 
the antecedents of efficient teamwork in high reliability organisation. Based on the Input-
Process-Output model the empirical works aim to understand those inputs and processes 
that determine safe and efficient operator teamwork. 
After the theoretical considerations, the chapter synthesise different empirical works 
made in NPP control room analysing operator teamwork from different perspectives. 
Based on the theoretical works about specific task loads, the goal of Case study is to 
identify particular sources of task load, as inputs that influence operators well being. The 
revealed list of task load offers a practical guidance how to enhance operators’ well-being, 
safe and efficient work performance. Another important input of operator teamwork is 
the team members’ personality. Even though the NPP environment is strongly 
standardised, providing little room for individuals’ personality, team members’ 
characteristics influence how they behave and perform in this restricted environment. 
Based on Five Factor Model of personality the goal of Research 1 is to determine those 
personality traits that count for efficient teamwork, relating personality to team 
communication, to behavioural markers of team members, and performance. Operator 
team is a professional work team, requiring the interaction of team members representing 
different areas of speciality. It is important to understand how the operator team members 
having specific technical and professional knowledge are able to operate and manage 
jointly the plant system. Communication as a key process is used to share specific technical 
and human aspects of the plant parameters, operations, establishing the shared 
knowledge about the plant, environment, task and team members. This shared knowledge 
helps the operator team to develop joint strategies in order to manage the plant and to 
share different levels of task load during their operation. Research 2 aims to describe 
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characteristics of efficient team communication, to relate operator team communication to 
performance and to different levels of task load. The output of teamwork communication 
manifests in shared knowledge, the output of effective balance between demands created 
by high level of task load and operators resources is shown in the team well being. The 
most important output of teamwork is the team performance. In order to enhance team 
performance those input and process factors should be considered that determine efficient 
and effective performance. In sum, the present Chapter aims to provide theoretical 
background to understand the human factors of operator teamwork, and through the 
empirical works aims to reveal those factors that influence team performance.  
All the presented empirical works were made in Hungarian NPP. The Hungarian NPP 
located in Paks, along river Danube, houses four nuclear reactor units, and covers more than 
40% of national energy production.  
2. Safe and efficient operations 
Advances in technology have remarkably improved an organisation’s ability to build and 
manage hazardous technologies. Although, hazardous technologies are not maintained for 
their own sake, but to improve the quality of life of human beings. Since the complexity of 
hazardous technologies has extensively spread, the balance between safe and efficient 
actions has been widely acknowledged. It is often claimed that the management should 
endeavour to find the right balance between safe and financially, economically efficient 
operations (Reason, 1997). This equilibrium becomes crucial in the case of high reliability 
organisations that can be described as organisations that are faced with high hazard 
situations, and for this reason they try to achieve and maintain high reliability, safe and 
efficient performance, while managing complex systems.  
First in the 1960s, three organisations were considered as high reliability organisations: the 
US air traffic control system, organisations operating at nuclear power stations, and the US 
Navy nuclear aircraft carrier operations. The initial definitions were less precise saying that 
hazardous systems are organisations that should function almost without errors, accidents. 
This broad definition raises the question how to interpret “almost without” or “near error-
accident free function”. This unclear definition has been changed to a more precise 
interpretation, which instead of error, accident rate emphasises the effective management of 
inherently risky technologies or environment. Another expression, describing organisations 
in which there is more than normal chance for damage one’s own life, the life of others or to 
material property is called high risk environments (Dietrich & Childress, 2004). The latter 
concept focuses on the inner characteristics of these organisations, high risk, hazards, while 
the former emphasizes the efficient management of high-hazard situations.  
In the present work high reliability organisation and high risk environment concepts are used 
interchangeably to describe organisations such as a Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) where the 
idea of safety is not just a theoretical concept, but an eternal, conscious endeavour to 
maintain safety in the nature of the high hazard operation, environment. 
2.1 Differences and similarities between high reliability organisations 
Recent researches on high reliability organisations deal with domains in health, safety and 
environmental issues, including studies about the personnel of aircraft, air traffic control, 
nuclear power stations, operating rooms, medical team, intensive care units, fire service 
(Reason, 1997). Even though these organisations have some strong common characteristic in 
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their function, it is necessary to consider the differences between local features, such as the 
output of erroneous actions, types of damages stemmed from inefficient work, the degree of 
standardisation of action and of communication, the size and structure of team. In the case 
of a NPP the output of erroneous action is the most severe, demanding high number of 
fatalities, or worst case environmental catastrophe, while in medical field a committed error 
leads to relatively low number of fatalities. Despite these specific features, there is a list of 
joint characteristics of these organisations stemming from the duty of efficiently and reliably 
managing high reliability situations. One of the main characteristics of high-reliability 
organisations may be described by the eternal endeavour to collect, analyse information 
about errors, incidents, near misses, sources of potential accidents, such as mistakes, lapses, 
slips. The aim of information collection and analyses is to enhance the safety of the system. For 
example, in an NPP data and information gathered from reports about unsafe acts are used 
in order to improve the training procedures, or to refine rules, procedures that govern safe 
operations.  
The process of establishing technical standards, norms, and procedures to implement 
guidelines for safe actions has led to a high level of standardisation. Standardization can be 
regarded as the key element in minimizing unsafe acts. The efficient and reliable 
management of high-hazard situations necessitates highly level of training, to have the 
fundamental professional knowledge about the function of the systems, about events, and 
about the correct actions. In NPP, the simulation centres provides the opportunity to 
establish, update and practice professional knowledge, at the same time to drill compliance 
with rules, procedures. 
The obligation to manage efficiently and safely an innately hazard environment implies a 
strong pressure on the first line personnel to provide high-level performance under all 
possible circumstances. This high pressure is indispensable to maintain safe acts; however, it 
can have its own adverse effects. As a response to this strong pressure, the highly trained 
first line personnel have developed a strong sense of invulnerability. The recognition of 
effects of stress or the acknowledgement of vulnerability to error is an indispensable part of 
efficient stress and error management strategy. This does not imply that the organisations 
should decrease the pressure to high-level of performance, but rather to underline the 
importance of performing efficiently and reliably, without the pressure to cover up, or to 
hide the errors, and vulnerability. The personnel should be given more information about 
the effects of stress with guidance on how to manage stressful situations, such as the 
reallocation of human resources between team members.  
Due to high-level standardisation the first line personnel need to work mainly under a low 
or moderate level of task load. The vast majority of operations in a NPP are highly automated, 
in this situation the personnel need to monitor, follow the processes and to react on the 
specific events. The personnel need to be aware of the eternal presence of external factors 
that threaten the safety and effectiveness of operations. This awareness of new unfamiliar 
event emergence causes continuous alertness, one of the main sources of high task load in a 
high- risk environment (Mumaw, 1994).  
3. The paradox of human factors in NPP operations 
3.1 Autonomy vs. control 
High reliability organisations strive for minimizing hazardous, unsafe actions while 
improving operational efficiency by keeping maximum control and implementing strict 
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procedures that prescribe how to act, interact, and communicate under certain conditions 
(Gudela & Zala-Mező, 2004). On the other hand, the first line personnel is composed of 
individuals with high professional knowledge, highly skilled and experienced persons, with 
the strong need to manipulate and control their environment, striving for autonomy. 
Autonomy is a self determination regarding which goals, rule, and procedures to follow. 
Hackman and Oldham (1975, as cited in Byrne & Davis, 2006) defined job autonomy as the 
degree of freedom that employees have in order to schedule, choose and determine the 
method how to accomplish his/her tasks, responsibilities and work. Control is an influence 
to guide or regulate the activities or operation of a person, system or machine. In work-
related settings, the constellation when a person has little autonomy and strong centrally 
determined control is called strong situation (Barrick & Mount, 1993). In high risk 
environment the management is committed to minimize uncertainty with strong centralized 
control; this in turn will not allow the local actors to be engaged in situations where they 
have the opportunity to use their professional knowledge. In strong situations, individual 
differences in knowledge, skills, abilities, experience, and personality has little opportunity 
to be manifested, because individual’s actions are constrained by a variety of external factors 
including detailed rules, standard operation procedures, and supervision. In contrast, high 
degree of autonomy and low control situations, so called weak situations, permit or even 
elicit individual differences, where individual characteristics would play a major role in 
behaviour, actions to accomplish assigned tasks.  
The paradox between the centralised control and the need for local autonomy could be 
dissolved by the implementation of right balance between centrally defined rules 
procedures and opportunities to use expert knowledge.  
3.2 ”The golden rule is that there are no golden rules” (George Bernard Shaw)  
The need to reduce uncertainty is manifested by the need to foresee all the possible events, 
including normal situations and operations deviating from normal events. Uncertainty 
reduction is achieved by developing standardized procedures, rules for all the potential 
cases. In this sense standardization proves to be the key element of coping with uncertainty 
at organizational level. The paradox is caused by the fact that overregulated behaviour 
guided by strict rules may impede local actors to adapt to and manage situations when the 
rules are incomplete or inappropriate. During these uncertain events, especially during 
abnormal operations the appropriate action depends on reasonable flexibility between the use 
of procedures and professional knowledge (Gudela & Zala-Mező, 2004). In NPP industry 
60% of human performance problems are associated with wrong or inapplicable rules, 
procedures (Reason, 1997). In sum, harmful effects of high standardisation could be 
demonstrated by the incapability of reaction to those uncertain situation which lack 
adequate rules, and by an over-reliance on inappropriate rules. The detrimental effects of 
high standardisation can be avoided by the use of deep professional knowledge and 
experience. 
3.3 Certainty of uncertainty 
Due to strong standardisation the work of first line personnel mainly consists of periods 
of low and moderate levels of workload. During a low workload period, the personnel 
need to monitor and detect different sources of information, or to scan and follow 
particular parameters. During a period of moderate workload, the personnel need to react 
on certain parameters, information from different sources of the control panel, based on 
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predefined rules, procedures. This period of the work is described by routine operations. 
During a period of low and moderate workload the aim is to keep the system in 
equilibrium, to sustain or to improve the function of the complex system (Waller et al., 
2004). The task accomplishment is described by foreseeable actions and the steps, the 
decisions are mainly based on the application of prescribed rules, procedures. Even 
though, the “sharp end” personnel are exposed to the emergence of unexpected events 
(Mumaw, 1994). This constant alertness evokes high workload on the personnel’s capacity to 
adapt from the routine to non-routine actions, where the appropriate reaction relies, not 
just on rules-based behaviour, but more on expert knowledge to manage the unfamiliar 
and uncertain problems. The occurrence of uncertain situations can hardly be predicted, 
thus the adaptability to dynamic task load, flexible change from predictable to 
unpredictable situations is considered to be the key characteristics of managing complex 
system functioning. 
3.4 Centralisation vs. decentralisation  
The management of complex technologies necessitates the implementation of a 
conventional hierarchy, where the hierarchical structure of information and interaction flow, 
chain of actions is kept under control by centralised persons. The effective handling of an 
unexpected, uncertain event, where the rules do not cover the situation or they are not 
appropriate for the tasks in hand, the reliance on decentralised actions of the professional 
experts can be the crucial aspect of reliable and efficient performance. In this way it could 
be stated that in efficient high reliable organisations a decentralised hierarchy should 
coexist with a centralised hierarchy, in the form of adaptability from a hierarchical 
centralisation structure to a decentralised professional mode. This flexibility is an 
important way of achieving common, joint awareness of the situation, and to share the 
high task load between the team members, increasing the teams’ capacity to face high task 
demands (Reason, 1997).  
3.5 Individual- vs. teamwork  
Work teams consist of highly trained individuals with special expert knowledge. Each 
person is responsible for one specific area of the complex system. The intensive and constant 
pressure to perform efficiently and reliably, the high expectations from the organisation as 
well as from the society, stress out the importance of well established professional 
knowledge that guides the behaviour of these personnel under any circumstances. In this 
way the training of first line personnel is mainly focused on practicing professional technical 
knowledge, such as the management of the complex system. On the other hand, researches 
about safety functioning show that one of the major contributing factors of accidents, unsafe 
acts are not linked to the lack of professional knowledge related to technical aspects of the 
complex system, but rather to the failures of efficient teamwork, such as inappropriate 
communication, coordination (Flin et al., 2002). The duality lies in the fact that even though 
these operators are highly trained and strive for independence, the efficient system 
functioning depends on teamwork. The central point of this paradox is caused by the fact 
that the variety of the systems exceeds the variety of the persons who control them (Reason, 
1997). In this way the nature of these systems requires cooperation between the first line 
personnel. Since the cooperation, communication and coordination within the team is 
efficient, the end of these processes could exceed the variability of individuals, which in turn 
could minimize the unbalance between the variability of the system and the variability of 
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the human controllers. All work teams can include team members who prefer to work alone, 
rather than to work in group, to share information, cooperate with other team members. 
Also demands of the tasks can influence the level of the necessity of cooperation in 
teamwork (Thompson 1967 as cited in Blyton et al., 1989; Gudela & Zala-Mező, 2004; 
Hellriegel & Slocum, 2007).  
4. The relevance of teamwork in NPP 
More and more organisations prefer to restructure the workflow around teams. This is 
particularly true in the case of high reliability organisations, where the actions are based 
on technically complex operations. The increased complexity of operations requires the 
knowledge, experience, skills and abilities of more than one person, as the management of 
complex problems is too demanding for one individual. Furthermore, technological 
developments have led to a high variety of the system. As mentioned above this system 
variety exceeds the variety of the human controller’s characteristics. No wonder that 
professional work teams have started to play a crucial role in the management of complex 
operations, where the team members need to interact and integrate their individual 
capabilities to efficiently cope with the variety in the system they coordinate. Even though 
the education, training of individuals become more specialised, the problems that the 
teams need to face turns out to be more complex, requiring an inter- and multidisciplinary 
contribution. This line of reasoning underlines the demand of discipline specialisation, the 
justness of heterogeneous teams, where the team members posses specific roles 
knowledge, expertise (Ballard et al., 2008; Barry & Stewart, 1997; Cooke et al., 2001; 
Kiekel, & Cooke, 2004; Mathieu et al., 2000; Cannon-Bowers et al., 1993). 
4.1 NPP control room operator teams 
NPP control room is the central point for safe and reliable plant system coordination. 
Control room operators are responsible for maintaining safe and correct running of plant 
operations and optimising all of its parameters. The operators’ primary task is to monitor 
important plant parameters and to coordinate the efficient functioning of the reactor and its 
support system. The operators also direct activities of the personnel in the outer fields of the 
plant (for example maintenance staff). For safe and reliable plant operations the 
synchronisation of different support systems is needed. The control room operator team 
requires the interaction of six members: Unit Shift Supervisor, Reactor Operator, Turbine 
Operator, Turbine Chief Mechanician, Unit Electrician, and Shift Leader. The professional 
supervisor of the operator team is the Engineer in Duty.   
When taking into account the group’s definition (Cooke & Gorman, 2006) saying that a group 
consists of two or more individuals assembled together for a special common purpose, 
operator teams can be considered as a group. Furthermore, the operators in the control room 
can be considered as a team, because they exceed the characteristics of the group, consisting of 
members with specific and varied roles and with some degree of interdependence among the 
members. A team is “a distinguishable set of two or more people who interact, dynamically, 
interdependently an adaptively toward a common and valued goal, each of whom has been 
assigned specific roles or functions to perform, and who has a limited life-span of 
membership” (Salas et al, 1992 as cited in Salas & Fiore, 2002). The assemble of the operators in 
the control room is considered to be a team, inasmuch as they all need to follow and achieve a 
common goal: to obtain and maintain the optimal plant parameters and to detect and react on 
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incidents deviating from the normal conditions. The output of efficient coordination manifests 
in the „syntonization” with the entire plant. A control room operator team is a heterogeneous 
professional work team. Heterogeneous because the roles, responsibilities, tasks within the 
team are distributed heterogeneously between the team members. Moreover, the operator 
team is distinguished from other types of teams falling into the category of work teams. Work 
teams are relatively stable in terms of time, team objectives, goals and team members, where 
the individuals have stable work roles (Cohen & Bailey, 1997). An operator team can be 
considered as a professional work team highly differentiated from other teams by means of the 
exclusive membership of experts, where the team members represent different areas of 
speciality. The teams execute operations under technologically complex conditions, which 
require extended training and preparation from the organization as well as from the 
individuals focused on the development of both professional and social skills (Dietrich & 
Childress, 2004; Cooke et al., 2000). 
4.2 Team Input-Process-Output model 
Despite the renaissance of teamwork, relatively little is known about how the individual 
contributes to the team processes and outcomes. The dominant way of thinking about the 
team is the Input-Process-Output (IPO) model. The model posits that a variety of inputs are 
combined to influence processes, which in turn affect team outputs. This model has a 
powerful influence on recent empirical research on team effectiveness, and on theories 
studying the influencing factors of team performance (Salas et al., 1992; Barrick et al., 1998; 
Essens et al., 2005). Hackman (1987) divided the inputs into three categories: 1) individual-
level factors (team member attributes, personality, knowledge and skills), 2) team-level 
factors (structure and size) and 3) environmental-level factors (task characteristics, level of 
the autonomy). Intragroup processes refers to interactions that take place among the team 
members and include interaction patters such as conflict, efforts toward leadership and 
those communication patters that differentiate teams from each other. Each team has its own 
communication style depending on the environment they are working in. Team output 
refers to team outcomes associated with productivity, performance, as well as capability of 
team members to continue the work cooperatively.  
Based on the IPO model we would like to present those inputs-process-output variables that 
could count as important factors in NPP.  
Team inputs could be distinguished in three categories:  
 Team members’ characteristics, such as team members’ knowledge, ability, skills, 
personality. In case of NPP operator teams, the emphasis is on the team members’ 
professional knowledge, although the team members need to posses social skills and 
abilities for teamwork.  
 Tasks characteristics: level of autonomy and control; level of task interdependence; 
different level of task load, task complexity, uncertainty. The control room operator 
team needs to face different levels of task load, necessitating a continuous behavioural 
adaptation from the team members. 
 Organisational process: organisational culture employee selection, training, 
performance appraisal, reward system. In a NPP environment safety is the central key 
concept that appears in the practice of each organisational process.  
Process variables include all the written and unspoken rules, norms, beliefs, and team 
processes such as communication, information exchange, coordination, cooperation, 
leadership, and stress management.  
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Output variables include the quantitative and qualitative aspects of team performance, 
effectiveness, efficiency, productivity, team members’ satisfaction, well being, and 
commitment. The current and the future performance predict the capability whether the 
team continue to work together as a unit or not. The most important measure of team 
effectiveness is the current performance assessment of the team, which is based on either 
supervisor ratings of team productivity or objective indicators of team quantity and quality 
of productivity. Another critical measure of team effectiveness is the assessment of the 
team’s capability to continue functioning as a unit. 
5. Inputs of operator teamwork 
5.1 Task load and workload 
For those working in the control room of a NPP the level of task load continuously changes. 
In the work setting task load can be considered as an objective difficulty connected to the 
properties of a task and the term workload, is used when referring to how a situation is 
perceived by the people facing the task (Gudela et al., 2004). In our concept task load is 
considered as the sources of stressor that are related to the task environment and task 
fulfilment. Task load as a demand is inherent in the objective circumstances of the task and 
of the environment.  
5.1.1 Sources of task load in a NPP 
NPP operator teams need to work under various levels of task load, during normal operations 
there is always a chance for an unexpected, novel event that can have a strong effect on the 
team members’ behaviour. High level of task load may be a consequence of sudden and 
unexpected high demands that disrupt the normal procedures of task accomplishment. Task 
environments are complex and often unpredictable; the causes of the events are sometimes 
unclear, even though they demand a quick and immediate response. The personnel must 
perform multiple tasks under high time pressure, noise, heat or other type of stressors. The 
consequences of poor performance are immediate and severe (Driskell et al, 2006). 
Early stress approaches focus on the environment characteristics that have a direct impact 
on the operators. With the introduction of new technology the focus has shifted to task 
demands that operators are faced with. In the process of individual performance gradually 
increased the task complexity and the necessity of internal resource. In a NPP surrounding 
the following distinct categories as sources of task load can be distinguished:  
 Environmental factors 
The activity of control room operators and technical personnel are severely monitored by 
the management, the state, local government, the media and the citizens, causing a high 
pressure to perform without unsafe acts. Any slips, lapses, mistakes, delays, near misses or 
accidents should be analysed later and the operators, staff members are aware of their 
responsibilities in line with this. In a workplace such as a NPP the licensed operators need to 
be highly qualified persons who are requested to periodically renew their licences taking 
simulator-based requalification exams. Continuous professional trainings, exams can 
extensively load the personnel causing performance anxiety, which has been shown to be 
associated with performance decrements during trainings and exams. 
The operator teams are exposed to facing several external and internal environmental task 
load factors which may have significant effects on their operations. Hockey (1986, as cited in 
Mumaw, 1994) classifies external environmental factors in two categories: a) The physical 
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environment includes high heat, poor lightening, protective clothing, noise, and vibration. 
The control room operators’ concentrated activity may be disturbed by a high number of 
activated alarms. b) The social environment includes cooperation with each other, managing 
conflicts between operators, communication, increased demands of coordination with the 
personnel, and the requirement of keeping each other informed of event progress. The next 
three environmental stressors are considered as internal determinant of physiological state 
such as c) drug use such as caffeine, nicotine, depressants, alcohol. Under certain conditions 
some of these can facilitate task performance while others may impede it. d) Fatigue states 
caused by prolonged work, sleep deprivation or disruption and e) cyclical changes-regular, 
periodic changes in hormonal levels, alertness, body temperature due to sudden changes in 
work shift.  
In general, in a NPP environment, control room personnel and support staff are well 
protected from the environmental changes mentioned above because the back-up system is 
well functioning and highly reliable. 
 Factors related to the characteristics of the task  
An occurrence of novel and uncertain event such as loss of critical information, failed 
implementation of a plan is a serious phenomenon that should be considered. Novelty refers 
to events that have not been experienced before and are perceived as a potential risk. 
Uncertainty generally refers to an inability to know how an event will progress or be 
resolved or the lack of exact information how to act properly. The role of technology as a 
source of stress such as unfriendly interfaces can increase information uncertainty. Novelty 
can be tied to uncertainty when a situation is novel, as there is no expectation about the 
outcomes. Both novelty and uncertainty are significant sources of task load for control room 
operators. To reduce the effects of these types of task load more information should be 
provided to the operators, which could make events more predictable, getting back the 
control over the event’s outcomes.  
In NPP settings the task demands are very high and the increased occurrence of unsafe acts 
is likely to occur due to greater requirements in task demands. Time pressure, increased 
monitoring of plant state and increased job complexity due to multiple task accomplishment 
are additional sources of task load contributing to higher level perceived stress, workload. 
Stress may be defined as a state of imbalance between environmental demands and the 
human’s resources for dealing with the demands. The effects of time pressure impede the 
task performance in two ways. On one hand, under high time pressure people may perform 
the task more quickly at the expense of accuracy. On the other hand, performers may give 
an incomplete performance and the decision-making process can potentially produce 
significant errors. Multiple task accomplishment may have a negative effect when multiple 
sources of information need to be monitored or consulted simultaneously. Under these 
circumstances the shift in the focus of attention is needed for an effective task performance, 
although, this fast change, adaptation is impaired by the narrowed, focused attention. 
Complex multiple task environments strain the performer’s cognitive resources. Cognitive 
load is provoked by stressful conditions where the performer’s attention becomes more and 
more narrowly focused on cues of tasks and less sensitive to the more peripheral cues. 
Conditions described by a huge amount of information activate certain attention filters 
causing an increased selectivity of attention during perception of the tasks components. The 
filters serve as a protection from cognitive overload. A high amount of information process 
loads the working memory capacity that requires storing temporally relevant environmental 
cues, rules, procedures related to task accomplishment. 
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5.1.2 Reactions to task load 
It is not enough to measure the task characteristics causing demands independently of 
individuals’ ability because the difficulty in a stress situation is due to the degree of 
mismatch between task demands and human resources. A well-experienced operator 
possesses more abilities, skills, resources helping to cope with high demands in an 
overwhelming situation. For this reason, confronting with the same task a very experienced 
operator perceives less workload compared to an inexperienced one. Workload for 
individuals depends on the relationship between the cognitive resources of the individual 
and the demands of the situation. Experience is positively related to decision quality under 
high stress. Well established professional knowledge stimulates the person to analyse 
systematically the situation, to seek optimal solution, loading the cognitive resources 
(Fiedler, 1995). During high task load and under time pressure there is no room for 
systematic elaboration, in this way professional knowledge may impede a fast and efficient 
reaction. Professional knowledge by itself, without experience may impede the optimal 
contribution during high task load situations, due to the strong need to seek rational 
solutions which may not be available. Although, experience enriches the person with higher 
perceived control in the vast majority of the situations, and provide the feeling of comfort 
and stability during managing events. Experience enables the operators to react in an 
appropriate way without the need to think systematically.  
All the stress theories emphasise the interaction between a person and the environment, 
looking at stress as a misfit between them. Cooper (1998) provides an approach to describe 
why one person seems to flourish while another suffers in the same situation. Individuals 
try to maintain equilibrium between environmental demands and their own resources. The 
person’s physical and emotional state has a “range of stability” in other words “comfort 
zone” in which the individual feels stable, comfortably maintaining the control over the 
situation. The individual strives to cope with the external and internal sources of task load 
in order to restore the feeling of control and comfort. The balance between demands and 
resources should be kept by the persons’ endeavour to mobilize his/her own resources. The 
level of stress depends on the individual perception of the mismatch that can be considered 
as workload.  
Resources play an important role in the stress process. Skills, knowledge and ability are 
important resources to manage the task in hand and to cooperate with the team members. In 
a control room the operator team members can share the high level of workload by 
exchanging information via communication and asking each other to provide direct 
support. In order to support operators in keeping the balance between task demands and 
their resources, information should be provided to personnel about different sources of task 
load and potential limits and strength in resources, enlightening the personnel about the 
certain effects of task loads.  
5.1.3 Consequences of task and workload  
While there are some positive effects associated with high level of task load, such as the 
increased level of arousal, the high level of vigilance, wide range of cognitive skills may be 
affected at individual and team level, leading to various psychological, physical, 
behavioural problems.   
What price do we pay for imbalance between resources and demands? Scientifics have 
identified the physical and behavioural symptoms of stress that affect individuals’ well being. 
Physical symptoms of stress include: insomnia, constant tiredness, headaches, cramps and muscle 
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spasms, high blood pressure. Behavioural symptoms of stress include counterproductive 
behaviour such as absenteeism, aggressive behaviour, swear words, frequent drug use, 
smoking, loss of interest in other people, loss of sense of humour, difficulty in concentrating. 
Psychological problems: include constant irritability with people, feeling unable to cope with 
stress, lack of interest in life, feeling of ugliness. All these symptoms cause not only human 
suffering but they also imply economical costs.  
In order to avoid the negative consequences of uncertainty, task load, there have been 
strong efforts to foresee as many non routine situations as possible deviating from normal 
operations and to develop standardized procedures. High level of standardisation has been 
developed in order to reduce the influence of individual differences in the perception of 
imbalance between demands and resources.  
5.1.4 Case study 
Some years ago in the Hungarian Nuclear Power Plant a new model for monitoring and 
assessing the psychological state of the front line employees was worked out. A new model, 
called Psychological State Assessment (PSA) was developed in order to capture whether 
adaptation to the task load endangers employees’ health and safe, effective work. The model 
is based on previously revealed sources of task load relevant in the work of first line 
personnel. The goal of the model is to provide guidance to assess employees’ psychological 
state, and identify symptoms that could endanger safe work behaviour. The application of 
the model during several years promoted the establishment of preventive attitude in the 
organisation, providing counselling and training system, and various health promotion 
programs for employees.  
First of all, job analysis was carried out to identify the sources of the main task load for the 
first line personnel. Based on these results a 41-item questionnaire was compiled and sent to 
380 employees. 61% of the persons sent back the questionnaire so our sample consists of 231 
workers’ answers.  
Analysing the fulfilled questionnaires by means of factor analyses the sources of task load 
were categorised in three groups: 1) Task, 2) Environment and 3) Organisation. 
1. Task: Complexity of job (high amount of information to be provided and to be received, 
high level of attention and concentration, great amount of cooperation); Constant 
alertness, readiness, decision (decision making and working under time pressure, 
unexpected events, continuous alertness, responsibility for decisions consequences); 
Work shift (multi-shifts, overtime); Continuous learning (requalification exams, following 
technological developments). 
2. Environment: Working conditions (working equipments and devices, the materials, the 
equipments, the protective outfits, hygienic conditions, changing room, restroom, 
dining room); Physical environment (climate control, noise, lighting, potentially 
dangerous circumstances). 
3. Organization: Organizational operation (roles and responsibilities, over-regulated work 
process, information flow in the organisation); Atmosphere at work (work climate, work 
conflicts); Organizational instability (organizational changes influencing the work, 
employment uncertainty).  
In the following, factors are summarised that decrease or increase employees’ well being: 
Factor influencing well being negatively: shift work, overregulatedness, responsibility and 
decision making, increased attention and concentration, work overload, time pressure, 
permanent learning, and exams. 
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Factor influencing well being positively: experience of success, problem-solving, good 
community and atmosphere at work, opportunity to develop, wider knowledge, interesting, 
various exercises, human relation, communication, professional challenges, which require 
creativity, “correct” salary. 
5.2 Team members’ personality  
The job characteristics of the operator teams of a Nuclear Power Plant are complex and 
highly controlled in which there are considerable demands and pressures to behaviour 
conformity and a person is restricted in the range of his/her own behaviour. Thus, 
individual differences in personality characteristics are more likely to influence the specific 
behaviour a person adopts. This type of environment determines and regulates the team 
members’ communication flow that consists of team and task-oriented utterances. The role 
of personality in team process and team performance is unarguable. All these circumstances 
lead our focus on analysing the relationship between the employees’ communication and 
observable behaviour and their personality traits.  
Personality is an important factor in accounting for how employees behave in teams and in 
the organisation. The interest in identifying personality predictors of job performance has 
led researchers to use the Five Factor Personality Model as an important conceptual 
framework. The development of the Five-Factor Model (FFM) is an important event in the 
history of personality psychology because provides taxonomy for measuring personality 
traits. It describes personality traits based on five basic dimensions (Costa & McCrae, 1992).  
i. Neuroticism (N): The tendency to experience nervousness, tension, anxiety, emotional 
instability, hostility and sadness.  
ii. Extraversion (E): An energetic approach to the external world, including sociability, 
assertiveness and positive emotionality. 
iii. Openness to experience (O): Describes the breadth, depth, originality and complexity 
of an individual’s mental and experiential life. 
iv. Agreeableness (A): The quality of one's interpersonal interactions along a continuum 
from compassion and altruism to antagonism. 
v. Conscientiousness (C): Persistence, organization, and motivation in goal-directed 
behaviours, and socially prescribed impulse control. 
The predictive power of the model within the employment context has often been 
demonstrated (Barrick & Mount, 1991; Tett et al., 1991; Piedmont & Weinstein, 1994; 
Salgado, 2001; Gellatly & Irving, 2001). In a review of Moynihan (2004) three basic 
theoretical perspectives explain the nature of personality effects on team performance. 
Universal approach: certain traits always predict teamwork process and team performance. 
Contingent approach: certain traits predict team performance depending on the task and 
organisational culture. Configurational approach: the mix of traits within a team and the fit of 
individual members with each other predict team performance.  
Universal approach: Conscientiousness (C) has been examined in team performance because it 
is a reliable predictor of individual and team performance in field and laboratory settings 
(Neuman & Wright, 1999; Lepine et al., 1997; Barry & Stewart, 1997; Waung & Brice, 1998). 
Conscientiousness has consistently been found to be positively related to task focus and team 
performance, but only when both the team level and the leaders’ conscientiousness are high. 
But it seems that in creative tasks, for example, a brainstorming study found that when team 
members are allowed to discuss strategies, teams composed of highly conscientious people 
produce better-quality performance (in terms of feasibility), whereas teams composed of low-
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conscientiousness members produce a greater quantity of potential solutions. Tasks that 
require creativity may moderate the relationship between team conscientiousness and task 
performance. Therefore, Conscientiousness may be broadly applicable across numerous types 
of tasks, but may not predict specific types of tasks that require a high degree of creativity. The 
level of Conscientiousness in a team influences team functioning and outcomes. High level of 
Conscientiousness facilitates cooperation and creates an atmosphere in which individual team 
members are willing to learn from each other resulting in satisfied team-mates. If the level of 
Conscientiousness is low, no one feels responsible for a task, and team members do not stick to 
agreements or decision. All this can cause intragroup conflicts, stress and thus dissatisfaction. 
Conscientiousness relates to satisfaction and learning if the team is autonomous. A high level 
of autonomy is necessary to make decisions concerning any kind of work issues increasingly 
intensive intra-team communication and the mutual adjustment of efforts. If the team 
members are conscientious, they actively participate in decision making, and there is an 
opportunity to learn. So by sharing work-related attitudes and cooperating with each other, 
teamwork improves, contributes to satisfaction (Molleman et al., 2004). 
The trait of Extraversion (E) has been shown to have positive effects on individual job 
performance for jobs requiring a high degree of social interaction (Barrick & Mount, 1991; 
Mount & Barrick, 1995; Littlepage et al., 1995). Teams higher in mean levels of Extraversion 
receive higher supervisor ratings of team performance than teams low on Extraversion. 
Teams with more extraverted members tend to be more socially cohesive and more highly 
evaluated by their supervisors. The degree of variance of Extraversion has a curvilinear 
relationship to task performance suggesting that too many or too few extraverts in a team 
can be inefficient. In general, Extraversion appears to facilitate cohesive team process, but 
only at moderate levels.  
Teams with high mean levels of Agreeableness (A) have higher team viability, because 
Agreeableness is characterized by the concern for the team over desires and interests. In 
teams of management students working on a case study analysis and presentation task, 
individuals high on Agreeableness were more likely to be rated as cooperative team 
members by their peers. Low levels of Agreeableness (high individualism) are associated 
with reduced individual effort or social loafing in teams. Individuals low on Agreeableness 
tended to be unresponsive to teammates and tended to focus on their own task performance 
(Wagner, 1995; Comer, 1995). 
Neuroticism (N) has been identified as a detrimental variable for team performance, and 
productivity. Teams with negative affective tone (negative affectivity or neuroticism) 
experienced higher rates of absenteeism. In sum Neuroticism is negatively associated with 
cohesive team process and effective decision making.  
Contingent approach: According to this perspective the optimal team performance depends 
on the nature of the work, task and the organizational culture. These situational variables 
have moderating effects on the relationship between personality and team process or 
performance. Some studies consider the role of moderators in the relationship between 
personality traits and job performance (Barrick & Mount, 1993; Gellatly & Irving, 2001; Bono 
& Vey, 2007). The most important moderator is the situation in which the job performance 
takes place. The level of task autonomy moderates the relationship between personality and 
job performance: personality-performance correlations are founded to be higher in highly 
autonomous work situation than in less autonomous work situations (Beaty et al., 2001). The 
Agreeableness and performance relation is positive when the autonomy is low. When the 
autonomy is low, high level of agreeableness can helps the team member to achieve a higher 
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level of performance, while in high autonomy situations agreeableness can impede a high 
level of performance. This result indicates that personality-contextual performance 
correlations vary across situations with different expectations for performance. Personality 
and contextual performance behaviour is most strongly correlated when there are only weak 
cues and less correlated when there are strong cues.  
Configurational approach: Certain personality traits may interact with others to result in 
desirable, as well as undesirable workplace behaviours depending on the pattern and 
interactions of other traits. Studies on team composition attributes have highlighted the 
relationship between team composition characteristics and team outcomes, but the results are 
inconsistent. Most of researchers have found a positive relationship between the mean level of 
Conscientiousness in a team and performance (Barrick & Mount, 1991; Hogan & Ones, 1997). 
Using the supervisory rating as a reliable measurement of workplace behaviour and 
performance, the evaluations show that highly conscientiousness workers (C) being low in 
Agreeableness received lower ratings of job performance than highly conscientiousness 
workers being high on Agreeableness. Highly conscientious workers who lack interpersonal 
sensitivity may be ineffective, particularly in jobs requiring cooperative interchange with 
others (Witt et al., 2002; Barrick & Mount, 1993; Molleman, 2004). If all team members are 
highly conscientious, each member contributes to the team task, and this will lead to many 
opportunities of learning from each others, facilitating cooperation. However, if the level of 
Conscientiousness is low, no one will feel responsible for a task, and team members will not 
stick to agreements or decisions resulting an atmosphere in which members are blaming each 
other for social loafing. This will cause intragroup conflicts, stress, and thus dissatisfaction. 
A team that consists of stable members (N) is more effective. Stable individuals are more 
confident and less insecure while collaborating with others, and therefore they will more easily 
bring in their own knowledge and opinions and be more receptive to the inputs of others. This 
will enhance the opportunities of learning and lead to a more relaxed atmosphere. As Barrick 
(1998) argued, teams with unstable people tend to demonstrate more anxiety and negative 
feelings, which lessen the satisfaction of the individual team members.  
Individuals who are open to experience (O) will prefer tasks that demand creativity, and 
they will enjoy experimenting with new problem-solving strategies; hence, they will be 
motivated to learn. They will prefer work that challenges them to utilize and develop their 
cognitive abilities. Persons low in Openness to experience will easily bear a cognitive 
overload and avoid new and ambiguous situations that demand creativity and offer 
opportunities of learning (Molleman, 2004). 
5.2.1 Research 1 
Our research aim was to focus on NPP operator team members’ personality traits and to 
relate personality traits to communication patterns, to behavioural markers of non-technical 
skills, and to teams’ performance.   
5.2.1.1 Methods 
The data collection was based on 16 operator teams’ (N=96) interactions analysis in the 
Simulator Centre of the Hungarian Nuclear Power Plant (NPP). The NPP Simulator Centre 
is a realistic, high-fidelity tool that is widely used in training and exams creating the 
required level of face-validity to be relevant for real life situations.   
Each of the 16 operator teams had to follow the same scenario. In order to provide a 
complete picture of simulation the scenario “Failure of one turbine unit” will be described 
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briefly: according to the annual schedule used by instructors, a live Switchover Test needs to 
be performed, while an unjustified operation of the turbine protection occurs resulting in 
the failure of one turbine unit. The failure of the equipment is followed by the malfunction 
of the primary circuit pressure control, creating a condition that also needs to be managed. 
The mean duration of the scenario is about 35 minutes. 
Video records of operators’ activity during the selected scenario have been used for 
collecting and analyzing data. In order to keep the operators’ real life behaviour at the 
beginning of the simulator study they were informed about video recordings during the 
ongoing training session, but they did not know exactly which of the programmed scenarios 
would be videotaped. Video recordings were made with the operators’ joint consent.  
The operator team consists of the following team members: 1) Unit Shift Supervisor (USS), 2) 
Reactor Operator (ROP), 3) Turbine Operator (TOP), 4) Turbine Chief Mechanician (TCH), 5) 
Unit Electrician (UE), and 6) Shift Leader (SL).  
 Personality measurement 
Each team member (N=96) was asked to fill in the NEO-PI-R personality questionnaire. The 
NEO-PI-R focuses on five major domains of personality, as well as the six traits or facets that 
define each domain (Costa & McCrae, 1992). (Table 1.) 
 
Neuroticism N Anxiety NAN; Angry hostility NAH; Depression NDE; Self consciousness NSC; Impulsiveness NIM; Vulnerability NVU. 
Extroversion E Warmth EWA; Gregariousness EGR; Assertiveness EAS; Activity EAC; Excitement seeking EEX; Positive emotions EPE
Openness to 
experience O 
Fantasy OFA; Aesthetics OAE; Feeling OFE; Actions OAC; Ideas 
OID; Values OVA. 
Agreeableness A Trust ATR; Straightforwardness AST; Altruism AAL; Compliance ACO; Modesty AMO; Tender mindedness ATM. 
Conscientiousness C Competence CCO; Order COR; Dutifulness CDU; Striving for achievement CAS; Self discipline CSD; Deliberation CDL. 
Table 1. NEO-PI-R factors and scales 
 Communication measurement: team-oriented utterances 
All the video recorded conversation during the selected scenario was transcribed word by 
word, identifying the operators’ verbal utterances by two independent expert evaluators. 
Difficulties occurred in transcribing videotapes due to communication density during some 
periods of the interaction, much simultaneous conversation flow between members, 
additionally we were faced with a noisy control room environment. For all these reasons we 
have few blind points in the transcribed videotapes, where the speaker of some utterances 
cannot be identified properly.  
Our aim was to capture some relevant team and task-oriented communication utterances. Research 
1 focuses exclusively on team-oriented communication utterances that are likely to be related 
to team processes, on the team atmosphere stemmed from the individuals’ personality. Team-
oriented communication refers to the activities required to coordinate the workflow among 
team members. Task-oriented communication utterances and their analyses will be described 
in Research 2. During the task accomplishment specific team-oriented communication 
utterances were identified that were not strongly related to task accomplishment but rather to 
team process and interactions during the operation. Communication utterances: Relation (R) - 
Relation-related utterances, maintenance of contact, relationship, and vigilance in sentences 
(“Hold the line please!”, naming the addressee). Politeness (P) - The speaker gives a command, 
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information, question or affirmation formulated politely. The speaker determines the team 
atmosphere, and indicates the mutual respect among team members (“Thank you”, “Would you 
be so kind…”, “Do it, please”). Motivation (M) - Encouragement, formulated as reinforcement, 
completed with motivation, stimulation (“It’s perfect, just go on like this!”). First person plural 
(We) - The speaker uses first person plural (“We, our, us, let’s”). Affection (A) - Words describing 
emotions, someone’s emotional status, indicating astonishment, exasperation, frustration, 
excitement, relieve happiness or contentment (“I regret it”, “I’m quite happy” or laughing). 
Thinking, cognitive (T) - Words indicating cognitive process. It may suggest a problem-solving 
mechanism and can increase especially in facing with technical problems („I think…”, 
„Attention!”, „If… than…”, “Check it!”). 
 Team performance measurement 
The team performance was assessed by the instructors’ impression about the teams’ 
efficiency using a 3-point Likert scale (1: poor, 2: medium, 3: excellent) according to how fast 
and punctual they accomplished the task and in what degree they distorted from the 
optimal solution. 17% of the examined 16 teams were assessed as poor, 40 % as a medium 
and 35 % as an excellent performance teams.  
 Non-technical skills measurement  
Non-technical skills are defined as the cognitive, “hard” and social “soft” skills of team 
members (Flin et al., 2003). The cognitive so called “hard” skills are related to task-solving 
processes: Professional knowledge (appropriate knowledge about technology, equipment, 
environment, and ability to transfer and use this knowledge during operations); Problem 
solving (the skill to recognize and define the sources of task difficulties, and to be active in 
providing and implementing solutions); Standard compliance (following technical norms, 
rules, procedures, and stimulating other team members to comply with standards). 
The social “soft” skills are team relevant skills: Task load management (efficient coping 
mechanism with unexpected and novel events and with difficulties during team processes); 
Cooperation (the ability to work effectively in team, to consider and support other team 
members’ needs); Communication (the ability to exchange information briefly and clearly, 
acknowledging the received information). After each scenario accomplishment the 
instructors were asked to evaluate each nontechnical skill using a 4-point Likert scale (1: 
weak, 2: acceptable, 3: good, 4: excellent).  
5.2.1.2 Results 
 Team-oriented communication utterances 
Analysing team-oriented communication utterances, the results reveal that the most frequently 
used communication utterances are Thinking (T), indicating the team members’ cognitive, 
mental effort during the scenario. In the case of work teams, such as the operator team where 
the team’s goal is mainly task-oriented, the frequent use of cognition related utterances is 
inevitable, although these elements of the communication contribute to the establishment and 
maintenance of team processes. The second most frequently used communication utterance is 
the first person plural pronoun (We) that indicates that the team members apply team 
perspectives in their point of view, emphasizing a high level of identification with the team. 
Motivation, as a communication utterance is relatively rarely used by the team.  
Analysing the occurrence of communication utterances among different roles, the findings 
suggest that the Unit Shift Supervisor (USS) is the most active member in the 
communication process, often using team-oriented communication utterances such as 
Relation (R), the first person plural pronoun (We), Thinking (T). (Figure 1.) 
 
Human Aspects of NPP Operator Teamwork 
 
357 
 
Fig. 1. Descriptive statistic of the non-technical-related communication utterances according 
to observed teams’ roles 
 Relationship between team-oriented communication and personality  
The significant correlations between the frequency of different types of communication 
utterances and the NEO-PI-R factors and scales are presented. Correlation coefficients between 
personality and communication utterances organize around the Extroversion, Agreeableness, 
and Openness to experience personality factors and their scales. (*p<0,05; **p<0,00) 
These analysed operator teams’ communication refers to maintain relationship 
(Relationship) shows a significant correlation with Assertiveness (EAS) personality scale 
(,23**). The Extraversion personality factor and their scales such as Activity, Excitement 
seeking have significant correlations with Politeness communication style (E, EAC, EEX – 
Politeness: ,34**; 32**; 34**). The polite and acceptable communication style also has 
significant correlations with Openness personality factor and openness to fantasy and 
feeling scales (O, OFA, PFE – Politeness: ,26*; 32**; 32**) and Achievement striving scale 
(CAS – Politeness: ,27*). Behind a polite communication there is a positive and open 
personality, who is able to create an open and sincere relationship with other people and 
has the power to form acceptable team ambience in which everybody respects and 
tolerates each other without exaggeration. 
To our surprise the Agreeableness personality factor and their scales indicate negative 
correlations with most of these team-oriented communication utterances (A, AAL, AMO, 
AST - Relation: -,40**; -,29*; -,40**; -,38**; A, AMO, AST, ACO – Politeness: -,31**;-,27*;-,40**;-
,35**; AST – We: -,24*; A, AMO, AST, ACO – Thinking: -,31**; -,26*; -,29*; -,27*. It seems that 
the higher score on the Agreeable factor and its diverse scales, the lower is the possibility of 
using communication utterances related to maintaining interaction in this highly task-
oriented team. For maintaining good relationship and a strong cohesion in these types of 
work teams for the team members it is important to be assertive (EAS) and it seems to be 
less agreeable (A) or compliant (ACO). An agreeable character is less fitting to teams 
operating in a high risk and strongly standardised environment. Highly modest (AMO), 
altruist (AAL), compliant (ACO) operators are less willing to initiate a new social action and 
easily become pressed by others in the team. Less agreeable people (A) more frequently 
apply expressions related to problem-solving procedures like ‘think’, ‘attention’, ‘if…than’ 
than those high score on Agreeableness.  
 Team performance and personality  
The results of regression analysis are presented in Table 2. As shown, the relevant 
personality traits are significantly related to team performance as a dependent variable: 
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Extraversion (E) and Conscientiousness (C). The standardized Beta Coefficients give a 
measure of the contribution of each variable to the model. ∆R2 value tells that the Order 
scale (COR) model accounts for 9,8% of variance in the scores. Seeing that t value in this case 
is almost 3, it suggests that the Order scale as a predictor variable has a moderate impact on 
the criterion variable, on team performance. These findings underline and reinforce the 
relevant role of Conscientiousness (C) in the wok-setting performance.  
 
 Team performance rating (as dependent, criterion variables) 
Personality factors and scales 
(as predictor variables) ∆R2 ß t p 
Extraversion: Assertiveness (EAS) .048* .248 2,156 .035 
Extraversion: Activity (EAC) .050* .252 2,190 .032 
C_Conscientiousness .071* .290 2,552 .013 
CCO_Competence .050* .252 2,195 .031 
COR_Order .098** .332 2,966 .004 
CAS_Achievement striving .076* .298 2,633 .010 
CSD_Self discipline .036* .223 1,923 .058 
Table 2. Regression results for testing Team performance and various personality factors 
and scales. Note: *p<0,05; **p<0,00 (one-tailed), for t values (for unstandardized regression 
coefficients) or F values (for overall model). ß = Standardized Coefficients. 
Furthermore, it has also been analyzed how the homogeneity and heterogeneity of a certain 
personality factor alter team performance. The previously used Levene test rejects the 
homogeneity of variances, the Welsch D test on Agreeableness shows a significant main effect 
on standard deviation (SD) (d2=6,218; p<0,05). So, highly performing teams have a greater 
standard deviation of Agreeableness than poor or average performing teams. (Figure 2.) 
 
 
Fig. 2. Team performance and Standard Deviance of Agreeableness 
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 Non-technical skills measurements and personality 
Using the stepwise linear regression analysis from all the predictors only the Anxiety 
(NAN) personality trait predicts significantly Professional knowledge as a dependent 
variable (ß=0,34; t=3,07; p<0,00) along the supervisor ratings. The NAN has been left in 
the model even if the dependent variable has been changed: Comply with standard (keeping 
rules) (ß=0,3; t=2,59; p<0,05), Communication (ß=0,38; t=3,38; p<0,00) or Cooperation (ß=0,37; 
t=3,24; p<0,00). 
The other determinative personality trait that plays an important role in the instructors’ 
judgment is Conscientiousness (C) factor, precisely Dutifulness (CDU) and the Order (COR) 
scales. When the Comply with standard factor has been evaluated the Dutifulness (CDU) 
factor has emerged from all personality traits (ß=0,251; t=2,16; p<0,05), and when the 
Cooperation factor is the dependent variable the Order (COR) personality trait (ß=0,31; t=2,78; 
p<0,00) influences mostly the instructors’ rating. Furthermore, from the instructors’ point of 
view an operator’s communication skills mainly depend on his/her Assertively personality 
(EAS) type (ß=0,30; t=2,62; p<0,05). 
Whilst the communication utterances have a strong relationship with the Extraversion, the 
Openness to experience and the Agreeableness factors, the “soft” and “hard” skills only 
show a significant correlation with the Anxiety scale (NAN) and the Order and Dutifulness 
(COR, CDU) scales.  
Regarding our findings the Neuroticism factor associated with the Consciousness factor and 
their scales indicate their beneficial impact on the Professional knowledge, Comply with 
standard and on the interactive behaviour forms such as Communication and Cooperation.  
A moderate level of anxiety interacting with Conscientiousness can help persons to form  
a good impression about their own skills and behaviour. These persons endeavour to  
be accepted by others and strive to mark out from their environment with their  
remarkable performance. These people adapt to the changing environment in a very 
sensitive way.  
5.2.2 Discussion 
The extent to which the external environment constrains the individuals’ personality varies 
in weak or strong situation. In strong situations, the organization exerts considerable 
pressure or demands to induce conformity. These controlling forces press the individual to 
behave in a specific way or exhibit a very narrow range of behaviours. Controversially, in 
weak situations the individual determines which behaviours to display, leaving bigger 
space for personality. In a NPP environment the individuals are placed in strong situations 
due to the high level of standardisation. In spite of this fact, personality has a key role in 
coping with these constrains.  
The role of team members’ personality in team communication has been analysed, in 
occurrence of observable non-technical skills and in team performance during specific task 
accomplishment.  Our study reveals that team-oriented communication utterances highly 
correlate with Extroversion and Openness to experience personality traits, and to our 
surprise, in a negative direction with Agreeableness. Similar findings have been found in the 
Barrick & Mount (1993) study, in which the predictive validity of Agreeableness is 
investigated introducing autonomy as a moderator variable. The validity of Agreeableness 
is also higher in high-autonomy jobs compared with low-autonomy ones, but the correlation 
is negative. These findings suggest that the degree of the job autonomy influences the 
validity of personality dimensions. It means that in NPP operator teams when the members 
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work in a high autonomy, so-called strong situation the Agreeableness softly impedes the 
effective team functioning.  
During the team-process the operators’ “soft” and “hard” skills have a remarkable 
relationship with personality traits. First of all, Professional knowledge and Coordination 
behaviour markers show significant correlations with the Neuroticism and the 
Conscientiousness personality factors. The stable role of Conscientiousness has been 
reinforced, precisely Dutifulness and Order that mainly influence the operators’ Keeping 
rules and Cooperation skills that largely determine their behaviour in this type of work 
settings. It seems that Team-performance as a team process output is directly influenced by 
the Conscientiousness and the Extraversion personality factors based on the instructors’ 
evaluations.  
6. Process of operator teamwork 
The main question of studying teamwork in high risk environments is how the team 
members having specific knowledge, cognition and representing different fields are able to 
operate and manage a technically complex system. Cooke et al. (2004) emphasize that team 
cognition emerges from the interplay of the individual cognition of each team member and 
team process behaviour, thus team cognition is more than the sum of the individual team 
members’ cognition. According to theoretical approaches of team cognition each individual 
has two different models: an individual mental model, which is long term knowledge 
(professional knowledge related to task, and team members) and an individual situation model 
describing a momentary, transient understanding of the current situation. In order to run a 
complex system it is needed to integrate the information and knowledge of the individual 
team members. The integration of long term knowledge, as well as the harmonisation of all 
the continuously changing environmental technical information may be attained through 
team process behaviour such as communication, coordination, cooperation and decision 
making, etc. The interaction of team members is remarkably important, since individual 
knowledge is transferred to team knowledge through these team processes. The output of 
this process will be two kinds of team level cognitive constructs: the team mental model, 
referring to the collective task and team knowledge (roles and responsibilities, knowledge of 
team mates, skills, abilities, beliefs), and the team situation model, describing collective team 
understanding of the specific situation. This team situation model guides the team in 
assessing and interpreting cues and patterns of the current situation (Cooke et al., 2000). In 
our view shared knowledge includes two of the above mentioned knowledge: team situation 
and mental model.  
When analysing deeper the current literature of team cognition, two different 
complementary views of this construct can be found. The collective view of team 
cognition approaches this cognitive construct as aggregated individual knowledge. 
According to the other view the team knowledge may be assessed at a holistic level too, 
by focusing on the individuals’ actions, and behaviour, not only on their knowledge. 
Team knowledge at a holistic level is the team members’ knowledge that has been 
processed or integrated through team behaviours such as communication, coordination or 
cooperation (Cooke et al., 2004). On one hand, the collective view proved to be useful 
when knowledge is distributed homogenously among individuals, on the other hand, the 
holistic view is more appropriate when knowledge is distributed heterogeneously among 
team members (Kiekel & Cooke, 2004). 
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In spite of the fact that the individual knowledge is clear and accurate, the inefficient team 
processes (such as communication, coordination) may impede the integration of these 
knowledge structures, leading to inaccurate team knowledge, and inappropriate team 
action. This line of reasoning points out the importance of a holistic approach of team 
cognition. Thus, our view of team cognition describes this construct as the collection of 
individual situation and mental models, as well as those team processes that help the 
establishment and modification of team situation and mental models.  
Team cognition guides the team in assessing the cues of situation, determining strategies, 
taking appropriate actions. Team performance will be maximized to the extent that team 
knowledge is accurate, appropriately apportioned among members, structured in a way that 
supports the development of effective strategies (Cooke et al., 2000). In turn, team 
performance may influence team process. An unsuccessful performance may urge the team 
to change their communication, coordination or decision strategies.  
Team cognition is shaped by those team processes -such as interaction of the team members, 
communication - that helps integrate the team members’ knowledge creating and 
continuously sustaining shared knowledge. In this way one of the critical aspects of team 
cognition is the team process that helps team members to create and share their individual 
knowledge. 
Another question raised by researchers and practitioners is whether team knowledge exists, 
since team knowledge cannot be captured in one members’ mind, brain. It exists within the 
context of team actions, interactions and within dynamic environment. 
6.1 Communication as a crucial means to establish shared knowledge 
Communication as a key team process is used in the team to share information, individual 
knowledge, to establish and to maintain current shared knowledge. Communication defines 
the way how team members execute complex tasks, and the way how a team handles and 
manages difficulties, and high task load situations.  
There have been several attempts to help team communication in order to create and 
sustain shared knowledge under different circumstances. Waller et al. (2004) aimed to 
identify the adaptive communicative behaviours that help the NPP operator team to 
flexibly adapt to a dynamic task load environment. According to their studies adaptive 
behaviour such as information collection, task prioritization, and task distribution helps 
the team to create shared knowledge, which in turn helps the team to describe, explain, 
and make predictions and decide which action to be taken in a dynamically changing 
environment. It is also stated that information is collected and shared by the team 
members in order to identify tasks they need to perform, and receive, collect and screen 
information about these tasks. Appropriate information collection allows the team to 
better understand the situation, the system, which will help to build a shared 
conceptualization of the faced problems, leading to the effective establishment of team 
cognition (Waller et al., 2004). All these results suggest that teams attempting to collect 
more information will have an opportunity to gain, analyse, and understand the relevant 
cues from the environment resulting in higher level performance. While in low 
performing teams the members do not aim to acquire information reducing their ability to 
perceive the relevant environmental cues and act accordingly. Furthermore it has been 
also found that the use of long words is negatively related to performance and positively 
related to rates of errors. Similarly, studies claim that the use of more complex questions 
loaded the working memory, which in turn increased the risk of sending and receiving 
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erroneous messages (Sexton & Helmreich, 2000). Closed, yes/no questions are 
verifications, they are easy and quick to answer, in contrast with open questions (“what, 
why, how”) that are incomplete and force the addressee to use the cognitive resources, to 
think and reflect. It has been found in the existing literature that the increases in 
communication volume, in particular communication about coordination (number of 
coordination requests), are inversely correlated with team performance, (Diedrich et al., 
2005). However, it may be concluded that it is not just the communication quantity that 
affects team performance but also the characteristics of communication such as stability, 
focus, object of communication and timing. For the sake of an efficient information flow 
between team members it is also important to answer the question, to provide the 
information in timely manner. We tend to assume that team communication, has to be 
focused on the task itself trying to catch the relevant environmental cues from the present, 
and use this information to project future situations in accordance with the team’s goals in 
order to facilitate the establishment of shared knowledge and performance. Furthermore, 
if the team’s communication is consistently engaged in the past, they may fail to perceive 
and share relevant environmental cues from the present moment.  
In the process of the formation of shared knowledge it is not sufficient to gather and to 
share the information, but it is also necessary to confirm the received information. It is not 
only the information collection behaviour that counts, but also the acknowledgement of 
the received information. Besides shared knowledge, the importance of its accuracy is also 
emphasized, since creating a shared cognition by itself does not lead to high performance 
only if the shared knowledge is accurate (Mathieu et al., 2000; Mohammed et al., 2000; 
Banks & Millward, 2007). In NPP operation, the tasks are allocated to several operators, 
and what is even more important is that each operator has a different information source. 
Communication is the only way of sharing information with each other, in this way it is 
crucial to clearly perceive the information and develop shared knowledge. One of the 
major characteristics of effective communication is verbal reaction, affirmation signing 
that the addressee perceived the information (Sträter & Fokuda, 2004). The lack of verbal 
feedback may suggest that the recipient overlooked the information (that may be 
relevant), in this way the speaker does not know whether the information has been 
perceived or not. At the same time the verbal reaffirmation of information may have some 
important side effects, the repetition of information may increase redundancy and what is 
even more important it strains the linguistic and cognitive resources of team members 
(Krifka, 2004). Individuals who expand their cognitive resources to speak more 
elaborately, to acknowledge the received information in detailed manner do so at the 
expense of decreased situational awareness (Sexton & Helmreich, 2000). Krifka (2004) 
advises “Make your contribution as informative as is required, BUT do not make your 
contribution more informative than required”. The use of simple affirmation will help the 
team to clarify and acknowledge the received information, in this way to establish an 
accurate shared understanding of the situation. Conversely the affirmation with 
information will overload the cognitive resources of both the information provider and 
receiver, creating interference, impeding the team in creating a clear shared picture of the 
relevant aspect of situation. This criteria of efficient communication is in line with the 
Grice maxims, namely with the maxim of quantity prescribing that during efficient 
information transfer the speaker needs to give as much information as necessary but not 
more and with the maxim of manner describing the need to be brief and clear and 
avoiding long-winded information transfer (1957, as cited in Pléh, 1997).  
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The complete information flow between team members is particularly important in the joint 
establishment and fine tuning of shared knowledge. Coherent communication can be 
viewed as communication that responds to a previously initiated thought. These thoughts 
must be recognized, responded and new thoughts related to the previous one must be 
developed by the speakers, interlocutors. This goal can be achieved only if the members of 
the conversation are aware of each other’s needs. The coherent conversation can be viewed 
as a continuum, as there is a strong semantic connection, relation between the parts of 
conversation, such as cause, condition, affirmation, and summary. In other words, the 
conversation is hierarchically structured, each part is semantically related to other parts 
(Krifka, 2004). Analyzing the coherence of conversation, Grommes (2007) states that 
coherence can be connected to mental processes. The operating room team members share 
broad common professional knowledge which constitutes the basis to be engaged in a 
coherent conversation. In turn, the coherent flow of information facilitates the creation of 
shared knowledge, common ground, which is essential for efficient joint activities 
(Grommes, 2007).  
Communication is the most appropriate means of preparing for a coordinated action during 
routine operations and becomes more emphasised during non-routine situations, when the 
shared knowledge of the current situation is the key factor of efficient team actions. Shared 
knowledge can constitute the basis of an economical form of communication, namely 
implicit communication. Implicit communication is based on the knowledge of each others’ 
personality, competencies, needs, task and responsibilities allowing voluntary task relevant 
information exchange, listening and offering assistance, unsolicited help. This form of 
communication allows team members to reduce the costs of explicit communication. Explicit 
communication includes information exchange as a response to a specific request verifying 
and acknowledging information, giving orders and assigning tasks (Swain & Mills, 2003; 
Gudela et al., 2004). During high task load the individuals’ cognitive resources are 
overwhelmed with the management of a novel and complex situation, therefore it is 
important to save resources by means of implicit communication.    
6.1.1 Research 2 
The present paper aims to describe data from empirical researches about Nuclear Power 
Plant (NPP) operator team’s communication, and its application to efficient teamwork. 
The research aims to analyse and describe team communication, to identify those  
specific communication dimensions that help to create shared knowledge, supporting  
the joint assessment of the current situation and developing adequate team strategies to 
face it.  
The study focused on the NPP operator teams’ communication, firstly in order to identify 
and understand those key communicative utterances that could be linked to higher team 
performance, secondly to identify how the teams adapt to high task load situations.  
6.1.1.1 Methods 
The data collection was based on the analysis of 16 operator team interactions in the 
Simulator Centre of the Hungarian Nuclear Power Plant. Since communication is the central 
factor of our research, the empirical studies of a “lively” interaction can best be carried out 
by analysing carefully chosen simulator sessions.  
Each team had to follow the same scenario “Failure of one turbine unit” described under 
Research 1. Choosing the simulation, it was taken into consideration that the scenario had to 
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be oriented toward communication and in this way all team members had to be involved in 
solving the control task. Possessing complementary knowledge they had to share 
information with each other to manage the problems occurring during the simulated 
malfunctions. 
As described under Research 1, Methods, video recordings of operators’ activity during the 
selected scenario have been used for collecting and analyzing data. All the 16 teams’ 
conversation has been transcribed in order to analyse team communication utterances. 
 Task load evaluation 
The scenario was divided into 3 phases by the instructors, according to the level of task 
load. 
1. Phase of scenario Moderate level of task load: Executing a live switchover test 
2. Phase of scenario High level of task load: Identifying, announcing and managing 
sudden, unjustified turbine operation 
3. Phase of scenario Moderate level of task load: Indicating pressure control failure as 
well as the drop of one safety shutdown, requesting support service, resolving the 
situation. 
 Team performance measurement 
The performance scores were made by the instructors’ evaluation, based on their impression 
about the teams’ efficiency under the different phases of the scenario using the same 3-point 
Likert scale (1 – poor, 2 – medium, 3 - excellent).  
By eliciting data from performance assessments four team performance categories were 
developed:  
1. Excellent team: the whole team performance is evaluated excellent, through all the 
phases of the scenario (No. = 4 teams). 
2. Average team:  the team performance is medium continuously through all the phases of 
the scenario (No. = 5 teams). 
3. Unbalanced team: the team performance varies from excellent to poor through the 
scenario (No. = 3 teams). 
4. Poor team: the team performance is evaluated steadily poor through the complete 
scenario (No. = 4 teams). 
 Communication measurement: task-oriented utterances   
In Research 2 our aim was to capture some relevant task specific static and sequential 
analyses of the operator team’s communication. Static measurements consider the team’s 
communication only at a given point of time (e.g. every 10 seconds), or as an aggregate of 
the information flow over a period of time (e.g. during a complete task accomplishment). 
Sequential analyses take into consideration the ongoing stream of information exchange, 
interaction (Kiekel et al., 2001; Kiekel et al., 2002; Cooke & Gorman, 2006).  
In order to capture the most relevant content static aspect of team communication task-
oriented communication utterances have been developed expanding and specifying the 
communication dimensions used in similar environments (Conversation Analysis by Sacks, 
1992; Speech Act Type-inventory for the Analyses of Cockpit Communication, STACK by 
Diegritz & Fürst, 1999; Krifka, 2004).  
Task-oriented communication refers to the activities strongly linked to task strategies, 
task accomplishment, and it refers to the technical aspects of a task that must be 
performed.  
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Categories of communication (static measurements): 
- Information collecting question: The aim of the question is information acquisition, for 
example asking about certain indicators or resources. 
- Open Question Information: The question is addressed in order to complete the 
proposition with certain information, therefore, it is likely to receive a long answer 
(Questions that usually starts with words like what, when, who, etc.). 
- Closed Question Information: The aim of this question is verification, to judge the truth of 
a position; therefore, the answer is either a single word (yes, or no) or a short phrase 
(“Can we start the program?”). 
- Information Providing: The team members inform each other about some relevant aspect 
of the mission related to human or technical indicators. 
- Information Providing Past: The speaker informs the addressee about technological 
information, certain indicators that happened in the past, or about the crew’s past 
status, personnel resources in the past (“The error sign was caused by the failure of the 
pressure regulator.”). 
- Information Providing Present: The speaker informs the addressee about some actual, 
present technological information, certain indicators, or about the crew’s present 
status, personnel resources (“I am preparing the necessary condition for the switchover 
test.”). 
- Information Providing Future: The speaker informs the addressee about some 
technological information that may change in the future, foretells about certain 
indicators, or about his intentions and future actions (“We will continue the test as soon as 
we have managed this unjustified reaction.”). 
- Affirmation: It is the manifestation of two-way communications. 
- Simple Affirmation: Answers to closed questions or commands, acknowledges the 
received information (Affirmations, acknowledgements, acceptances, answer: ‘yes’, ‘no’, 
‘ok’, ‘good’). 
- Affirmation with Information: A feedback, reinforcement on a status report or 
information, or command completed with additional information (“Please switch on the 1 
cb001 circuit breaker!” “1cb001 circuit breaker is on, we have the necessary differential 
current.”).  
The team communication sequential analyses focused on the coherence of conversations. 
The anchored point of the coherence analyses was the new thought (that can be a question, 
information, etc.) initiated by one of the team members. The main condition of the coherent 
conversation is turn-taking, following this thought; the interlocutor develops a new question, 
information or command related to the previous information. Otherwise, if an initiated 
thought is not followed by any of the team members, it will be considered as a thought 
without turn taking.  
6.1.1.2 Results 
 Open information question and performance  
Appropriate information collection and distribution allows the team to better understand 
the situation helping to build a shared conceptualization of the faced problems. According 
to our analyses, several specific communication utterances were related to performance. 
Particular forms of questions proved to be the best way to dispel uncertainties and to realize 
efficient communication. The results revealed that fewer open information collecting 
questions are used by the excellent performing teams than the lower performing teams  
(F= 4,690, p<0,05). (Figure 3.) 
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Fig. 3. The mean frequency of Open Information Question according to the team 
performance  
The frequent use of open information collecting questions suggests that when lower 
performing teams formulate their questions, they have less information, knowledge about 
the environmental cues, so they formulate the questions in a less complete form. In turn, the 
excellent performing teams do not use open information questions so frequently, since they 
have more stable professional knowledge about the ongoing events being able to face the 
challenge of the situation. The open questions are incomplete and force the addressee to use 
the cognitive resources to complete the proposition. However, it is necessary to emphasize 
the usefulness of open questions in establishing team knowledge, but only during low task 
load, when the cognitive resources are not overloaded, so postulating an open question will 
not lead to any negative consequences. In this way effective communication that helps to 
establish team knowledge, and improve performance implies the ability of applying a 
simple and succinct vocabulary. 
 Affirmation and performance  
For the efficient information flow between team members it is also important to answer the 
formulated question, to acknowledge the received information. Although the differences are 
not statistically significant, the results can be regarded as a tendency that describes excellent 
performing teams using more simple affirmations and fewer affirmations with information, 
conversely with the low performing teams, where team members exchange more 
affirmations with information (Figure 4.). The result indicates the need for a clear 
information exchange that helps to establish accurate team knowledge, instead of creating 
an interference with additional, not so relevant, information. This result is line with Krifka’s 
advice (2004) and Gricean quantity and manner maxim (1957, as cited in Pléh, 1997) to apply 
a simple brief vocabulary and to avoid providing information that is above the needed 
quantity.  
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Fig. 4. The mean frequency of affirmation according to team performance 
 Information providing activity and performance 
Focusing closely on teams’ information providing activity (Figure 5.) it is possible to 
describe the team’s general tendency of focusing on the present, and less orientating about 
the past and future; at the same time there is a significant difference between the use of 
these communication utterances among excellent and poor performing teams. The poor 
teams’ information flow contains more information about the past events (p<0,05), less 
information about the presently ongoing events (p=0,005) and about the future than the 
excellent performing teams’ communication. The results suggest that excellent teams 
succeed to perceive the environmental elements in the present, to project the elements of the 
present status to the future, and focus less on the past. 
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Fig. 5. The frequency of providing information about past, present, future according to team 
performance 
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 Coherence of information flow and performance 
The coherent information flow between team members proved to be an efficient 
communication strategy to attain high performance. Comparing the coherence indicators of 
the excellent and the poor performing teams’ conversations, the results show that the poor 
teams’ conversations include more often thoughts without turn-taking (t=5,506, p<0,05) and 
fewer thoughts with turn taking (t=4,069, p=0,05) indicating an incomplete flow of 
information. Coherent communication means that the team members are aware of the 
information distributed by others, and react to the received information (either with a 
simple affirmation, or with a question, or providing additional information), creating a 
semantic connection in the information sharing activity. In this way coherent 
communication is one of the key elements of effective establishment or modification, fine 
tuning of accurate and complete team knowledge. The conceptual chain in the conversation 
helps the team to focus and maintain the attention on the exchange of information avoiding 
the loss of relevant information. (Figure 6.) 
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Fig. 6. The percentage of thoughts with and without turn-taking according to team 
performance 
 Communication under different level of task load 
Generally it can be concluded that as the task load increases, the frequency of communication 
utterances decreases. During high task load the communication is severely impeded, which 
can be explained by the operators’ overloaded cognitive resources. The unexpected problems, 
failures intensively load the team members’ cognitive capacity being unable to share their 
attention between the accomplishment of the task and communication. Furthermore, as the 
allocated resources disengage the collective need to process the causes and the consequences 
of unexpected event results in more frequent communication. (Figure 7) 
6.1.2 Discussion  
Some specific task-oriented communicative utterances prove to be crucial factors in the team 
processes that create and modify shared knowledge. Research 2 considers some specific 
aspects of communication that could be linked to establishing shared knowledge, such as 
using open information questions, affirmations, information providing activity, and 
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Fig. 7. The mean frequency of task-oriented communication utterances according to 
different levels of task load  
coherence of information flow in a NPP environment. The use of effectively formulated 
information collection questions, the development of a well established effective 
communication strategy that focuses on the ongoing events and projecting the 
environmental cues to the future, affirming the received information could all help the team 
to build, and modify accurate shared knowledge and to improve team performance. The 
coherent information flow between team members proves to be an efficient communication 
strategy to attain high performance. Coherent communication means that the team members 
are aware of the information distributed by others, and react to the received information 
(either by means of a simple affirmation, or by means of a question, or providing additional 
information), creating a semantic connection in the information sharing activity. 
Finally, at the beginning of the scenario, moderate task load necessitates less mental effort 
leaving more room for communication, although during simulation scenarios operators 
have some anticipation regarding unexpected events causing high task load (Antalovits & 
Izsó, 2003, Izsó, 2001). Under high task load the personnel’s and the operators’ cognitive 
resources are overloaded paying attention to the occurring problems, failures, and are 
unable to share their cognitive resources between problem management and 
communication. The communication density increases significantly in the third phase, 
under moderate task load as the cognitive resources disengage a collective need of 
elaborating the sources and consequences of high task load.  
7. Output of operator teamwork 
Taking into account that team performance is a multidimensional construct, measurements 
of team performance should focus not just on team efficiency but also on team effectiveness, 
because teams can be effective but inefficient at the same time. Team effectiveness measures 
the team output focusing on whether the team has reached all the specified goals, produced 
the intended results or not. While team efficiency refers to the way, how the team has reached 
the intended goals. The efficiency measures if the team was able to accomplish all of the 
 
Nuclear Power – Control, Reliability and Human Factors 
 
370 
necessary tasks for a job in the appropriate amount of time, with the appropriate level of 
efforts or not. The aim is not just to reach the specified goals, but also get the maximum 
output for a long term, without consuming all the accessible resources. Effectiveness focuses 
on the end of the activity, efficiency focuses on the process or “means”, if the team has 
reached the desired goals in an economical manner (Robbins, 1998 as cited in Horrowitz, 
2005).  
Measuring team performance two types of indicators should be considered:-quantitative and 
qualitative aspects of performance. In NPP control room the quantitative aspects of operator 
team performance includes incident, error, and accident data obtained from official reports, 
results of requalification exams. Qualitative aspects of performance consists of peer and 
supervisor ratings (Shift Leader) evaluating specific professional knowledge as well as 
cognitive and social skills required for safe and efficient plant functioning.  
In order to improve team performance, the measurements and development efforts should 
focus near the outputs, on processes as well. Firstly, because the team performance output 
could be often influenced by external factors, on which the team has little impact, in this 
way, focusing on the output may be incomplete and misleading for developmental 
guidelines. Moreover, team improvement recommendations based only on outputs may 
lack some substantial information, since the output measures do not specify what aspects of 
performance are insufficient, deficient. Thirdly, the exclusive focus on team output may be 
misleading for team training recommendations, because in practice we can easily meet cases 
when team outputs has reached the specified level, even though the processes were 
impaired. In this case if we base our team training principles on these scenarios we could 
erroneously reinforce some defective processes (Cannon-Bowers & Salas, 2000).  
Processes are regarded as a window to those strategies, knowledge, skills application that 
are used to accomplish specified goals, aims. Team processes refers to the application of 
team members’ cognitive and social skills during task accomplishment. In NPP environment 
simulation training programs aim to develop and maintain these cognitive and social skills. 
During the program instructors evaluate and provide continuous feedback about task and 
team-oriented skills. Task-oriented skills are described as skills strongly required for task 
accomplishment such as decision making, problem solving, situation awareness. Task-
oriented skills and knowledge are not sufficient when accomplishing tasks in a teamwork 
setting. Interpersonal, self-management skills and knowledge are regarded to be essential 
for performing well in teamwork setting. Team-oriented skills contains skills oriented 
toward team interaction, information exchange, those processes that help to maintain team 
as a whole unit, including cooperation, coordination, and communication between team 
members. The goal of training programs - besides developing professional, technical 
knowledge - is to reinforce efficient team interaction processes, to work better as a team. As 
a result shared knowledge will be formed, shaped about team including each other’s 
characteristics, roles, needs, and about task referring to equipment, environment, rules and 
procedures. This shared knowledge serves as crucial aspect of the adjustment to novel and 
complex, dynamic task environment.  
In recent years, the NPP industry has recognized besides the technical training the 
importance of team and task-oriented skill training, namely team interaction training. The 
concept of team interaction training stemmed from Crew Resource Management (CRM) 
training that has been developed as a special training in order to reduce error and increase 
the effectiveness of flight crew. This program focus on team and task-oriented skills critical 
for operational performance such as leadership, coordination, situation awareness, decision-
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making, teamwork and communication. CRM in NPP field consists of the following topics: 
operational conduct, health at work, decision taking, situation awareness, choosing 
behaviour, feedback, communication, and team skills (Flin et al., 2002).  
Training programs attempts to achieve change and development in different level: team 
members’ attitude, skills, behaviour, knowledge, and finally to improve safety functioning 
at organizational level. To measure training efficiency accurately is a difficult task. 
Objective, direct measurements such as accident rates are incomplete, not always reliable 
indicator of training efficiency, especially as the high reliability organizations tend to have 
low accident rates. Subjective, indirect measurements including expert evaluators determine 
whether there has been any improvement in operators’ knowledge, skill, behaviour, and 
attitude. For this evaluation experienced and trained observers use specially developed 
behavioral marker system such as in aviation Line/LOSA checklist (Line Operations Safety 
Audit, Klinect et al., 2003), NOTECHS (NOn-TECHnical Skills category, Flin et al., 1998), in 
medical field the behavioural marker system based on ANTS (Anaesthetists' Non-Technical 
Skills, Fletcher et al., 2003), NOTSS (Non-Technical Skills for Surgeons, Yule et al., 2006).  
8. Conclusion 
To conclude the results of the case studied and researches presented above, specific sources 
of task load were identified related to the task such as complexity of the task, constant alertness, 
continuous learning, and related to the environment, such as working conditions, related to the 
organisation, such as the amount of rules, responsibilities, the overregulated work process.  
Analysing team members’ personality based on Five Factor models and identifying the 
relationship between individual traits and performance, Extraversion and 
Conscientiousness were proved to be important characteristics influencing positively team 
members’ behaviour and performance, while Agreeableness had a negative relationship 
with behaviour and performance.  
Separating characteristics of team communication in two categories, the frequent use of 
team-oriented communication utterances were linked to Extroversion positively and 
Agreeableness negatively. Low level of Agreeableness could be associated with 
individualistic characters, attributes of experts striving for independence. Studying task-
oriented communication utterances, features of the well established communication strategy 
has been described. Information gathering questions formulated in open way, affirmation 
also proved to be efficient way of communication, but what is more important to apply brief 
and clear vocabulary. The information flow between team members should focus more on 
the ongoing events and projecting the information to the future and less about the past. 
Coherent information flow between team members proves to be an efficient strategy for 
establishing and updating shared knowledge, achieving high performance. Describing team 
communication under different levels of task load, the results how that team adapts to high 
task load with increased communication, paying more attention to the management of the 
occurred failures.  
The results of the researches and case studies can be used as directions for human resource 
management practices, especially in employee selection and development procedures, 
health promotion program. The revealed sources of task load and features of workload 
could help to develop and design health promotion programs. Operator teams’ selection 
methodology should take into consideration personality trait patterns of operator teams, as 
well as the key competencies. Our results may have some important applications in 
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developing training interventions based on well established competency list, providing 
greater emphasize on communication. Feedback about team communication should focus 
on specific aspects of team communication that help to establish and modify accurate shared 
knowledge and to improve team performance. Instructors and operators are all responsible 
for developing efficient communication strategy. Although, it is difficult to generalize the 
results about team communication to all operator teamwork, as long as the presented 
researches are based on the analyses of communication in simulation environment 
following a particular scenario.  
The presented researches emphasize one of the team processes, namely communication. 
Future research should go beyond communication, studying other team processes, such as 
coordination, cooperation, decision making. Furthermore future works could also reveal 
hidden complex patterns of team processes, in communication, in cooperation related to safe 
and efficient team performance.  
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1. Introduction 
After the Three Mile Island accident, people have been showing a growing interest in 
human errors in the nuclear field. Human errors in nuclear power plants have been an 
important factor in the human factors researches. As a part of human factors practices, 
nuclear power plants are conducting safety assessments such as Periodic Safety Review 
(PSR) and Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) in order to reduce any possibility which 
might cause major accidents or damage. Especially, to reduce the human errors recently not 
only some efforts to eliminate human related causes have been attempted, but also a means 
to widely manage the human errors such as Human Factors Management Program (HFMP) 
has been developed. Therefore, this chapter concerns the properties of complex systems and 
addresses the various practices of human factors. 
Traditionally, approaches to reduce human errors were to classify error types and to 
protect operators from Performance Shaping Factor (PSF). Classification of human errors 
were conducted in previous studies and applied to find cause factors in various ways. 
These analyses of human errors were gradually systematized as a safety reporting system. 
Especially, short-term and long-term countermeasures were attempted to minimize 
possible human errors in a complex system such as aircraft, nuclear power plant. The 
purpose of these countermeasures is to reduce human errors and to improve performance 
of operators and systems at the same time. These countermeasures previously focused  
on satisfaction assessment of Man-Machine Interface (MMI), but these focused on broad 
considerations which are operator related such as safety culture, communication, aptitude 
test, etc. in recent. With regulation, the will of employer and the safety consciousness  
of operators are necessary to manage them efficiently. This chapter concerns various trials 
of reducing human errors and discusses requirements to perform an identification of 
them. 
2. Complex systems 
In general industry, insuring tranquility of individuals and systems is acknowledging a 
prerequisite because that is the first requirement to avoid accidents. Especially, accidents 
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in complex system do not simply lead to worker’s individual disaster or pecuniary 
damage, but create unexpected damage or develop managerial risks or social issues. 
Therefore, when safety requirements are not satisfied in complex systems, the issues can 
bring serious problems in not only individuals and managements but also a longer society 
(Lee, 2006).  
Process industry contributes to society by mass production based on cost-effectiveness 
through large system of high-reliability. However, if an accident occurs in this industry,  
it can be face with rejection rather than contribution because of a great deal of  
damage. 
Recently, various safety-related efforts are being focused on large systems from workplace 
management for preventing individual’s injuries to risk management for maintenance of 
systems, customer protection like Product Liability (PL) law, and preparing an expansion of 
social damage. 
Among these efforts, safety related hardware is improving rapidly with the high-level 
reliability, but safety insurances for preparing human errors are not satisfied relatively. 
Especially, because relative importance of human errors related to accidents increases in 
large systems of high-reliability, it is difficult to determine correctly a direction of effective 
prevention. So, if efforts of accident prevention are effective, we should be more careful of 
which precautions are premised on relatively important considerations related to human 
error. That is, even if process industry is a high-tech industry of high-reliability, if it has not 
enough reliability, it can face unexpected new dimension of social antipathy, in spite of the 
achievement of industrial effect and role.  
Therefore, we have to investigate items which consider improving the efforts for accident 
prevention in complex systems such as nuclear power plants. According to Lee’s study 
(2006), he examined ten empirical reviews related to human error in nuclear fields  
and suggested basic considerations that need to prevent accidents. These reviews  
are misunderstandings about human error and suggestions which be found by trial and 
error; 
1. Human error in an accident occurs by accident 
2. Human error can be captured by the statistics 
3. Human error is to blame to human 
4. Human error can be reduced by enforcements 
5. Human error can be reduced by voluntary efforts 
6. Human error never recurs to the same human 
7. Human error can be prevented by eliminating causes 
8. Performance also means safety 
9. The same cause, the same accident 
10. Keep the basic principles against human errors 
Also, according to the previous studies, accidents related to the complex system’s reliability 
have three major the properties as follows (Lee, 2003; Park et al., 2008); 
1. Dependency and inherence of an accident 
2. Representativeness and latency of an accident 
3. Chaining and structural properties of accidents 
Not only nuclear power plants but other various major industrial accidents have these 
properties. Thus, the properties as stated above have to be considered to improve safety in a 
procedure for an accident analysis. 
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3. Human factors practices in NPPs (Nuclear Power Plants) 
In the following, we introduce human factors practices which include human factors 
assessment and management in NPPs.  
3.1 PSR 
PSRs were adopted in order to guarantee the continued safe operation of nuclear power 
plants. PSRs are focused on considering various aging effects and are generally conducted 
approximately every ten years, and for this, analysis procedures are required such as an 
inspection, structure analysis, failure assessment and a combination of them (IAEA, 2010; 
Ko et al., 2006). 
Through PSRs in Korean NPPs, the status of various human factors in operating NPPs has 
been reviewed by human factors experts and independent operation experts. Many points 
that are not suitable in a human factors sense have been revealed and remedies for these 
have also been discussed between the reviewers and plant personnel (Lee et al., 2004a, 
2004b, 2004c; Lee et al., 2006a, 2006b). 
In the process of PSRs, two different types of responses from plant personnel have been 
identified. One is to encourage our reviews and admit the findings as valuable information 
for upgrading human factors in their plant. Another is to refuse to assist in the reviews and 
to insist that they do not have any human factors problems. 
We will describe here in detail about a PSR of human factors since we think that our PSR 
activities contribute considerably to an enhancement of the human factors in NPPs. 
Our PSR of human factors complies with the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) 
safety guide (IAEA, 2003). The following items are defined in the IAEA guide; 
a. Staffing levels for the operation of a nuclear power plant with due recognition of 
absences, shift working and overtime restrictions 
b. Availability of qualified staff on duty at all times 
c. Policy to maintain the know-how of the plant staff 
d. Systematic and validated staff selection methods (e.g. testing for aptitude, knowledge 
and skills) 
e. Programs for initial training, refresher training and upgrading training, including the 
use of simulators  
f. Training in safety culture, particularly for management staff 
g. Programs for the feedback of operating experience for failures and/or errors in human 
performances that have contributed to safety significant events and of their causes and 
corrective actions and/or safety improvements 
h. Fitness for duty guidelines relating to hours of work, good health and substance 
abuse 
i. Competence requirements for operating, maintenance, technical and managerial staff 
j. Human-machine interface: design of the control room and other work stations; analysis 
of human information requirements and task workload; linkage to PSA and 
deterministic analyses  
k. Style and clarity of procedures. 
These broad areas were grouped into five categories; (1) procedures, (2) Human Machine 
Interface (HMI), (3) human resources, (4) human information requirements and workload, 
and (5) use of experience. The relationship between the five areas and the IAEA assessment 
items is shown in Table 1. 
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Our assessment areas Items defined in IAEA safety guide 
(1) Procedures (k)
(2) HMI (j)
(3) Human resources
(4) human information requirements and workload (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (h), (i) 
(5) Use of experience :
incorporated into (1), (2), and (3) (g) 
Table 1. Relations between our assessment area and the PSR items defined in IAEA safety 
guide (IAEA, 2003) 
For the five assessment areas, the details of these assessments are described as following. 
 
1. Procedures 
Class Detail
a. Check 
Points 
 The availability of the procedures; to evaluate if the plant provides procedures 
that explicitly identify the tasks related to plant safety 
 The appropriateness of the style and structure; to assure that procedures do not 
result in an excessive load to operators and cause them to become confused 
during their task performance 
 The suitability of the detailed elements; to evaluate if the structure and properties 
of the procedures satisfy the requirements in NUREG-0899, NUREG-1358, 
NUREG/CR-1999, other relevant NRC documents, IAEA TECDOC-1058, and 
various plant procedure management and guideline documents
b. Methods 
 Procedural document reviews 
 Interviews with plant personnel 
 On-site reviews 
 Expert panel reviews
c. Scope 
 Operation procedures: EOPs (emergency operation procedures), GOPs (general 
operation procedures), SOPs (system operation procedures), AOPs (abnormal 
operation procedures), and alarm procedures  
 Many departmental procedures 
Table 2. Procedures assessment 
 
2. HMI 
Class Detail 
a. Check 
Points 
 The availability of HMI; to evaluate if all HMI elements are provided as required 
for a performance of the tasks. Comparison between a list of HMI elements made 
from the analyses of the operation procedures and operator interviews and the list 
of HMI elements on the control boards 
 The suitability of HMI; to verify if the HMI properties are suitable for human 
factors guidelines NUREG-0700 or NUREG-0700 Rev. 2 and KINS-G-001 chapter 
18. 
b. Methods 
 The effectiveness of HMI; to assure that HMI supports task performance so that 
operators can achieve the intended task objectives through the HMI. Experiments 
in a plant simulator were performed to evaluate the effectiveness of HMI 
 The suitability of the work environmental conditions; to check by measurement if 
illumination, noise, vibration, etc. on selected spots are within required limits 
c. Scope  MCRs (main control rooms), RSPs (remote shutdown panels), local control panels, SPDS (safety parameter display systems), and main computer systems 
Table 3. HMI assessment 
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3. Human Resource 
Class Detail
a. Check 
Points 
Work Management
 working hour management (e.g. adequate work hour, overtime) 
 shift management (e.g. rules of shift work, shift rotation schedule) 
  job substitute management (e.g. job substitute considering qualification, 
authority, and human factors) 
 work management during an O/H (overhaul) period 
Health Management 
 medical examination (e.g. epidemiology) 
 mental health and alcohol, substance abuse  
 health promotion activity (e.g. musculoskeletal disorders) 
 job satisfaction and devotion 
 health promotion activity 
 staff morale 
Recruit and Qualification 
 recruit (e.g. criteria for recruiting) 
 qualification and requirements for NPP personnel  
 maintaining a specialty of plant personnel  
Training Program 
 execution of SAT (Systematic Approach to Training)  
 assessment of instructors (academic career, job career)  
Safety Culture 
To check if the plants make an effort to enhance the awareness of plant safety through 
education; 
 plan and contents of safety culture education Operator Training using Simulators; 
To check if the plants provide adequate simulator training to operators for them to 
operate the plant safely and manage emergency state well; 
 training program for operators using simulators 
 suitability of simulators (e.g. facility status, maintenance and management status) 
b. Methods 
 document reviews
 structured interviews with plant personnel 
 on-site reviews 
 expert panel reviews
Table 4. Human resource assessment 
 
4. Human Information Requirements and Workloads 
Class Detail
a. Check 
Points 
To determine if explicit task information requirements are satisfied and if a job 
operation by a department, a plant person, and an individual task is appropriate 
b. Methods 
 selection and reviews of a total of 80 departmental procedures
 structured interviews with plant personnel 
 on-site reviews 
 expert panel reviews
c. Scope 
 mental workload related information requirements
 other factors related information requirements 
- personal requirements; expertness, experience, job characteristics, levels 
of knowledge 
- organizational requirements (among individuals or departments) ; work 
orders, training and education factors 
 environmental factors related information requirements (e.g. illumination, noise, 
vibration) 
 Workload (e.g. objective and subjective workload, physiological workload) 
Table 5. Human information requirements and workloads assessment 
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5. Use of Experience 
Class Detail 
a.  Check 
Points 
To review various operational experiences and to incorporate the findings of the 
above elements into human factors 
b. Scope 
 the issues and recommendations raised by the regulatory body 
 operation and maintenance experience 
 trip and event reports 
 human error reports 
 minor deficiency reports, 
 the implementation of the TMI action plan 
 FSAR changes 
Table 6. Assessment for use of experience  
Conclusively, reviews of human factors in NPPs by external experts have revealed many 
human factor problems which have remained hidden. Through PSRs, practical methods to 
assess the factors other than HMIs and the procedures have been established. 
3.2 HFMP (Human Factors Management Program) 
From the results of our PSRs, it has been found that human factors in NPPs need to be 
managed continuously by an organization inside the plant. For this reason, we are 
developing a prototype of the HFMP. We introduce the HFMP here as a proposition for a 
human error management in NPPs. 
It will have a top level general human factors management procedure document, and detail 
documents for practice procedures, checklists, and technical criteria. The top level 
procedural document contains a general procedure and other information such as purpose, 
scope of application, references, definition, responsibility, and basic articles including the 
organization, committee, training and education for the operation of the HFMP. Plant 
personnel who are exclusively in charge of human factors are newly assigned and a 
committee for the HFMP operation is formed in the plant. General HFMP procedure has the 
form of a Plan-Do-Check or Study-Act which is a basic process in a BPM (business process 
management). It describes procedures for planning, execution and operation, assessments, 
reviews by the HFMP committee and decision making. Attachments of detailed procedures 
are provided for the management of individual human factors such as plant procedures, 
work management, qualification, training and education, workload management, HMI, and 
human error management. These items are considered in the HFMP based on the 
requirements for a PSR of human factors in NPPs. HFMP will have a complete form this 
year and many discussions with plant personnel and many cases of a real application will be 
attempted to establish the system. Figure 1 shows a structure of documents which include 
procedures and guides for HFMP.  
4. Human error analysis 
4.1 Human error taxonomy 
When designing installations for safety-related complex systems it is important to be able to 
analyse the effect of human errors on essential tasks. For this reason the sensitivity and 
reliability of these systems to errors must be judged from some kind of EMEA (Error Mode 
and Effect Analysis) based on a classification of types of human error. To be useful also for 
adopting new technology in the HMI, taxonomy through psychological mechanisms is 
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necessary rather than taxonomy derived from behaviouristic classification (Rasmussen, 
1988). However, there is no generally approved and used taxonomy for human errors. 
Taxonomy for human errors is just made for specific purpose. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Construction of HFMP 
Swain (1982) suggested task-based taxonomies which state what happened. These 
taxonomies of human errors are classified as either error of commission or error of omission. 
Error of omission is defined as slip or lapse in performing a task, while error of commission 
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is defined as erroneous action while executing a task. Many studies of human error 
taxonomy focused on symbolic processing models. These approaches are more cognitive in 
their direction, and consider the human as having reference mental models and how things 
work, and how to perform. Rasmussen (1982) suggested SRK model. Reason (1990) 
suggested 4 types of error modes slips, lapses, mistakes and violations. Hollnagel (1993; 
1996) suggested Cognitive Reliability and Error Analysis Method (CREAM) which based on 
a set of principles for cognitive modelling, Simple Model of Cognition (SMoC), Contextual 
Control Model (COCOM).  
4.2 IAD (Industrial Accident Dynamics) 
The dependency and the potentiality of the hazards in a NPP are defined by estimating the 
relative factors of the events using the IAD diagram as shown in Figure 2. 
IAD matrix has usually been applied to the industrial safety domain. This technique is 
arranged as seven accident occurrence stages (background factors, background and 
initiating factors, initiating factors, intermediate factors, immediate factors, near accident, 
and accident) and two management stages (measurable results and countermeasures) for 
the column of a matrix. A row consists of four general classes: (1) machine, material and 
object of work, (2) human, (3) environment, and (4) others (management, supervision, 
education, etc.). In nuclear field study, these factors were modified to make the best use of 
the Frank Bird’s accident theory (lack of control, fundamental factors, immediate factors, 
accident and injury) for ensuring an easiness of analyses. And finally, the IAD matrix 
consisted of the managerial and influencing factors, the fundamental causes and factors, 
unsafe conditions, unsafe actions, accident inducing factors, and the result and loss, as well 
as the 4M (Lee et al., 2007; Hwang et al., 2007; Hwang et al., 2008). 
4.3 HPES 
Human Performance Enhancement System (HPES) developed originally by INPO has 
been used in many countries, including Korea. In the case of our country, the Korean 
utility company modified the original HPES to become K-HPES similar to the J-HPES in 
Japan, which is a Japanese version of HPES and was developed by the Central Research 
Institute of Electric Power Industry (CRIEPI). The development and application of K-
HPES was led by the top management of the Korean utility company in the early 1990s. 
The top management compelled plant personnel to generate K-HPES reports to the pre-
assigned number of cases during the early years of its application. This enforcement 
hindered the advantages of voluntary reporting and brought about adverse effects in the 
use of the system. Workers felt stress by this reporting assignment, additional to their 
normal work, and sometimes reported artificial data, and hesitated to use the reports in 
their work practice. 
Another feature of the initial version of K-HPES that caused its failure was the difficulty of 
plant personnel to produce a report by using K-HPES. It used many cognitive terms that are 
not understandable to plant personnel and required a high level of skill in the analysis of 
human error cases.  
Many revisions have been performed. The system has become more simple and a web-based 
version has been developed (Jung et al., 2006). Also the compulsive attitude of management 
in the operation of K-HPES was mitigated. An analysis and report generation can be done 
with the web-based K-HPES. New K-HPES without the disadvantages that the initial 
version had may help plant personnel to reduce the number of human errors. 
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Fig. 2. Hazard factors using the IAD diagram – case study 
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5. Countermeasures of reducing human error in Korea 
During the period 2004 to 2005, the Nuclear Safety Commission has suggest the importance 
of short and long term countermeasure as trip events of NPPs by human error has grown in 
Korea (KINS, 2006). Thereby, as part of countermeasure of reducing human error, human 
factors and nuclear power experts established a basic plan for reducing human error. These 
long-term countermeasures, the three directions and ten practical tasks have been selected 
and promoted. Also, experts suggested implementation plan for reducing human errors 
based on these practical tasks (Table 7). 
 
Plan Main execution items 
Development of system and program for 
individual job analysis 
- Management of individual job list of departments 
- Personality/aptitude tests and psychology tests 
- Establishment of job fitness 
Task analysis of procedures related in safety - A state-of-the-art review of task analysis methods - Development of task analysis methods 
Improvement of method for EOP (Emergency 
Operating Procedure) presentation  
Grasp and improve communication types 
- Analysis communication types among operators 
- Analysis communication types between operator 
and local 
- Analysis communication types between operator 
and support group 
- Improvement of communication channel and 
offer of communication tool 
Development of teamwork enhancement 
technique 
- Development of teamwork enhancement 
technique and reflection to training 
- Development of teamwork enhancement index 
Simulator construction and application using web 
virtual technology  
Korea human error program development based 
on behaviour 
- FMS (Fundamental Monitoring System), 
examination, human error tracking 
- Compensation for behaviour 
Human factors assessment support 
- MCR environment assessment 
- Human factors review support of automatic 
facility 
Job support system development using mobile  
Table 7. Implementation plan suggested by experts group 
Recently, the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) is developing several 
technologies for human error reduction and suggests plans as countermeasure. The 
following sections are main activities or assessment for human factors management (Lee et 
al., 2011).  
5.1 A suitability evaluation for human resources 
A suitability assessment of department assignment intends to prevent human errors 
through job assignment considering employees’ ability. Also, a purpose of this assessment is 
establishing an effective suitability assessment and developing an application plan in Korea 
NPPs. KAERI utilize the Organizational Personality Type Indicator (OPTI) which is 
developed to identify relationship with validity, immersion and satisfaction, based on 
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relationship and propensity correlation between personality types of individual and 
organization in organization diagnosis, development, personnel administration and 
psychology (O'Reilly et al., 1991; Yoo, 1999). Especially, the assessment guaranteed 
applicative possibility in business for a suitability assessment of department assignment 
through analyzing factors needed preliminary application after investigating relationship 
among propensities of organization, team administrator and individual. 
5.2 A development of job suitability criteria 
A Fitness for Duty (FFD), decision criteria of job suitability in human factors aspects, is 
developed to prevent human errors related in job of employee and improve job efficiency. 
The FFD derived factors which are necessary to manage human resources of employees in 
Korea NPPs using analysis for 10CFR26 (U.S. standard), ILO standard, employee 
characteristic and present state of suitability management. The reduced management factors 
are health diagnosis, mental health, drug management, job stress management, behavior 
observation, fatigue management, employee support and so on.  
5.3 A human error analysis method for digital devices 
In order to introduce advanced digital devices, KAERI analyzed types of human errors 
which occur on processes when user of digital devices use and developed plans which 
evaluate occasion possibility. Even if the digital devices are the same controller, the 
properties of devices can differ with the results through control methods. So, considering 
this point of view, they defined the Interaction Segment (IS) and the Error Segment (ES) 
which combined external physical units and control methods, and derived the types of 
human errors which are possible to rise up superposition of ES. If developed assessment 
applies job analysis, we can derive possible types of human errors and risk factors every 
types. 
5.4 A communication analysis 
Communication can help to harmonize job performance of employees in NPPs, but the 
communication can become causes of creating human errors as well as means of preventing 
human errors. Therefore, various studies which related in communication protocol and 
types between employees and interaction types with interface facilities are necessary in 
order to analyze communication types and improve communication tools. Especially, these 
studies can help to prevent hazard of human errors caused by communication. 
5.5 Human error reduction campaign posters 
The Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power (KHNP) bench marked the excellent foreign nuclear 
power plants and introduced human error prevention tools. The KHNP produced 40 posters 
for human performance improvement as shown in figure 3. The preceding posters which 
KHNP developed in 2006 give a message about specific information related to human errors 
events. However it is not enough to arouse interest in the effectiveness of posters because 
most people are favorably disposed toward a simple poster which has much of illustration. 
Therefore, KAERI developed new types of 30 posters for human error tools as shown in 
figure 4 (Lee, 2009). The developed posters illustrated the HE precursors to express 
effectively the primary intention and to make up for discrepancies in the current posters. 
The error precursors listed in table 8 were compiled from a study of the INPO’s event 
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database as well as reputable sources on human performance, ergonomics, and human 
factors (INPO, 2002). These posters put the accent on worker’s receptiveness than 
notification of information and lay also emphasis on visual characteristics. 
Except for these technologies, the others propel various methods for reducing human 
errors. These contain a teamwork evaluation of Main Control Room (MCR) crews, a 
behavior based safety program, an enhancement of the procedures and a human error 
hazard analysis. 
 
Category HE precursors 
Task Demands Time pressure, High workload, Simultaneous tasks, Repetitive actions, Irrecoverable acts, Interpretation requirements, Unclear goals & responsibilities, Unclear standards 
Work 
Environment 
Distractions/Interruptions, Changes/Departure from routine, Confusing displays, 
Work-arounds instrumentation, Hidden system response, Unexpected equipment 
condition, Lack of alternative indication, Personality conflict 
Individual 
Capabilities 
Unfamiliarity with task, Lack of knowledge, New technique not used before, 
Imprecise communication habits, Lack of proficiency, Indistinct problem-solving 
skills, “Unsafe” attitude for critical tasks 
Human Nature Stress, Habit patterns, Assumptions, Complacency, Mind-set, Inaccurate risk perception, Mental shortcuts (biases) 
Table 8. HE precursors 
 
 
Fig. 3. An example of the preceding posters (Title : Reconfirmation of communication by 
habit) 
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Fig. 4. An example of the developed posters (Title : Unexpected equipment condition) 
6. Discussion 
In this chapter, we introduce various human factors activities for reducing human errors in 
NPPs. Previous human factors activities were focused on regulation according to nuclear 
power laws. But these activities are going to expand an enterprise management as 
mentioned section 4-5 in recent years. The HFMP is an example of representative human 
factors activity in fragments. These management programs are necessary for complex 
systems, because many jobs interfered. That is, NPPs need integrated management systems 
with the parts working in coordination. 
Several technologies and assessments, as mentioned section 5, are developed, and the others 
are going to improve still methods for preventing and reducing human errors. New 
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methods for reducing human errors have to identify and verify application effectiveness in 
on-site. These can help to offer methods to be considered for reducing human error in NPPs 
as well as other fields of industry. 
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Virtual Control Desks for Nuclear Power Plants 
Maurício Alves C. Aghina1,2 et al.* 
1Comissão Nacional de Energia Nuclear, Instituto de Engenharia Nuclear, 
2Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, 
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Brazil 
1. Introduction 
Nuclear power is a very important option that meets the global needs for power generation. 
But nuclear plants’ operation involves high safety requirements, due to all the potential risks 
involved. Nuclear power plants (NPP) must be operated under safety conditions in all 
stages, since its start up, and during all the process. For this reason, control desks and rooms 
must be designed in such a way operators can take all the procedures safely, with a good 
overview of all variable indicators and easy access to actuator controls. Also, operators must 
see alarms indication in a way they can easily identify any abnormal conditions and bring 
the NPP back to normal operation. These matters have been taken into account through the 
years in NPP control desks and rooms design, through ergonomics or human factors 
evaluations, to help design safer NPP control systems (Hollnagel, 1985; Pikaar, 1990; ANSI 
ANS-3.5, 1993; Foley et al., 1998; Feher, 1999). 
Operator training routines used to be carried out in full-scope simulators that resembled 
real control desks with high fidelity. Then, a new concept emerged, using control systems 
simulators based on synoptic windows interface, with NPP dynamics computer-based 
simulation system. These later usually include all the dynamics involved in a NPP 
operation. All variables are affected by operators’ actions in the synoptic windows-based 
interface, with responses to their actions readily presented on screen. Although the high 
fidelity in the NPP dynamics simulations, synoptic windows-based interfaces does not 
resemble much real NPP control desks, since operators have to deal with graphical 
diagrams on computer screens. 
Virtual reality technology help NPP operation simulation, since it enables virtual control 
desks (VCD) prototyping, thus adding to NPP dynamics computer simulation the design of 
control desks with high visual fidelity with real ones. Operators can now take advantage of 
both the online simulation capabilities of NPP dynamics computer-based simulation 
systems, with a more suitable interface such as VCDs, which resemble more closely the real 
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ones. This approach have been under development and upgrading at Instituto de Engenharia 
Nuclear (IEN, Nuclear Engineering Institute) an R&D center of Comissão Nacional de Energia 
Nuclear (CNEN, Brazilian Commission of Nuclear Energy). This R&D enabled dynamic 
simulations and online operator interaction. 
An existing NPP simulator, originally designed with a synoptic windows-based interface, 
was then interconnected with the developed VCD through network, either local or through 
the Internet, by using TCP/IP protocol. First tests were reported earlier (Aghina et al., 2008), 
showing the remote operation of the computer-based NPP dynamics simulator through the 
VCD. 
Our staff has lately made improvements to this VCD, to turn its design an easier task, 
through the use of modules that can be added, deleted or modified. Besides this, new 
interaction modes have been included for an easier interfacing. There is a 3  2 m projection 
screen in one of our Labs, which can be used for the VCD simulation, among other ones. 
With friendlier interaction modes, users can interact with the VCD in front of this projection 
screen without using computer keyboard and mouse. 
One of these new modes makes use of speech recognition-based commands. Also, an 
alternative interaction mode makes use of head tracking, with or without visual markers. 
This Chapter spans many topics related to this R&D, ranging from the VCD development 
and the interfacing with the existing computer-based NPP dynamics simulator, to the new 
interactions modes. Thorough the chapter, related topics will be commented, such as the 
importance of ergonomic evaluations for safe NPP operation. 
2. Nuclear power plant operation 
NPP operation involves high safety requirements, due to the nature of this power source 
itself. Nuclear (fissile) materials must be dealt with very safely to achieve the desired 
objective,  that is, to generate power , through the use of highly efficiency control systems. 
The nuclear fission reactions must be taken in very controlled conditions. 
In NPP, fission takes place by inserting or removing control rods from the NPP core, where 
is the fissile material. The more operators remove the control rods from the core, the higher 
the operating power level. 
In the following, a simplified description of pressurized water reactor (PWR) NPP is given, 
since this is a very common type of NPP currently in operation. PWR NPP resemble much 
thermoelectric power plants, in that water is heated by a power source, to move turbines 
associated with electric generators. The main difference is that nuclear fissile material is 
used as power source, instead of coal or gas. 
A PWR NPP consists basically of three main parts, named: (i) primary, (ii) secondary, and 
(iii) tertiary. But one can consider also the electrical part, to suppy power to transmission 
lines. Fig. 1 illustrates a PWR NPP with its three main parts and the electrical part. 
Primary includes the NPP core, that contains the fissile material and the control rods,  
and also the associated primary circuit,  indicated as “reactor vessel”, in Fig. 1 , where 
water is heated through the nuclear fission reactions. There is a pressurizer, which keeps 
the pressure high enough to prevent water to vaporize above 100 degrees Celsius; this is 
the reason for the term “pressurized” in PWR. In the primary circuit, water  shown in 
red, in Fig. 1 , may have nuclear contamination. Thus, the primary and secondary water 
circuits are completely isolated from each other, to prevent nuclear contamination among 
them. 
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Heat is transfered from the primary to the secondary by a heat exchanger, named steam 
generator, the interface between both isolated circuits. This water in the secondary circuit is 
not kept at high pressure, but vaporizes itself to move the turbines, that are also part of the 
secondary. 
 
 
Fig. 1. PWR NPP simplified diagram1. 
As shown in Fig. 1, there is a containment structure for the nucler plant core, all the primary, 
and the steam generator. It consists, in the plants currently in use, of two containers, in fact, 
an inner container made of steel, resistant to high pressures and to corrosion, and an outer 
container made of concrete. This is an advancement in relation to older nuclear plants where 
only a concrete contaniment structure was used. 
The vapour at the secondary, after moving the turbines, is condensed back to water at the 
condenser, a heat exchanger that is another isolated interface between the secondary and the 
tertiary. The water used for this purpose comes in some cases from a nearby sea or other 
natural water source, by pumps. 
The electrical part after the NPP consists of the electrical generators coupled with the turbines 
axes, and all further devices and systems needed to supply power to the transmission lines, as 
transformers, power back-up and the frequency and phase synchronization controls. 
All these parts,  primary, secondary, tertiary and the electrical part , and related 
equipment, have their associated control subsystems, with all sensors, displays, actuator 
controls and alarm indicators. Operators are given specific tasks in NPP operation, and a 
supervisor must coordinate their actions. They all have to set operational conditions and 
monitor variables and any possible malfunctioning through the displays and alarms 
indicators. Once any abnormal conditions detected, they must identify fast and correctly 
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their cause, and mitigate their effects, bringing the NPP back to normal operational 
conditions. This is carried out through pre-defined procedures that must be followed during 
any incident or accident. 
The following subsections give an overview on some topics related to this R&D, and on 
related R&D run by other groups. 
2.1 Nuclear power plant simulators 
Given the high safety requirements for NPP operation, operators must run very efficient 
training programs. These are usually carried out by using full-scope control desks and 
rooms, which resemble the real ones with high visual fidelity, with associated NPP 
computer-based simulation systems. The former requires the physical construction of 
control desks, similar to the real ones, what involves high costs and time. For this reason, 
only a few of such full-scope simulators are constructed, meaning operator trainees usually 
have to wait for some time to be trained, among other teams, besides to the need of 
travelling to the training site. 
Fig. 2 shows, as an example, a reduced-scale full-scope simulator, in that the developed 
virtual control desk was based. The leftmost module is dedicated to neutron flux 
monitoring, control rods and general alarms. The central (and main) module is dedicated to 
the monitoring and control of nuclear plant’s core, pressurizer, stem generator and turbines, 
among other tasks. The rightmost module is dedicated to the monitoring and control of the 
electrical power generation besides other general alarms. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Reduced-scale full-scope NPP simulator2. 
Computer-based simulators perform numerical simulation of a NPP dynamics,  in general, 
a simplified modelling of its dynamics, online (IAEA-TECDOC 995, 1998). This involves all 
the mathematical models related to neutronics, thermohydraulics, chemical, and other NPP 
dynamical subsystems. It deals also with all input and output variables, the former set by 
operators, and the later monitored by them. 
Through the years, the use of physical full-scope simulators tended to be surpassed by the 
use of synoptic windows-based interfaces, where the NPP control desk is represented 
                                                 
2 This photo was obtained by IEN/CNEN’s staff during a visit to Korea Atomic Energy Research 
Institute. 
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through diagram views in computer screens. This approach is an upgrade relatively to the 
full-scope interfaces, but it lacks the visual fidelity with real control desks, since diagrams 
have quite different appearance, instead. 
2.2 Virtual control desks and rooms 
More recently, a new approach has come to use by some R&D groups, in which computer 
graphics and virtual reality technology are used to simulate control desks and rooms as 
visual interfaces (Drøivoldsmo and Louka, 2002; Nystad and Strand, 2006; Markidis and 
Rizwan-uddin, 2006; Hanes and Naser, 2006). This new approach thus combines both the 
NPP computer based simulator systems functionality with high visual fidelity with real 
control desks and rooms. These virtual interfaces become then virtual prototypes of real 
ones, for operator training or for ergonomics evaluation. 
The fields of ergonomics and human factors have become very important topics in the 
design of control desks and rooms (Hollnagel, 1985; Pikaar, 1990; ANSI ANS-3.5, 1993; Foley 
et al., 1998; Feher, 1999). The relevance of these fields is independent of the end user 
application, either for nuclear plants, or for any other industrial plants, as chemical, 
petrochemical or industrial plants in general. The following explanation concentrates in the 
design of control desks, but it could be applied to control rooms too. 
Ergonomics analyses enable the evaluation of the control desks’ design, relatively to the 
location of displays, actuator controls and alarms indicators, for a safer operation. A 
design which does not consider these factors may turn operation a more difficult and 
unsafe task for personnel, due to possible misallocation of all the above mentioned 
devices in the control desks, so operators may not act properly in the case of incidents or 
accidents. A design that considers these factors takes into account the evaluation of 
operators’ behaviour through many simulations, before a final decision about their 
location. Besides new control desks design, existing ones can be also evaluated and 
modified, to meet ergonomics requirements for safe NPP operation conditions. 
3. IEN’s nuclear power plant simulator 
IEN’s staff had been involved in a computer-based NPP simulator R&D, in a cooperation 
with the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI), and with the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (AIEA). This cooperation resulted in a new laboratory at IEN in 
2003, named Laboratório de Interfaces Homem-Sistema (LABIHS, Human-Systems Interface 
Laboratory), (Carvalho and Obadia, 2002; Santos et al., 2008). This simulator comprises a 
computer-based PWR NPP dynamics simulation system, with synoptic windows-based 
interface, and is used mainly for operator training and ergonomics evaluation. 
Fig. 3 shows a view of the LABIHS simulator room, while Fig. 4 shows its layout. There is 
a projection screen with a window showing an overview of the whole system. One can see 
two operators,  the primary (or reactor) operator and the secondary (or turbine) operator 
, near these projection screens and a supervisor in the back part of the room. There is 
also an instructor, not shown in this figure, who stands at “Simulator Set-up Controls”, 
shown in Fig. 4, that starts operation and may insert malfunctions into the system, which 
operators do not know in advance. One can also notice the use of multiple computer 
screens in front of operators, to minimise the need of switching among different views. 
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Fig. 3. LABIHS simulator room’s view. 
 
 
Fig. 4. LABIHS simulator room’s layout. 
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3.1 Synoptic windows 
Synoptic windows, as already briefly explained in section 2.1, mean the NPP control desk is 
represented through many diagram views on computer screens. This approach consists, 
from a point of view, in an upgrade relatively to the full-scope interfaces, which consisted of 
physical control desks construction. But, from another point of view, this approach lacks the 
visual fidelity with real control desks, since diagrams are used instead. Operator trainees 
have to switch among many windows, to see different parts of the NPP, to monitor variable 
indicators and also alarms. Multiple computer screens reduce this effort,  as can be noticed 
in Fig. 3 , but even so this can be a confusing task, besides the poor appearance, far from 
that of a real control desk (Carvalho et al., 2008). 
Some R&D have been carried out to improve these synoptic windows, following 
recommendations from ergonomic evaluations performed by IEN’s staff, which are detailed 
in the references (Carvalho et al., 2008; Santos et al., 2008; Oliveira et al., 2007). 
Fig. 5 shows a close view of an original synoptic window in a computer screen. 
 
 
Fig. 5. Example synoptic window. 
3.2 Networking 
The LABIHS simulator networking can be represented in the following form (Carvalho et 
al., 2008). There is an interface between the simulator code and the synoptic windows, the 
shared memory. The later keeps updated values of all input and output variables that can be 
accessed by both sides, from the simulator side, or from the synoptic windows one. 
Variables values, as temperature, pressure, flows, among others, are updated periodically as 
simulation runs, and feed the synoptic windows to inform personnel about operation 
conditions. Also, they can modify some other variables through actuator controls, such as 
“close valve A”, “open valve B”, “remove rods”, “insert rods”, and so on. These actions are 
readily input to the simulator code, that in turn updates simulation computation based on 
these new instructions. 
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All the tasks are performed in a local network, in which there is a central computer, 
operated by the instructor and where the simulator also runs, and other terminals operated 
by the trainees. Fig. 6 illustrates the networking scheme used, showing the shared memory 
rule. 
 
 
Fig. 6. The networking scheme used at LABIHS simulator. 
4. IEN’s virtual control desk 
4.1 Visual interface 
Due to the interactive nature of this R&D, the VCD makes use of programming, with the 
OpenGL graphics library, what enabled online operation training and dynamical 
ergonomics evaluation. The VCD developed was based on the reduced-scale full-scope 
physical control desk shown in Fig. 2 (Aghina, 2009). 
OpenGL is a free, public domain, and high performance 3D graphics function library 
written for C/C++ languages. It is dealt with directly by graphics card, setting the computer 
processor free of tasks. It can be defined as interfacing software for graphics hardware. 
There is also an auxiliary library, OpenGL Utility Toolkit (GLUT), for user interaction tasks 
through interface devices such as computer keyboards, mouses, among others. 
The VCD consists of more than five hundred graphic components, belonging to seven 
classes, as plane displays, cylindrical displays, buttons, switches, among others. The VCD 
panel is mapped in discrete Cartesian coordinates, for component location. As inserting text 
boxes in OpenGL is not so easy a task, textures are used instead, by pasting images from the 
real control desk, for the front panel’s background and for the displays and buttons, for a 
more realistic appearance. Fig. 7 shows an overall view of the VCD; compare it with Fig. 2. 
Fig. 8a and 8b show a comparison of partial views of the real and the corresponding virtual 
versions. This partial view corresponds to the leftmost module shown in Fig. 7. Fig. 9 shows 
a close perspective view of the VCD, showing the realistic impression one can have by 
interacting with it. 
 
 
Fig. 7. Overall view of the VCD. 
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a)    b)  
Fig. 8. a) Partial view of the real control desk; b) The corresponding virtual model. 
 
 
Fig. 9. A perspective view of the VCD. 
4.2 Networking 
The VCD now substitutes the former synoptic windows-based interface, and thus must 
communicate with the shared memory, for both reading variable values and feeding the 
simulator with input operator commands (Aghina, 2009; Aghina et al., 2008). This was done 
through networking, using TCP/IP protocol. Therefore, the VCD is able to communicate 
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with the simulator not only through local networks but also remotely, through the Internet. 
Fig. 10 illustrates the new networking scheme adopted. Comparing it with Fig. 6, one can 
see the VCD along with the TCP/IP socket now play the role formerly played by the 
synoptic windows-based interface. 
 
 
Fig. 10. The networking scheme used at LABIHS simulator. 
TCP/IP protocol was chosen because it suited very well in the communication needs for this 
R&D. It enables friendly bi-directional data transmission between two computers, besides 
the versatility to be used locally or remotely through a global medium such as Internet. This 
is very attractive for training, as it avoids unnecessary trainees travelling to the training site 
where the simulator is installed, since the VCD is portable and can be used in the end-user 
site. 
4.3 Interaction modes 
In a first moment, interaction was carried out through usual interaction modes as computer 
keyboard and mouse. But soon our staff planned to develop other friendlier interfaces 
through other mode such as voice, to set user free from keyboard and mouse, and turn user 
interaction with the VCD a more natural task. In IEN’s Labs there is a 3  2 m projection 
screen, where user can visualise different applications in an environment that enables 
immersion, in some sense. It would be very desirable if users could be stood up in front of 
this projection screen, interacting directly with the VCD, free from wired interfaces such as 
the ones cited before. 
First, an automatic speech recognition (ASR) system was developed and implemented (Jorge 
et al., 2010). Lately, other interaction modes were implemented, based on head tracking, 
with and without visual markers. Also, a head-up display was also tested as an alternative 
form of visualisation, besides the projection screen or simply desktop computer screens. 
All interaction modes in use are explained in the following sections. 
4.3.1 Automatic speech recognition 
An ASR system was developed based on well-known signal processing techniques, as cepstral 
analysis (Furui, 1981; Oppenheim and Schafer, 1989) of the spatio-temporal speech signals, and 
neural networks (NN), (Haykin, 1999; Cichocki and Unbehauen, 1993), for the pattern 
recognition stage. The good system’s performance has been demonstrated by tests, and was 
published elsewhere (Jorge et al., 2010). It was first implemented offline, thus partially online 
by using OpenAL library and also OpenGL, for integration with the VCD. But then, it was 
implemented as a self-contained system, for full online operation. Other purpose was to 
perform direct interaction with the operating system (OS), independent of the application, so it 
could be used for any other application in our Labs, besides the VCD. This was achieved by 
using MS Windows Application Programming Interface (API). The computer thus receives the 
spoken command inputs as they were keyboards’ or mouse’s ones. 
Tests were performed, showing also good performance of the system for changing views of 
the VCD through spoken commands, as moving it for left, right, up or down, or zooming it 
in or out, as examples of possible commands. 
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4.3.2 Head tracking 
Head tracking was implemented through two approaches, with and without visual markers, 
as described next. But, independently of using or not markers, the main purpose of head 
tracking is to turn interaction a much more natural task, because an user can turn his or her 
head towards the specific scene location he or she needs to see with more detail. 
Considering the current R&D, some examples might be: (i) one might need to look towards 
the leftmost VCD module (see Fig. 7) to see an alarm or any other indication; he or she needs 
simply to move head to the left, and the image on the projection or computer screen turns to 
that side. (ii) one might need to look in more details a variable indication in a specific 
display; he or she needs simply to approach head towards the screen (projection screen or 
computer screen), and the projected image zooms in. Other examples might easily be 
thought of, for moving to the left, up or down, or for zooming out. 
These tasks can be also executed by spoken commands, as former tests that we performed. 
Of course spoken commands is a more natural interaction mode than using keyboard or 
mouse. But head movement seems a more natural interaction mode than that supplied by 
the developed ASR system, so our staff moved towards this type of interaction too. In fact, 
each interaction mode has its own advantages and disadvantages, as will be discussed later. 
4.3.2.1 Head tracking with markers 
After the acquisition of a head-mounted head-up display, it soon became an alternative for 
visualisation, besides the projection screen and desktop computer screen. Coupling of visual 
markers in this head-mounted display readily enabled the use of an available computer 
code for head pose estimation, with the use of an infrared sensor,  Natural Point’s Trackir5 
, attached to a fixed location in front of user.  
The tracking system with markers does not need to be used with the head-up display, as  
the markers can be fixed in user’s head by other means. But the head-up display can not be 
used with the face tracking system without markers, as will be explained in the following 
section. 
This tracking system makes use of three reflective markers filed at user’s head (in the head-
mounted display or by other means). The pose is estimated based on their positioning, 
through projective geometry computation, by a freeware library, supplied by the same 
company,  Natural Point. This library is OptiTrack, and performs tracking with six degrees 
of freedom. 
This approach has a strong advantage related to accuracy in head pose estimation, due to 
the precise markers position detection by the fixed infrared sensor. The disadvantage, if one 
could mention it, is the need to use the markers at one’s head. 
4.3.2.2 Head tracking without markers 
Another approach is the use of a code for head pose estimation based on tracking some 
points detected in user’s face. This code is a proprietary library named FaceAPI, by Seeing 
Machines. The source code is not available, and the company does not supply any details 
about the tracking methodology used. Thus, it has been used as an executable called by our 
application. It also performs tracking with six degrees of freedom, and operates with either 
webcams or infrared cameras, as described in section 4.3.2.1. 
After some tests, evaluation showed it did not offer good accuracy when user turns his or 
her head to the sides; at twenty degrees to both sides, the estimation of head angle,  its 
pose , sometimes oscillates, making the VCD image on screen to shake for both sides. The 
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advantage is that there is no need to use any markers at one’s head, turning interaction more 
natural. 
This system can not be used with head mounted display, because it comes trained to detect 
faces, and thus any other device in one’s head makes face undetectable by the code. 
4.3.3 Combining the interaction modes 
After many tests with the interaction modes explained above, our staff has noticed each one 
had its own advantages and disadvantages, and thus could be combined, each one used for 
those tasks where it performs better. It results, therefore, in a more complete and friendlier 
interfacing. More specifically, the combination is performed between the ASR and head 
tracking (with or without markers), not between both head tracking approaches. 
The ASR system performs very well when one needs to switch quickly among different 
VCD views, as for example, switching from an overall view, as shown in Fig. 7, to a partial 
view, as shown in Fig. 8a, or to return to a previous view. One has to speak simple 
commands such as “left module” (or simply “left”), “up”, “down”, or “back”, to return to a 
previous view. 
Once switched to the desired view, through the ASR system, the head tracking system 
enables the user to see details in that view, by simply moving head a just bit for each side, 
up or down, to direct sight to a specific part of interest. User can also zoom the view in or 
out by approaching or apparting his or her head just a bit from the VCD image. 
Using head tracking to switch among different views can be not so easy and natural a task, 
because one would have to move not a bit, but a lot, his or her head for both sides, up, 
down, approaching or apparting from screen. 
From another point of view, using speech to move a bit for any position within a VCD 
module’s view would also be not so easy a task, as user would have to speak many times for 
little movements. 
Thus, combining ASR and head tracking results in a more natural interaction for users than 
using each of the modes alone. Table 1 summarises this combination. 
 
 
 Task Switching views Seeing details 
Interaction 
mode 
ASR Applies 
Head tracking  Applies 
Table 1. Interaction modes choice according to the desired task. 
4.3.4 The head-up display 
Tests also indicated the advantages and disadvantages of using the head-up display. It is 
good to remind that using head markers does not mean necessarily using also head-up 
display. The disadvantage, if one could mention it, is the need to use such a device in his or 
her head. 
But there is a strong advantage. When one uses head tracking (with or without visual 
markers), he or she must turn his or her head to the sides, or up, down, as examples, to 
direct sight towards a specific VCD module. But then, he or she must keep head in that 
position to keep looking at that module. This cause discomfort because he or she must direct 
only his or her eyes towards the desired detail, keeping the head turned to the sides, or up 
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or down. Eyes become directed towards the opposite head position, say, head turned to the 
left, and eyes turned to the right side. 
By using the head-up display, when turning head to the desired position, that module’s 
view is projected in the glasses in front of his or her eyes in a frontal angle, so anyone needs 
to direct eyes to the opposite head position. Thus, this is an important factor to be 
considered, if one has to keep interacting with the VCD for a long term. 
5. Concluding remarks and perspectives 
The developed VCD proved to be a very good alternative relatively to the synoptic 
windows-based approach, by aggregating both the high fidelity visual appearance with the 
corresponding real control desk, to the computer-based PWR NPP simulation system’s 
functionality. 
Relatively to the interaction modes, after developing and testing only the ASR system, in a 
first moment, and then the head tracking approaches, it suddenly turned out to be that a 
combination of ASR with head tracking would result in a more natural users’ interaction 
with the VCD. Each interaction mode is used for the tasks it fits best, with ASR performing 
better for switching among different VCD views, or what one could call macro movements; 
head tracking performing better for small movements within a particular VCD module or 
region, or what one could call micro movements. 
Another conclusion was related to users’ better comfort when using the head tracking 
approach with head-up displays, in relation to projection screen or computer screens. But 
the head-up display can only be used with the visual marker approach. 
The matters related to the markerless head tracking closed algorithm could be surpassed in 
the future, by using another methodology available in the literature. 
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1. Introduction  
Nowadays, every manufacturing enterprise, company providing services or transport wants 
to be successful. Its goal is to secure prosperity of business and to achieve it through 
manufacturing or services. The technological processes and equipment are closely linked 
with the industrial risks which have become the object of assessing their decrease on the 
acceptable level and last but not least permanent monitoring of risks from the side of 
enterprises as well as selected bodies of the public administration. Perception and 
awareness of the need to prevent rising the crisis phenomena is for the society as well as 
legal entities or natural persons very important. Overlooking and insufficient attention paid 
to the risks could have negative impacts for all people. An important part of the risk 
assessment process is also inspecting and monitoring the adopted measures in connection 
with the effort to decrease their number. 
As it was mentioned the risks connected with the technical and technological processes can 
be a source of unplanned interruption of the manufacturing processes or can violate 
providing a service and can cause material losses, damage the environment, threaten the 
health and lives of people. They can endanger not only the participating employees but also 
inhabitants from the surroundings and in the case of a leakage of dangerous substances it 
can become the source of violating the nature, the environment and endangering the 
inhabitants for a long-time period, if not forever. In the time period of increasing demands 
on the security of the technological processes the prevention is becoming the dominant idea 
and this article deals just with this area. It characterises the selected areas of prevention of 
industrial accidents which are the basic assumption for securing the safety of the industrial 
processes.  
One of the objectives of this article is to show a possible approach to assessing the risks of the 
industrial processes in the form of structured diagrams. The logical procedure coincides with 
the currently used procedures created on the EU level as well as the national structures. Our 
attention will be aimed at especially at the area of the industrial accidents and the process of 
the risk assessment of the industrial processes in the Slovak Republic.  
The uncertainty and its influence is significant in the process of the risk assessment and it is 
valid especially when assessing the risk from the quantitative point of view. The variance of 
the results is caused especially by different approaches to assessing and presenting the risk. 
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However, an extensive investigation of uncertainty is missing here. In the next part of the 
article I will deal with the influence of the uncertainty in assessing the risks and I will show 
the main sources of its presence. Several investigations have been realised worldwide which 
are to find out the main sources of the uncertainty influence when assessing the risks. 
(Amendola et al., 2002) 
The last part of this article deals with the main cause of rising the industrial accidents, 
namely with people – the human factor.  The human factor operates in an interaction with 
the industrial accidents and plays an important role in their rise; however, it is affected 
also by the consequences of their demonstrations. Here we can mention its three 
positions. The first one is the often analysed position of people as the human error that is 
the main cause of developing the industrial accidents. James Reason (1990) analyses it 
thoroughly in his book “Human Error”. In his next book “Human Contribution” he 
describes also another position of the human factor – the hero who is able to prevent the 
rise of the industrial accidents. It is just the position of the human factor whose causes and 
characteristic features are not investigated in depth and therefore there is the space for 
further research. Last but not least they are the people – the human factor who is affected 
by the rise of the industrial accidents and which puts them to a position of a victim. The 
victims can be the so called direct victims (dead, injured people…) and indirect ones (the 
families of the missing or dead people).  
2. Risk assessment in industrial accident prevention 
The effort of people to achieve higher and higher standard of living reflects in the dynamic 
development of technologies, which are, on the other hand, still more and more complicated 
and can lead to the industrial accidents. The industrial accidents as the explosion in 
Flixborough (1974) or in Seveso (1976) as well as the disaster of the firm Union Carbide in 
Bhopal (1984) or in Chernobyl (1986) as also a whole range of others have shown the failure 
of the technology, its attendance. Due to these failures a great number of people died, or the 
consequences of these accidents caused durable health damage, not to speak about the 
losses of the material values and environment which can be of a long-term character or even 
irreversible.  
The aim of the first part of this chapter is to describe the environment of the industrial 
accidents in the EU and in the Slovak Republic and to show an algorithm for assessing the 
risks through structured diagrams which should be mainly used in Slovak Republic. The 
model created complies with the currently valid legal regulations in the area of prevention 
against industrial accidents and is in balance with the used procedures for practical risk 
assessment in Slovakia as well as the EU. 
Industrial accidents in the context of the EU and the Slovak Republic  
The company SWISS RE works out an annual overview and summary of natural disasters 
and anthropogeneous disasters (man-made disasters) according to selected criteria (see the 
note). For working out an overview I decided to use selected indicators from 1998 to 2008 
and to create the table 1 which depicts an overview of technological disasters in a chosen 
time period and is divided in three groups. The main group is created by the 
anthropogeneous disasters where belong all technological disasters caused by people and 
are designated in the table and the graphs as MMD (man-made disasters). This group 
comprises explosions, fires, air disasters, naval disasters, road and railway disasters, 
collapse of buildings and bridges, mining disasters and terrorism. The anthropogeneous 
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disasters where an explosion or fire arose or their combination create the second group and 
are designated as FED (fire and explosion disasters). There are disasters occurring in the 
industrial plants and warehouses, manufacturing processes working with petrol and gas, 
hotels and other buildings as well as remaining fires and explosions. The last group is 
created by accidents where an explosion, fire or leakage of hazardous substances in the 
industrial environment arose (factories and warehouses) are designated as ID (industrial 
disasters). In the table which is transformed into graphs I depict all three groups from the 
point of view of the overall number of the technological disasters, the number of victims and 
financial losses (million USD) during the time period of 1998 – 2008.  
 
  Number of events     Number of victims Financial losses (mil. USD) 
YEARS MMD FED ID MMD FED ID MMD FED ID 
1998 219 34 19 9788 1445 94 3534 1454 835 
1999 188 36 20 7238 723 189 4140,3 2551 2107,7 
2000 230 34 20 9694 1368 349 3049 1334 773 
2001 204 40 17 10247 921 371 24381 3748 2086 
2002 214 27 14 13066 2111 1562 2130 935 915 
2003 238 36 15 7914 1071 139 2320 1137 905 
2004 216 44 15 7275 1330 47 2889 1713 887 
2005 248 60 31 8935 692 162 5066 4095 2346 
2006 213 42 21 8677 906 185 4043 2110 1722 
2007 193 34 15 6923 611 163 4295 2145 1170 
2008 174 45 24 5618 454 159 7812 5255 2146 
Total 2337 432 211 95375 11632 3420 63659,3 26477 15892,7 
(Source: Swiss Re, 1998 – 2008) 
Note: The company SWISS RE understands a disaster as an event when at least 20 people lose their lives, or the 
total amount of damages represents the sum of 72 million USD or the damages on property exceed 36 million 
USD 
Table 1. Overview of selected anthropogeneous disasters according to number of events, 
number of victims and financial losses   
The table shows that the disasters in the industrial environment create a relatively great 
part of the anthropogeneous disasters especially from the point of view of their number 
and financial losses. Their impacts on the employees and inhabitants from this point of 
view are not negligible which is proved by the numbers of victims in the individual 
categories. The financial losses caused by the largest disasters in the industrial 
environment create a relatively great proportion of the anthropogeneous disasters in the 
individual years.   
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Seveso II directive 
The growth of the number of industrial disasters is the reason why new methods rise or the 
old ones are modified, i.e. the so called systematic procedures are developed which attempt 
to increase the security in the industrial enterprises. An example is the implementation of 
the SEVESO II directive in the framework of the EU as the basic pillar of preventing serious 
industrial disasters in the member states. Forming the directive began after the 
consequences of the large industrial disasters in the 1970s and 1980s when the EU in 1982 
adopted a directive on serious industrial disasters. The EU called this first document 
“SEVESO Directive” – it got its name after the Italian town Seveso where after an explosion 
in a chemical factory dioxin leaked and caused a mass intoxication of the inhabitants. The 
prevention of the serious industrial disasters was later adapted by the Council Directive 
96/82/EC on the control of major-accident hazards involving dangerous substances also 
called “SEVESO II” which is aimed not only at the prevention of large disasters but also at 
reducing their consequences for people and the environment.  
Due to serious industrial disasters (breaking the dam of the sludge bed in the Rumanian 
town Baia Mare which caused intoxicating the river Tisza, the explosion of the 
pyrotechnics factory in the Dutch town Enschede, the explosion in the factory for 
producing fertilisers in the French town Touluse) a requirement for updating this 
directive arose. In 2003 the Council Directive 2003/102/EC was adopted. It formulates the 
environmental objectives of the EU as well as the decisive procedures in adopting 
measures for achieving these goals. The objects of this legal adaptation are specific duties 
of the operators and corresponding bodies concerning the enterprises where the selected 
hazardous chemical substances can be found. These issues are solved from the view of 
supervising the risk management of the possible serious industrial disasters. This law 
concerns companies of heavy chemistry, firms dealing with pressurised gases, equipment 
working with a higher amount of ammonia (firms using refrigerating equipment), 
petrochemical operations, but also companies with a higher supply of oil substances, etc. 
It does not concern the military premises, transport of hazardous substance by pipelines, 
mining activities, garbage dumps, etc.   
EU study in the area of serious industrial disaster prevention  
In 2008 the EU – Vri (The European Virtual Institute for Integrated Risk Management) 
realised a questionnaire study whose aim was to acquire information about the 
transposition of the requirements concerning the SEVESO II Directive in the individual 
member states and its general procedure, practical experience with making use of the 
weaknesses and problems connected with its practical implementation, effectiveness of its 
implementation and the impacts of the directive on the competitiveness of the European 
industry and subsequently to respond to these comments (to improve the directive). The 
target industrial sectors for processing the questionnaire were as follows: production of 
metals, explosives, petrochemistry, pesticides, pharmaceutical industry, basic chemical 
production, plastics and rubber, production of energy and its distribution, food industry 
and beverages. The questionnaire assessment brought conclusions and lessons necessary for 
a partial updating of the directive and preparing new accompanying documents. The 
selected conclusions from the research realised are as follows:  
 the respondents have recognised a possibility to work out next accompanying 
documents in some areas – the area with the highest priority is the analysing and 
assessing the risks (risk assessment), 
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 a problematic area is the non-universality of the approach of the risk assessment, 
insufficient criteria for quantifying the risk and methods, tools and data for 
implementing these procedures, 
 a lot of enterprises work out more a qualitative rather than a quantitative analysis 
which can conceal a higher level of the result uncertainty,  
 the procedure for the risk assessment according to the SEVESO II Directive should be 
harmonised with the legal standards for the given area in the given country. /SALVI, 
O. et al 
Similarly the responsible bodies in the area of serious industrial disaster prevention 
recommend proposing and creating the European database for supporting the risk 
assessment and working out the other documents. There exist some “guaranteed practices” 
for working out the analysis and risk assessment, however, in general it is necessary to 
create a clear and understandable procedure for processing documents and most 
respondents are missing such a document.   
If new accompanying documents are created, the following issued should not be forgotten: 
 the criteria of risk acceptability (impacts and probability), 
 the assessment of the security measure management, 
 the assessment of emergency planning, 
 the calculation of the dangerous events´ consequences (explosion, fire, spreading a toxic 
substance),  
 the methodology taking into account prevention and protecting measures, 
 the methodology for assessing the domino effects. 
The final EU recommendations in the area of the questionnaire assessment head to two 
levels: 
 creating an accompanying document which will deal with what is to be done step by 
step and will explain how the directive requirements are to be interpreted, 
 creating manuals for individual industrial sectors which would specify the environment 
for risk analyses and procedures necessary for its processing (SMEs).    
Existing procedures for risk assessment  
The environment of preventing the industrial disasters in the EU member states is affected 
by obligations which result for them from the membership in the international 
organisations. The individual EU countries implement the directives in their legal guidelines 
and create new procedures for the risk assessment which should contribute to harmonising 
in the area of the industrial disaster prevention.  
There are several procedures for assessing the risks of the industrial processes. Systematic 
procedures, methods and techniques are used. The systematic procedures are structured 
operations which utilise selected methods and techniques in the individual steps. In the 
Slovak Republic the risk assessment also fulfils the requirements of the laws introduced in 
the Figure 1.  
The risk assessment is part of the risk management. Its activity as well as expending 
resources for preventing the rise of serious industrial disasters is often pushed to 
background both by the wide lay public and professionals during a time period when no 
crisis phenomenon arises. However, when any technological disaster occurs, e.g. the 
accident which happened on 27th October 1995 in VSŽ, a.s. Košice – the leakage of CO, on 
2nd March 2007 in Nováky - the explosion of the delaboration hall – both of them in Slovakia, 
then the losses of lives as well as material prove that a lot of tasks in this area are fulfilled 
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only in a formal way, their complex securing from the organisational, personnel, technical as 
well as material point of view is not solved. However, fulfilling these tasks is to be mutually 
harmonised and it is necessary to ensure them on a corresponding level.  
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Selected legal guidelines in the area of preventing the industrial disasters which 
require the risk assessment   
Prevention in risk assessment 
To avoid the industrial disasters, it is necessary to deal with prevention which is part of the 
crisis management model (prevention – preparedness – response – recovery). We utilise 
several procedures in the area of prevention whose main goal is to reduce the probability of 
the rise of the crisis phenomena or their negative impacts. One of these tools or more or less 
idea procedures or philosophy is the risk management, i.e. the process which is utilised not 
only on the microeconomic but also on the macroeconomic and global levels. Its procedures, 
methods and techniques contribute to reducing the probability of rising crisis phenomena 
and reducing their negative impacts which plays a positive role for the object assessed. It is 
implemented in different spheres of the social life and is applied in various forms in the 
practice. A consequent implementation of the risk management requires not only realising a 
thorough identification, analysis and risking assessment, their minimising by suitable 
procedures, but also a regular inspection of the measures realised.   
In the Slovak Republic in the area of risk management the standard STN 01 0380 Risk 
Management is used, however, it has become outdated in several directions and the professional 
circles criticise it. If we wanted to identify the decisive phases of risk management we could 
realise it according to the standard ISO 31 000 Risk Management Guidance Standard. According 
RISK 
ASSESSMENT IN 
INDUSTRIAL 
PROCESSES 
The decree of the Ministry of Environment of the Slovak 
Republic No 489/2002 Coll., which is the basis for 
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to it the process of risk management consists of the parts depicted in the figure 2. The risk 
assessment (outlined by an interrupted line in the figure 2) in this standard includes creating 
linkages, identifying the risk sources, risk analysis and evaluating the risk (risk estimation).  
 
 
Source: ISO 31 000, 2009 – adapted. 
Fig. 2. Risk management according to the standard ISO 31 000 
The individual phases are in the accessible sources, legal norms and regulations, 
methodological manuals frequently introduced in different ways and this fact can cause 
misunderstandings in communication in the given area (a problem is often caused by a 
translation from a foreign language).  
The risk assessment should be based on a systematic identification of the risk sources, on 
detecting what can be damaged, on creating scenarios in the form of trees of knowledge, 
trees of failures, and assessing the probabilities and their consequences. Expressing the risk 
should always comply with the mathematical formulation and represents a product of the 
probability and consequences. The consequences are determined in continuation to the rate 
of the threatened activities through calculations, and the probability either by a qualified 
estimation, or based on the historical experience. Quantitative risk analysis has its unique 
place in determining the level of adequacy of the security measures in the area of industrial 
process security. The quantitative criteria are, from the point of view of the level of 
subjectivity which enters the process, more credible than the qualitative ones.  
Risk assessment is the core of risk management. After its realisation, the corrective measures 
for carrying out the stabilisation of the system and decreasing the risks can be stated. Both 
phases are burdened by subjective as well as objective factors which affect their overall 
result (uncertainty). The objective factors comprise defining the real quantities when 
assessing the risk quantitatively. In practice it is a problem to define the probability and 
consequences of an undesirable phenomenon because often the relevant data required for 
stating the risk is missing.   
Existing procedures, methods and techniques for risk assessment  
Assessing the risks in the industrial processes and their decreasing has a whole range of 
specifics whose recognising and accepting is very important for improving the level of the 
safety of the whole society and its continual progress. There are lots of models and methods 
for assessing the risks, however, most of them use a special terminology and specify the 
same facts in a different way.  
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In Slovak Republic there should be used these types of systematic approaches:  
 PRA (Probabilistic risk analysis)  
 ARAMIS (Accidental Risk Assessment Methodology for Industries) 
 MOSAR and others  
PRA is also called quantitative risk analysis (QRA) or probabilistic safety analysis (PSA) is 
widely applied to many sectors. In many of these areas PRA techniques have been adopted as 
a part of the regulatory framework by relevant authorities (so do in the Slovak Republic). In 
other areas the analysis PRA methodology is increasingly applied to validate claims for safety 
or to demonstrate the need for the further improvement. The trend in all areas is for PRA to 
support tools for management decision making, forming the new area of risk assessment. In 
the Slovak Republic the approach is worked out in the document “Methodological Procedure 
for Risk Assessment of Hazardous Operations and Study of Companies in the Slovak 
Republic” (Ministry of Environment of the Slovak Republic, Bratislava, 2000). The document 
shows the advantages of implementing the PRA (probabilistic risk analysis) compared to other 
methodologies as well as its broad implementation. The usage of induction and deduction 
methods described by it is emphasised.  Next systematic approach is MOSAR which is a 
relatively new, systematic approach for analysing technical and technological risks developed 
in France. It can be used for analysing both a new and existing system. Two of its basic 
modules are known, namely Module A and Module B. The principle consists in realising a 
double analysis. In the first step the macroscopic view is searching for risks created by 
transmitting a danger (the so called risks of proximity) and this is solved by the Module A. In 
the second step the risks of individual sources are analysed, here we make use of the so called 
classical methods of the risk analyses (Module B). In the framework of the first step, i.e. the 
macroscopic view the so called black-boxes are used. The key when we use them is a 
simplified view at the considered system depicted as the black-box. The inputs are entered and 
concrete outputs are picked up. The way from the input to the system to the output from it is 
not determined in a greater detail.  
The European approach ARAMIS is a less utilised method. It serves for the risk assessment in 
the industry and combines the strengths of determinism and acknowledged objective 
regularities. Its aim is to create a unified procedure for the risk assessment in all companies 
which belong to the group which has to fulfil the SEVESO II Directive with the possibility of the 
mutual comparison of the “companies´ danger rate” regardless to the fact to which industrial 
sector they belong. This methodology was optimised for the gas industry, specifically for the 
company NAFTA, a.s. The methodology’s output is to determine the risk rate, suggesting 
suitable measures with a subsequent investment aim of the company in the area of increasing 
the operation security. The systematic procedure ARAMIS is recommended for implementation 
in the Slovak Republic. Currently only few companies in Slovakia use it for working out the risk 
assessment. A thorough depiction of the method is shown in the figure 3.  
The following types of analyses affect the selection of the methods and procedures of the 
risk assessment in an industrial environment: 
 the a priori analysis is based on the phenomenon which is the source of the risk and has 
occurred in the past at least once. The nature of the object assessed, the probable 
behaviour of the phenomenon is known and thus we can a priori forecast its behaviour 
and properties in the future; 
 the a posteriori analysis is used when the analyst has to work with information, 
phenomena and events about which he/she thinks can develop, although they have not 
happened in the past. It means that the risk is estimated based on the assumed 
behaviour of the phenomena which develop after the analysis. 
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Fig. 3. Systematic approach ARAMIS (ARAMIS final user guide) 
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From the point of view of the inputs used and their character we distinguish: 
 the qualitative analysis – is used for the qualitative estimation of the risk of a certain 
event, i.e. non-digital description consisting of identification and description of the risk 
sources, the relative verbal evaluation of the seriousness of the risk sources, 
identification, setting up and describing the accident scenarios; 
 the semi-quantitative analysis – makes use of the semi-quantitative estimation of the risk 
of a certain event, i.e. the category of frequencies and effects and certain levels of 
seriousness are determined both verbally and quantitatively for the scenarios. The risk 
is  stated similarly as in the qualitative risk analysis, however, the category of 
seriousness of the effects and scenario frequency are rendered more precisely; 
 the quantitative analysis – a systematic procedure of numerical quantification of the 
expected number and effects of the potential accidents connected with the equipment or 
operation based on an engineering estimation, assessment and mathematical methods. 
(Paleček et al., 2000)  
The decision about selecting the qualitative, semi-quantitative or quantitative analysis 
depends especially on the depths of the study and the purpose of the analysis realised. 
The approach to the analysis from the point of view of stating the consequences and 
probabilities can be as follows: 
 the deterministic approach – can be used if the problem formulated by one question or 
several questions can be answered clearly and understandably by one answer. The 
analysis itself is connected with a relatively simple determining of the causes, effects 
and impacts (by the relationships among them). We assume in the case of each problem 
it will have one result or one possible solution. It can happen that this approach does 
not result in any solution, i.e. there is no answer to the given question, or it cannot be 
answered. In this case only an approximate result is achieved. The uncertainty is not 
connected with a probabilistic result and is not easily detectable. When the effects 
which can develop are defined correctly we sometimes recognise the probability in the 
form of 100 % of the probabilistic occurrence or 0 % of the probabilistic occurrence (i.e. 
the phenomenon either develops or it does not);  
 the probabilistic approach – is based on an assumption that several possible results of 
one assessed problem (situation) can develop. Probabilistic modelling aims at 
studying several results from the given data. The input data itself for the 
deterministic model cannot be used for a probabilistic study of the same problem. 
The probabilistic approach is currently preferred more. It is also recommended in the 
Slovak Republic for processing the analysis and risk assessment in the area of serious 
industrial accidents. 
Model for assessing risks of industrial processes  
Based on the previous information in the further text I characterise analyses affect the 
selection of the methods and procedures of the risk assessment. The subjects of 
investigating the model for the risk assessment are especially the technological processes 
in the industrial environment utilising hazardous substances. The systematic procedure 
created can form a supporting apparatus for analyses, especially in the SMEs. It is 
similarly usable for the analysis in the process of managing continuity in the operational 
company processes (the business continuity management) whose mission is to ensure the 
operation of all important processes inside the organisation if any unexpected events 
occur.  
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A systematic procedure serves the processors of the risk assessment of the technological 
processes with the presence of a hazardous substance for a better orientation in the given 
area as well as for approximating the fulfilment of the individual phases and will make the 
selection of methods and techniques for their application in the individual steps easier. The 
creation of a logical sequence of the phases and their steps according to which the analyst 
should proceed are emphasised. The phases of the risk assessment can be depicted by a 
simplified model which shows the involvement of the analysts, the responsible manager 
(decision-maker) and the working team to the overall process. The figure 4 shows the basic 
structure of the model of the risk assessment.  
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. Basic structure of the model of risk assessment 
Further text explains the individual phases of the simplified model. As the first one, the 
preparatory phase of the risk assessment is characterised whose realisation is often 
underestimated or is not carried out correctly. The process of the risk assessment is 
implemented in the realisation phase and then the assessment of risk acceptability 
continues. Decreasing the risks is a decision which is realised on the basis of identifying 
unacceptable risks and subsequent work with them.  
Preparatory phase of risk assessment 
The preparatory phase of the risk assessment is followed by its implementation phase. In 
this part the risk analyst and the working group (if the decision is being made the presence 
of a responsible company manager is also necessary) are the most important players. The 
figure 5 depicts preparatory phase of risk assessment. 
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resources and type of the environment investigated as well as on the systematic approach 
used.  
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5. Preparatory phase 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 6. Steps of implementation phase of risk assessment 
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 the negligible (acceptable) level of the risk – it represent a socially acceptable level of the 
risk in which the probability of occurrence of an adverse effect is small, the effects of its 
operation are moderate and the profit from the situation (the real or perceived one) is 
that large that the persons, groups or the whole society is willing to take the risk. It 
means that this level of risk does not require any regulation or other measures for its 
decrease neither from the point of view of people’s health nor the protection of other 
live systems;  
 the unacceptable level of the risk – requires inevitable taking of regulation measures or 
other specific measures for its decrease.  
Every individual as well as every society has own values for the risk acceptability which are 
a compromise in many cases or sometimes a consensus reflecting its real “cultural”, 
technological or operational maturity – in the technical practice often designated as the 
culture of operation. However, the term culture of operation comprises much more than the 
personal and technological security. It involves except for other things also the overall 
philosophy and approach of an individual or society to understanding the needs of the 
society.  
3. Uncertainty in risk assessment 
The second part of book chapter will talk about the uncertainty in risk assessment. It is 
known that results of any risk assessment are inevitably uncertain to some degree. Because 
of inevitable limitations of the risk assessment approach it must be acknowledged that the 
true risks could be higher or lower than estimated. In general, the word ‘uncertainty’ means 
that a number of different values can exist for a quantity, and ‘risk’ means the possibility of 
loss or gain as a result of uncertainties. The uncertainty should be divided into two 
categories: aleatory and epistemic. Aleatory stochastic uncertainty or due to randomness 
should result from bad knowledge of risk figures and their distribution, quantities such a 
failure rates, meteorological conditions at the time of release. Epistemic (reducible) is related 
to incomplete knowledge about phenomena of concern and inadequate matching available 
databases to the case under the assessment.  
Besides, we know also the so called operational uncertainty. When comparing the physical 
models, the experience shows the importance of the human factor, e.g. using the same 
computer code by several specialists can lead to variations. The estimation variability of the 
commonly defined “representatives” of values expressing the risk and complexity of 
dangerous and main/temporary events which were identified by various experts from the 
teams, reflects the types of uncertainty, both operational and epistemic ones.  If the values 
are defined as the “point assessment”, in this case the variability is tied to an aleatory 
uncertainty. A different point assessment can be assumed for the main events or the 
parameters can be selected by an equal division.   
Benchmark studies 
EC´s Joint Research Centre in Ispra and RisØ National Laboratory were coordinators of 
projects that showed the acute presence of uncertainty when carrying out the risk 
assessments and emphasised the resources the uncertainty stems from and also the fact how 
it can decisively affect the final result of the analysis. In the first comparison study 7 teams 
carried out the risk analysis in a chemical factory at an undetermined place in Europe. Their 
results in spite of equal input data mutually differed which was caused especially by 
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utilising different methods and approaches. It was detected in the risk identification phase 
that the scenario assessment by probabilistic and deterministic approach can lead to fully 
different conclusions. The comparison study consisted of five main phases: the 
documentation phase, three working phases and the assessment (enlarging) phase. The 
working phases include the qualitative and quantitative phase – through study of the 
technological process mechanisms through case studies. The uncertainty is in this case 
bound to a lot of components, inspection mechanisms which are used in the technological 
process and interactions between them and the human factor. On the other hand we count 
on an uncertainty which is linked with meteorological and environmental conditions. The 
table 2 shows an example of a difference when stating uncertainties (6th team chose 
deterministic approach).   
 
 
S Team 1 Team 2 Team 3 Team 4 Team 5 Team 7 Size Deviations 
1 79.10  61.10  31, 4.10  79.10  61.10  71, 8.10  7 51, 8.10 1, 4.10   
2 51.10  63.10  51, 4.10  79.10  77, 3.10  74, 6.10  7 57, 3.10 1, 4.10   
3 44, 8.10 64, 8.10  38.10  75.10  75, 4.10  51, 3.10  6 34, 8.10 8.10   
4 61.10  –––––– 64, 6.10  79.10  78.10  61, 8.10  7 68.10 4, 6.10   
5 72, 8.10 81.10  35, 7.10  ––––– 62, 3.10  64, 9.10  10 56, 4.10 5, 7.10   
6 75.10  81.10  84.10  ––––– 85.10  75.10  8 71.10 5.10   
7 76.10  61.10  65.10  79.10  74.10  74.10  7 64.10 6.10   
8 61.10  75.10  61.10  74, 5.10  51, 3.10  74.10  7 54, 5.10 1, 3.10   
9 63.10  73, 4.10  51, 5.10  79.10  62, 2.10  78.10  7 53, 4.10 1, 5.10   
10 62, 4.10 71, 5.10  32, 1.10  62, 7.10  66.10  75.10  7 31, 5.10 2, 1.10   
11 95, 5.10 91, 5.10  71, 2.10  71, 2.10  64, 7.10  71, 4.10  9 61, 5.10 4, 7.10   
Table 2. Probability of „top events“ of the individual 7 teams´ scenarios (Amendola, 2002) 
The whole afore-mentioned procedure of assessing the consequences is full of uncertainties. 
In general we can thus say that there are two types of uncertainties: the uncertainty due to 
an incidental nature of the phenomena and uncertainties due to imperfect knowledge. The 
first type takes into account some phenomena and variables which incidentally change with 
time. The meteorological conditions can be such an example; it is impossible to determine 
with a 100 % certainty to forecast the direction and speed of the wind at a certain place of 
the space and at a certain time in the future, even if we knew exactly the conditions at 
present and in the past as well. The second type considers the lack of information which is 
presents at almost each step of the analysis. Our knowledge of phenomena following an 
unexpected leakage is not perfect and usually is based on empirical rules and observations 
of a limited number of accidents. The input parameters are also uncertain because exact 
conditions of accidents cannot be defined in advance. For an analyst to be able to cope with 
these uncertainties and insufficient knowledge, he/she usually has to state broad 
assumptions and to implement subjective judgement, i.e. an additional source of uncertainty 
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into the whole procedure. The result is then characterised as an output of assessing the 
consequences with the occurrence of a whole range of uncertainties. The analysts and the 
decision-making segment should be aware of these uncertainties connected with the results 
of the risk assessment and to take them into account in the case of the risk-oriented 
decisions. Some uncertainty sources can serve as an example: 
 the meteorological conditions, 
 the conditions in the closed equipment (e.g. pressure, the state of the substance, the 
quantity of the substance in the vessel at the time of damage), 
 the size and dimension of the opening, 
 the proportion of the removed liquid, 
 the drops in the material that leaked, 
 the presence of an initiation resource and the exact initiation time, 
 the behaviour of the flying ruins, 
 the vulnerability of the persons and buildings, etc. (Paleček, 2000)  
One of the methods how the uncertainty can be reduced is the repeating of the calculations 
for all possible combinations of uncertain input values and all possible changes of the used 
models and to assign them the individual uncertainties. However, this results in rising of an 
unbelievable large number of scenarios. In this case we can orient on a few important 
variables, or to choose some representative categories, we pay attention to calculating a 
significant expected frequency, as well as a great number of scenarios can be analysed and 
assessed or in the end the Monte Carlo simulation can be implemented. In the framework of 
the uncertain variables in assessing the risks the main attention should be paid especially to 
the correlation among them.  
 
 
 
 
N- uncertainties, E- error 
Fig. 7. Cumulating  of uncertainties in phases of risk assessment 
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On the figure 7 there is shown gradualness of risk analysis where in each phase there are 
partial uncertainty and partial error increasing to the final N and final E. Each phase is 
characterized by its own uncertainty and errors and input uncertainty and errors from 
previous phase. Finally we need to count not just with results of risk analysis but also 
estimate an uncertainty related to final figure.   
As a part of it, risk assessment is inevitably uncertain to some degree. And there is  
a question how issues of uncertainty are dealt with in existing safety regulations and  
in existing standards for risk analysis and management. I want to point on fact that there is  
a big need to deal with uncertainty and to count with it in risk assessment. Benchmark 
studies could serve as a guide to areas where caution must be taken when performing risk 
analysis. 
4. Human factor influence on accident occurrence and demonstration 
The last part will point out the problem which is very important to talk about. This is also 
the crucial part of crisis events occurrence and arising – the human factor. The aim of this 
part will be to show the human factor and his contribution to crisis events occurrence. The 
human factor will be assessed from two points of view as a hazard component  which cause 
industrial accidents occurrence by errors and human as a hero element whose adaptations 
and compensations have brought troubled systems back from the bring of disaster.  
In the past models of accidents dealing with the causes and relationships of accident rise 
were created. They insubstantially emphasized the human factor, it was only introduced as 
an immediate cause of events leading to an accident. Currently there is an effort to 
understand why and when the human factor affects the rise and development of serious 
accidents (it is the cause or part of accidents). What makes it possible to forecast, to prevent 
accidents as well as to decrease the share of the human factor on the rise and development 
of serious disasters? (Feyer, 2010) 
The analysis of events which occurred and were caused by the human factor is one of the 
methods for creating the preventive measures. According to this method it is possible to 
foresee partially the human behavior in the crisis situations.   
Over the past 50 years has been a dramatic widening of the scope of accidents investigation 
across many different hazardous domains:  
 system and cultural issues (1960s Metal fatigue, Aberfan Inbrox) 
 unsafe acts (errors and violations) (1970s Flixbourgh, Seveso, Tenerife TMI MT Erebus) 
 equipment failures (hardware – software) (1980s Chernobyl Zeebrugge Bhopal 
PiperAlpha Dryden, 1990s Paddington Long Island Alabama Eschede, 2000s Linate 
Uberlingen Columbia). (Holla &Moricova, 2010) 
Chemical incident statistics are very sketchy with respect to root causes and many reported 
incidents do not furnish much detail about the cause. Chemical safety and hazard 
investigation board published in 600K Report that: 
 Among cases where the cause was known, 49% were as a result of mechanical factors,  
39% from human factors and just 2% to weather-related phenomena, 10% causes not 
found, 
 Among cases involving mechanical factors, an overwhelming 97% were attributed to 
general equipment failure; 63% of human factors cases were attributed to human error. 
(Garcia, 2002) 
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The high rate of general equipment failure among reported incidents suggests that 
mechanical integrity/maintenance issues are significant and from the human error that 
training and proper procedures should also be examined.  
There should be introduced instances of accidents which were caused by failing the human 
factor or saving lives by human factor. The first of them is the Chernobyl disaster. An 
industrial accident of exceptional size had a lot of victims that cannot be counted exactly 
(the epidemiological analysis is not available). Various scientific studies assume from 9,000 
to 475, 000 victims. The most frequent conclusions and maybe the most probable values are 
in several tens of thousands (30,000 to 60,000). The 1986 Summary Report on the Post-
Accident Review Meeting on the Chernobyl Accident (INSAG-1) of the International Atomic 
Energy Agency's (IAEA's) International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group accepted the view 
of the Soviet experts that "the accident was caused by a remarkable range of human errors 
and violations of operating rules in combination with specific reactor features which 
compounded and amplified the effects of the errors and led to the reactivity excursion." In 
particular, according to the INSAG-1 report: "The operators deliberately and in violation of 
rules withdrew most control and safety rods from the core and switched off some important 
safety systems."  
Another example of the human factor failure in the environment of the nuclear power 
stations is the disaster Three miles island which happened at 4 am on 28th March 1979 and 
where the second nuclear reactor was partially melted. The operational building was 
contaminated and an extensive leakage of radioactivity to the environment also occurred. 
The investigation commission later designated for the reason of the accident a breakdown of 
the safety valve. The proportion of the human factor was that operators were unable to 
diagnose or respond properly to the unplanned automatic shutdown of the reactor. 
Deficient control room instrumentation and inadequate emergency response training 
proved to be root causes of the accident. 
Last example is connected to another type of accident - nearly accident. As an example we 
can introduce the Apollo 13 programme.  Its objective was the third landing of the human 
crew on the Moon surface, this time in the area of Fra Mauro. The typical sentence: 
“Houston, we’ve had a problem,” says how very close the crew was to a disaster. During 
the flight one of the oxygen tanks exploded and seriously damaged the service module. 
The consequences of this explosion were serious. Not only this situation caused the crew 
did not fulfill the task of this flight but it threatened the lives of the crew members.  The 
Manned Spacecraft Centre (today Lyndon B. Johnson Centre) had to develop with an 
extreme effort emergency scenarios thanks to which they succeeded in transporting the 
crew alive back to the Earth. Hundred of people were involved in the rescue: off – duty 
controllers, astronauts, simulation technicians, contractors’ personnel and many more. But 
this case is only to show how the team effort, and a magnificent display or sheer 
unadulterated professionalism, both in he spacecraft and on the ground brought the crew 
to the Earth alive. (Reason, 2010)  
There is a stark contrast between unsafe acts and these intrepid recoveries. Errors and 
violations are commonplace, banal ever, they are as much as a part of human condition as 
another ordinary human activities. Successful recoveries, on the other hand, are singular 
and remarkable events.  
The human factor in relation to the rise and demonstrations of the industrial accidents can 
play several roles. These roles are as follows: 
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 the human factor as the cause of the rise of the industrial accidents (hazard - human error), 
 the human factor as the recipient of the negative consequences of the industrial 
accidents (victim - negative impact), 
 the human factor as a hero or anticrisis factor (hero - heroic recoveries). 
Human factor as the cause of the rise of industrial accidents 
When the human factor fails, there is a whole chain of small errors which if occurred 
individually they would not have fatal consequences. However, from a certain point on the 
tragedy is unavoidable.  
There are several definitions of the human error. One of them says that the error is an action 
or a decision which was not determined (planned) and which leads to undesirable result. 
Furthermore, the human error defines a certain fact, statement or decision which deviates 
from the standard and the result is an actual or potential unfavourable event.  However, this 
event can but also need not lead to an unfavourable result.  
There are several possible definitions and there are also many ways in which errors can be 
classified. When we are talking about deviations concerning the human error we should 
mention such deviations that could be from upright (trip or stumble), from the current 
intention (slip or lapse), from an appropriate route towards some goal (mistake), or in some 
circles, it could even involve straying from the path of righteousness (sin).Human error 
classification should be done based on possible generic classification based on action: 
omission, intrusions, repetitions, wrong objects, disordering, mistiming, blends etc. 
In the industrial processes there are the following possible causes of errors and failure of the 
human factor: bad reflection of risks of the attendants; errors in communications; 
insufficient or incorrect knowledgeability of the employees, insufficient qualification, 
insufficient experience (lack of training) – practice, personality and health assumptions of 
the employees; failing to keep the working procedure; unsuitable working conditions and 
working environment; inattentiveness (momentary) of the employees and many others. 
(Malý, 2002) 
Human factor as hero (intrepid recoveries) 
Another perspective according to human factor, one that has been relatively little studied in 
its own right is human factor as a hero. This presents a human factor as an element whose 
adaptation and compensation have brought trouble systems back from the brink of disaster 
on a significant number of occasions. We have already presented an example Apollo 13 
where human factor saved several lives of astronaut. Other examples to be mentioned 
concerned to intrepid recoveries are connected to aeroplane crashes for example British 
airways flight 09 from London Heathrow to Aucland then BAC 1 – 11 flight to Malaga and 
many others. 
Reason (2010) presents:” I find the heroic recoveries of much greater interest and in the long 
run, potentially more beneficial to the pursuit of improved safety in dangerous situations 
(operations).” 
Human factor as recipient of negative consequences of industrial disasters 
As already mentioned people are in many cases the reason for rising industrial accidents 
and they also significantly affect their development. However, on the other hand people are 
also affected by them, tangibly by their negative consequences. The accidents affect the 
people – their lives, health, property but also the environment in dependence on the 
concrete form of the accident. The impacts on people can be divided into two groups, 
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namely the impacts on the employees working in the company and impacts on the non-
employees (the general public). The impacts of the industrial disasters on the employees 
according to their levels can be: death of the employee; serious damage of health with 
permanent consequences; serious industrial accident; light industrial accident; dangerous 
event (almost an accident); stress resulting from the situation arisen. (Zanicka Holla et.al, 
2010) 
Several scientific disciplines participate in solving the area of the human factor. They are 
especially disciplines as psychology, ergonomics, physiology, cybernetics, anthropology, 
hygiene, medicine, sociology and others. The human being as part of the working system is 
the most flexible, adaptable and valuable element, however, the most predisposed to making 
errors. An important role of the scientific disciplines which deal with the area of the human 
factor is to solve practical tasks in the real life, to increase the security, effectiveness and work 
comfort.  
There is nothing in the people’s history that would have prepared the human being for 
mastering the environment of the most modern technique, although we have adapted this 
technique to our capabilities and limitations. However, the technique is not sufficiently 
adapted to our psychical properties. In the field of the crisis management the area of the 
human factor is a cross-sectional area and therefore it is necessary to pay it increased 
attention.   
5. Conclusion 
The object of this article was the area of preventing the industrial accidents with an 
emphasis on the process of the industrial processes risk assessment, the influence of 
uncertainty on the results of the realised analysis and last but not least the position of the 
human factor in the process of the rise and operation of the industrial disasters´ effects. In 
Europe for the time being there are discussions concerning the utilisation of the same 
procedures, methods and techniques in the area of preventing the industrial disasters by the 
member states. This unification can bring positives but also negatives. One of the positives is 
the possibility to compare the results among individual companies and in this way to assess 
the level of their danger in the European context; however, this would be only possible in 
the area of serious industrial disasters, i.e. for the companies controlled by the SEVESO II 
Directive. The systematic procedure ARAMIS has been created and it is to serve these 
purposes, however, only a few countries are making use of it. The EU requirement also 
heads to utilising especially the quantitative approaches in regard to reducing the 
uncertainty rate in the analyses.  
A problem could be also the variance of approaches used by individual countries, selecting 
the probabilistic or deterministic approach of stating the risk, the a priori or a posteriori 
approach, the qualitative, semi-qualitative approach. The selection of the procedure 
depends especially on the size of the company assessed, the pre-disposition of the 
employees (the educational and personality one) who carry out these analyses, the financial 
possibilities of the company or institutions and many others.  
In my opinion the common approach which will work on the quantitative calculations can 
be selected only for the so called SEVESO companies which are monitored by the EU and 
have to work out these analyses based on the legal requirements. For other companies (but 
for the SEVESO firms as well) it is possible to state at least a structured approach. The 
structured approach should state how it is to proceed when assessing the risks phase by 
 
Nuclear Power – Control, Reliability and Human Factors 
 
426 
phase and subsequently step by step in the framework of the individual phases. The auditor 
would choose the individual methods based on the criteria for the risk assessment. The 
utilised methods should be, in my opinion, at least semi-quantitative and of course, the 
quantitative methods should be preferred.  
Another challenge for solving this area is to create a risk matrix which would be able to 
compare the quantitative expression of the risk components of several objects (loss of life, 
damaging health, damaging property, and environment). In such a case we would come to 
the issue of calculating the price of the human life by financial means which is today 
considered as non-ethical and impossible by many experts. Another problem is the presence 
of uncertainty in the risk analysis which causes deviations in the analysis results. It is 
necessary to identify the critical places in the analysis for the influence of uncertainty to be 
reduced as much as possible. In the Slovak Republic we are missing the investigation of 
uncertainty and due to this fact research and searching for critical places of uncertainty 
specific for Slovakia due to several differences compared with other countries in this region 
could be realised.  
However, we must not forget that the human factor is the weakest segment in this process. 
According to several investigations and analyses the human factor is the most frequent 
cause of the rise of the industrial disasters. The analysis of the human reliability should 
create an integral part of the risk assessment. It would be suitable to create a methodological 
instruction for processing the analysis of the human factor reliability which is missing in 
Slovakia for the time being. Creating some space for a further investigation in the area of the 
human factor I see especially in researching the specifics of surviving and behaving the 
human factor (personality) in three positions identified.  
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